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Abstract 
 
Fama and French (1995, 1996) argue that the high-minus-low (HML) book-to-
market (B/M) factor in their 1993 three-factor model is a proxy for a distress-risk return 
premium and that the model is consistent with rational pricing. Alternative views are 
that the HML premium is caused by irrational behaviour or market inefficiencies. 
Dichev (1998) finds that high distress-risk firms have low, not high, B/M and earn low 
returns. He also finds a systematic relation between the distress-risk characteristic and 
return, independent of the B/M characteristic. The effect of differences in the 
methodology used by Fama and French (1995) and Dichev (1998) has not been 
examined. In addition, there is no evidence of whether a distress-risk return premium is 
important in describing returns. 
Examination of the characteristics and returns of sorted distress-risk portfolios 
shows that most high distress-risk, positive book-equity NYSE-AMEX firms do have 
high B/M. However, for both the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ, small firms with high 
distress-risk have low B/M ratios. A positive relation between distress-risk and return is 
not found for either NYSE-AMEX or NASDAQ firms. A distress-minus-solvent (DMS) 
return premium constructed using Fama and French (1993) methodology is negative and 
significant. Regression results show that both the HML and the DMS factors are 
important in describing the time-series of returns. However, the HML factor is of only 
marginal importance when examining sorted distress-risk portfolio returns. In addition, 
the HML coefficients are related to the B/M characteristic, rather than distress-risk, 
when both sorted distress-risk and characteristic-balanced portfolio returns are 
examined. 
The combined evidence suggests that HML cannot be interpreted as a return 
premium related to financial distress. However, a systematic relation does exist between 
distress-risk and return. The evidence supports a market inefficiency or irrational  
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behaviour, rather than a risk based explanation of asset returns. Investors pay too much 
for financially distressed firms and subsequently earn low returns.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964), Treynor 
(1961), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), is the foundation of modern asset pricing 
theory. The central implications of the CAPM are that, as market participants are 
assumed to be rational mean-variance optimisers, they hold diversified portfolios and 
only the sensitivity of returns to changes in the return of the market portfolio is priced. 
This sensitivity is referred to as beta. Empirical testing has found the relation between 
beta and return to be much flatter than postulated under the CAPM (Black, Jensen and 
Scholes (1972), Sharpe and Cooper (1972), Blume and Friend (1973), Fama and 
MacBeth (1973)). Alternative models have been proposed, such as the Intertemporal 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) (Merton (1973)) and the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) model (Ross (1976)). Consistent with the CAPM, these models assume 
investors require additional return to compensate for exposure to economic risk. 
However, they incorporate more than one source of risk and assume different 
mechanisms to enforce the risk-return relation.  
Empirically, although the market factor is required to capture the magnitude of 
returns earned by stocks (Chan and Chen (1991), Fama and French (1993)), both 
economic indicators and firm characteristics have been shown to do a better job of 
explaining the cross-sectional properties of return.
1 Fama and French (1992, 1993) 
developed two empirically determined pricing models that did a better job than the 
CAPM of describing returns. The 1992 model is a characteristic model incorporating 
both firm size and the book-equity/market-equity (B/M) ratio. The 1993 model is a 
                                                 
1 See for example Fama and MacBeth (1973), Banz (1981), Rosenberg and Reid (1985), Chen and Roll 
(1986), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994).   
  2
factor model, incorporating the market factor plus two factor mimicking portfolios 
related to size and B/M. This is known as the Fama and French three-factor model. The 
size factor portfolio is referred to as small-minus-big (SMB) and the B/M factor 
portfolio is high B/M-minus-low B/M (HML). Several studies confirm the existence of 
a positive return premium relating to both size and B/M. It is now recommended that the 
Fama and French three-factor model be used when determining the cost of capital 
(Ibbotson (2000)). The model has also become the standard to measure long run 
abnormal returns (Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000)). However, there is no 
agreement as to why the factors are priced and whether the pricing is rational.  
 
1.2 Research problem 
 
Fama and French (1993, 1995) argue that the three-factor model should be 
interpreted as an empirically determined ICAPM or APT model. Risk relating to the risk 
of financial distress is hypothesised as an explanation for both the size premium (Chan 
and Chen (1991)) and the B/M premium (Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996)). In 
contrast, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), LaPorta (1996), LaPorta, 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (2000) argue 
that the observed relation is due to irrational investor behaviour. Consistent with the 
irrational behaviour explanation, Daniel and Titman (1997) show that the importance of 
the HML factor in describing returns relates to the B/M characteristic, not the factor 
premium. Dichev (1998) shows that firms with high distress-risk, on average, have low 
B/M ratios, rather than high B/M ratios, and earn low returns. In addition, behavioural 
models have been developed that are consistent with the empirically observed return 
patterns (Hong and Stein (1999), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001)).  
Fama and French base their assertion that the HML premium is related to 
distress-risk on the finding that high B/M firms have low profitability. In contrast,  
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Dichev (1998) shows that when financial distress is measured using bankruptcy 
prediction models, a monotonic positive relation does not exist between distress-risk 
and either B/M or return. He concludes that it is unlikely that the HML premium 
represents a return for exposure to the risk of financial distress. However, he shows that 
the distress-risk characteristic is important in describing the cross-section of returns and 
does not subsume the role of B/M.  
There were several differences in the methodology used by Dichev (1998) and 
Fama and French (1993, 1995). In addition to the different method used to measure 
distress-risk, Dichev: 1) included firms with negative book-equity, 2) reported equal-
weighted portfolio characteristics and returns, 3) reported separately for firms trading on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) 
and for firms trading on the National Association of Security Dealers Automatic 
Quotations (NASDAQ) market, and 4) used the Fama and French (1992) characteristic 
model and cross-sectional regression to describe returns earned by distress-risk sorted 
portfolios. In contrast, Fama and French: 1) excluded firms with negative book-equity, 
2) reported value-weighted characteristics and returns, 3) reported for a combined 
sample of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms, and 4) used the 1993 three-factor model 
and time-series regression to describe returns earned by size-B/M balanced quintile 
portfolios.
2  
The robustness of Dichev’s conclusions to these differences in methodology has 
not been examined. The bankruptcy prediction literature shows that multivariate 
measures of distress-risk, such as the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models used by 
Dichev, are better predictors of a financial distress event than univariate measures such 
as profitability. Evidence that Dichev’s conclusion is robust to the use of a different 
methodology, in addition to evidence that distress-risk is important in describing return 
                                                 
2 Fama and French (1995) examined the period 1963 to 1991, whilst Dichev (1998) examined the period 
1981 to 1995. The effect of the difference in time period is not examined in the thesis. The extent to 
which the results are period specific is an area for future research, as indicated in section 5.5.  
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in the context of the Fama and French (1993) model, would support the view that the 
HML premium is not a proxy for the risk of financial distress. It would also clarify 
whether a systematic relation exists between the risk of financial distress and return.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
  This thesis examines the relations between distress-risk, B/M and return in 
detail, to determine the effect of changes in methodology on the observed relation 
between distress-risk, B/M and return and to determine whether distress-risk is priced. 
The two overarching research questions addressed are: 
Is the B/M premium, HML, a proxy for a financial distress-risk premium, such 
that the Fama and French three-factor model can be interpreted as consistent 
with rational pricing? 
Does a systematic relation exist between distress-risk and return that is consistent 
with rational pricing? 
  The following research questions are examined to provide evidence regarding 
these issues. Following Dichev (1998), distress-risk is measured using Ohlson’s (1980) 
and Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy prediction models and firms with negative book-equity 
are included in the sample.  
Research question 1: 
Is B/M able to discriminate between firms that will and firms that will not suffer a 
financial distress event? 
Research question 2: 
Are firms with negative book-equity systematically different from firms with positive 
book-equity, such that the reported relation between distress-risk, B/M and return for 
firms with positive book-equity cannot be generalized to apply to all firms?  
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Research question 3: 
What is the relation between distress-risk and B/M when distress-risk is measured using 
bankruptcy prediction models? 
Research question 4: 
What is the relation between distress-risk and return when distress-risk is measured 
using bankruptcy prediction models?  
Research question 5: 
Is the high distress-risk minus low distress-risk return premium positive and 
significant? 
Research question 6: 
Is distress-risk priced and do the Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time 
series of returns earned by sorted distress-risk portfolios? 
Research question 7: 
Is distress-risk priced and do the Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time 
series of returns earned by size, B/M and distress-risk characteristic-balanced 
portfolios? 
Research question 8: 
Are the relations between distress-risk, B/M and return consistent across all firms, 
independent of the exchange the firm is listed on? 
 
1.4 Importance of the research 
 
  The research questions are important from both a theoretical and practical 
perspective. Current financial theory is based on assumptions of perfect capital markets, 
investor rationality and the hypothesis that, on average, a positive return is required to 
compensate for exposure to systematic risk. Fama and French conclude,   
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“Our tests to date do not clearly identify the two consumption-investment state 
variables of special hedging concern to investors that would provide a neat 
interpretation of our results in terms of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM or Ross’s 
(1976) APT. The results of Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama and French (1994, 
1995) suggest that one of the state variables is related to relative distress. But 
this issue is far from closed and multiple competing interpretations of our results 
remain viable” (Fama and French (1996), p82).  
The answers to the research questions posed will provide insight into the validity 
of these competing points of view. Evidence that factors cannot be linked to systematic 
sources of economic risk which drive returns would not be consistent with the 
assumption of rational pricing. Instead, it would support the growing body of literature 
that suggests prices are driven by systematic patterns in investor behaviour and market 
inefficiencies.  
The CAPM is widely used in practice and taught to future practitioners (Haugen 
(1999), Graham and Harvey (2001), Brigham and Ehrhardt (2002)). It is used to 
determine the required rate of return in applications such as capital investment 
decisions, determining lending rates and to evaluate the performance of both 
investments and portfolio managers. In addition, the CAPM is used to adjust returns for 
risk when identifying abnormal sources of return. However, many studies show that the 
market prices other factors in addition to beta. If this is so, all priced factors should be 
included in the constructs used for decision-making purposes. Alternatively, it is argued 
that the CAPM holds and observed anomalies are due to the market proxies used to test 
CAPM not being mean-variance efficient (Roll (1977)). If this is so, and the true market 
portfolio is mean variance efficient but unobservable, then an application that uses the 
available market proxies will suffer from the same problems as those which plague the 
CAPM tests. Thus, an empirical model that correctly describes asset returns may be  
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more useful in practice than a theoretically correct model that uses unobservable inputs. 
If an empirical model is to be used, it is important that the nature of the inputs is 
correctly interpreted and the limitations of empirical models, such as time dependence 
and sensitivity to methodological specification, be understood.  
More recently, the Fama and French three-factor model has been used in 
conjunction with, or as an alternative to the CAPM.
 3 If the required return estimated 
using these models does not correctly reflect the return demanded by the market given 
the nature of the asset being evaluated, decisions based on the estimate are likely to 
result in inefficient resource allocation decisions and sub-optimal levels of productivity. 
In addition, incorrect interpretation of the nature of the HML factor may lead to 
incorrect conclusions in studies examining the factors that drive return. For example, if 
the HML factor does not represent a risk premium, excess returns after adjustment for 
the Fama and French factors cannot be interpreted as abnormal returns after adjustment 
for risk. Therefore, identification of the source of the success of the HML factor will 
allow for correct application and interpretation of the model.  
Furthermore, if the HML factor does not proxy for distress-risk but a systematic 
relation does exist between distress-risk and return, then augmenting the Fama and 
French (1993) model with a factor relating to distress-risk should produce a superior 
estimate of required return. If so, the augmented model would represent an alternative to 
both the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor models.  
 
1.5 Outline of methodology 
 
  Both sorted portfolio and time-series regression methodologies are used to 
answer research questions 1 through 8. Accounting data are sourced from 
                                                 
3 See for example, Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) and Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (2000).   
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COMPUSTAT and return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Data are for the years 1985 through 1994.  
Ohlson’s (1980) and Altman’s (1968) models are first shown to be good 
measures of distress-risk. Then Ohlson’s o-score and Altman’s z-score are used to rank 
firms by distress-risk and to determine a distress-risk return premium to augment the 
Fama and French (1993) model.  
To answer research question 1, firms are first sorted into B/M portfolios and the 
number of firms for which a distress related event occurs is determined for each B/M 
portfolio. Evidence that the majority of firms that suffer a distress event have a high 
B/M ratio would provide preliminary evidence of a positive relation between distress-
risk and B/M. 
Sorted distress-risk decile portfolios are then formed, both with negative book-
equity firms separated from firms with positive book-equity and with them aggregated. 
Research question 2 is answered by determining whether firms with negative book-
equity are mostly allocated to high distress-risk portfolios and whether the average size 
and distress-risk of negative book-equity firms is different from high distress-risk 
positive book-equity firms. Evidence that firms with negative book-equity, on average, 
have high distress-risk and that they are systematically different from high distress-risk 
positive book-equity firms, would support inclusion of negative book-equity firms when 
examining the relation between distress-risk and B/M. 
The B/M properties of sorted distress-risk portfolios at the portfolio formation 
date are examined to answer research question 3 and the return properties are examined 
to answer question 4. To examine the robustness of Dichev’s (1998) finding that a 
positive relation does not exist between distress-risk, B/M and return, both equal- and 
value-weighted properties are examined. The existence of a positive relation when firms  
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with negative book-equity are excluded and/or value-weighting is used, would support 
the Fama and French view that high B/M is a proxy for high distress-risk.  
Examining the change in B/M as distress-risk increases provides further 
information regarding the relation between distress-risk and B/M. A secondary sort is 
performed on firms that are classified as high distress-risk based on their distress-risk 
five years prior portfolio formation. The change in the market-equity, book-equity and 
B/M of these firms over the five years clarifies whether B/M increases or decreases as 
distress-risk increases and how the change in market-equity and book-equity interact. 
Research question 5 is answered by examining returns earned by trading 
strategies long in firms with high distress-risk and short in firms with low distress-risk. 
Equal- and value-weighted returns earned by the sorted distress-risk portfolios are used 
to construct four trading strategies offering different levels of diversification. In 
addition, a size and B/M balanced distress-risk premium is calculated following the 
methodology used by Fama and French (1993) to calculate the SMB and HML premia. 
The characteristic-balanced distress-risk premium is referred to as distressed-minus-
solvent (DMS). A significant positive return premium earned by the trading strategies is 
expected if the HML premium represents a return premium for distress-risk.  
Research questions 6 and 7 are examined using time-series regression. 
Dependent variables are the returns earned by the sorted distress-risk portfolios and the 
returns earned by size, B/M and distress-risk balanced, intersecting quintile portfolios. 
The characteristic-balanced quintile portfolios are formed using the Fama and French 
(1993) methodology. For both sets of regressions, the independent variables are the 
market, SMB and HML factors of the three-factor model, plus the DMS premium 
detailed above. Various combinations of the market factor plus the three other factors 
are tested to examine the ability of the alternative models to describe returns. Evidence 
that HML coefficients are positively related to distress-risk and that DMS has no  
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additional explanatory power once HML is included in the model, would support a 
rational pricing explanation for the success of the Fama and French model. However, 
evidence that the HML coefficients are related to the B/M characteristic, and/or distress-
risk is priced separately to HML would support the view that the HML premium is not 
related to the risk of financial distress. 
In addition to a sample consisting of all firms with required data, two sub-
samples are examined: 1) NYSE and AMEX firms, and 2) NASDAQ firms, when 
answering each of research questions 1 through 6. Following Fama and French (1993), 
only the combined sample is tested in relation to research question 7. Comparison of 
results for the sub-samples is used to address research question 8. This final question 
relates to whether relations are consistent for firms listed on the NYSE-AMEX and 
NASDAQ, as would be expected if markets are efficient and pricing is rational. 
 
1.6 Summary of results 
 
B/M is not found to be a good predictor of financial distress. Firms that suffer a 
distress related event are equally likely to have high, low or negative B/M. The B/M and 
return properties of sorted distress-risk portfolios show that the relation between 
distress-risk and B/M is sensitive to changes in methodology for NYSE-AMEX firms 
but not NASDAQ firms. A positive relation is generally found between distress-risk and 
B/M for most NYSE-AMEX firms. However, small high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX 
firms and NASDAQ firms with high distress-risk have low, not high, B/M values. 
Examination of the change in B/M as distress-risk increases shows that B/M generally 
increases with increasing distress-risk. However, when firms accumulate large losses so 
that book-equity becomes negative, B/M consistently decreases as distress-risk 
increases.   
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The relation between distress-risk and return is generally not sensitive to 
changes in methodology. The hypothesis that a positive relation exists between distress-
risk and return is consistently rejected and the distress-minus-solvent (DMS) premium 
is negative and significant. The high return earned by high B/M firms cannot represent 
compensation for high distress-risk and the negative distress-risk premium cannot be 
interpreted as compensation for risk. A four-factor model, where the Fama and French 
model is augmented with the DMS factor, is superior to other models considered when 
describing the return properties of both sorted distress-risk and characteristic-balanced 
quintile portfolios. Evidence that HML coefficients are related to the B/M characteristic, 
rather than to distress-risk, and that a negative distress-risk premium is priced, is not 
consistent with rational pricing.  
The combined evidence suggests that the HML factor cannot be interpreted as a 
return premium required by investors to compensate for distress-risk. Market value 
decreases and B/M increases as distress-risk increases for the majority of firms, 
consistent with rational pricing. However, market value adjusts slowly to deteriorating 
financial health, especially for small high-distress firms. The result is that these firms 
exhibit low B/M ratios and earn low returns; consequently the distress-risk premium is 
negative. Except for the tiniest of NYSE-AMEX firms, the market does not appear to 
overreact to increased financial distress. Instead, evidence is consistent with market 
inefficiencies inhibiting the downward adjustment of the prices of small high distress-
risk firms, so that they are slow to reflect deteriorating financial health, and/or investor 
behaviour resulting in underreaction to bad news. The effect appears to be more 
pronounced for NASDAQ firms than for NYSE-AMEX firms.  
The four-factor model represents an alternative to the CAPM and the Fama and 
French three-factor model when determining the cost of capital or when identifying 
abnormal returns. However, both the Fama and French and four-factor models should be  
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interpreted as capturing common sources of variation in returns, rather than risk, when 
used for these purposes. 
 
1.7 Limitations  
 
The main limitations of the study relate to the measures of distress-risk, the ten-
year data period, exclusion of finance firms and limitations that are common to all tests 
of the APT and ICAPM using empirically determined factors.  
Bankruptcy prediction models are used in practice and in the literature to 
identify firms with high levels of distress-risk. However, like all models, they measure 
distress-risk with error. Therefore, the tests represent a joint test of the ability of the 
Ohlson and Altman models to rank firms based on relative distress-risk and the relation 
between distress-risk, B/M and return.  
The data spans a ten-year period, 1985 through 1994. This represents the period 
for which data was available at the time of collection, where firms that suffered a 
financial distress-event could be identified across the COMPUSTAT and CRSP 
population. The data period incorporates a complete economic cycle, with a period of 
economic downturn in 1989 through 1991. Expansion of the data period to determine 
the stability of results for longer time frames and for sub-periods is an area for future 
research. 
Firms classified by CRSP as operating within the finance industry are excluded 
from the sample. Ohlson’s and Altman’s models are developed to predict bankruptcy 
for manufacturing and industrial firms, respectively, but not financial firms. Due to the 
large difference in the average ratios of financial firms compared with industrials, these 
models are not suitable to measure the distress-risk of finance firms (Dichev (1998)).  
The time-series regression results are subject to the same limitations common to 
all tests of the APT or ICAPM that use predetermined variables. The market return is  
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measured using a value-weighted proxy, the CRSP NYSE\AMEX\NASDAQ Value-
Weighted Market Index, rather than the true market portfolio. Therefore, when factors 
other than the market factor are found to be successful in describing returns, this cannot 
be interpreted as a rejection of the validity of the CAPM (Roll (1977)). When stocks are 
grouped into portfolios based on empirically motivated attributes, such as size, B/M and 
distress-risk, the grouping approach may spuriously exaggerate the relation between 
portfolio excess returns and the fundamental attributes (Lo and MacKinlay (1990), 
Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003)). In addition, when tests of the APT and ICAPM are 
performed using predetermined variables, tests have a low power to reject a 
misspecified model (Kan and Zhang (1999)). However, Loughran and Ritter (2000) 
argued that the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model has low power to identify 
abnormal returns. This is because: 1) the benchmark model is partly composed of the 
sample, 2) firms are value weighted, whereas misvaluations are more likely to occur for 
small firms than large firms, and 3) time periods are equally weighted, thus decreasing 
the ability of the model to detect time-varying misvaluations. The effects identified by 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Kan and Zhang (1999) and Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003) 
and the effect identified by Loughran and Ritter (2000), will be offsetting and the net 
effect on results is not determined. 
Finally, if distress-risk is found to be separately priced, results presented in the 
thesis will not address the question of why the market does not price financial distress in 
a manner consistent with it being able to be eliminated through diversification. This also 
is an area for future research. 
 
1.8 Outline of Thesis 
 
  The thesis proceeds in the following manner: Chapter 2 overviews the literature 
pertaining to determinants of asset returns, both theoretical and empirical. Literature  
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relating to prediction of financial distress is also briefly reviewed. Different 
interpretations of the Fama and French factors are identified. Research questions and 
related propositions are developed to further investigate areas where disagreement in the 
literature exists. Chapter 3 details and justifies the methodology used to examine these 
research questions. The propositions are expressed as testable hypotheses and the tests 
performed are explained in detail. Chapter 4 presents the results for each hypothesis 
tested and briefly discusses the direct implications for each research question. 
Implications of the results in relation to the current literature are discussed in full in 
Chapter 5. This includes implications relating to the overarching research questions and 
suggestions for further research. Supplementary information is provided in the 
appendices as required.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Development of 
Research Questions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The literature offers a variety of explanations for the observed cross-section of 
stock returns. These explanations can be broadly classified as risk and behavioural 
based. Risk-based explanations include equilibrium models such as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Treynor (1961), Lintner (1965b) and Mossin 
(1966), Merton’s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM), Ross’s 
(1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and multi-factor consumption, production and 
investment based asset pricing models (Breeden (1979), Cochrane (1991), Cochrane 
(1996)). The basic hypothesis behind these models is that return is required to 
compensate investors for incurring systematic sources of risk. The models differ in their 
assumptions relating to the source of systematic risk and the market mechanisms 
enforcing the risk-return relation. Behavioural explanations include aspects of investor 
irrationality such as under/overreaction and models such as those proposed by Hong and 
Stein (1999) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001). In addition, aspects of 
market inefficiency have been shown to result in asset prices being slow to incorporate 
information. 
Empirical evidence that returns could be predicted using firm-specific 
characteristics such as size and the book-to-market ratio (B/M) led Fama and French 
(1993) to develop an empirical three-factor model that incorporates return premiums 
relating to these firm characteristics. This model was shown to capture many of the 
empirical return patterns not captured by the CAPM (Fama and French (1996)). Fama 
and French (1996) argued that their return results were consistent with a three-factor 
version of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM or Ross’s (1976) APT, in which size and B/M were 
proxies for sensitivity to risk factors in returns. In particular, they suggested that the  
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B/M return premium is related to the risk of financial distress (Fama and French 
(1995)). 
Several studies have questioned the risk-based explanation. They have offered 
either behavioural explanations, or suggested the findings were the result of factors such 
as data mining or bias in the data. Other studies have examined the explanation that 
B/M is a proxy for financial distress with conflicting results.  
As detailed in Chapter 1, this thesis provides empirical evidence regarding the 
relation between B/M and the risk of financial distress. It investigates the affect of 
inclusion/exclusions of firms with negative book-equity and the weighting of portfolio 
characteristics and returns on observed relations. A distress factor premium is calculated 
and time series regression is used to determine whether the distress premium is priced 
and whether it is priced separately to the Fama-French high B/M-minus-low B/M 
premium (HML).  
This chapter reviews the literature pertaining to determinants of the cross section 
of asset returns and to financial distress. Markowitz’s (1952) optimal portfolio selection 
forms the basis for the CAPM and its extensions and is reviewed first in section 2.2.1. 
Development of the CAPM, ICAPM and APT models is detailed in sections 2.2.2 
through 2.2.7. Criticisms of the models and their performance are reviewed in sections 
2.3 and 2.4. Evidence relating to the B/M and size effect and other anomalies is 
examined in sections 2.5 and 2.6. This is followed by the development of the Fama and 
French (1993) model in section 2.7. The risk and behavioural explanations of the Fama 
and French findings are reviewed in section 2.8 and sections 2.10 through 2.14, 
including examination of evidence relating to the relation between B/M and the risk of 
financial distress. Research questions and related propositions are developed in section 
2.10, to further explore the validity of competing points of view.  
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Literature relating to the prediction and measurement of financial distress has 
primarily been empirical. Several models, using accounting and market data and a 
variety of methodologies, have been proposed to determine whether a firm would enter 
into a state of financial distress within a given period of time. Alternative models, their 
ability to predict financial distress, methodological issues and alternative definitions of 
financial distress are reviewed in section 2.9. 
 
2.2 Asset pricing models 
 
2.2.1 Markowitz optimal portfolio selection 
  The CAPM and its extensions are based on the portfolio selection model put 
forward by Markowitz (1952). The model is based on the assumptions that the expected 
return and standard deviation of returns from holding an asset are sufficient to describe 
an asset’s return. All investors are assumed to be rational and to be risk-averse, meaning 
they require additional return to compensate them for exposure to additional variability 
of return (risk). Therefore, investors will hold a portfolio of assets that provides the 
optimal risk-return trade-off given their level of risk aversion. All firm-specific risk is 
eliminated through diversification. Only risk that cannot be eliminated through 
diversification remains in portfolios held by investors. Investors are assumed to be able 
to borrow and lend at a fixed risk-free rate and they maximize the risk-return trade-off 
by holding an optimal efficient portfolio of risky assets in combination with the risk-
free asset. They achieve their desired level of risk exposure through adjusting the 
proportions of the optimal risky portfolio and the risk-free asset within their portfolio 
(Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994), Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002)).  
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2.2.2 CAPM 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was originally developed by Sharpe 
(1964) and Treynor (1961),
4 based on Markowitz’s (1952) theory of mean-variance 
efficiency and optimal portfolio selection. The model was extended and clarified by 
Lintner (1965a, 1965b), Mossin (1966), Fama (1968) and Long (1972).
5  
The CAPM is based on several simplifying assumptions. In addition to the 
assumptions of a perfect capital market, investors are assumed to be able to borrow and 
lend at the risk-free rate and have a single-period investment horizon. Investors are also 
assumed to be risk-averse mean-variance optimisers, implying upward sloping utility 
functions. They all possess the same information and analyse it in the same way.
6  
As all investors analyse the same information in the same way, they possess 
homogeneous expectations. Thus, the set of efficient portfolios is the same for all 
investors and the portfolio of risky assets that is perceived to provide the highest reward 
(ie. expected return) to variability ratio will be the same. To obtain their desired level of 
risk, investors will hold this optimal portfolio of risky assets in combination with the 
risk-free asset. This optimal portfolio is known as the market portfolio. The market 
portfolio is mean-variance efficient and is defined to include all traded risky assets 
weighted according to their market value. The investment opportunity set achieved 
through combinations of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset is called the Capital 
Market Line (CML).  
Because all investors hold combinations of the risk-free asset and the market 
portfolio, the risk that is relevant to them is the risk that an asset contributes to their 
diversified portfolio, which is the same as the risk the asset contributes to the market 
portfolio and is called beta (β). Beta is a measure of systematic risk, the risk that cannot 
                                                 
4 The work by Treynor (1961) was unpublished. Sharpe (1964) p 427 acknowledged that Mr. Jack L. 
Treynor had independently developed a model similar in many respects to the one described in Sharpe 
(1964). Reference for Treynor’s paper was provided in Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972).  
5 This sequencing of the development process was from Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972). 
6 For a complete list of these assumptions, refer to Sharpe (1964).   
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be eliminated through diversification. This relation between required rates of return and 
beta describes a straight line known as the Security Market Line (SML).  
The equation of the SML is: 
E(Ri) = rf + (E(rm) - rf ) βi         ( 2 . 1 )  
Where: E(Ri) is the expected return of asset i 
 rf  is the return on the risk-free asset 
 E(rm) is the expected return on the market portfolio 
 βi is the beta of asset i 
and βi = (COV (ri ,rm )) / σM
2 
Where: COV (ri ,rm ) is the covariance of the i th asset with the market portfolio, 
   σM
2 is the variance of the market portfolio. 
(E(rm) - rf ) is the expected market risk premium, the additional return above the risk-
free rate expected by the market for undertaking the market level of risk. Since           
(E(rm) - rf ) and σM
2 are the same for all assets, the COV (ri ,rm ) determines each asset’s 
unique beta and therefore its risk premium. 
Thus, according to the CAPM, an asset’s beta determines the asset’s equilibrium 
price through the SML relationship. The greater the systematic risk of an asset, the 
higher its required level of return and thus the smaller price an investor will be willing 
to pay for a given series of expected cash flows. The risk which relates to a specific firm 
or industry (unsystematic risk) can be eliminated through diversification, so an investor 
does not receive any reward for undertaking unsystematic risk (Tucker, Becker, 
Isimbabi and Ogden (1994), Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002)). 
2.2.3 CAPM with relaxed assumptions 
Because many of the assumptions underlying the derivation of the CAPM are 
unrealistic, alternative forms of the CAPM have been developed. The CAPM has been  
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shown to be robust to relaxing the assumptions one at a time, to conform more closely 
to reality. In some cases relaxation of an assumption did not alter the CAPM 
significantly, while in some other cases it necessitated an extension or alternative form 
of the model (Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994)).  
Of these models, two have been tested extensively in the literature. The zero-
beta model, also known as the two-factor model, of Black (1972) assumes no borrowing 
and lending at the risk-free rate. The Merton (1973) model assumes multiple investment 
periods and is referred to as the Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM).
7 The zero-beta CAPM 
and the ICAPM are outlined in sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5, respectively. 
2.2.4 Zero-beta CAPM (Two-factor model) 
In Black’s (1972) zero-beta CAPM, the assumption that investors can borrow 
and lend at the risk-free rate is replaced with the assumption that investors are able to 
create a minimum variance portfolio that has a zero-beta with the market portfolio. 
Thus, investors will hold the zero-beta portfolio in combination with the market 
portfolio. The SML of the zero-beta CAPM is the same as the SML of the CAPM, 
except the risk-free rate, Rf, is replaced by the return on a zero-beta portfolio, Rz. Thus, 
the zero-beta CAPM has the same linear relationship as the CAPM and the measure of 
systematic risk is the same market portfolio beta. If the zero-beta portfolio has a higher 
return than the risk-free asset, then the SML intercept is higher and the market return 
premium is lower under the zero-beta CAPM compared with the CAPM. The zero-beta 
CAPM short falls are similar to those of the CAPM. In addition, creation of the zero-
beta portfolio relies on the assumption that unlimited short selling is possible. In reality, 
short selling is restricted and investors do not have access to funds obtained from short 
selling (Fama (1976)).  
                                                 
7 Inter-temporal models have also been developed by Lucas (1978), Ross (1978), Harrison and Krepps 
(1979), Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985a) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985b). However, Fama and 
French interpret the (1993) three-factor model as an empirical version of Merton’s (1973) model. 
Therefore, Merton’s ICAPM is reviewed here.   
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2.2.5 Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The CAPM assumes investors have a single period investment horizon. Merton 
(1971, 1972, 1973) developed an Intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) that allows for the 
investment opportunity set to change over time. The model retains the standard 
assumptions of a perfect capital market. In addition, investors know at each point in 
time the stochastic processes of the changes of the investment opportunity set and 
trading takes place continually over time. Merton showed that when the changing 
investment opportunity set is captured by a single state variable, a three-fund separation 
theorem applies and a three-factor multi-beta CAPM model describes expected returns 
in equilibrium. 
Richard (1979) developed a generalized version of the ICAPM, where k state 
variables are required to capture the investment opportunity set. In this generalized 
ICAPM, there are k+2 funds, instead of three and the ICAPM equation generalizes to:  
E(Ri) = rf + [E(rm) - rf ] βmi + [E(rs1) - rf ] βs1i + ……. + [E(rsk) - rf ] βski     (2.2) 
Where: E(rsj) is the expected return on asset j representing the jth state variable 
βsji is the beta of asset i associated with changes in the state variable j. 
As optimal diversification is assumed, the state variables are essentially market-
wide and influence the returns of all assets in the market. There is currently no 
agreement as to the nature of the state variables. Various studies have investigated the 
relation between returns and a range of economic factors. These studies are often 
undertaken in the context of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) and are discussed in 
section 2.4. However, the empirical and practical implications of the ICAPM and the 
APT are virtually the same (Sharpe (1984), Shanken (1985a), Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986)). Therefore, these tests also relate to the ICAPM.   
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2.2.6 Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (Ross (1976)) differs from the CAPM and its 
extensions, as the APT relies on the Law of One Price, rather than mean-variance 
efficiency, to determine the relation between risk and expected return. According to the 
APT, assets (or portfolios of assets) with the same sensitivity to common risk factors 
will sell for the same price and thus offer the same returns.  
The APT assumes that there are k systematic factors common to all assets that 
are mainly responsible for the movements in the prices of all assets.
8 The resulting 
pricing relation expresses the expected return on an asset i in a linear relationship with 
the k-factor risks as follows: 
E(ri) = λ0 + βi1 λ1 + βi2 λ2 + ….. + βik λk        (2.3) 
Where: λ0 is either the risk-free rate, or the return on a zero-beta asset or zero-beta 
portfolio  
λj is the risk premium required by investors per unit of the risk due to factor j  
βij is the sensitivity of asset i to risk factor j.     
The βijs (factor loadings or factor coefficients) are proportional to the covariance 
of the asset’s return with the corresponding risk factors. If a portfolio is sensitive to a 
single risk factor and the portfolio has unit sensitivity to that particular risk factor, the 
portfolio is called a pure factor or factor-mimicking portfolio. Thus, the λj s can be 
expressed in terms of the excess return above the risk-free rate (or the zero-beta rate) on 
a pure factor portfolio (Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994)). Thus, equation 2.3 
can be expressed as:  
E(ri) = λ0 + βi1[E(rp1) - λ0 ] + βi2 [E(rp2) - λ0 ] + ….. + βik [E(rpk) - λ0 ]     (2.4) 
Where: E(rpj) is the expected return on the pure factor portfolio with unit sensitivity to 
risk factor j. 
                                                 
8 For additional assumptions, refer to Ross (1976).   
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  All other variables are as defined for equation 2.3 (Ross (1976)).  
The systematic risk factors are expected to relate to fundamental economic 
factors such as economic activity, interest rates and inflation, which have economy wide 
effects on all assets or firms to varying degrees. However the APT does not address the 
question of how many factors there are, what the factors are, or the size or sign of the 
return premiums (Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994)).  
2.2.7 The relation between APT, ICAPM and CAPM 
When one of the pure factor portfolios is the market portfolio, then the APT, 
equation 2.4, is essentially the same as the ICAPM, equation 2.2. However, the two 
models are derived from different assumptions. Ross (1976) argued that one of the 
strengths of the APT is that it does not require the stringent homogeneity of 
anticipations of the CAPM and the ICAPM. As the APT relations rely on arbitrage 
principals, only a small number of investors are required to take large positions to take 
advantage of arbitrage profits for the APT relations to hold (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 
(2002)). Even if all investors agree with the return generating process, they may 
disagree on the probability distributions of the risk factors without violating the basic 
arbitrage condition, equation 2.4 (Ross (1976)).  
In the special case of a single arbitrage portfolio of interest to investors that is 
the market portfolio, the APT is the same as the original CAPM, or Black’s zero-beta 
CAPM.  
Expected return on asset i is given by  
E(ri) = λ0 + βi1 λ1            ( 2 . 5 )  
Where: λ0 = Rf or Rz  
 λ1 = (Rm – Rf), or (Rm – Rz) 
The difference between this special case of the APT and the CAPM is that the 
CAPM only holds when the market is in equilibrium. However, the APT relation will  
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hold “in all but the most profound sort of disequilibria. [and] … the market portfolio 
plays no special role” (Ross (1976) p343). In addition, when the model is derived using 
the APT, there is no requirement for the market portfolio to be mean-variance efficient. 
The market portfolio may be a market index such as the S&P 500, if it is considered that 
movements in the S&P 500 reflect unexpected changes in any systematic factors that 
influence asset returns (Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi and Ogden (1994)). 
 
2.3 Empirical testing of the CAPM and the zero-beta CAPM  
 
The CAPM provided the first theoretical framework to identify the relation 
between risk relevant to investors, (ie. systematic risk) and return for individual assets. 
Many studies have tested how well the CAPM explains stock returns, as well as the 
returns on other financial assets such as debt securities. The principal empirically 
testable predictions of the CAPM include: 
•  The expected return on the asset or portfolio is positively related to the beta of the 
asset or portfolio and the cross-sectional relation between expected return and beta 
is linear (as represented by the SML). 
•  Beta is the only measure of risk that is priced by the market. Thus, unsystematic risk 
and other characteristics, such as the size or B/M of a firm, are unrelated to expected 
returns once the beta is controlled. 
•  The intercept of the estimated SML is the risk-free rate (Tucker, Becker, Isimbabi 
and Ogden (1994) p267). 
The first two points also represent testable implications of the zero-beta CAPM. 
The intercept of the zero-beta CAPM, representing the return on a zero-beta portfolio, is 
expected to be greater than the risk-free rate. The different implications regarding the 
size of the intercept has been used to differentiate whether the CAPM or the zero-beta 
CAPM best fits the empirical data. Except for the implication regarding the size of the  
  25
intercept, the following discussion regarding tests of the CAPM also applies to the zero-
beta CAPM. 
2.3.1 The Market model 
The CAPM is an ex-ante model. Most tests utilize realized returns and are, 
therefore,  ex-post. The “market model” represents a testable ex-post version of the 
CAPM. 
The market model can be expressed in the form of a regression equation: 
Rit =αi+ βi Rmt + eit             (2.6) 
Where Rit is the excess return on asset i at time t 
Rmt is the excess return on the market portfolio at time t 
If asset returns only vary with market risk, then the intercept αi will be zero. 
Thus, a direct test of the model can be obtained by estimating 2.6 for a security over 
some time period and testing to see if αi is significantly different from zero (Black, 
Jensen and Scholes (1972)).  
When the market model is used to test the validity of the CAPM, three 
assumptions are made: 
1.  the market model holds in each period, 
2.  the CAPM holds in every period, and 
3.   the beta is stable over time (Elton and Gruber (1995)).
9  
2.3.2 Regression methodology 
Both cross-sectional regression (CSR) and time-series regression (TSR) have 
been used when empirically testing the CAPM. The cross-sectional test typically 
follows a two-pass methodology. A first-pass time-series regression is used to estimate 
the beta (sensitivity of the stock’s return to the return of the market proxy). The beta 
                                                 
9 The assumption that beta is stationary is not required to obtain the CAPM, but it is required to test it 
Fama (1976).  
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estimate is then used as the independent variable, or one of the independent variables, in 
the second-pass cross-sectional regression. The time-series test typically uses asset 
characteristics or factor premia as the independent variables. If the CAPM is well 
specified, using CSR the coefficient of beta should equal the market return premium and 
using TSR the coefficient of the market return premium, (Rm – Rf), should show 
significant variation across assets. Under both methodologies the intercept should be 
equal to the risk-free rate, or equal to zero if the CAPM is expressed in excess return 
format.  
There are several problems with tests of the CAPM. The CAPM is an ex-ante 
model but is tested using an ex-post model. In any individual period the expected 
relation between beta and return may be described by the CAPM, but the observed ex-
post relation can have a negative slope or intercept (Harrington (1987)). As the CAPM 
relies on the assumption of efficient markets, any test of the CAPM is a joint test of 
both the CAPM and efficient market hypothesis (Keim and Ziemba (2000)). Statistical 
issues and the true market portfolio not being observable lead to problems with the 
testability of the CAPM (Roll (1977)). These issues are examined in more detail in 
sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4. 
2.3.3 Early tests of the CAPM and the zero-beta CAPM 
Most early empirical tests of the CAPM used New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) data and supported the hypothesis of a positive linear relation between beta and 
returns. There was mixed evidence relating to whether unsystematic risk was priced. 
However, the slope of the empirical SML was generally found to be flatter than 
predicted by CAPM and the intercept was greater than the risk-free rate. This was 
interpreted as implying that the empirical SML better reflected the zero-beta CAPM 
than the original CAPM. A summary of some of these studies follows.  
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The earliest tests of the CAPM by Lintner (1965a) and Douglas (1969) provided 
evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that investors attempt to hold efficient 
portfolios. However, Miller and Scholes (1972) showed that the methodology used in 
these studies could lead to the results reported, even if there were no systematic effects 
of non-beta risk. The major problems with the methodology related to; 1) skewness of 
the return data, and 2) beta being measured with error in first pass regressions, then used 
as an independent variable in the second pass regressions. The second problem is known 
as errors-in-variables (EIV). 
Subsequent studies used alternative methodologies designed to minimize or 
avoid these problems. However, the findings still did not fully support the CAPM. 
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and Blume and Friend (1973) utilized both CSR and 
TSR, whilst Sharpe and Cooper (1972) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) utilized CRS.
10 
The methodologies used in these studies are discussed first, followed by the findings.  
All of the studies used equal-weighted monthly returns
11 and adapted a portfolio 
approach. The portfolio approach eliminates the positive skewness found in the return 
of individual stocks (Fama and MacBeth (1973), Simkowitz and Beedles (1978)). When 
errors in estimated stock betas are substantially less than perfectly positively correlated, 
portfolios also minimize the EIV problem (Blume (1970)). The problem with the 
portfolio approach is that individual variations from the asset pricing relation might 
cancel out in the portfolios and escape detection (Roll (1979)). 
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Sharpe and Cooper (1972), Blume and Friend 
(1973) and Fama and MacBeth (1973) assigned stocks to portfolios based on their beta. 
Ranking beta was calculated using data from five years prior to the ranking period. For 
                                                 
10 Data used was for the period: 1926 – 1966 (Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972)), 1931 – 1967 (Sharpe 
and Cooper (1972)), 1950 – 1968 (Blume and Friend (1973)) and 1926 – 1968 (Fama and MacBeth 
(1973)).  
11 Blume and Friend (1973) also tested value-weighted portfolio returns and reported similar results.  
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the CSR, portfolio beta was then calculated using current data to test the CAPM.
12 This 
approach is often referred to as the Fama and MacBeth methodology.  
Turning next to the findings of these studies, the TSR results of Black, Jensen 
and Scholes (1972) showed that higher beta portfolios provided higher expected returns, 
supporting the CAPM prediction that expected returns increase linearly with beta. 
However, high-beta portfolios tended to have negative excess returns and low-beta 
portfolios had positive excess returns. Blume and Friend (1973) replicated the TSR of 
Black Jensen and Scholes and arrived at similar results. 
Consistent with the Black Jensen and Scholes TSR results, the CSR of Sharpe 
and Cooper (1972), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Blume and Friend (1973) and 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) showed that average portfolio returns were positively 
linearly related to their average betas and the relation was nearly perfectly monotonic. 
However, the slope of the regression was less than (Rm – Rf) and the intercept of the 
regression was considerably in excess of the average risk-free rate. In addition, Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) found no relation between total risk and return in the overall 
period. The size and variability of the intercept was interpreted as being consistent with 
the zero-beta CAPM, rather than the CAPM (Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama 
and MacBeth (1973)).  
Subsequent evidence provided by Fama and French (1992) suggested the 
findings of these studies might have been period specific. They found that a significant 
relation between beta and return only existed in the 1941 to 1965 period, a major part of 
the sample for these early studies. Even for this period, the relation between beta and 
average return disappeared after controlling for size. Section 2.5 provides a discussion 
of the size effect. 
                                                 
12 This reduced the regression phenomenon that occurs when current data is used to measure ranking beta. 
With current data, securities entering the high-beta portfolio tend to have positive measurement errors in 
their βit, introducing a positive bias in the portfolio beta. The opposite occurs for the lowest beta portfolio 
(Fama (1976)).   
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2.3.4 Efficiency of the market portfolio proxy  
One of the major problems of tests of the CAPM is measurement of the market 
risk premium. It is impossible to measure the return on the true market portfolio, as it 
contains all tradable assets. The majority of empirical studies use an equity index as a 
market proxy. As equities are comparatively risky, it is unlikely that an equity index sits 
on the efficient frontier and therefore, unlikely it represents a mean-variance efficient 
portfolio. In particular, many early studies used the CRSP equal-weighted index of 
NYSE stocks as the market proxy. This index was found to be inefficient (Gibbons 
(1982), Shanken (1985b)) and not a particularly good proxy for the true value-weighted 
market portfolio (Roll (1977), Tinic and West (1986)). A value-weighted equity index 
appears to be more consistent with the true market portfolio. However, Kothari, 
Shanken and Sloan (1995) argued that whether the value- or equal-weighted index is a 
better proxy for the true market portfolio depends on whether the returns on assets other 
than stocks are more closely related to small or large firm returns.  
Conclusions reached from empirical studies are not necessarily sensitive to the 
alternative return weightings or incorporating other assets into the index. Stoll and 
Whaley (1983), Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985), Fama and French (1988b), Jegadeesh 
(1990) and Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995) found their conclusions were robust to 
using either an equal-weighted or a value-weighted equity index. In contrast, Tinic and 
West (1986), Chan and Chen (1988) and Ritter and Chopra (1989) reported that their 
tests were sensitive to the index weighting. In addition, Miller and Scholes (1972) and 
Stambaugh (1982) found that conclusions regarding CAPM were not sensitive to 
whether equities and bonds or just equities were included in the index.  
Roll (1977) argued that the single testable hypothesis associated with the zero-
beta CAPM is that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient. All other 
implications of the model follow from the market portfolio efficiency and are not  
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independently testable. As the market portfolio cannot be observed, the model is not 
testable. Roll showed that the linearity found between beta and returns could be 
obtained no matter how stocks were priced in relation to risk in the real world, as long 
as the market proxy used in the test was mean-variance efficient. Also, even if the 
CAPM held, finding an intercept greater than the risk-free rate was possible, if the 
market proxy used was mean-variance efficient, but significantly different from the true 
market portfolio. This was true even if the market proxy was highly correlated with the 
true market portfolio. Roll (1977) concluded that there had been no unambiguous test of 
CAPM. Studies by Haugen (1993), Roll and Ross (1994), Kandel and Stambaugh 
(1995) and Grauer (1999) have supported Roll’s argument. In contrast, Shanken (1987) 
and Tiemann (1988) concluded that tests incorporating a market proxy could provide 
evidence regarding the validity of the CAPM. However, some of the assumptions made 
in these studies are difficult to estimate in practice (Haugen (1993)).  
Stambaugh (1982) accepted Roll’s argument that different market proxies could 
lead to different implications regarding the validity of CAPM. However, he argued that 
the empirical question is whether such a reversal occurs with indexes that approximate 
returns on portfolios of aggregate wealth. He showed that even when common stocks 
represented only 10% of the index market value, inferences about CAPM were found to 
be the same as those obtained with a stock-only index. Results were inconsistent with 
CAPM, but consistent with the zero-beta CAPM. Note however, that Stamaugh’s results 
were consistent with those described by Roll (1977).  
 
2.4 Empirical  tests  of  the APT and the ICAPM 
 
Neither the APT nor the ICAPM specify the number or nature of the risk factors 
that determine market prices. Therefore, much of the empirical investigation relating to 
these models has centered on these two issues. The majority of the studies have been  
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carried out in the context of the APT. However, as both models had the same empirical 
implications, the studies also applied to the ICAPM (Sharpe (1984), Shanken (1985a), 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986)). As the true market portfolio was not used in these tests, a 
test that supported multiple factors could not be interpreted as a clear rejection of the 
CAPM. 
Empirical researchers have used two major approaches to determine the nature 
and number of risk factors: 
•  Factor analysis (FA) and principal component analysis (PCA) have been used to 
extract factors from historical returns. 
•  Regression analysis was used to determine whether a set of economic and financial 
factors that represent pervasive sources of risk described returns in a manner 
consistent with the model. 
Empirical tests have found some combinations of variables to be consistent with 
the APT and multi-factor pricing models in general. However, no specific set of factors 
has been determined to be the set that consistently explains cross-sectional variations in 
expected returns. All of these studies represented joint tests of the asset pricing relation 
and either the technique used to extract factors or the economic factors chosen. 
2.4.1 Is the APT empirically testable? 
  As the APT is based on the no arbitrage condition, which should hold for any 
subset of securities, it is not necessary to identify all risky assets or a market portfolio to 
test the model. The APT equation is used directly in empirical tests, as it describes both 
the ex-ante individual perceptions of the return process and the ex-post returns (Roll and 
Ross (1980)). However, there are other issues that affect the testability of the APT. In 
particular, there are many factor structures corresponding to equivalent sets of securities 
and the APT does not provide a criterion for singling out one structure as the ‘relevant 
one’ (Shanken (1982)). Also, Fama (1998a) showed that when factors and state  
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variables are unidentified, it is impossible to determine the number of priced factors and 
Kan and Zhang (1999) showed that, if the state variables are unidentified or chosen 
based on economic intuition, the model may be misspecified and the factor(s) may be 
useless. Where a model is misspecified, the hypothesis that the risk premium for the 
useless factor is zero will only be rejected with a low probability.  
2.4.2 Factor analysis and principal component analysis. 
Both factor analysis and principal component analysis have been used to 
determine common factors important for pricing. Roll and Ross (1980) used factor 
analysis to examine the number and importance of common factors in daily stock 
returns. The factor model suggested the maximum reasonable number of factors was 
five. They concluded that the evidence generally supported the APT. Subsequent studies 
using both factor analysis and principal component analysis reported between one and 
six factors and also provided evidence supporting the APT (Chen (1983), Brown and 
Weinstein (1983), Kryzanowski and To (1983), Cho (1984), Cho, Elton and Gruber 
(1984), Trzcinka (1986), Lehmann and Modest (1988), Conway and Reinganum (1988), 
Connor and Korajczyk (1988), Brown (1989), Connor and Korajczyk (1993)).  
There is evidence that one of the identified factors is the market portfolio (Chen 
(1983), Ferson, Kandel and Stambaugh (1987), Connor and Korajczyk (1988), Brown 
(1989)). However, Ferson and Korajczyk (1995) reported that although both the market 
premium and a single factor determined using PCA explained about 60% of returns, 
regressions using the market premium left a pattern in residuals relating to size that was 
not left by the PCA factor.  
There has been mixed empirical evidence whether these techniques provide 
conclusive results relating to the number of priced factors. Cho, Elton and Gruber 
(1984) provided some support for the Roll and Ross technique. They simulated a set of 
data using the zero-beta CAPM. When the Roll and Ross methodology was applied to  
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the data, the number of factors found to be significant was consistent with the zero-beta 
CAPM. When the Roll and Ross methodology was applied to actual returns, between 
three and six factors were found to be significant, more than was consistent with the 
zero-beta CAPM. In contrast, other studies have found the number of factors found was 
dependent on the data used and sample size (Cho, Elton and Gruber (1984), Dhrymes, 
Friend and Gultekin (1984), Dhrymes, Friend, Gultekin and Gultekin (1985), Cho and 
Taylor (1987)). In addition, the number of observations, the group size and the method 
of grouping stocks affected the model’s intercept (Dhrymes, Friend, Gultekin and 
Gultekin (1985)).  
2.4.3 Regression analysis using predetermined economic variables 
The first study of the APT involving the a priori selection of economic variables 
as factors was undertaken by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986).
13 The economic variables 
chosen for the study represented changes in variables that affected expected cash flows, 
the discount factor and the marginal utility of real wealth. Portfolios were formed based 
on size. The variables found to be significant for the period 1958 to 1984 were: monthly 
growth rate in US industrial production, changes in expected inflation, unanticipated 
inflation and unanticipated changes in the default risk premium and in the slope of the 
term structure of interest rates. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) concluded that, although 
stock market indexes explained much of the intertemporal movements in stock 
portfolios, their betas did not explain the cross sectional differences in average returns 
after the betas of the economic state variables were included. Stocks were priced in 
accordance to their exposure to systematic economic news and that news could be 
measured as innovations in state variables. 
  Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) reported results similar to Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986). They cautioned that the insignificant coefficient for the market index did not 
                                                 
13 This study was originally published as a CRSP working paper (number 119) in 1983.  
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mean that the index was not priced. The effect of the market may be the same for firms 
of every size. Using time series analyses, Rozeff (1984), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), 
Campbell (1987) and Fama and French (1988a, 1988b, 1989) have shown that both 
economic variables and variables from within the equity market could be used to predict 
NYSE stock returns over similar periods. The explanatory variables included short-term 
interest rates, expected inflation, yield spreads between long- and short-term 
Government bonds, yield spreads between low-grade and high-grade bonds, the 
dividend yield and lagged stock price ratios.  
Fama and French (1989) and Chen (1991) hypothesised that state variables 
forecast stock returns because state variables forecast economic activity and economic 
activity in turn forecasts the market premium. They showed that the expected market 
premium was negatively related to the recent growth of economic activity and positively 
related to the expected future growth of economic activity.  
 
2.5 Potential anomalies to the CAPM & the efficient market 
hypothesis 
 
  Discussion in section 2.3 indicated that early empirical tests of the CAPM did 
not fully support the hypothesis that sensitivity to market risk fully captured the cross 
section of returns. Empirical failure of the CAPM motivated researchers to determine 
whether the APT and ICAPM were more successful than the CAPM at describing 
returns, as discussed in section 2.4. Failure of CAPM also motivated researchers to 
investigate empirical patterns in returns not captured by sensitivity to market risk. These 
studies document relations between returns and firm characteristics such as price-to-
earnings (P/E), size, book-to-market (B/M) and stock price. Patterns in returns have also 
been reported, such as return reversals and momentum.   
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All of these relations represent potential anomalies to the CAPM. They also 
represent violations of the weak or semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis, 
as they suggest that information on past prices or other publicly available information 
can be used to predict returns. However, the documented relations may have resulted 
from empirical issues, such as the inability to correctly identify the market portfolio, or 
statistical problems. In addition, Ball (1978) noted that variables like size, E/P and B/M 
are all scaled versions of a firm’s stock price. Therefore, it is reasonable that some of 
the effects subsume others. Studies that examine these potential anomalies and why they 
are observed are discussed in section 2.5. 
2.5.1 Evidence of P/E, size, price and B/M as predictors of returns 
2.5.1.1 Price / Earnings 
  The hypothesis that low P/E stocks outperform high P/E stocks has dated back at 
least to Nicholson (1960).
14 Early empirical research seemed to support the P/E 
hypothesis. However, these early studies had statistical limitations such as selection 
bias, look-ahead bias and no adjustment for risk (Basu (1977), Banz and Breen (1986)). 
Basu (1977) examined the P/E hypothesis using estimation procedures that corrected for 
these statistical issues. For the 1956 to 1971 period, each year NYSE firms were sorted 
into 5 portfolios based on their P/E ratio. Firms with negative P/Es formed a sixth 
portfolio. Both the CAPM and the zero-beta CAPM were used to determine risk 
adjusted returns.  
Basu reported that low P/E portfolios earned 2% to 4.5% per annum more than 
that implied by their level of risk, whilst high P/E portfolios earned 2.5% to 3% less 
than that implied by their level of risk. He concluded that the P/E ratio contained 
‘information content’. Companies with very low (high) P/E were temporarily 
undervalued (overvalued) because investors become excessively pessimistic (optimistic) 
                                                 
14 Reference to Nicholson (1960) was provided in Reinganum (1981b).   
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after a series of bad (good) news reports. When earnings turned out to be better (worse) 
than expected, the price adjusted. Thus, the behaviour of security prices over the period 
studied was not completely described by the efficient market hypothesis. 
2.5.1.2 Size 
The relation between company size and asset returns was first documented 
separately by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981b). These studies measured firm size as 
the market value of shareholder's equity. In contrast, later studies measured firm size as 
ln (market value). Both studies sorted firms into 25 portfolios, first into size quintiles, 
then by beta. Using NYSE monthly returns, Banz (1981) found a non-linear relation 
between market value and equity returns. Time series regression showed a negative 
coefficient on the size variable. Banz concluded that, on average, small NYSE firms had 
significantly larger risk adjusted returns than large NYSE firms over the 1936 to 1975 
period. The effect was most pronounced for the smallest firms in the sample and the 
linear relation underestimated the true size effect for very small firms. The magnitude 
and significance of the size factor coefficient varied across sub-periods. Banz found that 
the average excess return from holding very small firms long and very large firms short 
in an arbitrage portfolio was, on average, 1.52% per month. However, this trading 
strategy left an investor with a poorly diversified portfolio.  
2.5.1.3 Interaction between size and E/P 
Tests of the interaction between the size effect and the E/P effect have shown, 
alternatively, the size effect (Reinganum (1981b), Banz and Breen (1986)), the E/P 
effect (Basu (1983)) and neither effect (Cook and Rozeff (1984), Jaffe, Keim and 
Westerfield (1989)) to dominate. Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989) reported an 
interaction between size and E/P; firms with negative earnings and firms with high-E/P 
tended to be small firms, whereas not all low-E/P firms were large.  
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Basu (1983) and Cook and Rozeff (1984) argued that Reinganum’s (1981b) 
findings resulted from not controlling for market risk. Small firm portfolios and low-E/P 
portfolios had higher risk (beta) than large firm portfolios and high-E/P portfolios, 
respectively. As a result, not adjusting for risk biased results towards finding a size 
effect and against finding an E/P effect (Basu (1983)). Another possible explanation for 
the conflicting results was that the magnitude of the two effects was period specific 
(Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983), Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989), Cook and 
Rozeff (1984)) and negatively correlated (Basu (1983)). In particular, Brown, Kleidon 
and Marsh (1983) found a stable positive linear relation between size and excess returns 
for portfolios ranked on size over the period 1969 to 1973 and a stable negative linear 
relation over the period 1974 to 1979.
15 This non-stationarity was robust to using either 
the CAPM or the zero-beta CAPM to adjust for risk.  
2.5.1.4 Price 
The inverse of price per share has been shown to be significantly positively 
related to mean excess returns (Stoll and Whaley (1983), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), 
Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989)). This is known as the price effect. It has been 
hypothesised that the size effect is really a price effect, as many small firms have low 
prices (Stoll and Whaley (1983), Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992)). Stoll and Whaley 
(1983) found the price effect to have a similar magnitude and to show the same pattern 
over time, as the size effect. In contrast, Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989) found 
different results when price was used in regressions rather than size. They concluded 
that price and size had separate influences on expected return.  
                                                 
15 Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) suggested that the linear relation reported between ln (market value) 
and returns, compared with the non-linear relation between market value and return reported by Banz 
(1981) and Reinganum (1981b), may relate to the positive skewness in the market value of equity across 
securities.  
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2.5.1.5 Book-equity/Market-equity 
Keim (1980) and Stattman (1980) first documented the relation between book-
to-market (B/M) and asset return.
16 They found a significant negative relation between 
the B/M ratio and the return on equity. Both studies reported that the B/M effect was a 
proxy for the size effect. Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) found that positive risk 
adjusted returns could be made from a strategy of buying low B/M stocks and selling 
high B/M stocks over the 1973 to 1980 period. The sample used consisted of large 
stocks only. Abnormal returns continued to exist after adjustment for trading costs.  
A B/M strategy was also shown to earn significant positive returns when NYSE, 
AMEX and NADAQ stocks were included in the sample (Fama and French (1992)) and 
over a five-year investment horizon when NYSE and AMEX stocks were examined 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). In addition, the B/M of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average was shown to predict market returns and small-firm excess returns 
over the 1926 to 1994 period (Kothari and Shanken (1997), Pontiff and Schall (1998)). 
However, Loughran (1997) reported that for large firms the B/M effect was only evident 
in January. In the remainder of the year, small-low B/M ratio firms that had newly listed 
on NASDAQ drove the B/M effect. In addition, he showed that the significance of the 
B/M effect was driven by the 1974 to 1984 sub-period, which coincided with the period 
studied by Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985). For the periods 1963 to 1973 and 1985 
to 1995, growth firms had slightly higher returns than value firms.  
2.5.2 Testing the size effect in the context of the APT 
  Evidence that the APT can capture the variation in returns across size portfolios 
would suggest that the size effect is related to risk factors, rather than market 
inefficiencies. However, the evidence to date has been mixed. Reinganum (1981a) 
found the APT failed to capture the size effect in NYSE and AMEX returns. Using daily 
                                                 
16 These are both unpublished manuscripts. Reference to these studies was provided in Keim (1983).  
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returns, he estimated three, four and five-factor APT models using factor analysis and 
Chen (1980)’s technique to estimate factor loadings.
17 Using all three models, the small 
(large) firm portfolio possessed a positive (negative) and significant average excess 
return even after controlling for APT risk. The inability of the APT to account for the 
size effect was interpreted as evidence against the APT. 
In contrast, Chen (1983), Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) and Ferson and 
Korajczyk (1995) found that the APT was able to capture the size effect. Chen (1983) 
divided NYSE firms into large firms and small firms. He tested the ability of a five-
factor APT model developed from daily returns to explain the size effect and concluded 
that firm size did not have additional explanatory power after adjusting for the risk 
incorporated in the factor loadings.  
Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) used predetermined macroeconomic variables to 
explain size portfolio returns. The predetermined variables were similar to those used by 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) (see section 2.4.3). They reported that the default risk 
premium best explained the difference in returns between the smallest and largest size 
portfolio. The magnitude of the default risk premium varied with the business cycle. 
They argued this was consistent with small firms suffering relatively high rates of 
failure during business contractions, reflected in higher average returns. Chan, Chen and 
Hsieh (1985) concluded that the macroeconomic variables were as good an explanation 
of the firm size effect as was size.  
2.5.3 Subsequent evidence of the size effect 
Research undertaken since the size effect was initially identified predominantly 
focused on determining whether the effect was a real anomaly to the simple CAPM, or 
whether it was due to problems with measuring returns, problems with determining the 
market beta or market inefficiencies. The use of daily returns in early studies was found 
                                                 
17 Chen’s methodology allowed the APT to be estimated and tested across large numbers of securities.  
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to overestimate the size effect. Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) showed 
that for small firms, a significant portion of their computed daily returns reflected a bid-
ask bias. However, for large firms the bid-ask bias was likely to be negligible. In 
addition, it was shown that when beta was estimated from daily returns the risk of 
holding a small firm portfolio was underestimated and thus the size effect was 
overestimated (Roll (1981), Reinganum (1982), Brown, Kleidon and Marsh (1983), 
Keim (1983)). Although the use of monthly or longer period returns eliminated most of 
the problems associated with daily returns, it still did not fully account for the size effect 
(Stoll and Whaley (1983), Roll (1983), Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Chan and 
Chen (1988)). 
2.5.3.1 Market Inefficiencies 
Market inefficiencies may cause additional risks that cannot be diversified and 
are not modeled in the simple CAPM. The existence of market inefficiencies that affect 
small firms more than large firms has been suggested as a possible reason for the 
existence of the documented size effect. Compared with large firms, small firms:  
•  Have less information to accurately assess the true parameters of the return 
distribution, causing estimation risk
18 (Banz (1981), Arbel, Carvell and Strebel 
(1983), Barry and Brown (1984), Carvell and Strebel (1984), Merton (1987)).  
•  Are less liquid than large firms and it has been argued that returns include a liquidity 
premium (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Reinganum (1990),
19 Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)). 
•  Incur larger transaction costs, such as commission and the bid-ask spread (Stoll and 
Whaley (1983), Schultz (1983), Keim and Madhaven (1997)).
20 The size effect was 
                                                 
18 Klein and Bawa (1977) found that if insufficient information was available about a subset of securities, 
investors would not hold these securities because of estimation risk, ie. uncertainty about the true 
parameters of the return distribution.  
19 Reinganum (1990) found the liquidity premium to be larger for small stocks trading on the NYSE than 
for small stocks trading on NASDAQ.  
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eliminated by adjustment for transaction costs when only NYSE stocks were 
examined (Stoll and Whaley (1983)), but not when NYSE and AMEX stocks were 
examined (Schultz (1983)). 
•  Experience greater return volatility (Stoll and Whaley (1983)). However, 
Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986) and Tinic and West (1986) found the size effect and 
volatility to be independent.  
2.5.3.2 Small NYSE firms are distressed firms 
Chan and Chen (1991) proposed that the difference in return behaviour of small 
and big NYSE stocks related to the marginal nature of the majority of small NYSE 
stocks, rather than size. The majority of small NYSE firms had lost market value 
because of poor performance, had high financial leverage and cash flow problems. 
These firms were “marginal in the sense that their prices tend to be more sensitive to 
changes in the economy and they are less likely to survive adverse economic 
conditions” (Chan and Chen (1991) p1468). In contrast, the majority of big firms were 
successful. Additional evidence showed that NASDAQ firms of similar size to small 
NYSE firms had lower returns and did not have the same marginal characteristics as the 
majority of small NYSE firms. This supported the view that it was the marginal firm 
characteristic, rather than size, which drove the size effect. 
Chan and Chen (1991) investigated whether two proxies for financial distress; 
reductions in dividends and high leverage, were related to returns. Two zero investment 
size matched portfolios of NYSE firms were formed to create factor mimicking 
portfolios, DIV and LEV. DIV was long in firms that had cut dividends by more than 50 
percent and short in smaller firms that had not reduced dividends. LEV was long in 
                                                                                                                                               
20 Chan and Lakonishok (1997) reported that once relative firm size was controlled for, costs were lower 
on NASDAQ for trades of comparatively small firms, while costs of trading larger firms was lower on the 
NYSE.  
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firms that were in the highest leverage quintile and short in smaller firms in the lowest 
leverage quintile.  
Time series regression tests, where the dependent variables were the returns of 
20 size portfolios, showed the coefficients of the value-weighted NYSE index and the 
LEV and DIV portfolios to be significant for almost all of the regressions. Furthermore, 
most of the partial market betas were statistically indistinguishable from 1. This 
suggested that the aggregate market affected firms of every size but DIV and LEV 
captured the differential response of small and large firms. In cross-sectional regressions 
including size as a fourth explanatory variable, neither size nor DIV and LEV 
dominated the other in explaining the cross sectional dispersion of average returns. 
Chan and Chen concluded that small NYSE firms were riskier than large NYSE firms 
and the risk of small firms was not likely to be captured by a market index heavily 
weighted towards large firms. 
2.5.3.3 Summary of evidence relating to the size effect 
The size effect has been shown to be both economically and statistically 
significant over long periods for NYSE and AMEX stocks. However, the magnitude of 
the effect was not consistent across sub-periods and was negative in some sub-periods. 
There was considerable, but not conclusive evidence that the size effect dominated both 
the P/E and the price effects.  
Examination of possible explanations for the observed differences in returns 
between large and small firms has shown that: 
•  APT risk factors and market beta risk accounted for some but not all of the size 
effect. 
•  Small NYSE firms had a higher risk of financial distress compared with large NYSE 
firms.   
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•  Market inefficiencies, such as transaction costs and liquidity premiums, were 
different for small and large firms. 
None of these explanations, separately or combined, have been shown to explain the 
entire size effect. 
2.5.4 Long-horizon momentum, reversal and overreaction 
Asset pricing models such as the CAPM, ICAPM and APT assume that 
investors behave rationally. Rational behaviour requires that, when new information 
becomes available, investors revise their beliefs regarding probability of future returns 
in an appropriate manner. In contrast, behavioural evidence has shown that in revising 
their beliefs, individuals tend to overweight recent information and underweight prior 
data (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)). Overreaction to news implies that stocks with 
favourable news (winners) tend to be overvalued and stocks with bad news (losers) tend 
to be undervalued. An investment strategy of buying losers and selling winners is 
known as a contrarian strategy. An investor who undertakes a contrarian strategy gains 
when stock prices revert to fundamental values (Chan (1988)).  
The behavioural evidence that investors overweight recent information, 
combined with the hypothesis that the P/E effect may result from temporary mispricing 
of securities,
21 led De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) to investigate whether stock 
returns could be predicted using the principal of overreaction. In their 1985 paper, 
NYSE firms over the period 1926 to 1982 were sorted based on three years of past 
performance. The 35 stocks with the best (worst) performance were allocated to the 
winner (loser) portfolio. The loser portfolio outperformed the winner portfolio by an 
average cumulative return of 24.6% over the three years after portfolio formation. The 
beta of the loser portfolio was consistently less than the beta of the winner portfolio, 
                                                 
21 Basu (1977) put forward temporary mispricing as a possible explanation for the P/E effect, refer to 
section 2.5.1.1.  
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suggesting losers earn higher return with less risk than winners. Using B/M as a 
measure of under/overvaluation, DeBondt and Thaler (1987) found that the cumulative 
abnormal returns of portfolios based on B/M showed the same reversal pattern as the 
winner-loser portfolios. They concluded that the evidence was consistent with an 
over/undervaluation effect. 
Return reversal, more pronounced in prior losers than prior winners, was also 
found when examining decile and ventile portfolios (Chan (1988), Pettengill and Jordan 
(1990)). However, Davidson and Dutia (1989) found no evidence of return reversal or 
abnormal returns using a contrarian strategy when examining nearly all stocks on the 
NYSE and AMEX. Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995) found that contrarian strategy 
returns was related to the extreme skewness of returns earned by low priced stocks in 
the loser portfolio and largely disappeared when these stocks were deleted from the 
sample or portfolios were formed in June rather than December.  
Subsequent investigation by Fama and French (1988a) and Poterba and 
Summers (1988), using a variety of tests, showed positive autocorrelation in returns 
over short periods and negative autocorrelation over a three- to five-year period. These 
findings supported the proposition that prices contained substantial transitory 
components and were predicable due to mean reversion. They also found that these 
effects were more pronounced for small firms. This was later supported by Chopra, 
Lakonishok and Ritter (1992). 
An alternative explanation, consistent with the observed negative correlation, is 
that return reversal is induced by variation in risk at an individual firm level. DeBondt 
and Thaler (1987), Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989) and Chopra, Lakonishok and 
Ritter (1992) examined the time varying betas of winner and loser portfolios. Chan 
(1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) reported that the market value of winner (loser) 
stocks increased (decreased) during the rank period. They hypothesised that change in  
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size may have resulted in change in risk through leverage and economies of scale. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, all four studies showed that the betas of winners 
(losers) decreased (increased) from the rank period to the test period and winners had 
lower betas than losers over the test period. After adjusting returns for test period beta, 
Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) found only weak evidence of return reversal 
and small abnormal returns were earned by a zero investment contrarian strategy.  
In contrast, Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) reported an economically 
significant overreaction effect still existed after adjusting for test period betas and 
controlling for size. They used the same methodology as Ball and Kothari (1989), 
except Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) used an empirically determined price of 
market risk (9.5 percent), instead of the price of risk implied by the CAPM (14 to 15 
percent). Thus, differences in betas of winners and losers did not generate differences in 
returns as great as that assumed by the CAPM.  
2.5.5 Short-term momentum and underreaction 
An alternative explanation to the momentum found in stock returns is that the 
market initially underreacts to news and prices are slow to adjust. This effect has been 
shown to be greatest for small firms and firms with negative surprises. Therefore, 
underreaction is likely to affect the return of firms that are financially distressed.  
Evidence that returns could be predicted from short-horizon past returns was 
initially presented by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990). In a subsequent paper, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) examined returns earned by short-horizon momentum 
trading strategies using NYSE and AMEX stocks, over the period 1965 to 1989. When 
portfolios were formed based on 6 months of prior returns and a holding period of 6 
months, a strategy of buying the winner portfolio and shorting the loser portfolio  
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produced a return of 1% per month.
22 The majority of the return was attributable to the 
winner portfolio. Consistent with long-horizon momentum studies, the relative strength 
portfolios experienced negative abnormal returns starting about 12 months after 
portfolio formation date. Over an entire 36-month holding period, abnormal return was 
not significantly different from zero. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) reported that a 
momentum effect followed by return reversal continued to be observed in the 1990 to 
1998 period.  
Momentum strategy profits have been linked to the market reacting slowly to 
both firm-specific information and common economic factors. There has been no 
evidence that beta can account for momentum strategy returns (Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)). Evidence that the market reacts 
slowly to firm-specific information was provided by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), who found that abnormal momentum returns 
mostly occurred around earnings announcement dates. Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 
(1996) reported that abnormal returns earned at the first two quarterly earnings 
announcements accounted for 41 percent of abnormal returns. In addition, analyst’s 
forecasts were found to react slowly to earnings surprises. This was more pronounced 
for firms with negative surprises. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggested that the 
market might underreact to information about the short-run prospects of the firm, such 
as earnings forecasts, but overreact to more ambiguous information about their long-run 
prospects. Consistent with this proposition, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) 
found that medium-term return continuation could be explained by underreaction to 
earnings information, but price momentum was not subsumed by earnings momentum. 
  Lo and MacKinlay (1990b) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) found that a 
large part of the abnormal returns documented by short-horizon momentum studies was 
                                                 
22 The majority of the discussion in the paper related to the 6 month formation and holding period 
strategy. A strategy of forming portfolios based on 12 months of returns and holding for 3 months was the 
most successful, with a return of 1.49% per month.   
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attributable to a delayed stock price reaction to common factors rather than 
overreaction. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 1995) refuted this finding. Using a different 
decomposition of the source of contrarian profits, they demonstrated that delayed 
reaction by small firms to common factors added little to short-horizon contrarian 
profits. Most of the profit arose because of a tendency for stock prices to overreact to 
firm-specific information.  
2.5.6 International evidence of anomalies 
Many of the anomalies to the CAPM and to the efficient market hypothesis have 
been found in markets outside of the US. Finding these anomalies outside the market in 
which they were originally documented has supported the view that the observed 
anomalies are not the result of data mining. Some of these papers are briefly mentioned 
below.  
E/P, cash-flow-to-price (C/P), price, size and B/M effects have been reported in 
a range of countries from Europe, the UK, Australia, the Asia-Pacific region and South 
and North America (Brown, Keim, Kleidon and Marsh (1983), Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonisok (1991), Capual, Rowley and Sharpe (1993), Clare, Priestley and Thomas 
(1998), Fama and French (1998), Ferson and Harvey (1998), Rouwenhorst (1999), 
Dimson and Marsh (1999), Halliwell, Heaney and Sawicki (1999b), Booth and Keim 
(2000), Hawawini and Keim (2000), Patel (2000), Gaunt, Gray and McIvor (2000), 
Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001)). In Singapore, Wong and Lye (1990) reported that the 
E/P effect was stronger than the size effect, although not independent of size. In Japan, 
Chan, Hamao and Lakonisok (1991) concluded that the size and E/P effects were 
subsumed by the influence of B/M. In Australia, Gaunt, Gray and McIvor (2000) 
reported the size effect to be independent of the price effect. 
Short-horizon momentum effects have also been found in a range of countries 
from Europe, the Asia-Pacific region and North America (Rouwenhorst (1998),  
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Hawawini and Keim (2000), Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000)). Rouwenhorst (1998) 
found international momentum returns were correlated with U.S. momentum returns, 
suggesting that exposure to a common factor may drive the profitability of momentum 
strategies. Using a conditional model applied to country level data, Ferson and Harvey 
(1998) found that momentum was related to mispricing, not risk.  
2.5.7 Why do anomalies continue to exist? 
If the anomalies discussed in section 2.5 cannot be accounted for by risk, it 
should be expected that they would disappear through the activities of arbitrageurs. 
Some possible explanations for why the anomalies have not disappeared include: 
•  Investors are exposed to opportunity costs if there is no certainty that mispriced 
securities will be corrected in a timely manner. The opportunity cost plus periodic 
evaluation of money managers by their clients means that resources are devoted to 
short-term, not long-term arbitrage positions. Thus, trading strategies that require 
capital commitments over extended horizons in smaller firms persist (Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991) in Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter (1992), Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1994)). 
•  Past winners appear to be more ‘prudent’ investments, hence are easier to justify to 
sponsors and many financial institutions screen out stocks of financially distressed 
firms. Career concerns of money managers may cause money managers to tilt their 
portfolios towards past winners, even though they earn lower returns in the long-run 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).  
•  The investment community is not interested in very low market capitalization stocks 
that typically constituted a portfolio of losers because they cannot capture the 
positive returns (Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995)). Keim (1989), Kothari, Shanken 
and Sloan (1995) and Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000) found that an increase  
  49
in price of $0.125 resulted in a substantial reduction in the return earned by loser 
portfolios.  
•  Contrarian strategies do not account for price, so are unhedged in relation to price-
related microstructure effects such as bid-ask spread and liquidity (Ball, Kothari and 
Shanken (1995)). 
•  A substantial portion of the B/M effect is driven by low returns on newly listed 
NASDAQ stocks and managers find it difficult to use these stocks on the short-side 
of their portfolio due to liquidity and portfolio mandate constraints (Loughran 
(1997)).  
 
2.6 The role of B/M and size characteristics in describing 
returns 
 
2.6.1 The Fama and French 1992 characteristic model  
Evidence that factors such as E/P, size and B/M have a stronger role than beta in 
explaining stock returns led Fama and French (1992) to develop a cross-sectional model 
incorporating both firm characteristics and beta. The model was developed using a 
sample of non-financial firms trading on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ, over the 
period 1963 to 1990. Thus, the data set used to develop the model did not incorporate 
the 1926 to 1962 period investigated by many of the earlier studies, but did incorporate 
smaller NASDAQ firms that had not been examined in earlier studies. Firms with 
negative book-equity were excluded from the sample for development of the model. 
However, Fama and French did compare negative book-equity firms with those firms 
included in the sample. They reported that firms with negative book-equity had high 
returns, consistent with the high returns of high B/M firms and consistent with the  
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proposition that both high B/M and negative book-equity were signals of poor earnings 
prospects.  
The cross-sectional model was estimated using the two-stage methodology of 
Fama and MacBeth (1973). Individual stock characteristic data were used in the 
regression. A stock’s beta was measured first by estimating beta for portfolios and then 
assigning the portfolio’s beta to each stock in the portfolio. The market proxy was the 
CRSP value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. The best 
model examined in the paper has become known as the Fama and French 1992 model: 
Ri = β1 ln(market value)i + β2 ln(B/M)i        (2.7) 
Where Ri is the excess return for asset i. 
2.6.2 Consistency of the B/M effect 
  Although Fama and French (1992) reported that the B/M effect was not 
subsumed by size, there has been considerable evidence that the relation between B/M 
and return is stronger for small firms than large firms. Kothari, Shanken and Sloan 
(1995) found the B/M coefficient for the largest 500 stocks was approximately 40% 
smaller than when all COMPUSTAT stocks were considered and only marginally 
significant. Loughran (1997) found that B/M had no reliable predictive power for the 
largest quintile of firms. Kothari and Shanken (2000) formed B/M decile portfolios and 
examined average return. Little relation was found between B/M and value-weighted 
returns for the lower-B/M deciles. In contrast, a reliable positive relation was reported 
between B/M and equal-weighted return. Chen and Dong (2001) found B/M to be a 
mostly insignificant predictor of returns in a sample of large cap stocks.  
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2.6.3 Role of size and B/M in value, momentum and contrarian 
strategy returns  
The relation between the size and B/M characteristics and the returns earned by 
value, momentum and contrarian trading strategies has also been investigated. 
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) investigated the role of size and B/M in 
explaining the cross-section of returns, when portfolios were formed based on value 
strategies.
23 Using Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology, B/M, but not size, was 
found to be significant in univariate regressions describing value strategy returns.  
Asness (1997), Daniel and Titman (1999) and Hawawini and Keim (2000) 
investigated the interaction between B/M and momentum for similar periods spanning 
1962 through 1997. Hawawini and Keim (2000) examined NYSE and AMEX stocks 
and adjusted for size, while Daniel and Titman (1999) and Asness (1997) also included 
NASDAQ stocks. Daniel and Titman (1999) and Hawawini and Keim (2000) reported 
that the B/M and momentum effects appeared to be independent and all studies found 
the momentum effect to be strongest for low B/M stocks. The B/M effect was non-
existent across the extreme winner quintile and strongest within the quintile of stocks 
with negative returns. Daniel and Titman (1999) interpreted their findings to be 
consistent with predictions of overconfidence. In a related study, Chen and Dong (2001) 
found that, for a sample of large cap stocks over the 1977 to 1996 period, momentum 
was a better predictor of return than B/M.
24 Even though they found that the stock 
market tended to go through under-and over-valuation cycles, they found only a weak 
negative correlation between B/M and their measure of mispricing.  
 
                                                 
23 Refer to section 2.11.1.1 for a description of the value strategies investigated by Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994). 
24 This was consistent with other studies that reported B/M to be an insignificant predictor of returns for 
large firms. Refer to section 2.6.2.  
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2.7 The Fama and French three-factor model 
 
2.7.1 Development of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model  
Fama and French (1993) extended the 1992 paper to determine whether size and 
B/M captured the cross-section of excess returns earned by bonds as well as stocks. 
Firm characteristics had no obvious meaning for bonds. Therefore, Fama and French 
(1993) used the time-series regression approach of Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), 
with the independent variables being the excess return on a market portfolio of stocks 
plus return premia related to risk-factors. In the context of the APT, these return premia 
represented factor mimicking portfolios. Factor coefficients were interpreted as risk 
factor sensitivities. If the model was well specified the intercept would not be 
significantly different from zero. 
The factor premiums examined were size, B/M, term to maturity and default 
risk. When examining equity returns, the dependent variables were the returns earned by 
25 intersecting size - B/M quintile portfolios. When used alone, the term and default 
factors captured some of the variation in stock returns but still left strong size and B/M 
effects. This finding was in contrast to Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) and Chen, Roll 
and Ross (1986), where a default premium was found to capture the variation in return 
of size portfolios. When size and B/M were added to the regression, all of the stock 
portfolios loaded in the same way on the market, term to maturity and default risk 
factors. Fama and French asserted that the market portfolio of stocks captured the 
common variation in stock returns associated with all of these factors. 
When examining stock returns, where size and B/M factor premiums were the 
only explanatory variables in the regression, the intercepts for all 25 stock portfolios 
were similar and significantly different from zero. When the market premium was  
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added to the regression the intercepts were close to zero and the coefficient on the 
market premium was close to one for all portfolios. Fama and French concluded, 
“the size and B/M factors can explain the differences in average returns across 
stocks, but the market factor is needed to explain why stock returns are on 
average above the one-month bill rate” (Fama and French (1993) p38). 
The model incorporating these three factors has become known as the Fama and  
French (1993) three-factor model: 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi       (2.8) 
Where: (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio, 
SMB is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio 
of big stocks, where the small and big stock portfolios have similar B/M 
characteristics, 
HML is the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks minus the return on a 
portfolio of low B/M stocks, where the high and low B/M portfolios have 
similar size characteristics, and 
bi, si, hi are the sensitivities of asset i to the market, size and B/M premia, 
respectively. 
  Although the hypothesis that all intercepts were zero could not be accepted, 
Fama and French argued that the three-factor model “does a good job on the cross-
section of average stock returns” (Fama and French (1993) p41). Subsequently, Fama 
and French (1997), Daniel and Titman (1997) and Lewellen (1999) have also found the 
three-factor model intercepts to be non-zero. Fama and French (1993) asserted that the 
rejection for the three-factor model was because it did not fully explain returns earned 
by the lowest B/M quintile of stocks. All five lowest B/M-size portfolios produced 
coefficients on the size factor that were strongly negatively related to size; however, no 
size effect was apparent in returns. The intercept for the low-B/M, small-firm (big-firm)  
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portfolio had returns that were too low (high) relative to the predictions of the three-
factor model.  
Fama and French (1996) presented evidence that the three-factor model was a 
three-factor version of the ICAPM or APT. Under the ICAPM, optimal portfolios are 
multi-factor minimum variance (MMV). Spanning was used to show that the four 
component portfolios of SMB and HML and thus SMB and HML, were MMV. Triplets 
of the excess returns earned by the four component portfolios described the excess 
return of the fourth component portfolio and of B/M, E/P, D/P and sales growth decile 
portfolios. In addition, regressions showed that the CAPM could not explain the excess 
returns of the component portfolios, thus the three-factor model did not collapse to the 
CAPM.  
2.7.2 Ability of the three-factor model to capture other return 
anomalies 
In addition to explaining returns earned by intersecting size and B/M portfolios, 
the three-factor model was shown to explain returns earned by stock portfolios formed 
based on E/P, D/P and sales growth (Fama and French (1995, 1996)). Low (high) E/P 
and D/P stocks showed low (high) average returns similar to low (high) B/M stocks. 
This was interpreted as being consistent with low (high) E/P, D/P and B/M stocks being 
growth (distressed) stocks with persistently high (low) earnings. The model predicted a 
return that was too large for both the negative E/P and zero D/P portfolios. The negative 
E/P portfolio loaded heavily on size and B/M, while the zero dividend portfolio loaded 
heavily on size.  
The three-factor model was also able to capture the long-term reversal of returns 
(Fama and French (1996), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)). However, it could not explain 
the continuation of short-term returns. Fama and French (1996), Chan, Jegadeesh and 
Lakonishok (1996) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) found both winner and loser  
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portfolios loaded significantly and positively on SMB. Winners (losers) had a 
significant negative (positive) loading on HML, whether they were long- or short-term 
winners (losers), correctly predicting low (high) returns for long-term past winners 
(losers), but incorrectly predicting low (high) returns for short-term past winners 
(losers).  
 
2.8 Explanation for the size and B/M factors  
 
  There has been considerable debate about why the B/M and size factors are 
related to returns. Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) argued that pricing is rational 
and the size and B/M factors represent systematic risk factors that cannot be eliminated 
through diversification. In particular, they argued that the B/M factor, HML, represents 
a return premium to compensate for the risk of financial distress. Alternative 
explanations are that pricing is irrational or is affected by market inefficiencies.  
  Explanations such as data mining and survivor bias have also been offered (Lo 
and MacKinlay (1990a), Black (1993), Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995)). Survivor 
bias is argued to come from using COMPUSTAT data, as COMPUSTAT is less likely 
to add small distressed stocks to the database and surviving firms that are added to the 
database are more likely to have high returns in their turnaround years immediately 
before inclusion on COMPUSTAT. Subsequent investigation has shown these 
explanations to be unlikely. Survivor bias has been shown to have minimal effect on 
value-weighted returns (Fama and French (1995, 1996)) and the B/M premium has been 
shown to exist in samples of large firms (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). In 
addition, the B/M and size effects have been shown to be robust to only including firms 
with five years of data prior to the ranking year (Barber and Lyon (1997)) and filling 
missing data from sources such as Moody’s Manuals (Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok 
(1995), Kim (1997)).   
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Possible explanations for the size effect were examined extensively prior to the 
development of the Fama and French 1992 and 1993 models, as detailed in section 2.5. 
Similar examination of the B/M effect predominantly occurred after development of 
these models. The major evidence relating to the competing explanations of the B/M 
factor and new evidence relating to the size factor is outlined in the following sections. 
In particular, the distress-risk explanation for the HML premium is examined in detail. 
Alternative methods of measuring distress-risk are discussed in section 2.9 and a series 
of research questions and propositions are developed in section 2.10 to further explore 
the relation between distress-risk, B/M and returns.  
2.8.1 B/M is a proxy for the risk of financial distress  
  Fama and French (1995) further investigated the assertion made in their 1993 
paper that low (high) B/M stocks were growth (distressed) stocks. Chan and Chen 
(1991) had previously reported the size effect to be related to financial distress.
25 Fama 
and French (1995) argued that the link between B/M and distress is stronger than the 
link between size and distress. They showed that low (high) B/M was typical of firms 
with persistently high (low) profitability and concluded that these firms were therefore 
growth (distressed) firms. This evidence was used to argue that size and B/M served as 
proxies for sensitivity to risk factors in returns and that the three-factor model was 
consistent with rational pricing.  
Fama and French examined profitability of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks 
for the 1962 to 1991 period. Stocks were grouped by size and B/M and profitability was 
measured using earnings relative to book-equity. Profitability was first examined 
relative to the portfolio formation date. Low B/M firms were more profitable than high 
B/M firms for four years before and five years after the portfolio formation date. Small 
stocks were also less profitable than big stocks. Over the entire period, the link with 
                                                 
25 Chan and Chen (1991) was discussed in section 2.5.3.2.  
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profitability was stronger for B/M than size, although small firms were significantly less 
profitable than big firms after 1980.  
Fama and French (1995) also examined whether shocks in expected earnings 
were related to size and/or B/M. Regression evidence showed that changes in the 
earnings of a market index, size portfolios and B/M portfolios were related to the cross-
section of changes in earnings of firms in the same way as market returns, the size 
factor and the B/M factor were related to returns. However, the relations reported for 
earnings were not as consistent or as strong as for returns. Changes in the market and 
size portfolio earnings were also related to the market and size factors in returns. 
However, changes in B/M portfolio earnings were not related to the B/M factor in 
returns. Fama and French suggested that the lack of reported strength in the earnings 
relations might be due to noisy measures of shocks to expected earnings.  
The higher average return of stocks trading on the NYSE compared with stocks 
of similar size trading on NASDAQ was also shown to support the distress explanation 
for the HML factor. This difference in returns had previously been attributed to small 
firms trading on the NYSE being less liquid and having higher trading costs than small 
firms trading on NASDAQ (Reinganum (1990)). Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield 
(1993) showed that the difference in returns resulted from NYSE firms loading more 
heavily on HML than NASDAQ firms of similar size. Many small NYSE firms were 
once large and had become small, so small size and high B/M were signs of distress. In 
contrast, most NASDAQ firms were always small. Therefore, the heavier loading on 
HML for small NYSE firms was argued to be consistent with HML being related to 
financial distress. Consistent with this, Loughran (1997) reported that NASDAQ was 
heavily weighted towards small-low B/M firms while small firms on the NYSE were 
predominantly high B/M firms.  
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Fama and French (1997) investigated the relation between B/M and financial 
distress for industry portfolios using a conditional three-factor model. Consistent with 
HML being related to financial distress, the HML coefficient for an industry increased 
when it became distressed. They argued that the increased factor loading would result in 
an increased discount rate and negative abnormal returns. The opposite was true where 
an industry received unexpected good news. Thus, an industry where cumulative shocks 
were negative would have positive HML coefficients and negative intercepts. 
2.8.2 Additional evidence - B/M, profitability and financial distress 
The negative relation between B/M and profitability found by Fama and French 
has generally been supported (Loughran (1997), Dichev (1998), Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002) and Cohen, Polk and Voulteenaho (2003)). However, there has not been support 
for the conclusion that the low average profitability of high B/M firms implies that high 
B/M firms earn higher returns to compensate for the risk of financial distress. Loughran 
(1997) argued that, for the period 1963 to 1995, a positive bankruptcy risk premium 
could not explain the high returns on small-high B/M firms compared with small-low 
B/M firms. In all but the smallest size quintile, low B/M firms were more profitable 
than high B/M firms, when profitability was measured as return on assets. However, 
both small-low B/M firms and small-high B/M firms were on average unprofitable and 
the difference in profitability was not significant. In addition, the quintile of small-low 
B/M firms had the highest level of non-merger delistings, suggesting that these low 
B/M firms had a higher level of distress-risk. 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) examined the profitability of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ firms over the period 1965 to 1996. Firms were sorted based on size, B/M 
and distress-risk, where distress-risk was measured using Ohlson’s (1980) bankruptcy  
  59
prediction model.
26 For firms with low probability of distress, they confirmed the Fama 
and French (1995) finding that low B/M firms had higher profitability than high B/M 
firms. However, for the high distress-risk groups the relation between profitability and 
B/M was reversed. In addition, for firms in the high distress-risk quintile, low B/M 
firms were slightly more likely to delist for performance reasons than high B/M firms. 
Examination of returns around earnings announcements showed that earnings surprises 
were negative (positive) for low (high) B/M portfolios and the high distress-high B/M 
portfolio had the largest positive abnormal earnings surprise. The pattern in earnings 
surprises supported the hypothesis that mispricing was most pronounced in high 
distress-risk firms. The pattern of earnings surprises, combined with evidence that high-
distress firms, especially those with low B/M, were less likely to have analyst coverage 
than low-distress or high B/M firms, also suggests that earnings announcements provide 
more information for high-distress than low-distress firms. 
High distress-low B/M firms were also found to have higher growth in sales than 
high B/M firms, but lower growth than other low B/M firms. In addition, these high 
distress-low B/M firms tended to invest heavily in future growth opportunities. One 
interpretation presented by Griffin and Lemmon was that firms in the high distress-low 
B/M portfolio were in growth-orientated industries, but lagged other firms in their 
industry in terms of sales and current earnings. Investors awarded these firms high 
multiples relative to book-equity, possibly perceiving that they would catch up with the 
other firms in the industry. Subsequently, investors were disappointed. Griffin and 
Lemmon suggested that rather than extrapolating current performance too far into the 
future, investors may underestimate the importance of information about current 
fundamentals and overestimate the payoffs from future growth opportunities. 
 
                                                 
26 Refer to section 2.9.2 for further discussion of Ohlson’s (1980) model.  
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2.9 Financial Distress Prediction models  
 
The studies discussed in section 2.8, primarily used profitability as a univariate 
measure of relative financial distress. Studies from as early as the 1930s have concluded 
that failing firms exhibit significantly different accounting measures, when compared 
with continuing firms (Altman (1968)). Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Deakin (1976), 
Simnett and Trotman (1992) and Altman (1993) reported a significant deterioration in 
the accounting ratios of financially distressed firms between two and three years prior to 
bankruptcy. However, Altman (1968) and Taffler (1983) argued that using a univariate 
measure, such as profitability, to predict financial distress ignores other aspects of the 
financial health of the firm and is potentially misleading. Altman gave an example: 
“a firm with a poor profitability and/or solvency record may be regarded as 
potentially bankrupt. However, because of its above average liquidity, the 
situation may not be considered serious” (Altman (1968) p591). 
Since the work of Altman (1968), studies relating to the prediction of financial 
distress have predominantly utilized multivariate models to predict financial distress. 
These models usually contained between four and seven independent variables and 
loaded heavily on profitability, short-term liquidity, leverage, cash flow and activity 
factors (Scott (1981)). Beaver (1966) defined failure as,  
“the inability of a firm to pay its financial obligations as they mature. 
Operationally, a firm is said to have failed when any of the following events 
have occurred: bankruptcy, bond default, an overdrawn bank account or non-
payment of preferred stock dividend” (Beaver (1966), p71). 
When developing models for predicting financial distress, most studies used the 
event of legal bankruptcy as the operational definition for economic financial distress 
(Ward and Foster (1997)). However, as pointed out by Scott (1981), Giroux and 
Wiggins (1984), Pastena and Ruland (1986), Bahnson and Bartley (1992) and Coats and  
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Fant (1993), bankruptcy is a very narrow definition of financial distress. Coats and Fant 
(1993) argued,  
“bankruptcy is only one outcome of financial distress. Others include 
reorganization, liquidation and acquisition by a viable firm. Regardless of the 
eventual outcome, losses and downside risks preceding the final resolutions are 
likely to be incurred by stakeholders” (Coats and Fant (1993) p147).  
Broader definitions of financial distress that have been used include; liquidation 
(Taffler (1982, 1983, 1984), Izan (1984), Simnett and Trotman (1992)), loan default or 
accommodation (Ward (1994), Lau (1987), Ward and Foster (1997)), greater than 40% 
reduction in dividends (Ward (1994), Lau (1987)) and the financial statements recording 
an ‘Auditor’s Going Concern’ statement (Coats and Fant (1993)). A brief list of 
financial distress prediction models, the definition of failure used and the classification 
accuracy of the model is provided in Appendix 1. 
Taffler (1984) suggested that bankruptcy prediction model scores should be 
interpreted as descriptions of financial distress rather than as predictions of bankruptcy 
per se. He argued that bankruptcy prediction models provided a measure of the 
probability that an economic event that affected shareholder risk would occur. 
Consistent with this view, both Lau (1987) and Ward (1994) developed a single logit 
model that was able to successfully estimate the probability that a firm would enter 
several states of varying financial distress.
27 Also, Coats and Fant (1993) successfully 
developed a model that used the variables from the Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy 
prediction model to predict ‘Auditor’s Going Concern’ events over the period 1970 to 
1989.
28 However, not all studies have found that bankruptcy prediction models could be 
                                                 
27 Lau (1987) reported classification accuracy of 96% in the original sample and 80% in a holdout 
sample. Ward (1994) reported an overall rank probability score (RPS) of 209 out of a possible 227. 
28 Coats and Fant (1993) reported a classification accuracy of 88% for the model developed using MDA 
methodology and 95% for the model developed using Neural Networks. Although Coats and Fant used 
the Altman (1968) model, they adjusted pre-1980 data to capitalize financial leases in line with Altman, 
Haldeman and Narayanan (1977).  
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used to measure the likelihood of other distress events. Ward and Foster (1997) and 
Bahnson and Bartley (1992) found that the predictive ability of the models employed 
was sensitive to the definition of failure employed.  
To summarise, the scores from financial distress prediction models provide an 
alternative to profitability as a measure of a firm’s relative risk of financial distress. The 
evidence of whether a model developed to predict bankruptcy can also successfully 
measure relative levels of financial distress, when distress is defined more broadly than 
bankruptcy, has been dependent on the models tested.   
Both Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) used multivariate distress 
prediction models when investigating whether high B/M stocks had higher risk of 
financial distress than low B/M stocks. The models used were the Altman (1968) and 
Ohlson (1980) models. These models have been widely used to measure financial 
distress in research and in practice (Altman (1993), Begley, Ming and Watts (1996), 
Dichev (1998)) and it has been standard practice to use these models in empirical work 
(Begley, Ming and Watts (1996)).  
The findings of Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) are discussed in 
section 2.10. The remainder of section 2.9 reviews the Altman (1968) and Ohlson 
(1980) models and the evidence relating to the strengths and limitations of those 
models. The Altman and Ohlson models were developed to measure bankruptcy risk for 
manufacturing and industrial firms, respectively. Testing whether the B/M premium is a 
proxy for financial distress requires measurement of relative distress-risk for firms from 
a wide range of industries. Therefore, evidence of the ability of Altman’s and Ohlson’s 
models to predict relative distress-risk for firms from a range of industries is examined. 
In addition, bankruptcy prediction models developed specifically for use across a range 
of industries are reviewed briefly.   
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2.9.1 The Altman model  
Altman (1968) developed the first multivariate model to predict financial 
distress. Multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) was used to distinguish between firms 
that would file for Chapter X bankruptcy within a year and those that would not file. A 
sample of 66 manufacturing firms was used to develop the model; 33 of these firms 
filed for Chapter X bankruptcy. The data were for the period 1946 to 1965.  
The Altman (1968) model is:  
z-score = 1.2 (working capital / total assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings / total assets) 
+ 3.3 (earnings before interest and tax / total assets) + 0.6 (market value of equity 
/ book value of total liabilities) + (sales / total assets)       (Altman (1968) p594)  
A lower z-score represents a higher likelihood of bankruptcy.  
Altman argued that the financial ratios used in the model had the effect of 
deflating statistics by their size. The Altman model had a 95% (83%) in-sample 
classification accuracy using data from one (two) years prior to bankruptcy. The model 
also showed a high level of out-of-sample classification accuracy, correctly classifying 
96% of a secondary sample of bankrupt firms as bankrupt and 79% of firms with 
negative reported profits that did not become bankrupt as non-bankrupt. Of the 14 firms 
in this sample that were incorrectly classified as bankrupt, 10 had z-scores that were in 
the range defined by Altman as the grey area, where the likelihood of bankruptcy was 
less definite. Predictive ability of the model decreased considerably using data more 
than two years prior to bankruptcy.
29  
                                                 
29 Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) developed the ZETA model as an alternative to the original 
Altman (1968) model. Of the seven variables in the ZETA model, two were also in the original model 
and one of the variables was similar. Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977) reported the ZETA model 
to be superior to the Altman (1968) model. However, some of the improvement in accuracy came from 
adjustments made to data used when developing the ZETA model, rather than differences between the 
two models. The most important data adjustment was capitalization of non-cancelable leases. Accounting 
standards were changed in 1980 to require capitalization of leases, reducing the superiority of the ZETA 
model compared with the Altman (1968) model (Altman (1993)). The ZETA model is used extensively in 
practice by financial institutions Scott (1981). However, the model coefficients are not published. Thus, 
the original model, rather than the ZETA model, is commonly used in empirical studies.   
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2.9.2 The Ohlson model 
Ohlson (1980) used conditional logit analysis to predict the probability that a 
firm would file for Chapter X or Chapter XI bankruptcy within a year.
30 The model was 
developed from a broad sample of firms over the period 1970 to 1976: 105 bankrupt 
firms and 2,058 non-bankrupt firms from all industries listed on COMPUSTAT except 
for firms in the financial, utility and transportation industries. Ohlson argued that firms 
in these industries were structurally different and had a different bankruptcy 
environment.  
Ohlson’s (1980) model is: 
  o-score = -1.32 – 0.407 log (size) + 6.03 (total liabilities / total assets) – 1.72 (1 
if total liabilities > total assets, else 0) – 2.37 (net income / total assets) – 1.83 
(funds from operations / total liabilities) + 0.285 (1 if net loss for last two years, 
else 0) – 0.521 (net incomet - net incomet-1 / |net incomet | + |net incomet-1 |)   
(Ohlson (1980) p121) 
A higher o-score represents a higher probability of bankruptcy. 
  Using the optimal cut-off score, the model had a classification accuracy of 
85.1%.  
2.9.3 Altman’s and Ohlson’s models applied to out of sample data  
Altman’s (1968) and Ohlson’s (1980) models have been widely used in research 
and in practice (Altman (1993), Begley, Ming and Watts (1996), Dichev (1998)). The 
models have been used to measure a firm’s relative level of financial distress using data 
from periods after the original models were developed, for different operational 
                                                 
30 Ohlson (1980) developed three models. The models incorporated the same ratios but utilized data from 
differing time periods prior to bankruptcy occurring. He reported that model one, the model predicting 
bankruptcy within one year, had a higher likelihood ratio index and slightly higher in sample 
classification accuracy than models two and three. The signs for all of model one’s coefficients were as 
expected, however the signs of two of the coefficients in each of models two and three differed from the 
signs of the related coefficients in model one. Model one is commonly used in the literature and is the 
model referred to here as Ohlson’s (1980) model.  
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definitions of financial distress and for a variety of industries, except for financial firms. 
Coats and Fant (1993) reported that Altman’s (1968) model was successful in predicting 
the issue of an ‘Auditor’s Going Concern’ statement over the 1970 to 1989 period. 
Begley, Ming and Watts (1996) examined the classification accuracy of Altman’s 
(1968) and Ohlson’s (1980) models for the period 1980 to 1989. They compared the 
original models with models re-estimated using data for industrial firms trading on the 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.
31 The original and re-estimated models were tested on a 
holdout sample of 65 firms and a further random sample of 1300 non-bankrupt firms. 
Although all of the models had higher error rates when applied to the 1980 to 1989 data 
when compared with the error rates reported in the original studies, the re-estimated 
models did not reduce combined error rates relative to using the original models. 
Ohlson’s (1980) model performed better than Altman’s (1968) model, with 
classification accuracy of 81.3% and 78.2%, respectively. Begley, Ming and Watts 
(1996) concluded that the results supported the use of Ohlson’s original model as the 
preferred indicator of financial distress in this period, 1980 to 1989. 
Dichev (1998) also showed that both the Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) 
models were good ex-ante measures of the probability of bankruptcy and other 
indicators of financial distress for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms in the 1980s and 
1990s. Two definitions of financial distress were used: 1) bankruptcy and liquidation 
(firms with CRSP delisting codes of 400, 572 and 574), and 2) performance delisting 
(CRSP delisting codes 400, 550 through 585). 
2.9.4 Industry relative models  
The Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models were developed from samples of 
manufacturing and industrial firms, respectively. The norm for financial ratios such as 
liquidity, profitability and leverage has been shown to vary across industries and reflect 
                                                 
31 Industrial firms were defined as firms with a SIC code less than 4000 or in the range 5000 to 5999.  
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the capital structure and revenue/expense patterns specific to that industry (Edmister 
(1972), Izan (1984), Platt and Platt (1990)). Therefore, a model appropriate for 
classifying manufacturing firms as financially distressed might not be appropriate for 
classifying firms from other industries. 
Edmister (1972), Izan (1984) and Platt and Platt (1990) developed models that 
incorporated ratios measured relative to the industry norm, referred to as industry 
relative models. In addition to accounting for differences between industries, industry 
relative ratios account for ratio instability caused by factors such as changes in 
corporate strategy and technology (Platt and Platt (1990)). Preliminary tests indicated 
the Ohlson and Altman models dominated the industry relative models for this thesis. 
Therefore, they are not discussed further here. The models are briefly reviewed in 
Appendix 2. 
2.9.5 Statistical limitations of bankruptcy prediction models 
There has been considerable criticism of both the sampling methods used to 
develop bankruptcy prediction models and the suitability of the statistical 
methodologies in relation to the sample characteristics of accounting data.  
In brief, a model developed using a large sample where the proportion of failed 
and non-failed firms were close to the proportions existing in the economy, was shown 
to have fewer statistical problems than a model developed using a small sample 
consisting of equal numbers of failed and non-failed firms (Joy and Tollefson (1975), 
Pinches (1980), Zmijewski (1984), Lo (1986), Stone and Bishop (1991)). Also, logistic 
regression methodology was argued to eliminate many of statistical problems caused by 
accounting data that violated MDA assumptions (Ohlson (1980)). Thus, the 
methodology used by Ohlson (1980), for both sample selection and model estimation, 
had fewer statistical problems than the methodology used by Altman (1968). Despite 
these statistical problems, Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985) reported that MDA was the  
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standard against which models were judged and Lo (1986) concluded that the null 
hypothesis that MDA and logit were equivalent could not be rejected.  
More recently, non-parametric approaches, such as recursive partitioning 
(Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985)) and neural networks (Fletcher, Desmond and Goss 
(1993), Dorsey, Edmister and Johnson (1995)) have been used to predict bankruptcy. 
Although neural network models have been shown to marginally outperform both logit 
models (Fletcher, Desmond and Goss (1993), Huang, Dorsey and Boose (1994)) and 
MDA models (Coats and Fant (1993), Huang, Dorsey and Boose (1994)), Coats and 
Fant (1993) concluded that if you were concerned about making a correct classification, 
then either tool sufficed.  
2.9.6 Ability of size, B/M and market price to predict failure 
Although the ability of B/M to predict failure has not been tested for NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ firms, market factors such as size and market price have. Also, 
B/M has been tested for Australian firms. Several studies have reported size to be a 
significant predictor of financial distress.
32 In particular, size was explicitly incorporated 
as a predictor of financial distress in the Ohlson (1980) model and was significant at the 
1% level. Queen and Roll (1987) reported that, for firms trading on the NYSE and 
AMEX over the 1962 to 1985 period, a strong inverse relation was found between 
financial distress and size. About 25% (less than 1%) of the smallest (largest) decile of 
firms recorded on CRSP were reported as halting trading for unfavorable causes within 
a decade.  
Market prices of stocks and B/M were considered as potential predictors of 
financial distress by Beaver (1968) and Izan (1984), respectively. Beaver (1968) 
reported that a firm’s market value decreased as the firm approached failure and that the 
                                                 
32 See, for example, Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan (1977), Frydman, Altman and Kao (1985), Pacey 
and Pham (1990) and Dorsey, Edmister and Johnson (1995).  
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cross-sectional dispersion of returns of failed firms was larger than for non-failed firms. 
The median return of failed firms continually decreased over the five years prior to 
failure, with the largest price decline occurring in the final year prior to failure. This 
resulted in lower median returns for failed firms than non-failed firms for the entire five 
years. He concluded that investors appeared to adjust to the new solvency positions of 
failed firms continuously over a five-year period, but were still surprised at the 
occurrence of failure in the final year before it occurred.  
Izan (1984) directly examined the ability of B/M to discriminate between failed 
and non-failed Australian firms. She reported that B/M was, on average, higher for 
failed firms than non-failed firms and the difference did increase from 3 years to 1 year 
prior to failure. She did not include B/M in the model because the difference between 
the B/M of failed and non-failed firms was not as significant as the difference found for 
the other ratios examined. The standard deviation of the B/M ratio of the failed sample 
increased as failure became closer, decreasing discriminatory power. 
2.9.7 Summary – Financial distress prediction models 
Multivariate distress prediction models have been shown to be superior to a 
univariate measure, such as profitability, as a measure of relative financial distress. 
Scores from Altman’s (1968) and Ohlson’s (1980) bankruptcy prediction models have 
been widely used in empirical studies to measure a firm’s relative risk of financial 
distress. The classification ability of the models was shown to be robust across 
alternative time periods, industries and definitions of financial distress. Alternative 
models have not been shown to be clearly superior to the original models in terms of 
classification ability. Within the context of failure prediction models, size but not B/M 
has been reported as having significant power to discriminate between firms that would 
and would not fail. 
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2.10 Development of research questions – the distress-risk 
explanation 
 
2.10.1 Ability of B/M to predict failure  
Evidence that a firm’s B/M could be used to predict failure would support the 
view that the B/M premium represents a return for undertaking distress-risk. Bankruptcy 
prediction models have high classification accuracy up to two years prior to failure. 
Therefore, if firms with high (low) B/M were firms with high (low) distress-risk, then 
they should have a significantly higher (lower) incidence of a financial distress event 
occurring within a period of two years after the high (low) B/M value was observed.  
Research question 1: 
Is B/M able to discriminate between firms that will and firms that will not suffer a 
financial distress event? 
  The bankruptcy prediction literature has not specifically considered firms with 
negative book-equity. In addition, Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) did not consider 
firms with negative book-equity. However, firms with negative book-equity must have 
suffered persistent losses. As profitability has been shown to be an important measure of 
distress-risk, it is likely that firms with negative book-equity have high distress-risk and 
therefore, should be considered when examining the relation between distress-risk and 
B/M.  
Proposition 1:  
When firms are sorted by B/M, the proportion of firms that subsequently suffer a 
financial distress event is substantially larger for firms with a high B/M and for 
firms with negative book-equity, than for firms with a low B/M.   
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2.10.2 Distress-risk measured by bankruptcy prediction models 
Fama and French (1995) argued, since firms with high B/M, on average, have 
lower profitability than firms with low B/M, the HML premium represents a risk 
premium related to financial distress. Multivariate bankruptcy prediction models have 
been shown to be superior to profitability as a measure of a firm’s relative distress-risk. 
Dichev (1998) argued that evidence that firms with high (low) probability of bankruptcy 
had high (low) B/M and high (low) average returns would support the risk-based 
explanation for the HML premium. However, when he used bankruptcy prediction 
models to measure distress-risk, the findings did not support the Fama and French 
proposition. Fama and French (1993, 1995) and Dichev (1998) used different 
methodologies and the robustness of their findings to different methodologies has not 
been investigated.  
Dichev (1998) analysed the characteristics and returns of portfolios of non-
financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. Firms were sorted into distress-risk 
decile portfolios, where both Altman’s (1968) and Ohlson’s (1980) bankruptcy 
prediction models were used to estimate the probability of bankruptcy. The scores from 
these models were labeled z-scores and o-scores, respectively. The data were for the 
period 1981 to 1995 and firms with negative book-equity were included in the sample. 
Analysis of portfolio characteristics showed that bankruptcy risk was negatively related 
to size. However, the relation between bankruptcy risk and B/M described an inverted-
U. High distress-risk firms generally had higher B/M than low distress-risk firms but the 
highest distress-risk firms had low B/M. Book-equity of the highest distress-risk firms 
was often negative, being wiped out completely due to losses.  
Examination of the returns earned by firms in the sorted distress-risk portfolios 
also failed to support the hypothesis that firms with high B/M earn high returns to 
compensate for distress-risk. Dichev found that the highest distress-risk portfolios  
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earned the lowest returns. An equal-weighted arbitrage portfolio, short in the decile of 
the highest distress-risk firms and long in 70% of all firms with lowest distress-risk, had 
a mean return of 1.17% per month, significant at the 1% level. The return was positive 
in 11 of the 15 years. Dichev concluded that for both bankruptcy measures, there was an 
economically large return premium of 0.4% to 0.6% per month for avoiding the most 
distressed NYSE-AMEX firms and over 1% for avoiding the most distressed NASDAQ 
firms. The most distressed 10% of firms earned negative returns averaging –1.28% per 
month over the 12 months prior to portfolio formation and their returns were 
significantly lower than other firms for at least 4 years after portfolio formation. Dichev 
suggested that, in the year prior to portfolio formation, the market recognised but did 
not fully impound the deteriorating condition of firms that ended up in the highest 
distress-risk decile. Evidently the market was slow to adjust to available information. 
2.10.2.1 Methodological differences - Fama and French vs Dichev 
The portfolio evidence provided by Dichev (1998), relating to both B/M and 
returns, was not supportive of the Fama and French (1995) proposition that the HML 
factor represented a return premium required by investors to compensate for the risk of 
financial distress. There were several major differences in the methodology used by 
Fama and French (1993, 1995) and Dichev (1998) when providing portfolio evidence. 
The robustness of Dichev’s results to these differences in methodology has not been 
examined. The differences between the two studies are: 
The Fama and French (Dichev) study: 
1.  used profitability (bankruptcy prediction models) to measure distress risk, 
2.  excluded (included) firms with negative book-equity from (in) the sample, 
3.  reported value-weighted (equal-weighted) portfolio characteristics and 
returns, and  
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4.  reported findings for a combined sample (separate samples) of NYSE-
AMEX firms and NASDAQ firms.
33  
Evidence that the portfolio results reported by Dichev are robust to the use of 
different methodologies would support the view that the HML premium is not a return 
premium relating to the risk of financial distress. As multivariate bankruptcy prediction 
models have been shown to be superior to profitability for measuring distress-risk (refer 
to section 2.9), the scores from these models represent the preferred method of 
measuring distress-risk when undertaking further examination of the relation between 
distress-risk, B/M and returns.  
In relation to the other three methodological differences, there has been no clear 
evidence that either alternative is superior. Therefore, the possible effects of the other 
three methodological differences are discussed next, in sections 2.10.2.2 through 
2.10.2.5. The current evidence is presented, along with research questions 2 through 5. 
The possible effects of different methodologies are discussed and propositions are 
developed. Examination of the validity of the propositions will assist in clarifying the 
relation between distress-risk, B/M and returns and the sensitivity of this relation to 
methodological differences. Evidence relating to the direction of the change in a firm’s 
B/M as distress risk increases may help to determine whether the relation between 
distress-risk and B/M is monotonic and positive. As this issue has not been examined 
to-date, propositions are also developed relating to the expected change in a firm’s B/M 
as distress-risk increases. Subsequently, research questions 6 and 7 address regression 
evidence of the relation between distress-risk, B/M and return and question 8 addresses 
the consistency of relations for firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges, 
compared with the NASDAQ exchange. 
                                                 
33 As indicated in footnote 2, page 3, the effect of different time periods examined by Fama and French 
and by Dichev is not addressed in the thesis.  
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2.10.2.2 Distress-risk of firms with negative book-equity 
Fama and French (1993, 1995) excluded firms with negative book-equity from 
the sample. Dichev (1998) reported that many of the firms with high distress-risk had 
negative book-equity. However, he did not report the actual distribution of firms with 
negative book-equity across the sorted distress portfolios, nor whether the majority of 
firms with negative book-equity had high distress-risk. For book-equity to be negative, 
firms must have incurred large losses, possibly over a number of years. Therefore, it is 
likely that the firms excluded from the Fama and French (1993, 1995) studies would 
have been classified as high distress-risk, using either profitability or bankruptcy 
prediction models to measure distress-risk. It has not been determined whether firms 
with negative book-equity are systematically different from firms with positive book-
equity and whether exclusion of these firms from the sample may lead to different 
results. These issues are addressed in research question 2 and propositions 2a through 
2c. 
Research question 2: 
Are firms with negative book-equity systematically different from firms with positive 
book-equity, such that the reported relation between distress-risk, B/M and returns for 
firms with positive book-equity cannot be generalized to apply to all firms? 
Proposition 2a: 
Firms with negative book-equity, on average, have high distress-risk.  
Whether results are affected by excluding, rather than including, firms with 
negative book-equity, is dependent on whether the characteristics of these firms are 
systematically different from the characteristics of firms with positive book-equity. A 
systematic difference does exist between the B/M of firms with negative and positive 
book-equity, as these firms have a negative (positive) B/M. Systematic differences in 
relation to both distress-risk and size may also affect the reported relation between  
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distress-risk and returns. If firms with negative book-equity have sustained large losses 
over a number of years, they may also have experienced other distress events such as an 
increase in leverage, loan accommodation or a decrease in dividend. Beaver (1968) 
reported that market values decreased as distress-risk increased. Thus, firms with 
negative book-equity may be of smaller average size and have higher average distress-
risk than high distress-risk firms with positive book-equity.  
Proposition 2b: 
The average size of firms with negative book-equity is significantly different 
from the average size of firms with high distress-risk and positive book-equity.  
Proposition 2c: 
The average distress-risk of firms with negative book-equity is significantly 
different from the average distress-risk of firms with high distress-risk and 
positive book-equity.  
If propositions 2b and 2c are true, then firms with negative book-equity should 
be included in the sample when examining the relation between distress-risk, B/M and 
return to ensure that the reported findings are applicable across all firms. However, the 
affect of aggregating the characteristics and returns of firms with positive and negative 
book-equity should be considered.  
2.10.2.3 Relation between distress-risk and B/M. 
Research question 3: 
What is the relation between distress-risk and B/M, when distress-risk is measured 
using bankruptcy prediction models? 
  Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) reported a portfolio B/M that 
represented a simple, equal-weighted mean. However, the portfolio B/M reported by 
Fama and French (1993) represented a value-weighted portfolio B/M and the HML 
premium was also value-weighted. Evidence relating to the size effect (refer to section  
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2.5) shows systematic differences between small and large firms, also, a negative 
relation has been reported between distress-risk and size (refer to sections 2.5.3.2 and 
2.9.6). Dichev also reported that the firms in the higher distress-risk portfolios had a 
smaller average size. Therefore, different weighting schemes may affect reported 
results. Under the equal-weighted procedure, the mean portfolio B/M would be 
weighted towards the B/M of these small firms. If small high distress-risk firms have, 
on average, low B/M, while large high-distress risk firms have high B/M, then the 
relation between distress-risk and a value-weighted B/M may be positive, even though 
an inverted-U shape relation is observed between distress-risk and an equal-weighted 
portfolio B/M. As the return premium, HML, is value-weighted and hence driven by 
larger firms, examination of the relation between distress-risk and a value-weighted 
portfolio B/M would provide more direct evidence of whether the HML premium is a 
proxy for a return premium relating to distress-risk.  
Proposition 3a: 
When negative and positive book-equity firms are aggregated, a positive 
relation is observed between distress-risk and value-weighted portfolio B/M. 
Dichev (1998) did not separate firms with positive and negative B/M values 
when reporting the mean portfolio B/M of sorted distress-risk decile portfolios. 
Concentration of firms with negative book-equity in the highest distress-risk portfolios 
may have resulted in the comparatively low B/M values reported for these portfolios. 
The relation between distress-risk and B/M for positive book-equity firms may be 
positive and monotonic, supporting the Fama and French hypothesis. However, the 
aggregation of negative B/M values with the high-B/M of high distress-risk, positive 
book-equity firms would have resulted in a low portfolio B/M being reported for the 
high distress-risk portfolios. This would have masked the actual relation for positive 
book-equity firms.   
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Additional evidence has been presented by Griffin and Lemmon (2002), who 
found that positive book-equity firms with high distress-risk could have either a high or 
a low B/M ratio. This suggests that even when negative book-equity firms are not 
included in the sample, the relation between distress-risk and B/M may not be 
monotonic and positive. Griffin and Lemmon examined the characteristics and returns 
of intersecting distress-B/M portfolios for a sample of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
firms over the 1965 to 1996 period. Ohlson’s (1980) o-score was used to estimate 
distress-risk. For all except the most distressed quintile of firms, both low and high B/M 
firms had the same bankruptcy probability. However, for the most distressed quintile, 
low B/M firms had the highest probability of bankruptcy, at 19.4%, against an 8.7% 
probability of bankruptcy for high B/M firms.  
In summary, a positive relation between distress-risk and B/M for firms with 
positive book-equity would provide evidence supporting the Fama and French 
hypothesis. Dichev may not have observed this positive relation because of the 
aggregation of positive and negative B/M values. As indicated previously, both an 
equal- and value-weighted portfolio B/M should be examined.  
Proposition 3b: 
When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms with 
positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and an 
equal-weighted portfolio B/M.   
Proposition 3c: 
When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms with 
positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and a 
value-weighted portfolio B/M.     
The existing research has examined the relation between distress-risk and B/M 
at a point in time. As yet, the change in B/M as the financial health of a firm changes  
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from low to high distress-risk has not been examined. If firms with low (high) distress-
risk have low (high) B/M, then over time, as financial distress increases, an increase in 
B/M should be observed. When B/M becomes negative due to the firm accumulating 
large losses, the firm’s B/M should be high immediately prior to becoming negative. 
However, a firm’s B/M would not necessarily increase as distress-risk increases. A 
firm’s distress-risk may increase for a number of reasons, including negative net 
earnings, low levels of liquidity and high leverage. As distress-risk increases, if markets 
are efficient and distress risk is priced, the market value of the firm should decrease. 
The impact of increased distress-risk on book-equity will depend on the reason/s for the 
increase. When a firm has cash flow problems or high leverage, but still has positive net 
profit, book-equity would not decrease. Under these circumstances, B/M would increase 
as market value decreases.  
Proposition 3d: 
As distress-risk increases from low to high, B/M increases for firms that became 
financially distressed and whose book-equity remains positive. 
In contrast to the situation where a firm has positive net profit, if distress-risk 
increases due to negative earnings, then book-equity will decrease. Whether B/M 
increases or decreases will depend on the rate of decrease in book-equity compared with 
the rate of decrease in market value.  
  The ability of the market value to adjust to reflect the market participant’s views 
of the firm’s true value has been found to be dependent on market structure. Costs of 
trading, restrictions on short-selling, lack of information due to low analyst coverage of 
distressed firms and firms being slow to disseminate bad news (refer to section 2.11.4) 
have all been argued to restrict the speed with which the market price adjusts to new 
information and whether market value reflects the true value of the firm. These market 
inefficiencies have been shown to affect high distress-risk firms more than they affect  
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low distress-risk firms. Thus, for a firm whose book-equity becomes negative when 
losses are accrued, market structure issues may result in market value not decreasing as 
fast as book-equity and B/M decreasing as distress risk increases.  
Proposition 3e: 
As distress-risk increases from low to high, B/M decreases for firms that become 
financially distressed and whose book-equity becomes negative. 
2.10.2.4 Relation between distress-risk and return  
Research question 4: 
What is the relation between distress-risk and return, when distress-risk is measured 
using bankruptcy prediction models?  
To date, only evidence relating to the equal-weighted returns earned when firms 
with positive and negative book-equity are aggregated has been presented. If the market 
prices distress-risk, any systematic differences between the distress-risk of firms with 
high distress-risk and positive book-equity, when compared with firms with high 
distress-risk and negative book-equity, should be reflected in systematic differences in 
the returns of these two groups of firms. If these systematic differences exist, 
conclusions reached regarding the relation between distress-risk and return may be 
sensitive to whether firms with negative book-equity are included in the sample. 
Proposition 4a: 
Average equal-weighted return is significantly different for firms with negative 
book-equity relative to high distress-risk firms with positive book-equity.  
Proposition 4b: 
Average value-weighted return is significantly different for firms with negative 
book-equity relative to high distress-risk firms with positive book-equity. 
Due to the negative relation between distress-risk and size discussed in section 
2.5, the equal-weighted high distress-risk portfolio returns reported by Dichev may have  
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been driven by the returns earned by small firms, while the value-weighted HML 
premium is driven by the returns earned by large firms. It has been reported that fewer 
market inefficiencies exist for large firms compared with small firms.
34 If distress-risk is 
priced, one possible scenario may be that the price of large, high distress-risk firms 
adjusts more quickly to reflect distress-risk than the price of small firms with a similar 
level of risk. Under these circumstances, large high distress-risk firms might earn high 
returns, while small high distress-risk firms earn low returns as the market continues to 
adjust prices downward. Consequently, a high value-weighted return may exist for 
portfolios of high distress-risk firms, even though the equal-weighted return is low. 
However, evidence that the relation between distress-risk and value-weighted return 
describes an inverted-U or is negative would further support the view that the HML 
premium is not a proxy for distress risk.  
Proposition 4c: 
When firms with negative and positive book-equity are aggregated, a positive 
relation is observed between distress-risk and value-weighted portfolio return. 
In contrast to the situation with B/M, aggregation of the returns of firms with 
positive and negative book-equity should not affect the relation between distress-risk 
and return, unless a systematic difference exists between the returns of high distress-risk 
positive book-equity firms and the returns of negative book-equity firms. If the market 
places a positive price on distress-risk, a monotonic positive relation should be found 
between distress-risk and return, independent of whether the book-equity is positive or 
negative.  
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) provided evidence that B/M and a measure of 
distress-risk, Ohlson’s (1980) o-score, appeared to be capturing different aspects of 
financial distress. For a sample of firms with positive book-equity, they found that the 
                                                 
34 Refer to section 2.5.3 for evidence of differences in market efficiency for small and large firms.  
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market reacted differently to firms with high distress-risk and high B/M, compared to 
firms with high distress-risk and low B/M. When examining equal-weighted returns 
earned by firms in intersecting distress-B/M portfolios, within each distress quintile 
returns increased from the low B/M portfolio to the high B/M portfolio. The difference 
in return between the low and high B/M portfolios increased from not significant for the 
lowest distress-risk quintile to highly significant for the highest distress-risk quintile. In 
addition, the returns earned by the high distress-low B/M portfolio were half the size of 
the returns earned by any other portfolio and less than the risk-free rate for the period. 
This poor performance of high distress-low B/M firms was consistent across periods 
representing both high and low economic growth. Griffin and Lemmon concluded that 
Dichev’s (1998) evidence of low return earned by high distress-risk firms was largely 
driven by the under-performance of low B/M stocks.  
This evidence suggests that when only firms with positive book-equity are 
examined, the relation between distress-risk and equal-weighted return may not be 
monotonic and positive, as would be expected if HML represents a distress-risk 
premium, but may describe the inverted-U shape reported by Dichev (1998). 
Proposition 4d: 
When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms with 
positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and equal-
weighted portfolio returns.  
As the HML premium is value-weighted, the relation between distress-risk and 
value-weighted return for positive book-equity firms should also be explored. 
Proposition 4e: 
When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms with 
positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and value-
weighted portfolio returns.   
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2.10.2.5 Distress-risk return premium  
As noted earlier, Fama and French suggest that the high-minus-low (HML) B/M 
premium represents compensation for distress-risk. If so, then a return premium relating 
to distress-risk (high minus low distress-risk) would also be expected to be positive. A 
significant positive distress-risk premium would support the view that the market placed 
a positive price on the risk of financial distress. 
Research question 5:  
Is the high distress-risk minus low distress-risk return premium positive and 
significant? 
Dichev (1998) provided preliminary evidence that the distress-risk premium 
may be negative. He reported that an equal-weighted arbitrage strategy, short in the 
decile of the highest distress-risk firms and long in the 70% of all firms with the lowest 
distress-risk, had a positive return of 1.17% per month, significant at the 1% level. This 
evidence was not necessarily inconsistent with a positive distress-risk premium, as the 
long side of Dichev’s strategy included firms with both low and medium distress-risk. 
Portfolio results showed that firms in the middle deciles earned high equal-weighted 
returns. Therefore, the reported premium may have reflected the inverted-U shaped 
relation between distress-risk and equal-weighted return, rather than a negative distress-
risk premium. If only high and low distress-risk firms were considered, the reported 
premium may be consistent with a positive distress-risk premium. However, when 
considered in conjunction with portfolio results that showed high distress-risk firms, on 
average, had a low B/M, a positive distress-risk premium could not be interpreted as 
supporting the view that the HML premium represents compensation for distress-risk.  
The other differences between the methodologies used by Dichev (1998) and 
Fama and French (1993), when calculating the distress-premium and the HML 
premium, respectively, related to return weighting, diversification and factor balancing.  
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The HML premium was value-weighted, whereas the trading strategy returns examined 
by Dichev were equal-weighted. The high- and low-B/M portfolios used to calculate the 
HML premium were well diversified. Each portfolio consisted of 30% of the firms in 
the sample and had approximately equal average firm size. In contrast, the high (low) 
distress-risk portfolio examined by Dichev had low (high) levels of diversification, 
consisting of 10% (70%) of available firms, respectively, and no attempt was made to 
control for size or B/M. Given the small average size and low B/M of firms in the 
highest distress-risk decile, the trading strategy returns may have been driven by size, 
B/M or distress-risk.  
In brief, there has been no conclusive evidence regarding either the sign or the 
significance of the distress-risk premium. Evidence that a positive distress-premium 
exists when B/M is not controlled would be consistent with the hypothesis that the 
HML premium is compensation for distress-risk. However, taken in conjunction with 
portfolio results showing that high distress-risk firms have low B/M values, a positive 
distress premium would not be sufficient to prove that the HML premium is 
compensation for distress risk. Evidence of a significant distress-premium after B/M is 
controlled would suggest that the HML premium and the distress-risk premium are 
being driven by different factors. Also, any evidence that the distress-risk premium is 
significant and negative would be inconsistent with the HML premium representing a 
return for distress-risk. 
Proposition 5a:  
The return earned by a zero investment trading strategy, long in a portfolio of 
firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with low distress-
risk, is positive and significant when B/M is not controlled.  
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Proposition 5b: 
The return earned by a zero investment trading strategy, long in a portfolio of 
firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with low distress-
risk, is not significantly different from zero when B/M is controlled. 
2.10.2.6 Regression evidence 
Research questions 1 through 5 provide a framework to extend the current body 
of portfolio evidence regarding the relation between distress-risk, B/M and returns. 
Additional understanding of the relation can be gained through examination of 
regression evidence. Current cross-sectional and time-series regression evidence is 
reviewed below. As noted earlier, Fama and French argue that the three-factor model 
represents an empirically determined ICAPM or APT model. There is no evidence 
relating to the ability of a distress-risk premium to capture the time-series of returns in 
the context of the ICAPM or the APT. Research questions 6 and 7 and related 
propositions address this issue.  
As well as presenting portfolio evidence, Dichev (1998) examined cross-
sectional regression evidence to determine whether a relation exists between distress-
risk and B/M. The regression model used was the Fama and French (1992) model, 
augmented with a distress-risk score. Both z-score and o-score were used, alternatively, 
for the distress-risk score. The dependent variables were the equal-weighted excess 
returns earned by the distress-risk decile portfolios. The size effect was found to be non-
existent in the sample period. For the NYSE-AMEX sample, the coefficients of both 
B/M and the z-score were significant; suggesting that the common variation in z-score 
and B/M reported for portfolio results had little to do with returns. For the NASDAQ 
sample the coefficient of B/M was significant, but the coefficient of the z-score was not 
significant. This was due to the inverted-U shape relation between z-score and returns, 
showing that both high and low distress-risk NASDAQ firms earned lower than average  
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returns. Results using o-score as the measure of distress-risk confirmed those using z-
score. On balance, Dichev concluded that although the distress-risk characteristic was 
significant in describing cross-section of returns, a distress explanation was unlikely to 
account for the B/M effect. 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) provided evidence of the ability of the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model to explain the time-series of returns earned by 
intersecting distress-B/M quintile portfolios of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. 
Large and small firms were presented separately. The market and size factor loadings 
increased nearly monotonically from the low to high distress-risk quintiles. For large 
firms, the HML loading was positively correlated with B/M but not distress risk. The 
high distress-low B/M portfolio loading on the HML factor was significant and negative 
and similar to other low B/M firms. However, for small firms, both B/M and distress-
risk were positively correlated with the HML loading and the high distress-low B/M 
portfolio had an insignificant positive loading on HML. For both large and small firms, 
the intercepts of the high distress-low B/M firms were negative and significant, 
indicating that the model did not adequately describe the returns earned by these firms. 
Griffin and Lemmon argued that, to the extent that the three-factor model captured 
differences in risk across firms, the evidence did not support the view that the low 
returns earned by high distress-low B/M firms was due to these firms being less risky 
than other low B/M firms.  
Both Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) concluded that B/M and 
the distress-risk characteristic appeared to be capturing different aspects of return. High 
distress-risk firms, especially those with low B/M and those trading on NASDAQ, 
appeared to earn very low returns. The evidence does not support the view that investors 
received higher returns for undertaking higher levels of distress risk. However, the 
issues of whether a factor-model captures the time-series of returns earned by sorted  
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distress-decile portfolios and whether a distress-risk premium is systematically related 
to the time-series of returns have not been examined.  
Research question 6:  
Is distress-risk priced and do the Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-
series of returns earned by sorted distress-risk portfolios? 
Research question 7:  
Is distress-risk priced and do the Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-
series of returns earned by size, B/M and distress-risk characteristic-balanced 
portfolios? 
If the risk of financial distress is a systematic risk that is priced by the market, a 
positive distress-risk return premium should describe the time series of returns in the 
context of the ICAPM or the APT. As the characteristic of distress-risk describes the 
cross-section of returns, evidence that the time-series of returns is not captured by a 
distress-risk premium would support a market inefficiency explanation of returns rather 
than a risk-based explanation. The finding that the time-series of returns is captured by a 
negative distress-risk premium would also support a market inefficiency explanation. In 
addition, if the HML premium is a proxy for the distress-risk return-premium, then the 
Fama and French (1993) model should capture the time-series of returns of distress-risk 
portfolios. In this case, augmenting the Fama and French (1993) model with a distress-
risk premium should not increase the explanatory power of the model or affect the 
observed HML coefficient. 
Proposition 6a: 
The Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-series of returns earned 
by sorted distress-risk decile portfolios.  
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Proposition 6b: 
A distress-risk premium does not outperform the Fama and French factors in 
capturing the time-series of returns earned by sorted distress-risk decile 
portfolios. 
Sorted distress-risk portfolios do not control for size or B/M. Therefore, these 
characteristics could drive the returns earned by sorted distress-risk portfolios. 
Characteristic-balanced portfolios eliminate these confounding effects. Therefore, the 
ability of a factor model to capture the time-series of returns earned by characteristic-
balanced portfolios would provide stronger evidence of whether distress-risk is priced 
than evidence relating to distress-risk deciles.  
Proposition 7a: 
The Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-series of returns earned 
by size, B/M and distress-risk characteristic-balanced portfolios. 
Proposition 7b: 
A distress-risk premium does not outperform the Fama and French factors in 
capturing the time-series of returns earned by size, B/M and distress-risk 
characteristic-balanced portfolios. 
2.10.2.7 Consistency of relations – NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ 
If the market systematically prices the risk of financial distress, the relations are 
expected to be consistent across all exchanges. However, Dichev (1998) reported 
different relations between distress-risk, B/M and returns for firms trading on the 
NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges. Different results for NYSE-AMEX and 
NASDAQ firms have also been reported by Chan and Chen (1991), Fama, French, 
Booth and Sinquefield (1993), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahman (1998) and Chou 
(2000). Furthermore, firms trading on NASDAQ have been found to be generally 
smaller than firms trading on NYSE-AMEX (Reinganum (1990), Dichev (1998)) and  
  87
market inefficiencies have been shown to effect small firms more than large firms (refer 
to sections 2.5.3.1 and 2.11.4). Also, Chan and Lakonishok (1997) reported that trading 
costs were different for NYSE firms compared with NASDAQ firms.  
If the ability of the market to adjust the price of small high distress-risk firms is 
affected by market inefficiencies, then the reported relations are expected to be different 
for firms trading on NYSE-AMEX and firms trading on NASDAQ. These differences 
are more important when considering equal-weighted portfolio characteristics and 
returns, as considered by Dichev (1998), than value-weighted characteristics and 
returns, as considered by Fama and French (1993, 1995). Therefore, evidence that the 
relation between distress-risk, B/M and return is consistent for NYSE-AMEX and 
NASDAQ firms would support the view that prices are driven by systematic factors, 
rather than market inefficiencies or differences in market structure.  
Research question 8: 
Are the relations between distress-risk, B/M and the return consistent across firms, 
independent of the exchange the firm is listed on? 
Proposition 8: 
The reported relations between distress-risk, B/M and return are consistent for 
firms trading on the NYSE-AMEX exchanges and for firms trading on NASDAQ.  
 
2.11 Alternative explanations for the size and B/M factors 
 
The previous section has summarised evidence directly related to the proposition 
that the HML premium is a proxy for a distress-risk premium. Research questions and 
propositions were developed to further examine the relation between distress-risk, B/M 
and returns. Alternative explanations for the relative high returns of high B/M stocks 
include behavioural explanations, such as investors overreacting to past performance  
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and overconfidence, as well as the effect of informational inefficiencies. These 
explanations are detailed below. 
2.11.1 B/M, value strategies and overreaction 
One alternative explanation for the HML premium is that the success of value 
strategies, such as buying high B/M stocks and shorting low B/M stocks, is due to 
systematic investor overreaction. Overreaction has been linked to investors 
extrapolating past returns too far into the future, positive feedback trading and 
parameter uncertainty.  
2.11.1.1 Extrapolation hypothesis 
Several studies, including those by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), 
LaPorta (1996), LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Mun, 
Vasconcellos and Kish (2000), have investigated and generally found evidence 
supporting the extrapolation hypothesis. The conclusions reached in these papers have 
been questioned by Fama and French (1995), Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2002) and 
Lewellen and Shanken (2002).  
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) hypothesised that value strategies 
earned positive returns because investors extrapolate past performance too far into the 
future and do not recognise the mean reversion of earnings. Thus, stocks with high 
(low) growth in the past become overpriced (underpriced). Low (high) returns are 
earned when the market recognises that actual earnings are less (more) than expected. 
They examined a sample of NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period 1963 to 1990. 
Glamour (value) stocks were defined as stocks with high (low) growth, both past and 
expected. Past growth was measured using five years growth in sales. B/M, in addition 
to E/P, cash-flow-to-price (C/P) and dividend-to-price (D/P), represented future 
expected growth. After portfolio formation, the actual growth of fundamentals was  
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found to be much lower (higher) for glamour (value) stocks than the expected growth 
implied by the related ratio. They concluded that the B/M effect, as well as other value 
effects, was the result of investors extrapolating past performance too far into the future. 
The market learned about its mistake slowly, as their expectations were confirmed in the 
short-term but disconfirmed only in the long run. This conclusion was later supported 
by Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (2000), who used non-parametric techniques. They also 
found that risk accounted for only a small and insignificant part of the cyclicality 
between winners and losers. 
Similar to Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), Fama and French (1995) 
reported that the earnings of low (high) B/M stocks grew faster than (declined relative 
to) the market prior to portfolio formation, then reverted to market growth rates. This 
pattern of reversion was stronger for small stocks than big stocks. However, Fama and 
French found reversion in earnings occurred soon after the portfolio formation date, 
rather than two years after, as reported by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). This 
difference in timing resulted in a different conclusion. Fama and French argued that 
investors find out about the change in earnings soon after portfolio formation. Thus, the 
persistent difference in average returns of high and low B/M stocks must reflect 
equilibrium expected returns. They suggested that where a firm experiences a demand 
or supply shock that changes its cost of capital, the firm reacts by expanding or 
contracting output and investment as appropriate. The adjustment in output continues 
until, at the margin, returns on investment revert to competitive-equilibrium levels. 
Consistent with the extrapolation explanation for the B/M premium, LaPorta 
(1996) found B/M was correlated with errors in analyst’s expectations for a sample of 
large NYSE-AMEX firms, over the period 1982 to 1990. Both expected earnings 
growth and B/M were significant in cross-sectional regressions on revisions in expected 
growth, changes in forecast earnings for period (t + 1) and errors in associated forecasts  
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for the current and subsequent fiscal year. This was interpreted as confirming that B/M 
explained stock returns because it was correlated with errors in expectations.  
LaPorta (1996) and LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) found the 
direction of returns around earnings dates was consistent with the extrapolation 
hypothesis. LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) used B/M to define value 
and growth. They reported that, for a sample of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms, in 
the three days around the earnings announcement low (high) expected growth firms had 
positive (negative) excess returns, consistent with the market being happily (unhappily) 
surprised. The difference was 4% in the first year after portfolio formation and 
decreased slowly to 2% by five years after portfolio formation. This suggested that 
positive updating of the earnings prospects of value stocks relative to glamour stocks 
took place slowly. However, the event differences were not as large for the largest 50% 
of NYSE firms and accounted for a smaller portion of the overall difference between the 
returns of value and glamour stocks. The finding suggested that a greater portion of the 
fundamental news was impounded into prices outside of the quarterly earnings 
announcement for large stocks than for small stocks. 
In contrast, when Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2002) compared actual earnings 
with earnings forecasts made directly after portfolio formation, rather than with forecast 
made immediately prior to the earnings announcement, as used by LaPorta (1996) and 
LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), the extrapolation hypothesis was not 
supported. High B/M and small firm portfolios displayed higher median forecast errors 
and larger downward forecast revisions than low B/M and large firm portfolios, 
respectively. This indicated that investors were more optimistic about value and small 
stocks than growth and large stocks, respectively. The market was found, on average, to 
correctly anticipate earnings just before they were announced.   
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Danielson and Dowell (2001) provided further evidence on the link between 
B/M, earnings and overreaction in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. They 
developed a model linking a stock’s return to its operating performance. The model was 
based on Fairfield’s (1994) and Penman’s (1996) proposition that B/M was a function 
of the expected level of profitability, while P/E was a function of expected changes in 
profitability. Danielson and Dowell (2001) confirmed the finding of Fama and French 
(1995), that low B/M firms had consistently higher profitability
35 than high B/M firms. 
However, when they used the P/E ratio to further divide low B/M firms into growth and 
mature firms and to divide high B/M firms into turnaround and declining firms, they 
concluded that the B/M premium related to irrational market expectations rather than 
risk of financial distress. Low B/M-growth firms typically did not meet market 
expectations of higher expected growth in excess income. Consequently these firms 
experienced low returns. Low B/M-mature firms typically met or exceeded market 
expectations and experienced higher returns. Both high B/M-turnaround and high B/M-
declining firms generally outperformed market expectations and consequently earned 
high levels of return. 
2.11.1.2 Parameter uncertainty and return volatility  
The ability of rational investors to take advantage of and eliminate empirically 
documented return patterns has been examined in relation to both parameter uncertainty 
and the volatility of arbitrage profits.  
Several studies have shown that the negative autocorrelation of returns could be 
the result of investors not knowing the true data-generating process for dividends 
(Timmermann (1993, 1996), Lewellen and Shanken (2002)). Lewellen and Shanken 
(2002) asserted that the process of learning about the distribution of returns resulted in 
past mistakes eventually being reversed and negatively autocorrelated returns. These 
                                                 
35 Danielson and Dowdell (2001) used return on equity to measure profitability.  
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results were consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis but were driven entirely by 
rational decision-making and parameter uncertainty. 
An alternative, but not contradictory, explanation put forward by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) was that arbitrage trading based on the B/M anomaly was deterred by the 
costs of trading away arbitrage profits, combined with the risk caused by the volatility 
of arbitrage returns. This view was supported empirically by Ali, Hwang and Trombley 
(2003). The finding that the B/M effect was linked to return volatility was not consistent 
with the conclusions reached by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and LaPorta 
(1996), who reported that the higher standard deviation of value portfolio returns could 
not account for the B/M anomaly. However, these studies did not examine the B/M 
effect for high and low volatility stocks separately.  
2.11.1.3 Positive feedback trading 
  An alternative explanation for market overreaction was that trading occurred 
based on positive feedback and/or herding (DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann 
(1990), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Nofsinger and Sias (1999)). Empirical 
evidence suggested that limited herding and positive feedback trading occurred and it 
affected the returns of small stocks but not large stocks (Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992)). This was considered to be consistent with common institutional trading 
strategies, institutions using the behaviour of others to infer information on small stocks 
when only limited information was available, or managers selling small stocks that 
other institutions sold to avoid embarrassment (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992), Nofsinger and Sias (1999)).  
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) modeled positive feedback 
trading. The implication of their model was that prices overreacted because news 
stimulated positive feedback trading as well as trading by rational investors. Prices  
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moved away from fundamental values in the short-term but reverted to fundamentals in 
the long-term. 
2.11.2 Behavioural explanations for under- and overreaction 
Psychological evidence supports the view that individuals do not assess 
information rationally. Individuals are shown to overweight some types of information 
and underweight other types. Many of the behavioural patterns documented by 
psychologists are consistent with the overreaction and underreaction explanations for 
observed patterns in stock returns. Several papers have presented asset pricing models 
based on documented behavioural patterns that are consistent with empirically 
documented return patterns, especially in relation to short-term momentum and long-
term reversal. These studies are outlined briefly.  
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Odean (1998b) modeled an 
informed overconfident investor who overestimated the precision of his private 
information signal, but not the information signals received by all.
36 Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) concluded that prices initially overreacted to private 
information regarding earnings. If public information confirmed the prior decision, 
further overreaction occurred. Public information inconsistent with prior decisions 
resulted in the inefficient deviation of the price gradually being corrected. This resulted 
in earnings-based short-term momentum and long-term reversals, especially among 
stocks where it was difficult to estimate growth potential and where information 
asymmetry was greatest, such as small stocks and growth stocks. Odean (1998b) 
concluded that overconfident price-taking traders resulted in divergence between prices 
and fundamental values. Conversely, overconfident insiders moved prices closer to 
fundamental values. Markets also underreacted to abstract, statistical information that 
was highly relevant such as earnings changes, dividend omissions and brokerage 
                                                 
36 This behaviour is referred to as self-attribution.  
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recommendations. Markets overreacted to salient but less relevant information such as 
changes in stocks price, scandals and advertising campaigns.  
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) modeled an investor who believed that 
earnings moved between two states: 1) mean reverting and 2) trending,
37 when earnings 
actually followed a random walk. The investor used observed earnings to determine 
which state he was in. State 1 resulted in initial underreaction and momentum. State 2 
resulted in initial overreaction and mean reversion. Odean (1998a) also linked belief in 
the mean reversion of prices to underreaction. He documented that investors held losing 
investments too long and sold winning investments too soon. Suggested reasons for the 
finding were: 1) investors believe prices are mean reverting, and 2) investors use the 
original purchase price as their reference point and are not willing to sell at prices below 
this.
38 If many investors purchase a stock at a given price and the stock drops below 
(rises above) that price, investors are unwilling (willing) to sell. This behaviour reduces 
(increases) supply of potential sellers and reduces the speed at which prices decrease 
(increase).  
Hong and Stein (1999) assumed two types of traders: 1) those who forecast on 
fundamentals (News watchers) and 2) those who forecast on past prices (Momentum 
traders). News was assumed to diffuse slowly across the ‘News watchers’. Momentum 
traders, attempting to profit from underreaction caused by ‘News watchers’, eventually 
created an overreaction to any news. If momentum traders are able to choose to trade 
using momentum or contrarian strategies, eventually a contrarian strategy would be 
judged to be optimal and return would reverse. The implications of the model were 
subsequently tested empirically by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). Consistent with the 
hypothesis that overreaction was caused by gradual information flow; the momentum 
effect was found to be more profitable and lasted for a longer period for small firms and 
                                                 
37 These beliefs represent theories of conservatism and representative heuristic, respectively. 
38 This behaviour is referred to as the disposition effect.   
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firms with low levels of analyst coverage. The effect of analyst coverage was greater for 
small stocks and past losers than for large stocks and past winners, respectively. This 
pattern was consistent with negative information diffusing more slowly than positive 
information across the investing public.  
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001) modeled an investor who 
overestimated the quality of private information. Other individuals exploited the pricing 
errors introduced by the trading of informed overconfident individuals, but did not 
eliminate all mispricing because of risk aversion. Thus, the cross-section of returns was 
determined by both risk and investor misvaluation. This model was argued to be 
consistent with size and B/M describing the cross-section of returns. If high B/M 
reflected both mispricing and risk and beta reflected only risk, B/M could be a better 
predictor of returns. Also, as the market value of the firm reflected misvaluation, firm 
size, as measured by market value, predicted future returns. If size and B/M factors 
reflected misvaluation and risk, inclusion of these factors in a regression would weaken 
the effect of beta.  
The view that the observed under- and overreaction resulted from investors 
behaving irrationally was challenged by Fama (1998b). He argued that evidence that the 
market overreacted in some circumstances and underreacted in others was consistent 
with market efficiency. Many anomalies were restricted to tiny firms and tended to 
disappear when returns were value-weighted. If markets were efficient, the expected 
value of abnormal returns was zero, but chance generated apparent anomalies that split 
randomly between overreaction and underreaction. In contrast, Loughran and Ritter 
(2000) argued that abnormal returns not being robust to alternative methodologies was 
consistent with market inefficiencies, as the reported size and significance of anomalies 
varied in a predictable fashion, depending on the testing methodology used.   
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2.11.3 Factors or characteristics? 
There has been disagreement whether the ability of B/M to predict returns is 
related to the B/M characteristic itself, or an unidentified positive risk premium for 
which it serves as a proxy. The high correlation between B/M and the Fama and French 
(1993) HML factor premium means that it may appear that there is a relation between 
HML and return, whereas the relation is really between B/M and returns. Evidence that 
it is the characteristic rather than the factor premium that describes the variation in 
returns would support the irrational pricing explanation for the success of the three-
factor model against the risk explanation. Both Daniel and Titman (1997) and Davis, 
Fama and French (2000) addressed this question in the context of an unconditional 
model and found the evidence was period specific. Lewellen (1999) examined the 
question in the context of a conditional time-series model and supported the rational 
pricing theory.  
Both Daniel and Titman (1997) and Davis, Fama and French (2000) separated 
the effect of firm characteristics and factor premiums by examining the cross sectional 
variation of returns of portfolios formed such that there was low correlation between the 
HML factor loading and the B/M characteristic.
39 Daniel and Titman found that, for the 
1973 to 1993 period, the results were in line with the characteristic model. Davis, Fama 
and French (2000) confirmed this finding for the 1973 to 1993 period; however the 
result was period specific. For the entire period they studied, 1929 to 1997, and for other 
sub-periods, the factor model was supported.  
Lewellen (1999) tested a conditional version of the Fama and French model, 
where the intercept and coefficients were conditioned on B/M. Data were for NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ firms over the period 1964 to 1994. Results were consistent with 
B/M capturing variation in risk but not directly predicting returns. B/M tended to be 
                                                 
39 Stocks were first sorted by B/M and size. The 9 intersecting B/M-size portfolios were then sorted 
according to pre-formation loading on the HML factor.  
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positively related to the SMB and HML factors for both industry and size-B/M 
portfolios. B/M was negatively related to market betas for industry portfolios. Lewellen 
asserted that if B/M was interpreted as evidence of distress, market risk became less 
important for distressed firms. However, for size-B/M portfolios the relation between 
B/M and market beta was mixed, being positive (negative) for 8 (10) portfolios. 
Lewellen also argued that HML appeared to proxy for more than just a distress factor in 
returns, unless some industries were distressed through the entire sample period.  
  In a related study, Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) used an APT 
framework to investigate whether, over the 1966 to 1995 period, firm characteristics had 
incremental explanatory power for returns relative to the three factors from the Fama 
and French (1993) model. When NASDAQ and NYSE-AMEX firms were examined 
separately, it was found that after adjusting for risk using the three-factor model, the 
intercept for NYSE-AMEX firms was on average not significantly different from zero. 
In comparison, for NASDAQ stocks the intercept in the risk adjusted regressions was 
consistently negative and significant, suggesting the average NASDAQ stock 
underperformed relative to the risk model by 5% to 7% per year.  
2.11.4 Informational inefficiencies  
  It has been hypothesised that the market value of firms that have performed 
badly does not decrease fully to reflect the true change in value whenever investors with 
the lowest estimate of stock value do not trade. Two market imperfections shown to be 
consistent with this hypothesis are: 1) when the incentive structure for analysts 
discourages analysts with poor outlooks from voicing their opinions, and 2) when there 
are restrictions on short sales. The finding that analyst forecasts are linked to mispricing 
has also been noted in previous sections.  
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2.11.4.1 Analyst forecasts 
 Analysts’  forecasts  represent  a  major source of earnings-expectations 
information for the market. Thus, any bias in forecasts may result in biases in pricing 
and consequently affect returns. Franknel and Lee (1998) demonstrated that a measure 
of valuation based on analyst’s earnings and growth forecasts was highly correlated 
with stock prices. Firms with higher earnings and growth forecasts relative to price 
earned higher returns that were not due to differences in market betas, firm size or B/M. 
In addition, studies by McNichols, O'Brien and Francis (1997) and Franknel and Lee 
(1998) found analyst expectations to be overly optimistic.  
Evidence suggests there are consistent biases to analyst optimism. Also, 
differences in analyst coverage are consistent with less information being available for 
small and distressed firms. These findings suggest that mispricing will be greater for 
small and distressed firms. Franknel and Lee (1998) found analysts were particularly 
optimistic for glamour stocks with high sales growth and low B/M and when forecasts 
of growth were high relative to current growth. McNichols, O'Brien and Francis (1997) 
and Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) documented that analysts rarely issued sell 
recommendations and they gathered and disseminated less information for firms with 
poor future prospects. Stocks not covered by analysts, or with a high dispersion in 
analyst forecasts, earned comparatively low returns. This was most pronounced in small 
stocks and stocks that had performed poorly over the last year.  
Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) suggested this evidence was consistent 
with prices reflecting the optimistic view whenever investors with the lowest estimate of 
stock value did not trade. For example, when there were restrictions on short sales or 
when analysts with poor outlooks were discouraged from voicing their opinions. These 
findings were consistent with LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), who 
reported that financially distressed firms were underrepresented in their sample,  
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suggesting analysts dropped coverage of financially distressed firms. In addition, 
McNichols, O'Brien and Francis (1997) found that a longer time elapsed before ratings 
downgrades than upgrades, suggesting that bad news from analysts appeared on a less 
timely basis than good news. 
2.11.4.2 Restrictions on short-sales 
Miller (1977) argued that short sale restrictions increase the price of risky assets 
above those that would occur in a world with no restrictions. Aggregate demand 
increases because those investors, who would have short sold the stock with no 
restrictions, must now hold zero quantities. Miller asserted that the larger the dispersion 
of opinions concerning the stock’s future value, the larger would be the price increase. 
This view was supported in later studies by the finding that restrictions on short sales in 
both the NYSE and NASDAQ markets caused stock prices to underweight negative 
information (Figlewski and Webb (1993), Aitken, Frino and McCorry (1998), Jones and 
Lamont (2002), Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002), Diether, Malloy 
and Scherbina (2002)). Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002) reported 
that, for NASDAQ stocks over the period 1988 to 1994, heavily shorted firms were 
more likely to be delisted compared to their size, B/M and momentum matched control 
firms. 
  It has also been shown that short-sales restrictions may lead to poorly 
performing shares being undervalued in some circumstances. Figlewski (1981) 
examined the situation where investors had different expectations. If investors adjusted 
their expectations primarily at the market level rather than on an individual stock, stocks 
on which there was more unfavourable information were overpriced relative to the 
market, while stocks with relatively little adverse information were underpriced. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) reported that short sale constraints eliminated some  
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informative trades but did not bias prices upward. However, the constraints did reduce 
the adjustment speed of prices to private information, especially to bad news.  
2.11.5 Size and reaction to economic events 
  It has been asserted that small and large firms are affected differently when the 
economic climate is poor. Chen (1988) argued, “because small firms tend to be 
marginal firms, they fluctuate with business cycles and thus have higher risk exposure 
to the changing risk premium” (Chen (1988) p183). Similarly, Jagannathan and Wang 
(1996) argued,  
“during bad economic times when the expected market risk premium is 
relatively high, firms on the “fringe” and more leveraged firms are more likely 
to face financial difficulties and thus have higher conditional betas”  
(Jagannathan and Wang (1996) p8). 
Consistent with these views, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) found that, 
for the period 1954 to 1997, the sensitivity of returns to lagged one month t-bill rates, 
the default premium and monetary growth was dependent on the state of the economy, 
with the variation in the coefficients being much more pronounced for small firms than 
for large firms.  
2.11.6 Size and B/M capture unspecified risk 
  The size effect has generally been seen as an anomaly to the CAPM and several 
studies have endeavored to determine the specific risk factor for which size is a proxy. 
However, Berk (1995, 2000) argued that size is not an anomaly and does not proxy for 
any specific risk factor. Instead, size captures any risk factor omitted from the asset-
pricing model being tested. This view was based on the insight that, all else being equal, 
a firm with riskier cash flows would have a higher discount rate and thus a lower market 
value. He argued that this same logic could be applied to explain the predictive power of  
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other anomalies such as B/M. In his 2000 paper, Berk showed that B/M was highly 
correlated with cash flow. He argued that, as book-equity represented a measure of cash 
flow not related to risk, all else being equal, high B/M ratio reflected a higher discount 
rate and higher risk.  
  Berk (2000) provided empirical evidence that smaller size reflected higher risk, 
but the higher risk was not due to the operating characteristics of small firms. No size 
effect was detected using four measures of size not affected by risk.
40 However, both a 
market value and a B/M effect were found in the same samples. In addition, once 
market value was controlled, larger size firms were associated with higher, not lower 
returns. This suggests that once market value is controlled, the larger (smaller) the firm, 
the higher (lower) the discount rate. 
2.11.7 Other evidence of the riskiness of value strategies 
  Links between value strategy returns and risk measures other than the risk of 
distress have been investigated. These studies have not supported a risk explanation for 
the difference in returns of high and low B/M stock. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) and LaPorta (1996) found that value stocks consistently outperformed glamour 
stocks in both up and down markets, with the greatest difference in down markets. 
Therefore, value strategies did not expose investors to greater downside risk. The 
difference in the beta and the standard deviation of returns between value and glamour 
stocks was small compared with the difference in returns. In addition, value stocks were 
on average smaller than glamour stocks and the difference in standard deviation 
disappeared when returns were adjusted for size.  
 
                                                 
40 The four measures of size were: 1) book value of assets, 2) book value of depreciated property plant 
and equipment, 3) annual sales, and 4) number of employees.   
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2.12 Out-of sample evidence regarding the size and B/M factors  
 
  The survivor bias and data mining explanations of the size and B/M factors have 
been refuted by evidence that the size and B/M factors have explanatory power for the 
cross-section of returns in samples other than those where the factors were originally 
documented.  
2.12.1 Finance firms and different time periods 
While Fama and French (1992) excluded financial firms from their sample, 
Barber and Lyon (1997) documented that the relation between size, B/M and returns 
were similar for financial and non-financial NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms, over 
the 1973 to 1994 period. Davis (1994) and Davis, Fama and French (2000) confirmed 
the existence of the B/M and size patterns in returns back as far as 1929. However, the 
size effect was found to be insignificant once B/M was controlled for. Consistent with 
findings reported in Fama and French (1993), the three-factor model had the most 
problem capturing the returns of small growth stocks.  
2.12.2 International evidence  
The size and B/M effects were also reported in markets outside the U.S. Papers 
documenting the size and B/M effects in international markets were discussed in section 
2.5.6. In addition, the size and B/M factor premia have been shown to describe the time-
series of returns in Pacific-Rim and European countries, the U.K and Australia. (Chen 
and Zhang (1998), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1998), Fama and French (1998), 
Halliwell, Heaney and Sawicki (1999a), Faff (2001), Gaunt (2004)). The strength of the 
relation between the SMB and HML factors and return was often not as strong as that 
documented for the US market. Also, Fama and French (1998) reported that for 10 of 
the 11 smaller developed countries studied, the slope on the global HML factor was 
positive, rather than negative, for the individual country low-B/M portfolios.   
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  The question of whether the size and B/M premia are related to risk factors or 
irrational pricing has been investigated in international markets. International evidence 
supporting a risk explanation of the size and B/M premiums has been provided by Chen 
and Zhang (1998), Fama and French (1998), Liew and Vassalou (2000), Daniel, Titman 
and Wei (2001) and Griffin (2002). However, evidence provided by Fama and French 
(1998), Liew and Vassalou (2000) and Hawawini and Keim (2000), that the correlation 
between the size and B/M premiums across a range of markets was mostly insignificant, 
suggests that it is unlikely that the premiums are related to common international risk 
factors. Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001) showed that whether the characteristics or the 
factor premiums were priced was period specific for the Japanese market, consistent 
with the finding for the US market. 
Chen and Zhang (1998) argued that the value premium was stronger in countries 
where value stocks had suffered from past misfortunes but insignificant where markets 
were growing strongly, resulting in a smaller difference in risk between small-high B/M 
and big-low B/M firms. Consistent with this, Liew and Vassalou (2000) showed that 
investors preferred to hold high (low) B/M and small (big) stocks when periods of high 
(low) economic growth were expected.  
 
2.13 Have the size and B/M effects disappeared? 
 
2.13.1 The size effect  
  The size effect was not consistently positive over all sub-periods prior to 1982, 
which was the period examined by the majority of research into the size effect (Brown, 
Kleidon and Marsh (1983)). Liew and Vassalou (2000) found that the size premium for 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, over the period 1957 to 1998, was related to the 
state of the economy, with the premium being on average 5.96% in ‘good states’ but  
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negative 4.61% in ‘bad states’. Booth and Keim (2000) and Horowitz, Loughran and 
Savin (2000) reported that, over the period 1982 to 1997, the size effect had been 
negative but insignificant on average for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks. Chou 
(2000) attributed the smaller post-1982 size effect to a comparatively small post-1982 
size effect for NYSE stocks and a negative size effect for NASDAQ stocks.  
The size premium has also changed sign in the U.K. and there has been 
conflicting evidence regarding the sign of the size premium in Australia in the 1990’s. 
In the U.K., over the 1955 to 1987 (1988 to 1997) period, small companies 
outperformed (underperformed) an ‘All Share’ index by a significant 6 percent per 
annum. The smallest company returns outperformed (underperformed) by the largest 
amount in each period (Dimson and Marsh (1999, 2000)). In Australia, Faff (2001) 
reported a negative size premium for the 1991 to 1999 period, consistent with a reversal 
of the size effect. In contrast, Gaunt (2004) reported a positive premium for the 1993 to 
2001 period. 
  Both in the U.S. and the U.K., the reversal in the sign of the size effect coincided 
with documentation of the effect in the respective markets and the launch of mutual 
funds to trade small firms (Booth and Keim (2000), Horowitz, Loughran and Savin 
(2000), Dimson and Marsh (1999, 2000)). Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000) 
suggested that the commencement of these funds may have resulted in the prices of 
small firms being bid-up, correcting an undervaluation of small firms in the 1960’s and 
1970’s. 
In addition, the transaction costs relating to small stocks has decreased over 
time, largely eliminating one of the market inefficiencies that was put forward as a 
possible explanation for the size effect (Keim and Madhaven (1997), Dimson and 
Marsh (1999, 2000)).    
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2.13.2 The B/M effect  
  There is limited evidence related to the stability of the B/M premium over time. 
Loughran (1997) reported that the B/M premium was significant and positive over the 
period 1974 to 1984, but growth firms earned slightly higher returns than value firms 
for the 1963 to 1973 and the 1985 to 1995 periods.  
  With regard to the HML premium, Fama and French (1996) reported that HML 
was negative in 10 of the 30 years from 1964 to 1993. In comparison, SMB was 
negative for 9 years of those years. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) reported that the 
magnitude  of  the  HML  premium  had  declined  since  1982;  from  0.48%  per  month         
(t = 2.60) over the period 1965 to 1981, to 0.33% per month (t = 1.88) over the period 
1982 to 1998. Also, for the period 1990 to 1998, the HML premium was an 
insignificant 0.12% per month (t = 0.47).  
 
2.14 Conditional models of asset returns 
 
  The CAPM and the Fama and French 1992 and 1993 models are unconditional 
models. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) argued that as both beta and expected returns 
were likely to vary over time, even when expected returns were linear in betas for every 
time period, the relation between unconditional expected return and unconditional beta 
could be ‘flat' due to the averaging of individual periods. Conditional models have also 
indicated that beta captured little of the variation in expected return. He, Kan, Ng and 
Zhang (1996), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Fama and French (1997), Ferson and 
Harvey (1999) and Lewellen (1999) have investigated the role of B/M and size factors 
in the context of a conditional model. Conclusions reached in studies of conditional 
models should be interpreted in light of the findings of Ghysels (1998), who showed 
conditional models to be misspecified when there were structural shifts in model 
parameters. He argued that true betas shifted only slowly over time, so conditional betas  
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estimated using volatile returns resulted in larger pricing errors than a model using 
unconditional betas. 
  As discussed in section 2.11.3, Lewellen (1999) found that his conditional 
model provided support for the risk based explanation of the HML premium, over the 
characteristic explanation. He, Kan, Ng and Zhang (1996) showed the Fama and French 
(1993) findings to be robust to whether the unconditional three-factor model or a model 
that allowed for both time-varying betas and time-varying reward premiums was used. 
Fama and French (1997) also examined a conditional version of the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor model. The conditional model captured industry portfolio returns 
better than either an unconditional three-factor model or the conditional CAPM.  
  The static CAPM was extended by Jagannathan and Wang (1996) to a 
conditional version of the CAPM that also included human capital in aggregate wealth. 
Consistent with Berk’s (1995) view, the size effect was found to absorb risk factors not 
included in the standard CAPM, but could not explain what was left unexplained by the 
model when risk premium sensitivity and human capital were included in the model. 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) concluded that the SMB and HML factors may proxy for 
the risk associated with the return on human capital and beta instability. 
 
2.15 Summary 
 
  In summary, rational asset pricing suggests that investors demand additional 
return as compensation for undertaking additional undiversifiable risk. Empirical studies 
have shown that a range of economic and firm-specific factors, in addition to the market 
factor, can be used to describe the cross-section of returns. In particular, the Fama and 
French three-factor model, incorporating a size and a B/M factor, does a good job of 
describing return properties and captures many of the anomalies to the CAPM.   
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There are competing interpretations of the nature of the size and B/M factors. In 
particular, it is debated whether the B/M premium, HML, represents a premium for 
undertaking the risk of financial distress, or whether the premium results from irrational 
investor behaviour or market inefficiencies. Research questions and related propositions 
are identified to extend available evidence regarding the relation between distress-risk, 
B/M and return. Examination of these propositions will answer the specific research 
questions and provide information to both help distinguish between the competing 
explanations for the B/M premium and determine whether a distress-risk is 
systematically priced. This in turn will provide evidence regarding the overarching 
question of whether the observed relations are consistent with rational pricing. The 
methodology used to examine these research questions is detailed next, in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
Chapter 2 identifies several research questions and propositions. These are 
summarized in section 1.3 and developed in section 2.10. The methodology used to 
examine these research questions is introduced in section 1.5. In Chapter 3 the 
propositions are expressed as testable hypotheses. Further detail of and justification for 
the sample investigated and the methodology used are provided.  
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 identifies several areas where there is 
conflicting evidence regarding the relation between the book-to-market ratio, (B/M), the 
risk of financial distress and return. It also identifies several areas of conflicting 
evidence relating to whether the Fama and French high B/M-minus-low B/M (HML) 
factor represents a proxy for a return premium demanded by investors to undertake the 
risk of financial distress.  
In particular, Fama and French (1995) assert that the HML factor loading in the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model is due to the market pricing the risk of 
financial distress. Firms with a high B/M are financially distressed and investors receive 
a return premium for undertaking the risk associated with financial distress. In contrast, 
Dichev (1998) shows that the most financially distressed firms have low B/M and low 
returns. Also, the financial distress characteristic is priced by the market and is not 
subsumed by the B/M characteristic. He concludes that financial distress is unlikely to 
account for the book-to-market factor.  
There are several major differences between the approaches taken by Fama and 
French (1995) and Dichev (1998). The differences relate to: 1) the method used to 
measure financial distress; 2) whether firms with negative book-equity are included in 
the sample; 3) weighting of portfolio characteristics and returns; 4) whether results are 
reported for a sample of all firms, or separately for NYSE-AMEX firms and NASDAQ  
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firms; and 5) the regression methodology used. The literature has not identified the 
effect of these different approaches on reported results.  
This thesis extends the studies of Fama and French (1995) and Dichev (1998) by 
further investigating portfolio evidence relating to the relation between the risk of 
financial distress and B/M and the relation between the risk of financial distress and 
return. Time-series regression is used to examine whether the market prices a return 
premium relating to financial distress and whether this premium is priced separately 
from the HML return premium. Review of the literature relating to the prediction of 
financial distress supports the view that multivariate bankruptcy prediction models are 
superior measures of distress-risk relative to univariate measures, such as profitability. 
Therefore, consistent with Dichev (1998), multivariate measures of the probability of 
bankruptcy are used as a proxy for the risk of financial distress.  
  The remainder of Chapter 3 outlines and justifies the methodology used to 
answer the research questions and to examine the validity of the propositions developed 
in Chapter 2. The order of presentation is as follows. First, the sample selection criteria 
and data requirements are detailed. Second, the alternative methods considered to 
measure financial distress are reviewed and the measures used are justified. Third, the 
methodology used to examine the relation between distress-risk and B/M is detailed, 
followed by the relation between distress-risk and return. Finally, regression 
methodology and models are detailed. 
 
3.1 Sample selection criteria 
 
3.1.1 Overall sample 
The sample consists of firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and 
found both on COMPUSTAT and on the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)  
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files. This corresponds to the markets studied by Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) 
and Dichev (1998). By studying the same markets, comparison can be made with these 
studies and the effect of the different methodologies determined. 
The sample selection criteria are consistent with those used by Fama and French 
(1993, 1995, 1996). The sample includes all firms with ordinary common equity (as 
classified by CRSP), that have book-equity on COMPUSTAT for fiscal year ending in 
calendar year (t-1) plus two years prior and CRSP stock prices for December (t-1) and 
June of (t). Firms with required data on COMPUSTAT and CRSP are matched by 
CUSIP. Including only firms with ordinary book-equity excludes ADRs, REITs and 
units of beneficial interest (Fama and French (1993) p9). The requirement to be on 
COMPUSTAT for at least two years avoids survivor bias caused when COMPUSTAT 
added firms to its tapes (Banz and Breen (1986)), “COMPUSTAT says it rarely adds 
more than two years of historical data when it adds firms” (Fama and French (1993) 
p9). The requirement for CRSP stock prices for December (t-1) and June (t) and 
COMPUSTAT book-equity for year (t-1), allows the book-to-market ratio for 
December (t-1) and the market value at June (t) to be determined for portfolio formation 
purposes. When a measure of financial distress-risk is required for analysis, firms are 
also required to have all necessary data to calculate the relevant bankruptcy prediction 
model for the fiscal year ending in calendar year (t-1), and where appropriate (t-2). 
Ohlson’s (1980) and Altman’s (1968) models are used to measure financial 
distress. As these models are not appropriate for indicating the distress levels of finance 
companies (Dichev (1998)), they are excluded from the sample. Only firms with 
Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC codes) 6000 to 6999 (Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate) are excluded from the sample. Dichev (1998) excluded firms with SIC 
codes of 4000 to 4999 and 6000 to 9999. Thus, excluding firms classified as 
transportation, communication, utilities and service, in addition to finance. The  
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approach taken here, of only excluding finance firms, means that the sample tested is as 
close as possible to a sample containing all firms trading on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ.  
Data are collected for the period (t) equal to 1985 through 1994. This represents 
the period for which data was available at the time of data collection that allowed for 
CRSP delisting codes to be used to identify firms that delist for negative reasons. It 
overlaps the periods reported on by Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) and Dichev 
(1998). On average, there are approximately 3,400 firms per year that meet all data 
requirements.  
The sample start period is determined by the availability of CRSP delisting 
codes that provide adequate detail regarding the reason for a firm delisting. CRSP 
delisting codes for the period (t+1), 1986 through 1995, are used to determine whether a 
firm delisted for negative financial reasons (refer to section 3.5). Shumway (1997) 
documented that CRSP introduced three digit-delisting codes in 1987. Prior to 1987, 
CRSP assigned a delisting code of 5 to all firms that went bankrupt, had insufficient 
capital, changed exchange, or were not easily classified. With the advent of three digit 
codes, all stocks previously given a code of 5 are given a code of 500.  
To confirm availability of delisting codes that specifically indicate delisting for a 
negative reason, a search of CRSP is undertaken for the period 1962 to 1997 for all 
companies with the CRSP delisting code of 574 – Delisted from current exchange – 
company request, bankrupt, declared insolvent. Two hundred and ten companies with a 
delisting code of 574 were found. Of these two hundred and ten, six were firms that 
delisted between 1970 and 1985. The remaining firms delisted between 1986 and 1995. 
Therefore, a sample start period of (t) = 1985 is selected, corresponding to the 
availability of detailed CRSP delisting codes from 1986 through 1995.  
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3.1.2 Sub-sample of high distress-risk firms with five years of data  
Propositions 3d and 3e address the question of what happens to a firm’s B/M as 
distress-risk increases. A sub-sample of firms is used to examine this question. As the 
financial ratios of firms that became financially distressed are shown to begin 
deteriorating up to five years prior to a financial distress event occurring (Beaver 
(1966), Altman (1968), Izan (1984)), the B/M is tracked for five years prior to the firm 
being classified as high distress-risk. Therefore, the firms in the sub-sample are firms 
that are classified as high distress-risk firms at June (t), for the years t = 1989 through    
t = 1994 and have five years of data, (t-5) to (t-1).
41 A high distress-risk firm at June (t) 
is defined as a firm with negative book-equity or a firm with positive book-equity and 
classified as having a level of distress-risk that places the firm within the highest 30% of 
distress-risk firms for year (t). The requirement for five years of data ensures that the 
reported changes in B/M do not result from firms entering and leaving the sample over 
the period being examined.   
3.1.3 NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ sub-samples 
The literature provides evidence that systematic differences exist between firms 
that trade on the NYSE and AMEX and firms that trade on the NASDAQ (Chan and 
Chen (1991), Dichev (1998), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Chou 
(2000)). In order to address research question 8 and determine whether conclusions are 
robust to the exchange on which the firms are listed, results are reported for three 
samples: 1) all firms that meet the data requirements (‘All Firms’), 2) firms listed on the 
NYSE or the AMEX (NYSE-AMEX), and 3) firms listed on NASDAQ.   
 
                                                 
41 To be included in the original sample, a firm has to have two years book-equity prior to (t-1) recorded 
on COMPUSTAT. Therefore, the additional data requirements imposed here mean that to be included in 
the sub-sample a firm requires seven years of book-equity data plus five years of market value data plus 
five years of the data required to calculate o-score (z-score).  
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3.2 Calculation of individual firm characteristics and returns  
 
3.2.1 Firm size and B/M 
Firm size and book-to-market (B/M) are calculated using the same methodology 
as Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996). Firm size is defined as market value (MV) at 
June (t), where MV is defined as the CRSP number of shares outstanding at June (t) 
multiplied by CRSP share price at June (t), expressed in $ millions. Firm B/M is B/M at 
(t-1), where B/M is the COMPUSTAT book value of equity for the fiscal year ending in 
calendar year (t-1) divided by the CRSP market value of equity at December (t-1). Book 
value of equity is the COMPUSTAT book value of shareholder’s equity, plus balance 
sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credits (if available), minus the book value of 
preferred stock. Depending on availability, redemption, liquidation or par value (in that 
order) is used to estimate the book value of preferred stock.  
Where a firm has more than one issue listed in CRSP, market value is calculated 
as the sum of the market value of the individual issues and monthly price and return 
data are calculated as a weighted average of the individual issues.  
Weighted average price of issues i and j at time t is calculated as:  
((shares outstandingit)*(priceit) + (shares outstandingjt)*(pricejt)) /  
(shares outstandingit + shares outstandingjt).   
 
Market value weighted returns for issue i and issue j at time t are calculated as: 
((shares outstandingit)*(priceit)*(returnit) + (shares outstandingjt)*(pricejt) 
*(returnit)) / ((shares outstandingit)*(priceit) + (shares outstandingjt )*(pricejt))  
3.2.2 Firm distress-risk 
Ohlson’s (1980) model and Altman’s (1968) model are used to measure distress-
risk. These two models are also used by Dichev (1998), thus the findings provide an  
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extension of the work of Dichev that is directly comparable. Ohlson’s (1980) model and 
Altman’s (1968) model have been widely used in other research and in practice (Altman 
(1993), Begley, Ming and Watts (1996), Dichev (1998)). Begley Ming and Watts (1996) 
stated that although studies had attempted to improve upon these original models, it is 
standard practice to use the original models in empirical work.
42  
The Platt and Platt (1990) industry relative model was also considered for use as 
a measure of distress-risk. However, preliminary testing following the methodology 
outlined in section 3.5.2 showed the model to be an inferior predictor of financial 
distress in the sample period, when compared with the Ohlson and Altman models. 
Analysis showed that when a firm performed poorly and at the same time negative 
changes were experienced in the industry, as occurred over the 1989 to 1991 period, 
industry relative ratios incorrectly indicated that the firm was financially healthy. 
Therefore, the Platt and Platt model is not used here as a measure of distress-risk.  
3.2.2.1 Ohlson model  
The financial distress measure from Ohlson’s model is referred to as the o-score.  
As pointed out in section 2.9, Ohlson’s model is:  
o-score = -1.32 – 0.407 log (size) + 6.03 (total liabilities / total assets) – 1.72 (1 if 
total liabilities > total assets, else 0) – 2.37 (net income / total assets) – 1.83 
(funds from operations / total liabilities) + 0.285 (1 if net loss for last two years, 
else 0) – 0.521 (net incomet - net incomet-1 / |net incomet | + |net incomet-1 |) 
(Ohlson  (1980)  p121)         (3.1) 
A higher o-score represents a higher probability of bankruptcy.
43 
                                                 
42The Altman, Haldeman and Naryanan (1977) Zeta model was also considered. However, the model 
coefficients are not published. Also, the requirement for five years of data to calculate two of the 
variables would introduce survivor bias, as firms that delist within five years of being included on 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP would be excluded from the sample. 
43 The calculated o-scores can be converted into a probability of bankruptcy. However, as probability of 
bankruptcy is an increasing function of o-score and only a ranking of relative probability of bankruptcy is 
required to answer the research questions, the o-scores are not converted.  
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The variables used to calculate o-scores are reported in Table 3.1, along with the 
applicable COMPUSTAT variable number. 
 
Table 3.1. Ohlson model variables 
Ohlson model - independent 
variables 
Calculation of independent variables 
size  ln(Total assets 6 / (GDP price level index * 3.8) 
TL/TA  Liabilities – total 181 / Total assets 6 
WC/TA  (Current assets 4–Current liabilities 5)/Total assets 6  
CL/CA  Current liabilities 5 / Current assets 4 
1 if TL > TA, else 0  Liabilities – total 181 > Total assets 6  
NI/TA  Net income (loss) 172 / Total assets 6 
Funds from operations / TL  Funds from operations(110/308)/Liabilities–total 181
1 if net loss last two years, else 
0 
Net income (loss) 172 
(NI(t-1) – NI(t-2))/ 
            (|NI(t-1)+NI(t-2)|) 
Net income (loss) 172 
 
GDP price level index data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Quantity and Price 
Indexes for Gross Domestic Product.
44  
Except for when calculating change in net income from (t-2) to (t-1), COMPUSTAT 
variables are for fiscal year end of calendar year (t-1).  
The variable used for ‘Funds from Operations’ changed in 1987 due to changes 
in reporting requirements at that time. COMPUSTAT variables used for funds from 
operations are: 
Up to and including 1987: Funds from operations – Total (Statement of Changes) 110,  
Post 1987: Operating activities – Net cash flow (Statement of cash flows) 308. 
Ohlson defined size as log (total assets / GNP price level index). The GNP index 
used by Ohlson (1980) had a base of 100 in 1968. The GDP price level index used here 
has a base of 100 in 1996. To be consistent with the original model, the GDP index is 
adjusted to have a base of 100 in 1968. This adjustment is achieved by multiplying the 
                                                 
44 www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/TableViewFixed.asp , accessed 28/10/2001  
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GDP index by 3.8, calculated as 100/26.3 = 3.8, where 26.3 is the value of the GDP 
index in 1968.  
Dichev (1998) did not deflate Total Assets when calculating the size variable. 
He argued that as the o-score was to be used in cross sectional regressions, deflating 
Total Assets was not necessary, as the deflator would be the same for all observations 
within each month. However, by not deflating Total Assets, relative to the other 
variables in the model, the effect of the size variable on the calculated o-score is larger 
than if Total Assets are deflated. Thus, firm size had a greater effect on the o-score 
calculated by Dichev (1998) than it does on the o-score calculated here.  
3.2.2.2 Altman model 
The financial distress measure from Altman’s model is referred to as the z-score.  
Section 2.9 also presented Altman’s model:  
z-score = 1.2 (working capital / total assets) + 1.4 (retained earnings / total assets) 
+ 3.3 (earnings before interest and tax / total assets) + 0.6 (market value of equity 
/ book value of total liabilities) + (sales / total assets) 
          (Altman  (1968)  p594)    (3.2) 
In contrast to Ohlson’s model, a lower z-score represents a higher likelihood of 
bankruptcy. 
Variables and related COMPUSTAT numbers used to calculate z-scores are reported in 
Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2. Altman model variables 
Altman model 
independent variables 
Calculation of independent variables 
WC/TA  (Current assets 4 – Current liabilities 5)/ Total assets 6 
RE/TA  Retained earnings 36 / Total assets 6 
EBIT/TA Operating  income  after  depreciation 178 / Total assets 6 
MV/TL  ((CURSHR (I) /1000)* PRC (I)) / Liabilities – total 181 
S/TA  Sales 12 / Total assets 6 
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CURSHR(I) and PRC(I) are collected from CRSP for December (t-1). CURSHR(I) is 
divided by 1000 to make the data obtained from CRSP consistent with data obtained 
from COMPUSTAT. CRSP stores data in thousands; COMPUSTAT stores data in 
millions. 
All other variables are collected from COMPUSTAT. COMPUSTAT variables are for 
fiscal year-end of calendar year (t-1).  
3.2.3 Trimmed variables 
  Dichev (1998) reported variables that were trimmed to abstract from the effect 
of outliers. Following the methodology of Dichev (1998), a corresponding set of 
trimmed variables is calculated to determine whether outliers drive the results. B/M, o-
score and z-score are trimmed at the 1
st and 99
th percentile to create the respective 
trimmed variables. The bottom one-percent of observations is set at the 1
st percentile for 
that year. The top one-percent of observations is set at the 99
th percentile for that year. 
Details of the 1
st and 99
th percentile values are provided in Appendix 3. 
 
3.3 Portfolio formation 
 
  Five types of portfolios are constructed. These are: 
1)  Sorted B/M portfolios; used to examine the ability of B/M to predict financial 
distress events. 
2)  Sorted distress-risk portfolios; used to examine the relation between distress-risk 
and B/M and the relation between distress-risk and return. Returns earned by these 
portfolios are also used as the dependent variables in time-series regressions.  
3)  Distress tracking-portfolios; used to determine the change in B/M as a firm’s 
distress-risk increases.  
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4)  Intersecting quintile, characteristic-balanced size-B/M, B/M-distress and size-
distress portfolios. The returns earned by these portfolios are used as the dependent 
variables in time-series regressions. 
5)  Intersecting size-B/M-distress portfolios; used to calculate the size, B/M and 
distress-risk factor premiums. 
  The method used to form portfolio types 1 through 4 is explained in order in 
sections 3.3.1 through 3.3.4. Formation of type 5 portfolios is explained in section 3.4.4. 
Consistent with Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), all portfolios are formed at June 
(t), using accounting data from fiscal year ending in December (t-1) and/or market value 
data from June (t). Penman (1987) reported that 92% of firms filed annual reports 
within three months of their fiscal year-end and Alford, Jones and Zmijewski (1994) 
reported that 98% of 10K reports are filed by the end of the fifth month after fiscal year-
end. Therefore, portfolios are formed using data that is available to the market at the 
time of portfolio formation, thus avoiding look-ahead bias (Banz and Breen (1986)). 
3.3.1 Sorted B/M portfolios 
Sorted B/M portfolios are formed to test the ability of B/M to identify firms that 
have high distress-risk. It is likely that most firms with negative book-equity have 
accumulated accounting losses and have high distress-risk. However, evidence 
regarding the distress-risk of positive book-equity low-B/M firms has been mixed. 
Therefore, firms with negative book-equity are segregated from firms with positive 
book-equity and low-B/M to provide clear evidence regarding the proportion of firms 
with positive book-equity and a low-B/M that have a high level of distress-risk. 
Each year June (t), for each sample, all firms with available data are sorted from 
lowest B/M to highest B/M. Firms with negative book-equity are allocated to a portfolio 
referred to as NegBE. Firms with positive book-equity are sorted into B/M decile  
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portfolios. B/M portfolio 1 consists of the decile of firms with the lowest positive B/M 
values and B/M portfolio 10 consists of the decile of firms with the highest B/M ratios. 
3.3.2 Sorted distress-risk portfolios  
Two sets of sorted distress-risk portfolios are formed for each sample. The first 
set is formed using the methodology used by Dichev (1998); firms with negative book-
equity are not segregated from firms with positive book-equity. These portfolios are 
referred to as the distress-risk deciles. To form the second set of portfolios, firms with 
negative book-equity are segregated from firms with positive book-equity. This second 
set of portfolios is referred to as the distress-risk (pos) portfolios. 
To form the sorted distress-risk deciles, each year June (t) firms are sorted into 
decile portfolios based on their measured level of distress-risk using data from fiscal 
year ending in (t-1). This sort is undertaken separately using o-score and z-score. The 
sort is also undertaken separately for each of the three samples referred to in section 
3.1.3. The breakpoints used to form the portfolios are the breakpoints for the respective 
sample. The decile of firms with the highest level of distress-risk, as measured by the 
bankruptcy prediction model (highest o-score, lowest z-score), is allocated to decile 1. 
The decile of firms with the lowest level of distress-risk, (lowest o-score, highest z-
score) is allocated to decile 10. Following Dichev (1998), the breakpoints used to form 
the portfolios are the breakpoints for the respective sample. 
To form the distress-risk (pos) deciles, firm-years where book-equity is negative 
are segregated from firm-years where book-equity is positive. At June of each year (t), 
firms with negative book-equity are allocated to a portfolio referred to as the NegBE 
portfolio. Firms with positive book-equity are sorted into decile portfolios based on 
their o-score/z-score for fiscal year-end in calendar year (t-1). The highest (lowest) 
distress-risk positive book-equity firms are allocated to decile (pos) 1 (10). The sorting 
procedure results in a total of eleven portfolios, including the NegBE portfolio. This  
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treatment of firms with negative book-equity is consistent with the methodology used 
by Basu (1977), Banz and Breen (1986) and Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989), when 
examining firms with negative P/E.  
3.3.3 Tracking portfolios – Five-year B/M history of high distress-risk 
firms  
  Propositions 3d and 3e examine the change in B/M as distress risk increases. 
They are examined using the sub-sample of firms with high distress-risk at June (t) and 
five years of data, as detailed in section 3.1.2. High distress-risk firms at June (t) each 
year are defined as firms allocated to the NegBE portfolio and distress-risk (pos) deciles 
1 through 3, as described in section 3.3.2. Firms allocated to distress-risk (pos) deciles 4 
through 7 are defined as medium distress-risk and those allocated to distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 8 through 10 are low distress-risk. 
Examination of these propositions require portfolios to be formed so that the 
B/M of firms can be tracked over the five years prior to the firm becoming classified as 
high distress-risk. The path of the B/M ratio is expected to be different for firms that 
begin and end the five-year period as high distress-risk firms, compared with firms that 
begin the five-year period as low distress-risk and become high distress-risk over the 
five years. To capture this expected difference, a second sort is performed on firms that 
are classified as high distress-risk at June (t). Firms in the NegBE portfolio and distress-
risk (pos) deciles 1, 2 and 3 at June (t) each year are split again into 4 groups, depending 
on their portfolio allocation at June (t-4).
45 The four groups consist of firms that are 
allocated at (t-4) to: 
1)  the NegBE portfolio,  
2)  distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3 (high distress-risk, positive book-equity),  
3)  distress-risk (pos) deciles 4 through 7 (medium distress-risk), and  
                                                 
45 Distress decile (pos) allocation at June (t-4) is determined by the firm’s o-score/z-score, calculated 
using data for financial year-end in calendar year (t-5).  
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4)  distress-risk (pos) deciles 8 through 10 (low distress-risk).  
  This procedure creates 16 portfolios each year (t). These 16 portfolios are 
referred to as tracking-portfolios. The notation used to identify each of the tracking-
portfolios is (portfolio at (t-4), portfolio at (t)). The NegBE portfolio is referred to as 
portfolio 0. Table 3.3 details the notation used to identify the 16 tracking-portfolios. 
 
Table 3.3. Tracking-portfolios formed 
Distress-risk 
(pos) decile (t) 
Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
  0 
NegBE 
1 – 3 
High 
4 – 7 
Med 
8 – 10 
Low 
NegBE    0  (0, 0) (1–3,0) (4-7,0) (8–10,0) 
High       1  (0,1) (1–3,1) (4-7,1) (8–10,1) 
2  (0,2) (1–3,2) (4-7,2) (8–10,2) 
3  (0,3) (1–3,3) (4-7,3) (8–10,3) 
 
Two examples:  
1)  tracking-portfolio (8-10,1) is the portfolio of firms that are allocated to one of the 
low distress-risk (pos) deciles, 8 through 10, at June (t-4), that become more 
distressed and fall to distress-risk (pos) decile 1 at June (t), and  
2)  tracking-portfolio (1-3,0) is the portfolio of positive book-equity firms that are 
allocated to one of the high distress-risk (pos) deciles, 1 through 3, at June (t-4) but 
suffer losses and have negative book-equity at June (t).  
3.3.4 Intersecting characteristic-balanced quintile portfolios 
Intersecting characteristic-balanced quintile portfolios are formed to determine 
the characteristic-balanced returns. These returns are the independent variables in the 
time-series regressions used to examine research question 7. The intersecting quintile 
portfolios are formed using the methodology of Fama and French (1993). Portfolios are 
formed from the ‘All Firms’ sample only. Firms with negative book-equity are 
aggregated with firms with positive book-equity. For June (t) of each year firms are  
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independently sorted into size, B/M and o-score/z-score quintile portfolios, using NYSE 
20%, 40%, 60% and 80% breakpoints. Quintile 1 consists of the 20% of firms that are 
the smallest size, lowest B/M and highest distress-risk, respectively. These portfolios 
are used to form the intersecting quintile portfolios. Independently, all NYSE firms with 
size (B/M) data are used to determine the size (B/M) breakpoints. Therefore, 
breakpoints are not biased by the exclusion of firms with insufficient data to determine 
all variables.  
As NYSE breakpoints are used to allocate firms into the quintile portfolios, there 
are unequal numbers of firms in each quintile. Table 3.4 reports the distribution of 
firms. The difference in numbers of firms is most pronounced in the size quintiles. Size 
quintile 1, the small-firm quintile, contains 59.4% of all firms with required data and 
71.5% of these are NASDAQ firms. The number of firms in each size quintile decreases 
monotonically, with only 7.4% of all firms in the big-firm quintile, quintile 5, of which 
only 4.7% are NASDAQ firms. Firms are distributed comparatively evenly across the 
B/M and distress-risk quintiles. The differences in numbers of firms across the B/M and 
distress quintiles are largely due to the difference in distribution of NASDAQ firms, 
rather than NYSE-AMEX firms.  
 
Table 3.4. Allocation of firms - quintile portfolios 
  Percent of firms in each quintile 
  1* 2  3  4  5 
Size  59.4 14.3 10.5 8.4 7.4 
B/M  26.1 17.6 16.4 16.2 23.7 
Distress – 
 o-score 
37.6 16.9 14.0 14.0 17.5 
Distress – 
z-score 
21.6 16.5 17.9 19.2 24.8 
*Quintile 1 is defined alternatively as: small-firm, low-B/M, highest-distress. 
 
Two methods of forming the intersecting portfolios are considered. The first 
option is to form three-way intersecting portfolios: 5 size x 5 B/M x 5 distress. The  
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second option is to follow the methodology used by Chou (2000) and form three sets of 
pair-wise intersecting portfolios: 5 size x 5 B/M, 5 B/M x 5 distress and 5 size x 5 
distress.  
Creating three-way intersecting portfolios is preferred, as two characteristics that 
may affect returns are controlled. For example, size portfolios where B/M and distress-
risk are controlled. In contrast, pair-wise intersecting portfolios only control one 
characteristic at a time. However, when three-way intersecting portfolios were formed, 
many contained either no firms or a small number of firms. Therefore, this option is not 
practical. Instead, three sets of pair-wise intersecting portfolios are formed. There were 
no pair-wise portfolios with zero firms and only 8 portfolio-years had fewer than 10 
firms in the portfolio. Refer to Appendix 4 for details of the number of observations in 
intersecting quintile portfolios, for both three-way and pair-wise sorts.  
Size, B/M and o-score/z-score characteristics of the intersecting quintile 
portfolios are reported and discussed in Appendix 13. In brief, the characteristics show 
that the sorting procedure was generally successful in controlling the factors for the 
middle three quintiles. However, the sorting procedure was not as successful for the 
extreme quintile portfolios. 
 
3.4 Calculation of portfolio characteristics and returns 
 
3.4.1 Sorted distress-risk portfolio characteristics 
The average portfolio B/M values of both the distress-risk and distress-risk (pos) 
portfolios are calculated to examine the relation between distress-risk and B/M. Average 
portfolio firm size and average portfolio o-score (z-score) are also calculated. Average 
firm size is used to examine whether the distress-risk, B/M relation is interrelated with 
firm size. The average o-score (z-score) for the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ portfolios  
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are compared to determine whether there is a systematic difference in the level of 
financial distress in the two markets. This analysis assists in understanding any 
difference in the distress-risk, B/M relation found between the two markets. The relative 
levels of distress-risk of firms trading on the NYSE-AMEX and the NASDAQ also 
determines the composition of the ‘All Firms’ sorted portfolios in terms of exchange 
and thus may assist in explaining the distress-risk, B/M relation found for the ‘All 
Firms’ sorted portfolios.  
Portfolio average characteristics are calculated for both unadjusted and trimmed 
firm characteristics. Dichev (1998) reported portfolio averages of trimmed variables but 
did not report unadjusted variables. Average portfolio characteristics are calculated by 
first calculating the mean o-score (z-score), trimmed o-score (trimmed z-score), B/M, 
trimmed B/M and size of firms allocated to each portfolio at June (t) for each year. The 
reported portfolio results are the simple averages of the annual portfolio means for the 
period t = 1985 to t = 1994, for each sorted portfolio. This method of determining 
portfolio averages is consistent with Dichev (1998). The methodology results in 
portfolio characteristics representing an equal weighting of firm characteristics, 
regardless of firm size. Periods were also equal-weighted. 
A value-weighted average portfolio book-to-market, Bv/Mv, is calculated in 
addition to the mean B/M. Bv/Mv is calculated as follows: for June of each year (t), the 
book-equity for each firm in the portfolio is summed across the portfolio to create ‘Bv’ 
and the market-equity for each firm in the portfolio is summed across the portfolio to 
create ‘Mv’. ‘Bv’ is divided by ‘Mv’ to form Bv/Mv. Bv/Mv is calculated using 
unadjusted variables only. This methodology is consistent with the methodology used 
by Fama and French (1993) when calculating average portfolio book-to-market. The 
portfolio results reported are the simple averages of the annual portfolio Bv/Mv values, 
for the period t = 1985 to t = 1994.  
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3.4.2 Portfolio returns 
Average monthly portfolio returns are calculated for each of the distress-risk 
deciles, the NegBE portfolio, the distress-risk (pos) deciles and the intersecting quintile 
portfolios. Portfolio returns for portfolios formed at June (t) each year are monthly 
returns for the period July (t) to June (t+1). CRSP often does not capture the final return 
when a firm delists for performance reasons, resulting in an upward bias in returns. 
Therefore, delisting returns are adjusted for using the methodology suggested by 
Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) and used by Mello-e-Souza (2001). 
For all firms that stop trading for performance reasons an estimated delisting return is 
included for the month directly after the final CRSP return. An average delisting return 
of –30% for NYSE and AMEX firms (Shumway (1997)) and -55% for NASDAQ firms 
(Shumway and Warther (1999)) is used. Portfolio returns are also calculated without 
adjustment for delisting returns to determine the sensitivity of results to the adjustment. 
These results are summarized in section 4.4.2.4 and reported in Appendix 8. 
Both equal-weighted and value-weighted monthly returns are calculated for the 
sorted decile portfolios and the NegBE portfolio. Following Fama and French (1993), 
only value-weighted returns are calculated for the intersecting quintile portfolios. For 
value-weighted returns, monthly returns are weighted by the respective stock’s market 
value at the start of the month. When firms drop out of the sample during the year, it is 
assumed that funds are reinvested across the rest of the firms in the portfolio until the 
portfolios are reformed in June of the following year. The distribution across remaining 
firms is assumed to be equal when equal-weighted returns are being calculated or 
according to the market value of remaining stocks in the portfolio when returns are 
value-weighted. Reported portfolio returns represent the average of the monthly returns 
across the 120 months, July 1985 through June 1995.  
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The market return premium is calculated as the return earned by the monthly 
CRSP value-weighted market index minus the risk-free rate, defined as the return 
earned by US Treasury Bills.
46  
3.4.3 Tracking-portfolio characteristics 
  The tracking-portfolios, described in section 3.3.3, are formed to track and 
examine the change in B/M over time. The five-year history shows first, whether firms 
with negative book-equity have a high or low B/M prior to the book-equity becoming 
negative. Second, it clarifies whether the changes in B/M are different for firms that 
become financially distressed and the book-equity becomes negative, compared to firms 
that become financially distressed and the book-equity remains positive. To assess 
whether the changes in B/M are due to changes in book-equity and/or changes in 
market-equity, the history of the book-equity and the market-equity are reported 
separately, in addition to reporting the B/M ratio. The average portfolio characteristics 
reported for the tracking-portfolios are:  
•  Average distress-risk (pos) decile allocation of the firms in the tracking-portfolios at 
June (t-4) through June (t).  
•  Tracking-portfolio average book-equity and tracking-portfolio average market-
equity for each fiscal year ending in calendar year (t-5) through (t-1).
 47  
•  Tracking-portfolio B/M for each of the fiscal years ending in calendar year (t-5) 
through  (t-1).  Three  measures  of  tracking-portfolio  book-to-market  are  used:          
1) mean B/M, 2) mean trimmed B/M, to abstract from the effect of outliers, and 3) 
Bv/Mv, to determine whether the mean tracking-portfolio B/M is driven by smaller 
firms. 
                                                 
46 Total Returns to US Treasury Bills, Ibbotson Associates, SBBI 2000 Yearbook Table A-14, is used as 
the return earned by US Treasury Bills. 
47 The market-equity reported in this section is the market-equity as at December of the relevant year. 
This is the same as the market-equity used in other sections to determine the B/M ratio. It is not the same 
as the market value reported in other sections as a measure of size. Firm size is defined throughout as 
market value as at June (t).  
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  The average tracking-portfolio characteristics are calculated using the same 
methodology as used to calculate the sorted distress-risk portfolio characteristics. 
However, the reported tracking-portfolio characteristics, except for the distress-risk 
(pos) decile allocation, are standardised so that the path of the variable over time does 
not reflect changes in market conditions.  
  Each variable is standardised as follows: each year the tracking-portfolio 
average is divided by the related full-sample average of the relevant variable for that 
year. The related full-sample average is calculated from all firms in the sample, not just 
the sub-sample used to form the tracking-portfolios. For example, the mean B/M for the 
NYSE-AMEX sample is the mean B/M of all NYSE-AMEX firms with book-equity 
and market-equity data for that year. The reported figures are interpreted as the 
tracking-portfolio average as a ratio to the related full-sample average. Thus, the 
reported figures show whether the variable’s value increases or decreases, relative to 
average levels, as the level of financial distress changes. So, for example, if 
standardised B/M increases from 1.00 to 1.20 over the five-year period, this is 
interpreted as the average B/M for the tracking portfolio increasing from equal to the 
sample average to 1.2 times the sample average. 
  Alternative methods were considered for standardising the variables so that the 
path of the reported variable did not reflect changes in market conditions. The first 
alternative considered was to standardise by dividing the portfolio characteristic by the 
related full sample average for that variable, for the respective distress-risk (pos) decile 
and year. The second alternative was to deflate the book-equity and market-equity using 
the CPI or an equity index. Both were rejected as inappropriate.
48 
                                                 
48 In the interest of brevity, discussion of the issues considered has not been included.  
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3.4.4 Characteristic-balanced return premia; SMB, HML, DMS.  
Proposition 5b addresses the sign of a size and B/M balanced distress-risk return 
premium.
49 The premium calculated to examine proposition 5b is referred to as 
distressed-minus-solvent (DMS). It is calculated similarly to the characteristic-balanced 
size and B/M factor premia, SMB and HML (Fama and French (1993)). In addition, the 
three factor premia, DMS, SMB and HML, are used when investigating whether a 
distress-risk premium captures the time-series of returns, research questions 6 and 7.  
Distress-risk is shown to be correlated with size (Chan and Chen (1991), Dichev 
(1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002)) and there is mixed evidence regarding the relation 
between distress-risk and B/M (refer to sections 2.8 and 2.10). The Fama and French 
(1993) methodology is designed to create portfolios of firms that are different in relation 
to the characteristic of interest but have similar average levels of other characteristics 
that may influence returns. Therefore, the Fama and French (1993) methodology is used 
to form portfolios of firms with high, medium and low distress-risk, where each of the 
distress-risk portfolios have similar B/M and size characteristics. The characteristic-
balanced distress-risk portfolio returns are independent of the B/M and size return 
premiums.  
The characteristic-balanced size, B/M and distress-risk portfolios are formed as 
follows. For June of each year (t) all firms are allocated independently into portfolios 
based on size, B/M and distress-risk. Two size portfolios are created; big and small, 
where the median NYSE market value for June (t) is used for the breakpoint. The 
median NYSE size is determined from all NYSE companies on CRSP with market 
value at Dec (t-1) and June (t). Three B/M portfolios are created; high B/M, medium 
B/M and low B/M. The portfolio breakpoints are the NYSE 30
th percentile B/M value at 
                                                 
49 Research question 5 addresses the sign and significance of the high minus low distress-risk return 
premium. Propositions 5a and 5b address the case where the size and B/M characteristics are not 
controlled and are controlled, respectively. The methodology used to examine proposition 5a is described 
in section 3.9.  
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Dec (t-1) and the NYSE 70
th percentile B/M value at Dec (t-1). The B/M breakpoints 
are determined from all NYSE companies on CRSP and COMPUSTAT with book-
equity for Dec (t-1), (t-2) and (t-3), market value for Dec (t-1) and June (t).   
Three distress-risk portfolios are created; high distress-risk, mid-levels of 
distress-risk and low distress-risk. The distress-risk portfolios are referred to as 
distressed, grey and solvent, respectively. One set of distress-risk portfolios is formed 
using Ohlson’s model to define the risk of financial distress and a second set is formed 
using Altman’s model. The distress portfolio breakpoints are the NYSE 30
th percentile 
o-score/z-score and the NYSE 70
th percentile o-score/z-score. O-scores/z-scores are 
determined for all NYSE firms meeting the above criteria and having all the required 
data necessary to calculate an o-score/z-score. Eighteen portfolios are formed from the 
intersections of the size, B/M and distress-risk portfolios, as described in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5. Intersecting size, B/M, distress-risk portfolios  
Risk of 
financial 
distress 
Financial 
Distress-risk 
 
Size B/M 
High distressed  small  low   
 distressed  small  medium 
 distressed  small  high 
 distressed  big  low   
 distressed  big  medium 
 distressed  big  high 
Medium grey  small  low   
 grey  small  medium 
 grey  small  high 
 grey  big  low   
 grey  big  medium 
 grey  big  high 
Low solvent  small  low   
 solvent  small  medium 
 solvent  small  high 
 solvent  big  low   
 solvent  big  medium 
 solvent  big  high 
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Following the methodology of Fama and French (1993), only value-weighted 
returns for the full sample of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms are examined for the 
characteristic-balanced portfolios.  
To calculate the characteristic-balanced premia; the value-weighted return for 
each intersecting portfolio is calculated, for each month July (t) until June (t+1). The 
monthly DMS premium is the return for that month earned by all of the distressed 
stocks minus the return for that month earned by all of the solvent stocks. The distressed 
portfolio is formed from the six intersecting portfolios containing firms with a high 
distress-risk. The monthly return earned by distressed firms is calculated as the equal-
weighted average of the returns earned by the six high distress-risk intersecting 
portfolios. The monthly return earned by firms classified as grey and solvent are 
calculated similarly. The return premium, distressed minus solvent (DMS), is the 
difference each month between the simple average of the returns earned by the six high 
distress-risk intersecting portfolios and the six low distress-risk intersecting portfolios. 
The reported returns earned by the high and low distress-risk portfolios and the DMS 
premium represent the monthly returns averaged across the 120 months. 
The SMB and HML premia are calculated similarly to the DMS premium. For 
the small and big firm returns, each month’s return earned by the total small (big) firm 
portfolio is calculated as the equal-weighted average of that month’s return earned by 
the six small (big) firm intersecting portfolios. SMB is calculated monthly as the 
average return earned by the total small firm portfolio, minus the average return earned 
by the total big firm portfolio for that month. The reported average SMB premium is the 
mean of the 120 monthly premiums.  
For the high B/M and low B/M firm returns, each month’s return earned by the 
total high B/M (low B/M) firm portfolio is calculated as the equal-weighted average of 
that month’s return earned by the six high B/M (low B/M) firm intersecting portfolios.  
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The monthly HML premium is the return that month earned by the total high B/M 
portfolio minus the return for that month earned by the total low B/M portfolio. The 
average HML premium is the mean of the 120 monthly premiums.  
 
3.5 Ability of Ohlson’s and Altman’s models to measure 
distress-risk  
 
Ohlson’s (1980) and Altman’s (1968) models are described in Chapter 2. Prior 
to using the scores from these models to measure a firm’s relative level of distress-risk, 
it is determined whether the model represents a valid measure of distress-risk for the 
sample period. The discriminatory power of the models provides justification for using 
the Ohlson and Altman models to measure distress-risk in the investigation that 
follows.
50 
The methodology used to evaluate the discriminatory power of each of the 
models is described below. First, the operational definitions of financial distress used 
for evaluating the bankruptcy prediction models are presented. Second, the method used 
to evaluate the classification accuracy of the models is reviewed. The discriminatory 
power of the Ohlson and Altman models is detailed and discussed in section 4.1.  
3.5.1 Definition of financial distress used to evaluate bankruptcy 
prediction models  
An operational definition of financial distress is required to evaluate the ability 
of the bankruptcy prediction models to determine a firm’s relative level of financial 
distress. The operational definitions used are delisting due to bankruptcy and delisting 
for performance reasons. 
                                                 
50 As noted earlier, the classification ability of the Platt and Platt (1990) was also tested and found to be 
inferior to the Altman and Ohlson models.  
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Most studies of financial distress use legal bankruptcy as the operational 
definition for economic financial distress (Ward and Foster (1997)). However, 
bankruptcy is a very narrow definition of financial distress (Scott (1981), Pastena and 
Ruland (1986)). The risk of financial distress that affects shareholders incorporates 
events other than just the event of bankruptcy (Coats and Fant (1993)). If the risk of 
financial distress is priced, investors would be concerned about the risk of both 
bankruptcy and other distress events. Therefore, the operational definition of financial 
distress that is used to evaluate the suitability of the bankruptcy prediction models to 
examine the relation between distress-risk, B/M and returns needs to be broader than 
bankruptcy. 
Following the methodology of Dichev (1998), the event of ‘delisting for reasons 
relating to financial distress is used as the operational definition of financial distress and 
CRSP delisting codes are used to identify firms where a distress event has occurred.
51 
Two operational definitions of financial distress are used: 1) delisted due to bankruptcy; 
firms with the CRSP delisting code of 574, and 2) delisted due to liquidation, 
bankruptcy and other performance related issues, such as insufficient capital or price too 
low; firms with CRSP delisting codes 400 – 490, 550 – 585. 
Delisting due to bankruptcy is used as an operational definition of financial 
distress because this definition is consistent with the definition used when the Ohlson 
(1980) and Altman (1968) models were originally developed. Performance delisting 
provides a broader definition of financial distress.  
The definition of performance delisting used is slightly different to the definition 
used by Dichev (1998). Dichev used CRSP delisting codes 400 and 572 to identify 
                                                 
51 Some broader definitions of financial distress used in the literature relating to the prediction of financial 
distress are detailed in section 2.9. In addition, bond ratings could be used as a measure of financial 
distress. Bond rating data and data required to identify distress events such as loan default or issue of an 
‘Auditor’s Going Concern’ statement was either not available or very time consuming to gather. 
Therefore, they were not considered to be suitable operational definitions of financial distress, given the 
large sample size.   
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firms that delisted due to liquidation. However, the sample contained no firms with a 
delisting code of 400 and only 2 firms with a delisting code of 572. At the time of data 
collection, delisting codes 400 through 490 and 572 all related to delisting due to 
liquidation and 20 sample firms were assigned these codes. Therefore, CRSP delisting 
codes 400 through 490 and 572 are used to identify firms that delisted due to 
liquidation. 
3.5.2 Ability of bankruptcy prediction models to measure distress-risk 
The sorted distress-risk portfolios are used to assess the ability of the bankruptcy 
prediction models to classify firms that had delisted due to bankruptcy or for 
performance reasons as high distress-risk firms. For each firm where a distress event 
occurred, the distress-risk portfolio the firm is allocated to at June (t) prior to the CRSP 
delisting date in year (t+1) is determined.
52 The classification ability of the bankruptcy 
prediction model is determined by inspecting the proportion of firms that delisted for 
financial distress reasons that is allocated to distress-risk deciles 1 through 3 and deciles 
8 through 10. This process is undertaken using both definitions of financial distress. 
Distress-risk deciles 1 through 3 (8 through 10) consist of the 30% of firms with the 
highest (lowest) o-score or the lowest (highest) z-score. If the o-score/z-score are valid 
measures of financial distress in this period, the majority of firms which delist due to 
financial distress are expected to be allocated into portfolios 1 through 3 and very few 
allocated to portfolios 8 through 10.  
Testing classification ability by assessing the distress-risk portfolio allocation of 
firms at June (t) prior to the CRSP delisting date in (t+1) is equivalent to testing 
predictive ability of the model between thirteen and twenty-four months prior to 
delisting. Portfolios are formed at June (t) using data from the last fiscal year ending in 
                                                 
52 There are 1260 (1288) firms that have data to determine a o-score (z-score) over the sample period and 
that delist for performance reasons. 1220 (1241) of the 1260 (1288) firms have data to determine a o-
score (z-score) in the financial year ending December (t-1), prior to the CRSP delisting date in year (t+1).  
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December (t-1). If fiscal year-end of a firm is December (t-1) and the CRSP delisting 
date for that firm is January (t+1), the gap between the accounting data and delisting is 
thirteen months. If however, the fiscal year-end for a firm is January (t-1) and the CRSP 
delisting date is December (t+1), the gap between the accounting data and delisting is 
twenty-four months.  
Studies relating to the prediction of financial distress show that models usually 
have greater classification accuracy using accounting data from within one year prior to 
the distress event, compared with using data from within two years prior. Therefore, the 
test provides a conservative estimate of the classification ability of the bankruptcy 
prediction models. 
 
3.6 Ability of B/M to classify firms on the basis of distress-risk 
 
  The ability of B/M to discriminate between firms that will and firms that will not 
suffer a financial distress event is determined by testing hypothesis 1. 
H1: When firms are sorted by B/M, the proportion of firms that subsequently 
suffer a financial distress event is substantially larger for firms with a high B/M 
and for firms with negative B/M, than for firms with a low B/M. 
Hypothesis 1 is tested using methodology similar to that used to test whether the 
bankruptcy prediction models represent a valid measure of distress-risk. The operational 
definitions of financial distress are; firms that delisted due to bankruptcy or delisted for 
performance reasons, as defined in section 3.5.1. This allows the classification ability of 
B/M to be directly compared with that of Ohlson’s and Altman’s models. 
The sorted B/M portfolios described in section 3.3.1 are used to test hypothesis 
1. The ability of B/M to classify firms as financially distressed or not financially 
distressed is determined by inspecting the sorted B/M portfolio that each firm for which 
a distress event occurs is allocated to in the year prior to the CRSP delisting date. B/M  
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portfolios 8 through 10 consist of the 30% of positive book-equity firms with the 
highest B/M values. If B/M is a valid measure of financial distress and both high-
positive B/M firms and negative B/M firms are high distress-risk firms, the majority of 
firms that delist due to financial distress should be allocated to B/M portfolios 8 through 
10 and the NegBE portfolio. Similarly, if firms with low B/M are low distress-risk 
firms, very few firms that delist for distress reasons should be allocated to B/M 
portfolios 1 through 3. This process is performed using both operational definitions of 
financial distress and for each of the samples.  
The pattern of the allocation of firms that delist due to financial distress across 
B/M portfolios is compared with the pattern found across the o-score and z-score 
distress-risk deciles. The comparison is undertaken to gauge whether B/M is superior to 
either Ohlson’s or Altman’s models at identifying firms that delist due to financial 
distress.  
 
3.7 What is the relation between distress-risk and B/M?  
 
Section 3.5 outlines the methodology used to establish that Ohlson’s and 
Altman’s models are appropriate instruments to measure a firm’s relative distress-risk. 
Sections 3.7 describes the methodology used to investigate research questions 2 and 3, 
which address the relation between distress-risk and B/M, when distress-risk is 
measured by Ohlson’s and Altman’s models. 
3.7.1 Relative distress-risk and size of firms with negative book-
equity  
  Whether firms with negative book-equity were on average high distress-risk 
firms and systematically different from firms with positive book-equity, was examined 
by testing hypotheses 2a through 2c. Proposition 2a, which addresses the issue of 
whether firms with negative book-equity have high distress-risk, is tested in two parts:  
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H2a1: The majority of firms with negative book-equity are high distress-risk 
firms and are allocated to distress-risk deciles 1 through 3. 
H2a2: Firms with negative book-equity represent a larger proportion of firms 
allocated to the portfolio for distress-risk deciles 1 through 3, than for the other 
distress-risk deciles. 
Examination of the distribution of negative book-equity firm-years across the 
distress-risk deciles is used to test hypothesis 2a1. If firms with negative book-equity are 
on average high distress-risk, the majority of these firms will be allocated to distress-
risk deciles 1 through 3.  
Hypothesis 2a2  is tested by determining, for each distress-risk decile, the 
percentage of firm-years where book-equity is negative and comparing the proportion 
for deciles 1 through 3, to the proportion for deciles 4 through 10. This information 
shows whether the portfolio B/M of some distress-risk deciles is affected more than 
others by the decision whether or not to aggregate the B/M of positive and negative 
book-equity firm-years. 
Evidence regarding systematic differences between firms with positive and 
negative book-equity is provided by testing hypotheses 2b and 2c:  
H2b: There is no significant difference between the mean firm size of firms with 
negative book-equity and firms with high distress-risk and positive book-equity. 
H2c: There is no significant difference between the mean distress-risk score of 
firms with negative book-equity and firms with high distress-risk and positive 
book-equity. 
Firms with high distress-risk and positive book-equity are defined alternatively 
as firms allocated to distress-risk (pos) decile 1 and firms allocated to distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 through 3. Therefore, each hypothesis is tested twice.    
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Preliminary tests of normality of the data show the hypothesis that the data are 
normal cannot be rejected for some variable/decile combinations, but can be rejected for 
others. Therefore, both the non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test and a parametric 
t-test are used to test for significance of differences. Reporting these statistics when 
testing for differences in average attributes of sub-groups of firms follows the approach 
taken by Danielson and Dowell (2001). The Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test provides the 
main test of significance of differences and the parametric t-test is used for 
confirmation. Where the two tests lead to different conclusions, the Wilcoxon Rank 
Sum W test is used to draw conclusions if the hypothesis that the data are normal is 
rejected and the t-test is used if the hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
The t-test used assumes unequal variances. Preliminary examination of the F-test 
for equality of variances shows that the hypothesis of equality of variances is rejected 
for most variable/decile combinations where the hypothesis that the data are normal is 
not rejected.
53 The F-test test for equality of variances is not robust with respect to 
normality of the data (Berry and Lindgren (1996) p515), so the equality of variances 
cannot be established for the variable/decile combinations where normality cannot be 
assumed.  
3.7.2 Relation between distress-risk and B/M  
  Evidence of the relation between distress-risk and B/M, when distress-risk is 
measured using bankruptcy prediction models, is provided first by examining the 
correlation between the relevant variables and then by examining portfolio evidence.  
3.7.2.1 Correlation evidence  
Correlation between distress-risk, B/M and firm size for individual firms 
provides preliminary evidence of the relations that exist between these firm 
                                                 
53 P-values were generally below 0.00 and are not reported in a table.  
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characteristics. The Spearman Rank correlation was used, as preliminary results using 
the Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the data are not normal.
54 Consistent with Dichev 
(1998), correlation is calculated across all firm-years with all measures of o-score, z-
score, B/M and size.
55 To determine the effect of excluding firms with negative book-
equity, correlation is also calculated for all firm-years that meet these criteria and where 
book-equity is positive.  
The reason for examining each correlation is as follows. The correlation between 
o-score and z-score determines whether the two distress-risk measures are consistent in 
their measurement of relative distress-risk. Correlation between B/M and both o-score 
and z-score provides direct evidence relating to the relation between distress-risk and 
B/M. Chan and Chen (1991) and Ohlson (1980) show that a relation exists between size 
and distress-risk. Therefore, the correlation between size and both o-score and z-score 
and the correlation between size and B/M are determined because they may be 
important in interpreting the distress-risk, B/M relation.  
3.7.2.2 Portfolio evidence of the relation between distress-risk and B/M 
  The main evidence in relation to research question 3 is provided through testing 
of hypotheses 3a through 3e. The methodology used to test hypotheses 3a through 3c, 
which address the distress-risk B/M relation at a point in time, is discussed first. This is 
followed by hypotheses 3d and 3e, which address change in B/M as distress-risk 
increases. 
3.7.2.2.1 Sorted distress-risk portfolio evidence 
H3a: When negative and positive book-equity firms are aggregated, a positive 
relation is observed between distress-risk and value-weighted portfolio B/M. 
                                                 
54 P-values were generally below 0.00 and are not reported in a table. 
55 There are 34,162 firm-years in total: 15,973 NYSE-AMEX firm-years and 18,189 NASDAQ firm-
years.   
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H3b: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
equal-weighted portfolio B/M. 
H3c: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
value-weighted portfolio B/M. 
Hypotheses 3a through 3c are tested by observing the pattern in the portfolio 
book-to-market characteristics of the sorted distress-risk portfolios. The distress-risk 
deciles are examined to test hypothesis 3a. These portfolios are formed using the Dichev 
(1998) methodology, where both positive and negative book-equity firm-years are 
aggregated. Therefore, prior to testing the hypothesis, the portfolio size, mean B/M and 
mean trimmed B/M characteristics of these portfolios are observed to determine 
whether they are consistent with Dichev’s findings. Subsequently, the value-weighted 
portfolio book-to-market ratio, Bv/Mv, is examined to test hypothesis 3a. A 
monotonically decreasing pattern in Bv/Mv values, when moving from the highest to 
lowest distress-risk decile, will support hypothesis 3a and the Fama and French (1995) 
proposition that firms with high B/M have high distress-risk. An inverted-U shaped 
pattern in the Bv/Mv values will reject hypothesis 3a and show that Dichev’s (1998) 
findings are robust to the method used to weight portfolio B/M.  
  Hypothesis 3b is tested by observing the pattern in the mean B/M and the mean 
trimmed B/M ratios of the distress-risk (pos) deciles, which only contain positive book-
equity firm-years. The pattern in the Bv/Mv values of the distress-risk (pos) deciles is 
observed to test hypothesis 3c. For both of these hypotheses, an inverted-U shaped 
pattern in portfolio book-to-market across the deciles will cause the hypothesis to be 
rejected. It will also show that Dichev’s results are robust to the exclusion of negative 
book-equity firms. The findings in relation to hypotheses 3b and 3c are also compared,  
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to determine whether the relation between distress-risk and portfolio book-to-market is 
robust to the weighting method.  
3.7.2.2.2 Change in B/M as distress-risk increases 
H3d: As distress-risk increases from low to high over time, B/M increases for 
firms that become financially distressed and whose book-equity remains 
positive. 
H3e: As distress-risk increases from low to high over time, B/M decreases for 
firms that become financially distressed and whose book-equity becomes 
negative. 
Hypotheses 3d and 3e are examined by observing the pattern in the reported 
average tracking-portfolio characteristics over the five years prior to firms being 
classified as high distress-risk. The change in the average distress decile (pos) over the 
five-year period, June (t-4) to June (t), indicates whether the transition from low to high 
distress-risk occurs suddenly or gradually over the five-year period. The pattern in the 
tracking-portfolio mean B/M, for each fiscal year ending in calendar year (t-5) through 
(t-1), shows whether, on average, B/M increases or decreases as distress-risk increases. 
The mean trimmed B/M is examined to determine whether outliers drive the change in 
the tracking-portfolio book-to-market ratio and Bv/Mv is examined to determine 
whether smaller firms drive the change. Tracking-portfolio average book-equity and 
tracking-portfolio average market-equity, for each fiscal year ending in calendar year  
(t-5) through (t-1), is examined to determine whether the change in B/M is driven by the 
change in book-equity and/or change in market-equity.  
The reported variables represent the average of the standardised variables for six 
overlapping periods. Therefore, these variables provide evidence of patterns that exist in 
the data. However, because of the overlapping, it is not possible to draw any 
conclusions about the statistical significance of these patterns.   
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  The tracking-portfolios are classified into two broad groups. The first group 
consists of tracking-portfolios where the distress-risk of the firms increases over the 
five-year period. The second group consists of tracking-portfolios where the distress-
risk of the firms remains high. The primary purpose of the analysis is to determine how 
B/M changes as distress-risk increases. This is shown through the first group of 
tracking-portfolios. The second group is reported as a control. If B/M is a proxy for 
financial distress, then changes in B/M are expected to occur systematically with 
changes in distress-risk. As changes in the level of distress-risk are not as pronounced 
for the second group of portfolios compared with the first group, the pattern of changes 
in the reported variables are also not expected to be as pronounced. 
3.7.2.2.2.1 Testing for survivor bias in tracking-portfolio sub-sample  
The problem with using a sub-sample to examine the five-year B/M history of 
high distress-risk firms is that firms that are high distress-risk at June (t), but do not 
have five years of data, are excluded. These excluded firms would be firms that were 
financially distressed when they were first included on COMPUSTAT, or became 
financially distressed shortly after being included. If the B/M of these excluded firms 
were systematically different from the B/M of high distress-risk firms with five years of 
required data, then the reported results will reflect a survivor bias. 
Firms excluded from the sub-sample were classified as high distress-risk at June 
(t) and had 1, 2, 3 or 4 years of data. To test whether the change in B/M for firms 
excluded from the sub-sample was the same as for firms included in the sub-sample, the 
level of distress-risk of the included and excluded firms for each period of data 
availability, for each portfolio combination, at each period of time would have to be 
controlled. Therefore, it is considered that a full test of survivorship bias is not practical.   
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A test is conducted to provide some evidence that the average B/M of firms 
excluded from the sample is not significantly different from the average B/M of firms 
included from the sample. The null hypothesis tested is: 
H0: The average B/M at (t-1) of firms excluded firms from the sub-sample is not 
significantly different to the average B/M at (t-1) of firms included in the sub-
sample.  
  The test of the hypothesis provides evidence regarding the average B/M 
observed at the portfolio formation date to form the portfolios.
56 It does not provide 
evidence whether the average B/M of these two groups of firms changed in the same 
way over the period prior to the portfolio formation date. 
To perform the test, the firms in the high distress-risk portfolios are sorted into 
firms that are included in the sub-sample and firms that are excluded from the sub-
sample, as follows. Each June (t), t = 1989 to t = 1994, the firms in each of the four 
portfolios: the NegBE portfolio and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1, 2 and 3, are sorted into 
two groups. Group 1 within each sorted portfolio consists of firms that do not have data 
to determine o-score (z-score) and B/M for all of the fiscal years ending in calendar 
years (t-5) to (t-1). Group 2 within each sorted portfolio consists of firms that do have 
the required data.  
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test and a parametric t-test are used to test the 
significance of the difference between the mean B/M of the two groups. The test used is 
dependent on whether the hypothesis that the data are normal can be rejected, when the 
Shapiro-Wilk test is used to test for normality of the data. The t-test assumes equality of 
variances, except where indicated. Equality of variances is not assumed where the F-test 
test shows that variances are significantly different at the 5% level.  
 
                                                 
56 Portfolios were formed at June (t) based on firm B/M for fiscal year ending in (t-1).  
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3.8 What is the relation between distress risk and return? 
 
The analysis described in section 3.7 concentrates on research questions 2 and 3, 
relating to the relation between distress-risk and B/M. The method of examining the 
relation between distress-risk and return is addressed next. Testing of hypotheses 4a and 
4b shows whether the returns earned by high distress-risk companies are different, 
depending on whether the firm’s book-equity is positive or negative. Testing of 
hypotheses 4c through 4e then provides portfolio evidence of the relation between 
distress-risk and return.  
H4a: Average equal-weighted return is not significantly different for firms with 
negative book-equity, relative to positive book-equity high distress-risk firms.  
H4b: Average value-weighted return is not significantly different for firms with 
negative book-equity, relative to positive book-equity high distress-risk firms. 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b are tested by comparing the equal- and value-weighted 
returns, respectively, earned by the NegBE portfolio, with the returns earned by both 
distress-risk (pos) decile 1 and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3. Both the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test and a parametric t-test are used to test whether a significant 
difference exists. The methodology is the same as used to test for differences in size and 
distress-risk. Refer to section 3.7.1 for further detail. 
The return properties of the sorted distress-risk portfolios are examined next to 
determine whether the relation between distress-risk and return is positive. Dichev 
(1998) presents evidence about returns when firms with positive and negative book-
equity are aggregated and returns are equal-weighted. Prior to testing hypotheses 4c 
through 4e, the equal-weighted returns earned by the distress-risk deciles are examined 
to determine whether results are consistent with those reported by Dichev.   
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H4c: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are aggregated, a 
positive relation is observed between distress-risk and value-weighted portfolio 
returns. 
H4d: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
equal-weighted portfolio returns.  
H4e: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
value-weighted portfolio returns. 
The pattern in value-weighted returns earned by the distress-risk deciles is 
examined to test hypothesis 4c. The pattern in the equal-weighted and value-weighted 
returns earned by the distress-risk (pos) deciles is examined to test hypotheses 4d and 
4e, respectively. To assist with clarification of the pattern of returns earned by the sorted 
distress-risk portfolios, a t-test is conducted for each portfolio to test the null 
hypothesis: 
H0: Portfolio average return is not significantly different from zero. 
For each of hypotheses 4c through 4e, finding that portfolio returns decrease 
monotonically, from the high distress-risk portfolio to the low distress-risk portfolio, 
will mean that the hypothesis cannot be rejected and will provide support for the view 
that distress-risk is priced. A clear inverted-U shaped pattern in portfolio returns across 
the deciles will reject the hypothesis and demonstrate that the low returns previously 
documented for both high and low distress-risk firms are robust to the use of alternative 
methodologies.  
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3.9 Return premium – long high distress-risk, short low 
distress-risk firms 
 
  Section 3.8 details the methodology used to provide portfolio evidence 
clarifying the relation between distress-risk and return. This relation is further 
investigated by examining the return earned by trading strategies, long in a portfolio of 
firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with low distress-risk. If 
the market systematically prices distress-risk, the return earned by such a trading 
strategy will be positive and significant. If B/M is a proxy for distress-risk, then the 
distress-risk return premium will not be significantly different from zero after B/M is 
controlled for. In addition, evidence that the distress-risk premium is negative and 
significant will be inconsistent with market efficiency. 
H5a: The return earned by a zero investment trading strategy, long in a 
portfolio of firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with 
low distress-risk, is positive and significant when B/M is not controlled. 
Four trading strategies are investigated to test hypothesis 5a. These strategies 
differ in the level of diversification and the weighting of stocks in the portfolios. 
Examining four different strategies shows whether the size and significance of the 
return premium is sensitive to how the strategy is constructed.  
The distress-risk deciles and the distress-risk (pos) deciles are used, 
alternatively, to construct the trading strategies. Strategies 1 and 3 represent equal-
weighted returns, whilst strategies 2 and 4 represent value-weighted. The returns earned 
by the four trading strategies are calculated as:  
•  Strategy 1 (2): Equal-weighted (value-weighted) return earned by the decile of 
firms with the highest distress-risk minus equal-weighted (value-weighted) 
return earned by the decile of firms with the lowest distress-risk (decile 1 minus 
decile 10),   
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•  Strategy 3 (4): Equal-weighted (value-weighted) return earned by the 30% of 
firms with the highest distress-risk minus equal-weighted (value-weighted) 
return earned by the 30% of firms with the lowest distress-risk (deciles 1 - 3 
minus deciles 8 - 10).
57  
Equal- and value-weighted returns are calculated as described in section 3.4.2. 
For each trading strategy, each month the return earned by both the high and low 
distress-risk portfolios is determined and the high minus low distress-risk premium is 
calculated as the difference between the return earned by the high distress-risk 
portfolio(s) and low distress-risk portfolio(s). The reported portfolio return and the 
reported return premia represent the average of the monthly returns and monthly return 
premia, respectively, across the 120 months, July 1985 through June 1995. For each 
trading strategy, the sign of the premium is observed and a t-test is used to determine 
whether the return premium is significantly different from zero.  
H5b: The return earned by a zero investment strategy, long in a portfolio of 
firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with low distress-
risk, is not significantly different from zero when size and B/M are controlled. 
Hypothesis 5b is tested using a fifth trading strategy. The high and low distress-
risk portfolios used in the fifth trading strategy are the size and B/M characteristic-
balanced distress-risk portfolios, ‘distressed’ and ‘solvent’, formed using the 
methodology of Fama and French (1993), as described in section 3.4.4. The distressed-
minus-solvent (DMS) return premium represents the return on a trading strategy long in 
a portfolios of firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with low 
distress-risk, where the size and B/M characteristics of the high and low distress-risk 
portfolios are similar. To test hypothesis 5b, the sign of the DMS premium is observed 
                                                 
57 To calculate the return premium earned by strategy 4, each month returns are value-weighted across all 
firms within the relevant three deciles to determine the monthly high distress-risk and low distress-risk 
returns.  
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and a t-test is used to determine whether the return premium is significantly different 
from zero.  
 
3.10 Regression evidence 
 
Sections 3.8 through 3.9 describe the methodology used to examine whether a 
relation exists between distress-risk and return and whether this relation results in a 
positive return premium being earned by investors for exposure to the risk of financial 
distress. Next, time-series regression is used to examine whether the market 
systematically prices the return premium relating to the risk of financial distress and 
whether the distress-risk factor is priced independently of the B/M factor, HML. The 
distress-risk return premium used in the regression is the distressed-minus-solvent 
(DMS) characteristic-balanced premium, calculated using the methodology detailed in 
section 3.9 for trading strategy 5. Hypotheses 6a and 6b, address the scenario where the 
returns being explained relate to firms sorted by distress-risk only. 
H6a: The Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-series of returns 
earned by sorted distress-risk decile portfolios. 
H6b: A distress-risk premium does not outperform the Fama and French factors 
in capturing the time-series of returns earned by sorted distress-risk decile 
portfolios. 
  Hypotheses 7a and 7b relate to the scenario where the returns being explained 
relate to firms that have been sorted by size, B/M and distress-risk. 
H7a: The Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-series of returns 
earned by size, B/M and distress-risk characteristic-balanced portfolios. 
H7b: A distress-risk premium does not outperform the Fama and French factors 
in capturing the time-series of returns earned by size, B/M and distress-risk 
characteristic-balanced portfolios.  
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  The full unconditional time-series regression model used to test all of these 
hypotheses is the Fama and French three-factor model augmented with the DMS factor 
premium: 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi  (3.3.7) 
Where: 
(RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio, 
SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return 
on a portfolio of big stocks, 
HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks and a 
portfolio of low B/M stocks, 
DMS is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high distress-risk stocks and 
a portfolio of low distress-risk stocks.
58  
When excess returns and returns earned by zero-investment portfolios are used 
as explanatory variables, a well specified asset-pricing model produces intercepts that 
are indistinguishable from zero (Fama and French (1993) p5). A better model will also 
display higher adjusted R
2 values. If priced, factor loadings are expected to change from 
significant and positive, to not significant, to significant and negative, as indicated in 
Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6. Expected sign for factor loadings. 
  SMB HML  DMS 
Firm 
characteristic 
small big high  low high  risk  low  risk 
Expected sign  + - + -  +  - 
 
Prior to testing these hypotheses, the Pearson correlation was determined for the 
three factor premia; SMB, HML and DMS.
59 When testing hypotheses 6a and 6b, the 
                                                 
58 The definitions of SMB and HML are the same as those used in Fama and French (1993, 1995,1996), 
except that the portfolios have approximately equal distress-risk characteristics, in addition to having 
approximately equal B/M and size characteristics, respectively. All premia are calculated as described in 
section 3.4.4.  
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dependent variables in the regressions are the value-weighted excess returns earned by 
the distress-risk decile portfolios, described in section 3.3.2. To test hypotheses 7a and 
7b, the independent variables in the regressions are the value-weighted excess returns 
earned by the intersecting size-B/M, B/M-distress and size-distress portfolios, described 
in section 3.3.4. Monthly portfolio excess return is calculated by subtracting the 
monthly risk-free rate from the portfolio return. The returns earned by the distress-risk 
decile portfolios and the intersecting quintile portfolios resulted in a wide cross section 
of returns to be explained. Decile and intersecting quintile portfolio returns are reported 
in section 4.4.2.1, Table 4.12, and in Appendix 14, respectively.  
When hypotheses 6a and 6b are tested for the NYSE-AMEX and the NASDAQ 
samples, the dependent variables relate to the sub-sample of firms, but the independent 
variables are market wide factor loadings. Therefore, these regressions assess the ability 
of the market wide return premia to describe the returns earned by portfolios of stocks 
trading on the individual exchanges.  
Value-weighted portfolio returns are used as the dependent variables for three 
reasons. First, this is consistent with the methodology used by Fama and French (1993). 
Second, the independent variables represent value-weighted returns and third, many of 
the portfolios involve holding a mixture of smaller and larger stocks and a value-
weighted strategy is a more realistic strategy for investors.  
3.10.1 Regression Models 
The regressions run to investigate research question 6, when the dependent 
variables are the excess returns earned by the distress-risk deciles, consider various 
combinations of the market factor plus the three factor-premia; SMB, HML and DMS. 
The market factor is included in all regressions, following the finding of Fama and 
                                                                                                                                               
59 The Shapiro-Wilk test showed that the assumption of normality cannot be rejected for the return 
premia.  
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French (1993) and Chan and Chen (1991) that the market factor is required to describe 
stock returns. The literature does not provide any evidence regarding the significance of 
the factor loadings for the SMB, HML or DMS factors, when describing distress-risk 
decile returns. Therefore, it is first determined whether any single factor, in combination 
with the market factor, describes distress-risk decile returns better than the market factor 
by itself. Three- and four-factor combinations are then examined.  
The following models are tested: 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + hi HML +εi      (3.3.1) 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB +εi      (3.3.2) 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + di DMS +εi        (3.3.3) 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi       (3.3.4) 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi       (3.3.5) 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi       (3.3.6) 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi  (3.3.7) 
Where variables are as described earlier.  
  Model 3.3.4, the three-factor SMB/HML model, differs from the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model, as the factor premia considered here control for 
distress-risk, in addition to size and B/M. 
Fama and French (1993) report regression results for a sample of firms that 
include all firms with size and B/M data, but exclude firms with negative book-equity. 
The regressions run to test the hypotheses include all firms that have data to calculate o-
score/z-score, as well as size and B/M and specifically include firms with negative 
book-equity. Prior to testing hypotheses 7a and 7b, the effect of the different sample on 
reported factor loadings and intercepts is determined. The Fama and French (1993) 
model is estimated for all firms in the sample that have size and B/M data and positive 
book-equity. Both the intersecting quintile portfolio returns (dependent variables) and  
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the SMB and HML return premiums (independent variables) are re-calculated using the 
Fama and French (1993) methodology and the positive book-equity sample. The results 
from this regression are reported in Appendix 12. The factor loadings and intercepts 
were similar to those reported by Fama and French (1993). They were also similar to 
those reported when the SMB/HML model (3.3.4) was run against the size-B/M 
intersecting quintile returns (refer to section 4.5.3). Therefore, the inclusion of firms 
with negative book-equity had little effect on the results. 
  Turning now to the testing of hypotheses 7a and 7b, where the dependent 
variables are the excess returns earned by the characteristic-balanced portfolios. The 
literature provides evidence that SMB and HML, in combination with the market factor, 
do a good job of describing the returns of firms sorted by size and B/M (Fama and 
French (1993, 1995, 1996)) and sorted by B/M and distress-risk (Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002)). There is no evidence regarding the significance of the factor loading for DMS. 
Therefore, the three-factor models (3.3.4 through 3.3.6) are tested to determine whether 
DMS subsumes the role of either SMB or HML when describing the returns earned by 
the characteristic-balanced portfolios. The four factor model (3.3.7) is then tested and 
results are compared with those for the three-factor models. Results are examined to 
determine whether the four-factor model outperforms the best three-factor model and 
whether augmenting the SMB/HML model with DMS improves the performance of the 
model.  
 
3.11 Consistency of relations – NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ 
 
  Research question 8 addresses whether the relations between distress-risk, B/M 
and return are the same for firms that trade on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges and 
firms that trade on the NASDAQ. Consistency is expected if the relations are the result 
of B/M being a priced risk factor and a proxy for distress-risk.  
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H8: All reported relations between distress-risk, B/M and return are consistent 
for firms trading on NYSE-AMEX and for firms trading on NASDAQ. 
  To test hypothesis 8, each of the previous hypotheses, except hypotheses 5b, 7a 
and 7b, is tested using the both the NYSE-AMEX and the NASDAQ sub-sample, in 
addition to the ‘All Firms’ sample. The results for the two sub-samples are then 
compared to determine whether the observed relations are consistent across the 
exchanges. As the methodology used when testing hypotheses 5b, 7a and 7b is 
consistent with the methodology used by Fama and French (1993), these hypotheses are 
only tested for the ‘All Firms’ sample. 
 
3.12 Summary 
 
  Chapter 3 has provided detail of the hypotheses tested in order to answer the 
research questions developed in Chapter 2. The methodology employed to test the 
hypotheses has also been explained. The results of these tests are presented in Chapter 
4. The results are discussed in detail and the conclusion is presented regarding whether 
or not each null hypothesis can be rejected. Direct implications for the related research 
question are also discussed. Implications of the results in the context of the current 
literature are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 4 Results 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the methodology used to examine research questions and 
propositions identified in Chapter 2. The research questions address unresolved issues 
regarding the relation between distress-risk, B/M and return. The results are reported in 
Chapter 4 and the implications of the results in the context of the literature are discussed 
in Chapter 5. The first results are used to justify the use of Ohlson’s (1980) and 
Altman’s (1968) models to classify firms based on relative distress-risk. Results relating 
to each research question and hypothesis are then presented in the same order as 
outlined in Chapter 3. The ‘All Firms’ results largely reflect an average of the NYSE-
AMEX and NASDAQ results, except for when considering the high distress-risk 
deciles, where NASDAQ firms dominate. Therefore, ‘All Firms’ results are only 
discussed when they do not represent an average of the sub-samples. 
 
4.1 Ability of Ohlson’s and Altman’s models to measure 
distress risk 
 
Table 4.1, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score), report the number of firms for 
which a distress related event occurred, that were allocated to each distress-risk decile. 
These results were examined to determine whether NYSE-AMEX firms and NASDAQ 
firms delist for different reasons and to assess the ability of Ohlson’s and Altman’s 
models to rank firms based on distress-risk.  
As Ohlson’s and Altman’s models are bankruptcy prediction models, the reasons 
firms delist may affect the ability of the models to classify firms based on distress-risk. 
Examination of the total number of firms delisting shows that the predominant cause for 
delisting was very different for NYSE-AMEX firms compared with NASDAQ firms. 
Panel A shows that, for firms that delisted due to bankruptcy and with data to determine  
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Table 4.1. Ability of Ohlson’s (1980) o-score and Altman’s (1968) z-score to classify 
firms by relative distress-risk  
Each year firms were sorted into distress-risk decile portfolios using, alternatively, 
Ohlson’s o-score (Panel A) and Altman’s z-score (Panel B). The 10% of firms with the 
highest (lowest) distress-risk were allocated to decile 1 (10). The distress-risk decile 
allocation for each firm for which a distress event occurred was observed at June (t) 
prior to the distress event date in calendar year (t+1). This was done for each definition 
of financial distress: Delisted due to bankruptcy (CRSP delist code 574) and 
Performance delisting (CRSP delist codes 400 - 490, 550 – 585). ‘Num’ is the number 
of firms observed in each decile over the period 1985 – 1994, ‘%’ is the cumulative 
percentage.  
Panel A - O-score distress-risk deciles 
  Bankruptcy - 574   Performance Delist - 400-490, 550–585  
NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  Dist 
decile 
Num % Num % Num %  Num %  Num  %  Num % 
High1  58 72  7 44 44 45 95 67 326 30 539 44
2  15 90  6 81 30 76 26 86 279 56 311 70
3  2 93  2 94 15 92 8 91 177 72 148 82
4  4 98  1 100 2 95 6 96 102 82  66 87
5  0 98  3 97 0 96 59 87  60 92
6  1 99  2 99 2 97 58 93  26 94
7  1 100  0 99 3 99 23  95  21 96
8     1 100 0 99 20  97  15 97
9     0 100 0 99 22  99  17 99
Low10     0 100 1 100 13  100  17 100
Total  81   16 97 141 1079   1220
 
Panel B - Z-score distress-risk deciles 
  Bankruptcy - 574   Performance Delist - 400-490, 550–585 
NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’ Dist 
decile 
Num  %  Num %  Num %  Num %  Num  %  Num % 
High 1  37 46  6 38 40 41 66 47 344 31 492 40
2  10 58  2 50 14 56 16 58 205 50 178 54
3  7 67  3 69 10 65 10 65 162 65 128 64
4  8 77  5 100 14 81 16 77 95 73 103 73
5  4 81  6 87 7 81 66 79  74 79
6  4 86  3 90 8 87 49 84  51 83
7  5 93  5 95 5 91 40 87  58 87
8  4 98  4 99 7 96 32 90  32 90
9  1 99  0 99 2 97 45 94  43 93
Low10  1 100  1 100 4 100 62 100  82 100
Total  81   16 97 141 1100   1241
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o-score, 81 of the 97, 84%, were NYSE-AMEX firms. In comparison, for firms that 
delisted for performance reasons, only 141 of the 1220, 12%, were NYSE-AMEX firms. 
Thus, 57% (2%) of NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) firms that delisted for performance 
reasons delisted due to bankruptcy. The percentages were almost identical for firms 
with data to determine z-score.
60 
Further examination of Table 4.1 shows that both Ohlson’s and Altman’s 
models are successful measures of distress-risk. Looking first at NYSE-AMEX firms; 
using both definitions of a financial distress event, both models allocated at least 46% of 
the NYSE-AMEX firms that delisted to distress-risk decile 1. An examination of deciles 
1 through 3 showed that Ohlson’s model had the superior classification ability for 
NYSE-AMEX firms. Altman’s model allocated 67% of bankrupt firms and 65% of 
performance-delisted firms into the first three distress-risk deciles, while Ohlson’s 
model allocated 93% of bankrupt firms and 91% of performance delisted firms into 
these deciles.  
The low number of firms that delisted due to a distress event that were allocated 
to NYSE-AMEX deciles 8 through 10 also shows that both models performed well, but 
Ohlson’s model was superior to Altman’s. Ohlson’s model did not allocate any 
bankrupt firms to these deciles, whereas Altman’s model allocated 6 firms. For firms 
that delisted for performance reasons, Ohlson’s model only allocated 1% to deciles 8 
through 10, whereas Altman’s model allocated 9%.   
The classification ability of the bankruptcy prediction models for NASDAQ 
firms is very similar to NYSE-AMEX firms. The fact that the predominant reason for 
delisting differed for NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms does not appear to affect the 
classification accuracy of the models. 
                                                 
60 1220 (1241) firms for which a distress-related event occurred had sufficient data to calculate o-score  
(z-score) in the fiscal year ending in December (t-1) prior to the CRSP delisting date in year (t+1).  
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The superior classification ability of Ohlson’s model is consistent with the 
findings of Dichev (1998) and Begley, Ming and Watts (1996). Therefore, for 
subsequent analysis, results obtained using Ohlson’s model to measure distress-risk are 
used as the main results. As Altman’s model is also shown to have good classification 
ability and has been used extensively in the literature, this model is used to test the 
robustness of findings to the distress-risk measure utilized.  
 
4.2 Ability of B/M to classify firms on the basis of distress-risk 
 
Examination of research question 1 provides preliminary evidence regarding the 
Fama and French hypothesis that the B/M return premium represents a reward for 
investors undertaking distress-risk. Question 1 asks whether B/M is able to discriminate 
between firms that will and firms that will not suffer a financial distress event. The 
hypothesis tested is: 
H1: When firms are sorted by B/M, the proportion of firms that subsequently 
suffer a financial distress event is substantially larger for firms with a high B/M 
and for firms with negative B/M, than for firms with a low B/M. 
Table 4.2 reports on the proportion of firms that suffered a distress-event that 
were allocated to each sorted B/M portfolio. The results do not support the hypothesis. 
For the NYSE-AMEX sample, only 26% of firms that delisted due to bankruptcy were 
allocated to B/M portfolios 8 through 10 (high B/M). A further 28% had negative book-
equity and 25% were allocated to portfolios 1 through 3 (low B/M). For firms that 
delisted for performance reasons the proportions were: 30% high B/M, 28% negative 
and 23% low B/M. For both definitions of distress, portfolios 4 through 7 accounted for 
the remaining approximately 20% of firms.   
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Table 4.2. Ability of B/M to classify firms on the basis of relative distress-risk 
Each year firms were sorted into B/M portfolios. Firms with negative book-equity were 
allocated to the NegBE portfolio. Firms with positive book-equity were sorted into B/M 
deciles. The 10% of firms with the lowest (highest) B/M were allocated to B/M decile 
1(10). The B/M portfolio allocation for each firm for which a distress event occurred 
was observed at June (t) prior to the distress event date in calendar year (t+1). This was 
done for each of the definitions of financial distress: Delisted due to bankruptcy (CRSP 
delist code 574) and Performance delisting (CRSP delist codes 400 - 490, 550 – 585). 
‘Num’ is the number of firms observed in each portfolio over the period 1985 to 1994, 
‘%’ is the cumulative percentage.  
  Bankruptcy - 574   Performance Delist - 400-490, 550–585 
NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  B/M 
decile 
Num  %  Num %  Num %  Num %  Num  %  Num % 
NegBE  23 28  3 19 26 27 39 28 96  9 135 11
Low 1  13 44  2 31 12 35 20 42 191 26 257 32
2  1 46  2 44 6 45 4 45 125 37 120 41
3  6 53  2 56 5 51 9 51 89 46  90 49
4  5 59  0 56 8 58 6 55 78 53  75 55
5  2 62  3 75 4 63 6 60 79 60  73 59
6  4 67  0 75 4 67 7 65 56 65  60 64
7  6 74  1 81 8 75 8 70 68 71  74 71
8  1 75  1 88 5 80 4 73 66 77  68 75
9  7 84  1 94 7 90 11 81 104 87 100 83
High10  13 100  1 100 12 100 27 100 148 100  189 100
Total  81   16 97 141 1100   1241
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  The B/M portfolio distribution of NASDAQ firms that delisted due to 
bankruptcy was similar to that found for NYSE-AMEX. For firms that delisted for 
performance reasons, the B/M portfolio distribution of NASDAQ firms was slightly 
different to NYSE-AMEX, having a smaller proportion of firms with negative book-
equity and a larger proportion with low book-equity. NASDAQ had: 29% high B/M, 
9% negative and 37% low B/M. The distribution for the ‘All Firms’ sample was similar 
to NASDAQ.   
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Thus, firms that are financially distressed are just as likely to have low or 
negative B/M ratios as they are to have high B/M ratios. When compared with the 
classification accuracy of Ohlson’s and Altman’s models, the reasonably equal 
distribution of high distress-risk firms across high, negative and low B/M portfolios, 
emphasizes the comparatively poor ability of B/M to classify firms on the basis of 
financial distress.  
 
4.3 What is the relation between distress-risk and B/M? 
 
Research questions 2 and 3 explore the relation between distress-risk and B/M. 
Question 2 addresses whether firms with negative book equity are systematically 
different from high distress-risk firms with positive book-equity, in terms of average 
size and distress-risk. First it is established that firms with negative book-equity are, on 
average, high distress-risk firms.  
4.3.1 Are firms with negative book-equity high distress-risk firms? 
H2a1: The majority of firms with negative book-equity are high distress-risk 
firms and are allocated to distress-risk deciles 1 through 3. 
Firms were first ranked by distress-risk then allocated to distress-risk deciles. 
The distribution of negative book-equity firm-years across the distress-risk deciles is 
reported in Table 4.3, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score). The majority of firms with 
negative book-equity had high distress-risk, supporting hypothesis 2a1.  
  Looking first at the o-score deciles, of the 15,973 total firm-years available for 
formation of the NYSE-AMEX o-score distress-risk deciles, book-equity was negative 
for only 608, 3.81%. However, 75% of the negative book-equity firm-years were 
allocated to distress-risk decile 1 and 94% were allocated to distress-risk deciles 1 
through 3, the 30% of firms with the highest distress-risk.  
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Table 4.3. Distribution of firm-years where book-equity is negative, across distress-
risk deciles 
‘Num’ represents the number of negative book-equity firm-years allocated to each 
distress-risk decile. ‘%’ represents the cumulative percentage of negative book-equity 
firm-years allocated to the distress-risk decile(s).  
  Panel A - O-score  Panel B - Z-score 
NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  NYSE-
AMEX 
NASDAQ ‘All  Firms’  Dist 
decile 
Num % Num % Num %  Num %  Num  %  Num % 
High 1  456 75 369 53 825 60 398 65 421 60 819 64
2  88 90 176 78 264 83 87 79 131 79 218 77
3  28   94  86  90 114  92 39 85 54  86  93 85
4  16 96  32 95 48 95 28 90 30 90  58 90
5  11 98  13 97 24 97 20 93 13 92  33 93
6  4 98  6 98 10 98 16 95 11 94  27 94
7  2 99  4 98 6 99 9 97 8 95  17 96
8  0 99  5 99 5 99 10 98 10 96  20 97
9  3 100  4 99 7 99 3 99 14  98  17 99
Low10  0  3 100 3 100 5 100 12  100  17 100
Total  608   698 1306 615 704   1319
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  There were also 698 NASDAQ firm-years where book-equity was negative, 
adding to 1306 in total. The distribution of NASDAQ negative book-equity firm-years 
was similar to NYSE-AMEX. A similar distribution was also found for the z-score 
deciles. These negative book-equity firms were excluded from the sample examined by 
Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996). 
H2a2: Firms with negative book-equity represent a larger proportion of firms 
allocated to the portfolio for distress-risk deciles 1 through 3, than for the other 
distress-risk deciles. 
Table 4.4, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score) report the proportion of the firm-
years allocated to each distress-risk decile that displayed a negative book-equity value. 
The high proportion of firm-years with negative book-equity in distress-risk deciles 1 
through 3 compared with the remaining deciles supports hypothesis 2a2. For the o-score   
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Table 4.4. Percentage of negative book-equity firms years in each distress-risk 
decile 
‘%’ represents the percentage of the total firm-years allocated to each distress-risk 
decile where the book-equity value was negative. Total firm-years available are 34,162; 
15,973 NYSE-AMEX and 18,189 NASDAQ. 
Panel A - O-score  Panel B - Z-score  Decile 
Portfolio  NYSE-
AMEX % 
NASDAQ
% 
‘All 
Firms’ % 
NYSE-
AMEX %
NASDAQ 
% 
‘All 
Firms’ % 
High   1  28.4 20.3 24.2 25.0 23.1 24.0
2  5.5 9.7 7.7 5.5 7.2 6.4
3  1.7 4.7 3.3 2.5 3.0 2.7
4  1.0 1.8 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.7
5  0.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 0.7 1.0
6  0.2 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.6 0.8
7  0.1 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.5
8  0 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.6
9  0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.5
Low  10  0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.5
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
deciles and the NYSE-AMEX sample, 28.4%, 5.5% and 1.7% of the firms-years 
allocated to distress-risk deciles 1, 2 and 3, respectively, had negative book-equity, 
compared with between 1.0% and 0.0% of firms-years allocated to each of the 
remaining deciles. The proportions were similar for the NASDAQ and the z-score 
deciles. Thus, for distress-risk deciles 1 through 3, and in particularly decile 1, the high 
proportion of negative book-equity firms allocated to the portfolio suggests that the 
mean portfolio B/M will be lower if firms with negative book-equity are included in the 
sample, compared with if they are excluded.  
In summary, evidence relating to hypotheses 2a1 and 2a2 shows that although 
book-equity is negative for less than 4% of total firm-years, these firm-years are 
concentrated in the 30% of firm-years with the highest distress-risk. This indicates that 
the way negative book-equity firm-years are treated will impact on reported findings if 
the characteristics of firms with negative book-equity are systematically different to the 
characteristics of financially distressed firms with positive book-equity. The existence  
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of systematic differences in size and distress-risk is explored by testing hypotheses 2b 
and 2c.  
4.3.2 Difference in size and distress-risk - negative book-equity firms 
and high distress-risk positive book-equity firms 
Systematic differences between the size and distress-risk of firms with negative 
book-equity and high distress-risk firms with positive book-equity are examined by 
testing hypotheses 2b and 2c. High distress-risk, positive book-equity firms are defined 
alternatively as firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1 and distress-risk (pos) decile 1 
through 3. Therefore, each of these hypotheses is tested twice. Where normality of data 
cannot be assumed, a Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test is used to determine whether the 
differences in means are significant and a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances 
is used where the hypothesis that the data are normal cannot be rejected. The results are 
reported in Table 4.5  
H2b: There is no significant difference between the mean firm size of firms with 
negative book-equity and firms with high distress-risk and positive book-equity. 
Results for the o-score portfolios, Table 4.5 Panel A, show that, for all except 
one scenario, this hypothesis is rejected. The hypothesis is not rejected when comparing 
the NYSE-AMEX NegBE portfolio with distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3. For the 
NYSE-AMEX sample, negative book-equity firms had an average market value of 
$197.18m. This was significantly larger than the distress-risk (pos) decile 1 average of 
$70.73m (p = 0.001) but not significantly different from the distress-risk (pos) decile 1 
through 3 average market value of $220.09m (p = 0.794). The average market value of 
firms in the NASDAQ NegBE portfolios was $81.04m, significantly larger than the 
average market value of both distress decile (pos) 1 and deciles 1 through 3 firms of 
$21.54m (p = 0.019) and $24.60m (p = 0.008), respectively. ‘All Firms’ results were 
similar to the NASDAQ results.   
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Table 4.5. Size and distress-risk characteristics – negative book-equity firms/high 
distress-risk, positive book equity firms 
Four hypotheses were tested:  
H2b1: (H2b2:) There is no significant difference between the mean firm size of 
the NegBE portfolio and distress-risk decile (pos)1 (deciles (pos) 1 through 3) 
H2c1: (H2c2:) There is no significant difference between the mean distress-risk 
score of the NegBE portfolio and distress-risk decile (pos) 1 (deciles (pos) 1 
through 3) 
The mean size, distress-risk score and trimmed distress-risk score is reported for both 
the NegBE portfolio and the distress-risk (pos) decile(s), for each sample. For example, 
reading across the first row, for the o-score NYSE-AMEX portfolios, the mean size of 
firms in the NegBE portfolio is $197.18m and for distress-risk (pos) decile 1 the mean 
size is $70.73m. A Wilcoxon rank sum W test and a parametric difference of means t-
test are used to test these hypotheses. The parametric test for difference of means 
assumes unequal variances. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality is reported.  
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Table 4.5. cont. Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) portfolios 
Mean size 
$m 
Shapiro-Wilk 
p-value 
 
Distress-risk 
(pos) decile  NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
Wilcoxon 
Rank sum 
W p-value 
T-test  
p-value 
Neg BE  Distress
(pos) 
decile 
NYSE-AMEX           
Dec (pos) 1  197.18 70.73 0.001** 0.000**  0.990  0.015* 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  197.18 220.09 0.794 0.558  0.990  0.010** 
NASDAQ        
Dec (pos) 1  81.04 21.54 0.019** 0.047* 0.010**  0.032* 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  81.04 24.60 0.008** 0.055  0.010**  0.010** 
‘All Firms’        
Dec (pos) 1  133.69 23.08 0.000** 0.001**  0.491  0.063 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  133.69 66.72 0.001** 0.015* 0.491  0.010** 
 Mean  O-score 
 
    
NYSE-AMEX           
Dec (pos) 1  6.37 4.94 0.000** 0.000**  0.881  0.498 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  6.37 3.45 0.000** 0.000**  0.881  0.010** 
NASDAQ        
Dec (pos)1  8.81 11.48 0.063 0.224  0.210  0.010** 
Dec (pos) 1-3  8.81 6.72 0.018* 0.034*  0.210  0.010** 
‘All Firms’        
Dec (pos)1  7.68 8.78 0.436 0.335  0.324  0.010** 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  7.68 5.29 0.004** 0.000**  0.324  0.010** 
 Mean  trimmed 
O-score 
      
NYSE-AMEX      
    
Dec (pos) 1  6.02 4.84 0.000** 0.000**  0.413  0.561 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  6.02 3.42 0.000** 0.000**  0.413  0.010** 
NASDAQ        
Dec (pos) 1  7.22 8.33 0.001** 0.001**  0.794  0.824 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  7.22 5.67 0.072 0.001**  0.794  0.010** 
‘All Firms’        
Dec (pos) 1  6.68 7.07 0.089 0.080  0.423  0.935 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  6.68 4.72 0.015* 0.000**  0.423  0.010** 
** Significant at the 1% level  
*   Significant at the 5% level  
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Table 4.5. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) portfolios 
Mean size 
$m 
Shapiro-Wilk 
p-value 
Distress-risk 
(pos) decile 
NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
Wilcoxon 
Rank sum 
W p-value 
T-test 
p-value 
NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
NYSE-AMEX           
Dec (pos) 1  195.87 682.51 0.000** 0.000**  0.990  0.224 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  195.87 1072.62 0.000** 0.000**  0.990  0.036* 
NASDAQ        
Dec (pos) 1  80.52 23.55 0.011* 0.056 0.010**  0.010** 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  80.52 44.91 0.396 0.201  0.010**  0.077 
‘All Firms’        
Dec (pos) 1  132.79 185.49 0.529 0.255  0.496  0.031* 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  132.79 547.33 0.000** 0.000**  0.496  0.306 
 Mean  Z-score 
 
      
NYSE-AMEX           
Dec (pos) 1  -0.25 0.61 0.000** 0.005**  0.012*  0.321 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  -0.25 1.35 0.000** 0.000**  0.012*  0.015 
NASDAQ        
Dec (pos) 1  -2.72 -1.67 0.796 0.406  0.010**  0.460 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  -2.72 0.50 0.001** 0.026* 0.010**  0.010** 
‘All Firms’        
Dec (pos) 1  -1.61 -0.66 0.353 0.226  0.010**  0.169 
Dec (pos)1 - 3  -1.61 0.89 0.000** 0.006**  0.010**  0.010** 
  Mean trimmed  
Z-score 
      
NYSE-AMEX      
    
Dec (pos) 1  0.21 0.65 0.000** 0.000**  0.104  0.761 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  0.21 1.37 0.000** 0.000**  0.104  0.010** 
NASDAQ        
Dec (pos) 1  -0.16 -1.21 0.089 0.023*  0.041*  0.466 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  -0.16 0.65 0.083 0.084  0.041*  0.010** 
‘All Firms’        
Dec (pos) 1  -0.01 -0.40 0.315 0.138  0.084  0.330 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  -0.01 0.98 0.006** 0.002**  0.084  0.010** 
** Significant at the 1% level  
*   Significant at the 5% level  
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H2c: There is no significant difference between the mean distress-risk score of 
firms with negative book-equity and firms with high distress-risk and positive 
book-equity. 
Comparison of the o-scores in Table 4.5, Panel A, shows that for most scenarios, 
hypothesis 2c is rejected. The exception is when comparing the NASDAQ and ‘All 
Firms’ NegBE portfolio scores with the respective distress-risk (pos) decile 1 scores. 
The NYSE-AMEX NegBE portfolio exhibited a significantly higher distress-risk 
(higher o-score) than distress-risk (pos) decile 1 and deciles 1 through 3 (p = 0.000 for 
both). For the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ samples, firms in the NegBE portfolio had 
lower distress-risk than firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1. However, these differences 
were not significant (p = 0.063 and p = 0.436, respectively). Also, the average distress-
risk of the NegBE portfolio was significantly higher than for distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 
through 3 combined.  
Examination of the trimmed o-scores shows that outliers did not drive the 
direction of the difference between the means. However, for NASDAQ firms, the 
significance of the difference was altered depending whether or not the o-score was 
trimmed. Examining the trimmed o-scores, the lower average distress-risk of the 
NASDAQ NegBE firms, compared with firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1, was now 
significant (p = 0.001). In contrast, the higher distress-risk of NASDAQ NegBE firms, 
compared with firms in NASDAQ distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3, was no longer 
significant (p = 0.072).
61  
Results for the z-score portfolios, reported in Table 4.5 Panel B, also show 
NASDAQ firms with negative book-equity to be, on average, larger than high distress-
risk positive book-equity firms. However, for NYSE-AMEX firms, the average size of 
                                                 
61 The difference between mean trimmed o-scores for the NegBE portfolio and deciles 1 to 3 was not 
significant using the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test (p = 0.072), but was significant using a two sample t-test 
assuming unequal variances (p = 0.001). The hypothesis that the data were normal was rejected for 
deciles (pos) 1 through 3; therefore the Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test was a more appropriate measure of 
significance.  
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firms in the NegBE portfolio was significantly smaller, not larger, than for high distress-
risk positive book-equity firms.  
  When average distress-risk is examined, the NYSE-AMEX NegBE portfolio 
consistently exhibited a higher average distress-risk than the high distress-risk positive 
book-equity firms. In contrast, the NASDAQ results varied with the distress-risk 
measure. The z-score NegBE portfolio exhibited a higher average distress-risk (lower z-
score) than firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1. However, the difference was not 
significant (p = 0.796). Trimmed z-score results suggest that outliers drove the direction 
of the difference. Examining the trimmed z-scores, the NegBE portfolio exhibited the 
lower average distress-risk, but the difference was not significant (p = 0.089), consistent 
with o-score results. 
  To summarize, for NYSE-AMEX firms, the average firm size was mostly 
significantly different when comparing the NegBE firms with high distress-risk firms 
with positive book-equity. However, the direction of the difference was sensitive to 
whether o-score or z-score was used to measure distress-risk, as the average size of 
firms in distress-risk deciles 1 through 3 was sensitive to the distress-risk measure used. 
For both measures of distress-risk, the NYSE-AMEX NegBE portfolio had higher 
average distress-risk than high distress-risk positive book-equity firms. NASDAQ 
NegBE firms were on average larger than high distress-risk positive book-equity firms. 
When examining unadjusted o-scores and z-scores, average distress-risk of the NegBE 
portfolio was significantly higher than for distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3, but not 
significantly different from decile (pos) 1. 
4.3.3 Relation between distress-risk and B/M 
  Research question 3 addresses the relation between distress-risk and B/M. 
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c address the relation at a point in time, while 3d and 3e address 
change in the relation over time. Correlation results, which provide preliminary  
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evidence of the relation between firm characteristics, are discussed first, followed by the 
portfolio evidence used to test the hypotheses. Portfolio results at a point in time are 
discussed in section 4.3.3.2 and the change in B/M over time is discussed in section 
4.3.3.3. 
4.3.3.1 Correlation  
The Spearman Rank correlation of firm characteristics provides initial evidence 
of the relation between distress-risk and B/M and also how size affects the relation. 
Results are reported in Appendix 5. All correlations were significant at the 1% level. 
Results were consistent, whether firms with negative book-equity were included in the 
sample or excluded. 
As expected, the correlation between o-score and z-score was consistently 
negative, as both a higher o-score and a lower z-score represent higher distress-risk. A 
negative correlation was also found between B/M and size and between distress-risk and 
size. The distress-risk and size relation was stronger when o-score was used to measure 
distress-risk than when z-score was used. This is as expected, as the Ohlson model 
explicitly includes size, whereas, all variables in the Altman model are scaled for size.
62 
  The relation between B/M and distress-risk was dependent on the sample and the 
distress-risk measure. For NYSE-AMEX firms, a positive (negative) correlation was 
found between o-score (z-score) and B/M, suggesting a positive correlation between 
distress-risk and B/M for both distress-risk measures.
63 For NASDAQ firms, the 
correlation between the distress-risk score and B/M was negative for both o-score and z-
score. Thus, the NASDAQ o-score (z-score) result was inconsistent (consistent) with 
the proposition that firms with a higher distress-risk had a higher B/M. Portfolio results, 
reported next, show an inverted-U shaped relation between distress-risk and B/M; both 
                                                 
62 Possible problems with regressions resulting from multicollinearity between independent variables are 
discussed on page 222. 
63 Higher o-score (lower z-score) means higher distress-risk.  
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high and low distress-risk firms displayed low B/M values. Whether the high or low 
distress-risk firms had the lowest B/M was sensitive to the distress-risk measure. This 
sensitivity caused the inconsistency found in the B/M distress-risk correlation.   
4.3.3.2 Portfolio evidence – distress-risk, B/M relation at a point in time 
  The book-to-market of the sorted distress-risk portfolios provides the main 
evidence to test the relation between distress-risk and B/M at a point in time. The 
pattern in value-weighted book-to-market, Bv/Mv, for the distress-risk deciles is 
observed to provide evidence in relation to hypothesis 3a. This hypothesis addresses the 
relation between distress-risk and value-weighted B/M, when firms with positive and 
negative book-equity are aggregated. The distress-risk (pos) decile results are examined 
to provide evidence in relation to hypotheses 3b and 3c, which address the relation 
between distress-risk and B/M for firms with positive book-equity. The distress-risk 
decile portfolios are formed using the methodology of Dichev (1998). The relation 
between distress-risk, size and equal-weighted B/M for these deciles is also examined, 
to determine the effect of the different B/M weighting and treatment of firms with 
negative book-equity. Prior to discussing these results, the proportion of NYSE-AMEX 
and NASDAQ firms in each ‘All Firms’ portfolio is determined to clarify the effect this 
has on the ‘All Firms’ results.  
4.3.3.2.1 Percent of NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms in ‘All Firms’ portfolios 
  Table 4.6 shows the proportion of NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firm-years in 
each ‘All Firms’ portfolio. For all except the extreme portfolios, there were a reasonably 
equal proportion of NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms in each portfolio. Consequently 
‘All Firms’ portfolio results were generally an average of the NYSE-AMEX and 
NASDAQ results. In comparison, NASDAQ firms dominated the equal-weighted   
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Table 4.6. Percent of NYSE-AMEX firm-years and NASDAQ firm-years in each 
  ‘All Firms’ sorted distress-risk portfolio 
Each year, for every ‘All Firms’ distress-risk decile and every distress-risk (pos) decile, 
the exchange listing for each firm allocated to the portfolio was identified. The reported 
percentages represent the split in firm-years between firms listed on the NYSE-AMEX 
exchanges and firms listed on the NASDAQ. For example, of the firm-years allocated to 
‘All Firms’ distress-risk decile 1 when o-score was used to measure distress-risk, 21% 
were firms listed on the NYSE-AMEX and 79% were firms listed on NASDAQ (NAS). 
Distress 
portfolio 
Panel A - O-score  Panel B - Z-score 
 Distress-risk 
decile 
Distress-risk 
(pos) decile  
Distress-risk 
decile 
Distress-risk 
(pos) decile 
  NYSE-
AMEX 
% 
NAS 
% 
NYSE-
AMEX 
% 
NAS 
% 
NYSE-
AMEX 
% 
NAS 
% 
NYSE-
AMEX 
% 
NAS 
% 
Neg  BE   47 53   47 53
High    1  21 79 17 83 29 71  31 69
2  32 68 32 68 58 42  58 42
3  40 60 41 59 58 42  57 43
4  48 52 50 50 52 48  52 48
5  53 47 53 47 52 48  52 48
6  58 42 58 42 50 50  49 51
7  60 40 60 40 48 52  48 52
8  60 40 60 40 48 52  48 52
9  55 45 54 46 43 57  43 57
Low   10  44 56 44 56 29 71  28 72
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
portfolio results for the highest distress-risk decile. When portfolios were formed using 
the o-score (z-score) distress-risk measure, 79% (71%) of the firm-years in distress-risk 
decile 1 and 83% (69%) of firm-years in distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 were NASDAQ 
firms. Whether NASDAQ firms dominated the low distress-risk portfolio results was 
dependent on the distress-risk measure. When o-score (z-score) was used, NASDAQ 
firms did not (did) dominate, as 56% (71%) of firms in distress-risk decile 10 and 56% 
(72%) of firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 10 were listed on the NASDAQ.  
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4.3.3.2.2 Positive and negative book-equity firms - O-score distress-risk deciles 
  Table 4.7 reports the portfolio attributes of the distress-risk deciles, where firms 
with positive and negative book-equity are aggregated. The o-score portfolios are 
reported in Panel A.  
4.3.3.2.2.1 O-score, trimmed o-score  
Comparing the o-scores of the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ portfolios shows 
that, except for deciles 9 and 10, NASDAQ deciles had higher distress-risk than NYSE-
AMEX deciles. For example, the NASDAQ decile 1 firms had an average o-score of 
12.62, considerably higher than the NYSE-AMEX decile 1 o-score of 6.02. This 
comparatively higher distress-risk accounted for the high proportion of NASDAQ firms 
in the ‘All Firms’ distress-risk decile 1. 
Comparison of o-scores and trimmed o-scores showed that outliers were more 
extreme for NASDAQ firms than NYSE-AMEX firms. Trimming the top and bottom 
1% of o-score observations had a greater impact on NASDAQ deciles 1 and 10, where 
o-score changed from 12.62 to 8.98 and –3.08 to –2.43, respectively, than on NYSE-
AMEX deciles 1 and 10, where o-score changed from 6.02 to 5.78 and –2.23 to –2.08, 
respectively.  
4.3.3.2.2.2 Size 
A negative relation was generally found between distress-risk and size within 
each sample, confirming the correlation results. For NYSE-AMEX deciles 1 through 9, 
average firm size monotonically increased as distress-risk decreased, from $68.51m for 
decile 1 to $2348.02m for decile 9. Decile 10 firms, with an average size of $2075.58m 
were slightly smaller than decile 8 firms. For NASDAQ deciles, average firm size 
monotonically increased as distress-risk decreased, from $23.56m for decile 1   
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Table 4.7. Portfolio attributes of distress-risk deciles 
Three sets of sorted distress-risk decile portfolios were formed for each measure of distress-risk, o-score and z-score: 1) NYSE-AMEX firms, 2) 
NASDAQ firms, and 3) ‘All Firms’. At June (t) each year, from 1985 to 1994, firms were assigned to decile portfolios according to their relative 
distress-risk. Firms with the highest (lowest) distress-risk were allocated to distress-risk decile 1 (10). O-score and z-score were calculated using data 
from the fiscal year ending in (t-1). A higher (lower) o-score (z-score) represented higher distress-risk. MV was number of shares outstanding at June 
(t) multiplied by share price at June (t), expressed in $ millions. B/M was the book value of equity for fiscal year ending in (t-1) divided by the market 
value of equity at December (t-1). Book value of equity was the COMPUSTAT book value of shareholder’s equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and investment tax credits (if available), minus the book value of preferred stock. Trim o-score, trim z-score and trim B/M were calculated by setting 
observations below (above) the 1
st (99
th) percentile for each year to the 1
st (99
th) percentile value for that year. A portfolio’s o-score, z-score, trim o-
score, trim z-score, MV, B/M and trim B/M for each year (t) was the mean of the respective variables across all firms in the portfolio for year (t). 
Bv/Mv was the sum across firms in the portfolio of the book-equity for fiscal year ending in (t-1), divided by the sum across firms in the portfolio of 
the market value of equity for December (t-1). The results for the o-score (z-score) portfolios are reported in Panel A (Panel B). As trim o-score and 
trim z-score values only differed from the unadjusted variables for distress-risk deciles 1 and 10, the portfolio values for these variables are reported for 
decile 1 and 10 in parentheses under the related untrimmed values.  
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Table 4.7. cont. Panel A - O-score distress-risk deciles  
 NYSE-AMEX  NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Distress 
decile 
O-score 
(TrimO) 
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv O-score 
(TrimO)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv O-score 
(TrimO)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv 
High 1  6.02 
(5.78) 
68.51 -1.30  0.30 -0.35 12.62
(8.98)
23.56 0.10 0.20 -0.04 9.85
(7.82)
30.28 -0.58 0.20 -0.34 
2  3.29 179.72 0.88  0.90 0.57 5.26 28.13 0.55 0.57  0.23 4.36 48.53 0.71 0.73 0.20 
3  2.52 287.90 0.99  0.97 0.72 3.99 32.70 0.84 0.81  0.42 3.26 100.77 0.95 0.93 0.57 
4  1.98 463.98 0.97  0.95 0.77 3.17 39.14 1.01 0.96  0.57 2.55 170.68 0.99 0.96 0.69 
5  1.52 744.72 0.92  0.91 0.76 2.50 50.48 1.00 0.97  0.63 1.96 299.61 0.97 0.95 0.76 
6  1.10 1095.44  0.88  0.88 0.76 1.87 76.31 0.95 0.93  0.68 1.43 521.83 0.94 0.93 0.74 
7  0.67 1548.83  0.81  0.81 0.72 1.23 105.11 0.96 0.94  0.63 0.90 817.65 0.87 0.86 0.74 
8  0.17 2102.18  0.77  0.74 0.65 0.48 136.07 0.83 0.82  0.48 0.28 1202.43 0.79 0.78 0.65 
9  -0.49 2348.02  0.69  0.68 0.55 -0.51 163.87 0.76 0.76  0.48 -0.51 1320.68 0.73 0.72 0.56 
Low10  -2.23 
(-2.08) 
2075.58 0.60 0.56 0.42 -3.08
(-2.43)
310.06 0.66 0.66 0.35 -2.68
(-2.27)
1082.16 0.63 0.62 0.40 
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Table 4.7. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk deciles   
 NYSE-AMEX  NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Distress 
decile 
Z-score 
(TrimZ) 
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv Z-score 
(TrimZ)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv Z-score 
(TrimZ)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv 
High 1  -0.08 
(0.13) 
432.78 -0.85  0.67 1.08 -3.39
(-1.82)
28.71 0.42 0.51 0.10 -1.91
(-0.98)
92.29 -0.13 0.55 0.72 
2  1.36 1083.08  0.92  0.96 0.98 0.95 51.60 0.94 0.89  0.60 1.20 606.26 0.90 0.96 1.01 
3  1.84 1190.44  0.95  0.94 0.86 1.83 45.26 1.00 0.99  0.74 1.83 711.99 0.99 0.97 0.86 
4  2.29 1068.98  0.98  0.96 0.80 2.47 67.49 1.08 1.04  0.69 2.37 555.26 1.02 0.99 0.79 
5  2.75 1042.53  0.92  0.92 0.74 3.05 56.32 1.02 1.01  0.82 2.89 555.78 0.98 0.97 0.70 
6  3.22 1142.86  0.91  0.88 0.60 3.68 86.29 0.89 0.89  0.63 3.43 599.90 0.92 0.90 0.58 
7  3.77 1065.29  0.75  0.77 0.49 4.44 98.86 0.78 0.77  0.57 4.09 570.04 0.76 0.77 0.49 
8  4.53 974.73 0.66  0.66 0.45 5.59 146.36 0.64 0.64  0.46 4.99 589.18 0.67 0.67 0.41 
9  5.70 1422.10  0.57  0.57 0.34 9.14 160.00 0.51 0.51  0.35 6.74 800.16 0.54 0.54 0.30 
Low10  13.88 
(12.29) 
1547.90 0.37 0.37 0.24 45.01
(22.99)
222.43 0.34 0.34 0.21 30.15
(18.09)
504.10 0.35 0.35 0.24 
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to $310.06m for decile 10. The pattern for the ‘All Firms’ sample was the same as for 
NYSE-AMEX. 
Although, within each sample, a negative relation is found between size and 
distress-risk, it cannot be concluded that, in general, smaller firms have higher distress-
risk than bigger firms. NASDAQ decile 10 (lowest-risk) firms, with average market 
value of $310.06m, are of a similar size to the NYSE-AMEX decile 3 (higher-risk) 
firms, with an average market value of $287.90m.  
4.3.3.2.2.3 B/M and trimmed B/M  
For all samples, the relation between distress-risk and both mean B/M and mean 
trimmed B/M described an inverted-U. Both low and high distress-risk firms had low 
B/M and low trimmed B/M values, with NYSE-AMEX decile 1 firms having a negative 
average B/M. NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) deciles 1 and 10 had mean B/M values of  
–1.30 and 0.60 (0.10 and 0.66), respectively. The highest mean B/M values were 
exhibited by NYSE-AMEX decile 3, with a B/M of 0.99, and NASDAQ decile 4, with a 
B/M of 1.01. This suggests that firms that have higher than median levels of distress-
risk but also have not suffered considerable accumulated losses have high B/M values. 
These results are consistent with Dichev’s (1998) finding of an inverted-U shaped 
relation between distress-risk and B/M.  
Outliers largely drove the very low B/M values exhibited by NYSE-AMEX 
distress-risk decile 1, as mean trimmed B/M values for decile 1 were low, but not 
negative. For NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) distress-risk decile 1, the trimmed B/M was 
0.30 (0.20) compared with mean B/M of –1.30 (0.10). The effect of trimming the 
extreme B/M values was small to nil for portfolios other than distress-risk decile 1.   
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4.3.3.2.2.4 Bv/Mv  
  Hypothesis 3a is tested by observing Bv/Mv, the value-weighted measure of 
portfolio B/M. 
H3a: When negative and positive book-equity firms are aggregated, a positive 
  relation is observed between distress-risk and value-weighted portfolio B/M.  
For all samples, the relation between distress-risk and Bv/Mv described an 
inverted-U, rejecting hypothesis 3a. This is consistent with both the mean B/M and 
mean trimmed B/M results. Therefore, the relation between distress-risk and B/M is not 
affected by the method of weighting the firm B/M values. For all distress-risk deciles, 
except for NYSE-AMEX and ‘All Firms’ distress-risk decile 1, the Bv/Mv was smaller 
than the B/M. Thus, once distress-risk was controlled, smaller firms in the decile had a 
higher B/M ratio than larger firms. This is consistent with the negative correlation found 
between B/M and size.  
4.3.3.2.3 Positive and negative book-equity firms - Z-score distress-risk deciles 
  Table 4.7 Panel B shows the portfolio attributes of the z-score distress-risk 
deciles.  
4.3.3.2.3.1 Z-score and trimmed z-score  
Comparison of the portfolio z-scores for NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ shows 
that only the most distressed 20% of NASDAQ firms had higher distress-risk than firms 
in the corresponding NYSE-AMEX deciles. Thus, using both o-score and z-score, the 
20% of NASDAQ firms with the highest (lowest) distress-risk were on average riskier 
(less risky) than the 20% of NYSE-AMEX firms with the highest (lowest) distress-risk. 
In comparison, the relative distress-risk of NYSE-AMEX firms and NASDAQ firms for 
distress-risk deciles 3 through 8 was dependent on the method used to measure distress- 
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risk. Consistent with o-score results, outlier observations were more extreme for 
NASDAQ firms than for NYSE-AMEX firms. 
4.3.3.2.3.2 Size  
A negative relation was found between the distress-risk and size. The relation 
was not as strong for the z-score measure as it was when o-score was used to measure 
distress-risk. This weaker relation for the z-score portfolios was consistent with the 
correlation results and with the inclusion of size as a variable when calculating o-score, 
but not z-score. For the NASDAQ z-score portfolios, the relation between distress-risk 
and size was almost monotonic, increasing from $28.71m for decile 1 to $222.43m for 
decile 10. For the NYSE-AMEX and the ‘All Firms’ samples the negative relation was 
evident for deciles 1 through 3. No clear relation appeared to exist for deciles 4 through 
10. The average size of firms in NYSE-AMEX portfolios 9 and 10 were comparatively 
large. When considering ‘All Firms’ decile 10, due to the comparatively large number 
of NASDAQ stocks in the portfolio, its average market value, of $504.10m, was 
approximately 20 percent smaller than the average market value of deciles 2 through 9.  
4.3.3.2.3.3 B/M and trimmed B/M  
  The B/M results of the z-score distress-risk decile portfolios show the same 
inverted-U shaped pattern as that observed for the o-score portfolios. Consistent with o-
score results, the highest distress-risk deciles of firms in the ‘All Firms’ and NYSE-
AMEX samples exhibited negative mean B/M values. Outliers largely drove the very 
low B/M values of decile 1 in each sample but did not have a large effect on the B/M 
value for other deciles.  
4.3.3.2.3.4 Bv/Mv 
For the NYSE-AMEX z-score portfolios, Bv/Mv monotonically decreased with 
decreasing distress-risk, compared with the inverted-U shaped relation reported under  
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all other scenarios. Therefore, hypothesis 3a cannot be rejected for NYSE-AMEX firms 
when z-score is used to measure distress-risk.  
  To determine the cause of this different relation between distress-risk and 
portfolio book-to-market, the correlation between size and B/M was generated for all 
decile 1 portfolios and reported in Table 4.8. The correlation within z-score NYSE-
AMEX decile 1 was a positive 0.269 and significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the 
correlation between size and B/M was negative for all other decile 1 portfolios, 
consistent with the general correlation results reported in section 4.3.3.1. Further 
investigation (results not shown in a table) showed that, for the z-score portfolios, the 
negative mean B/M value exhibited for NYSE- AMEX decile 1 was driven by the 
smallest of NYSE-AMEX firms. Firm-years allocated to NYSE-AMEX decile 1 with 
positive book-equity had an average size of $545m and an average B/M of 1.3. 
Whereas, firm-years allocated to decile 1 with negative book-equity had an average size 
of $100m and an average B/M of –7.24. Thus, the reported relation between distress-
risk and portfolio B/M for NYSE-AMEX firms was sensitive to the measure of distress-
risk and the method of weighting portfolio book-to-market. 
  Returning to Table 4.7 Panel B, NASDAQ z-score distress-risk decile results 
showed an inverted-U shaped relation between distress-risk and Bv/Mv, rejecting 
hypothesis 3a and consistent with the relation reported for all other scenarios. 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 4.8. Spearman Rank correlation: size and BM within distress-risk decile 1 
The Spearman Rank correlation between size and B/M was determined for firms 
allocated to both o-score and z-score distress-risk decile 1, for NYSE-AMEX and 
NASDAQ. The size-B/M correlation of firms allocated to each portfolio is reported.  
  o-score z-score 
NYSE-AMEX distress-risk decile 1  -0.179** 0.269** 
NASDAQ distress-risk decile 1  -0.258** -0.305** 
** significant at the 1% level   
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The Bv/Mv ratio was generally less than mean B/M, except for NYSE-AMEX 
distress-risk deciles 1 and 2. Thus, generally, once distress-risk was controlled, smaller 
firms exhibited a higher B/M ratio and this was not sensitive to the measure of distress-
risk. The positive size B/M correlation, observed for firms in z-score decile 1, resulted 
in the value-weighted Bv/Mv being larger than the equal-weighted B/M for this decile.
64 
4.3.3.2.4 Summary - Distress-risk B/M relation, positive and negative book-equity 
firms 
In summary, when positive and negative book-equity firms are aggregated, high 
distress-risk NASDAQ firms are on average riskier than the corresponding NYSE-
AMEX firms. Consistent with Dichev (1998), a negative relation is found between 
distress-risk and size and the relation between distress-risk and both mean B/M and 
mean trimmed B/M describes an inverted-U.  
For NYSE-AMEX firms the relation between distress-risk and portfolio B/M is 
only robust to the method of weighting B/M when o-score is used to measure distress-
risk. When z-score is used to measure distress-risk, the relation with portfolio book-to-
market is an inverted-U when B/M is equal-weighted, but positive and monotonic when 
B/M is value-weighted. The reason for this sensitivity is the positive correlation 
between B/M and size for firms allocated to z-score NYSE-AMEX distress-decile 1. 
For NASDAQ firms the inverted-U shaped relation is robust to both the method of 
measuring distress-risk and the B/M weighting.  
4.3.3.2.5 Positive book-equity firms - O-score distress-risk (pos) deciles 
  The B/M attributes of the distress-risk (pos) deciles provide further insight into 
research question 3, presenting the relation between distress-risk and B/M for firms with 
                                                 
64 The size, B/M correlation for decile 2 was calculated. It was positive, but not significantly greater than 
zero, consistent with the Bv/Mv ratio being only slightly larger than the B/M ratio for this decile.   
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positive book-equity. The distress-risk (pos) portfolio attributes are reported in Table 
4.9, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score). 
 4.3.3.2.5.1 O-score and trimmed o-score  
On average, firms in the NASDAQ NegBE portfolio and distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 through 8 had higher distress-risk, as evidenced by a higher average o-score, 
than NYSE-AMEX firms in the corresponding deciles. This is consistent with the 
finding for the distress-risk deciles. 
4.3.3.2.5.2 Size 
For both NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ positive book-equity firms, a strong 
negative relation was found between distress-risk and size. Similar to the distress-risk 
deciles, the NYSE-AMEX average firm size increased monotonically as distress-risk 
decreased until distress-risk (pos) decile 9, with average firm size of $2,502.97m. 
Average firm size for distress decile (pos) 10, of $2,202.66m, was smaller than for 
decile (pos) 8. For the NASDAQ sample, average firm size increased monotonically 
from distress-risk (pos) decile 1, of $21.54m, to decile (pos) 10, of $330.66m.  
4.3.3.2.5.3 B/M and trimmed B/M  
Hypothesis 3b is tested by examination of the mean B/M characteristics of the 
distress-risk (pos) deciles. 
H3b: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
equal-weighted portfolio B/M. 
Distress-risk (pos) decile 1 did not have the highest mean B/M for any of the 
samples. For the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ samples, the relation between distress-risk 
and B/M represented a distinct inverted-U, rejecting hypothesis 3b. However,   
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Table 4.9. Portfolio attributes of distress-risk (pos) portfolios 
Three sets of sorted distress-risk (pos) portfolios were formed for each measure of distress-risk, o-score and z-score: 1) NYSE-AMEX  firms,                
2) NASDAQ firms, and 3) ‘All Firms’. At June (t) each year, from 1985 to 1994, firms with negative book-equity were assigned to the NegBE 
portfolio. Firms with positive book-equity were assigned to decile portfolios according to their relative distress-risk. Firms with the highest (lowest) 
distress-risk were allocated to distress-risk (pos) decile 1 (10). A higher (lower) o-score (z-score) represented higher distress-risk. All variables were 
calculated as described for ‘Table 4.7 – Portfolio attributes of distress-risk deciles’. The results for the o-score (z-score) portfolios are reported in Panel 
A (Panel B). As trim o-score and trim z-score values only differed from the unadjusted variables for the Neg BE portfolio and distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 and 10, the portfolio values for the trimmed variables are reported for these portfolios in parentheses, under the related untrimmed values. 
Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) deciles   
  NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Distress 
(pos)   
O-score 
(TrimO) 
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv O-score 
(TrimO)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv O-score 
(TrimO)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv 
NegBE  6.37 
(6.02) 
197.18 -4.70 -0.82 -0.75 8.81
(7.22)
81.04 -0.90 -0.44 -0.39 7.68
(6.68)
133.69 -2.68 -0.62 -0.63 
High 1  4.94 
(4.84) 
70.73 0.91 0.85 0.52 11.48
(8.33)
21.54 0.42 0.40 0.18 8.78
(7.07)
23.08 0.56 0.53 0.27 
2  3.04 235.94 1.02  1.00 0.69 4.91 21.80 0.76 0.74  0.38 4.02 51.65 0.95 0.90 0.53 
3  2.38 353.60 1.02  0.99 0.76 3.76 30.47 0.98 0.91  0.55 3.07 125.43 1.02 0.98 0.68 
4  1.87 555.34 0.96  0.95 0.78 3.02 44.39 1.01 0.98  0.64 2.41 194.00 1.02 0.99 0.75 
5  1.44 934.14 0.92  0.91 0.75 2.37 56.66 1.00 0.98  0.65 1.86 370.63 0.96 0.95 0.76 
6  1.04 1171.80  0.88  0.87 0.77 1.77 83.44 0.96 0.94  0.70 1.34 577.52 0.94 0.93 0.75 
7  0.60 1723.16  0.81  0.80 0.71 1.14 122.84 0.95 0.93  0.61 0.82 937.25 0.85 0.84 0.73 
8  0.11 2266.04  0.76  0.74 0.65 0.40 156.53 0.82 0.82  0.47 0.22 1326.96 0.79 0.78 0.66 
9  -0.55 2502.97  0.68  0.66 0.52 -0.57 183.86 0.76 0.76  0.47 -0.57 1433.83 0.72 0.71 0.52 
Low10  -2.28 
(-2.12) 
2202.66 0.60 0.56 0.42 -3.15
(-2.48)
330.66 0.66 0.66 0.36 -2.75
(-2.32)
1116.90 0.63 0.62 0.41  
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Table 4.9. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Distress 
(pos)   
Z-score 
(TrimZ) 
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv Z-score 
(TrimZ)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv Z-score 
(TrimZ)
MV B/M  Trim 
B/M 
Bv/Mv 
Neg BE  -0.25 
(0.21) 
195.87 -4.68 -0.81 -0.74 -2.72
(-0.16)
80.52 -0.93 -0.44 -0.39 -1.61
(-0.01)
132.79 -2.68 -0.61 -0.63 
High 1  0.61 
(0.65) 
682.51 1.27 1.19 1.17 -1.67
(-1.21)
23.55 0.95 0.86 0.57 -0.66
(-0.40)
185.49 1.08 0.98 1.19 
2  1.49 1240.30  1.08  1.05 0.95 1.19 57.95 1.05 1.00  0.73 1.37 718.11 1.08 1.04 0.99 
3  1.96 1295.05  1.02  0.99 0.87 1.98 53.25 1.09 1.06  0.80 1.97 738.40 1.05 1.02 0.85 
4  2.41 1048.33  0.98  0.96 0.76 2.59 69.10 1.09 1.06  0.72 2.49 569.73 1.04 1.02 0.77 
5  2.85 1182.60  0.92  0.92 0.73 3.15 70.73 1.01 1.00  0.75 3.00 671.37 0.98 0.97 0.67 
6  3.32 1175.12  0.91  0.88 0.55 3.76 90.31 0.88 0.88  0.67 3.54 604.31 0.90 0.88 0.54 
7  3.87 1230.34  0.77  0.76 0.49 4.52 110.89 0.76 0.76  0.55 4.19 614.07 0.77 0.77 0.49 
8  4.63 1032.50  0.66  0.66 0.44 5.67 169.26 0.65 0.65  0.46 5.10 642.45 0.66 0.65 0.41 
9  5.80 1564.12  0.56  0.56 0.33 8.18 169.05 0.50 0.50  0.35 6.89 864.59 0.54 0.54 0.29 
Low10  14.18 
(12.52) 
1576.69 0.37 0.37 0.24 45.14
(22.81)
235.23 0.34 0.34 0.21 31.12
(18.47)
527.12 0.35 0.35 0.23 
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the inverted-U nearly disappeared for the NYSE-AMEX sample. Therefore, hypothesis 
3b cannot be clearly rejected when examining the NYSE-AMEX sample. NYSE-
AMEX distress-risk (pos) decile 1 had a mean B/M of 0.91, approximately equal to the 
mean B/M of decile (pos) 5 of 0.92. Deciles (pos) 2 and 3 had the highest mean B/M 
values of 1.02. B/M then decreased monotonically to decile (pos) 10, with a mean B/M 
of 0.60. Thus, for NYSE-AMEX firms with positive book-equity, for all except distress-
risk (pos) decile 1, firms with higher distress-risk had higher B/M values. It should be 
noted that firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1 were on average very small NYSE-
AMEX firms, with an average firm size of only $70.73m.  
For the firms in the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ samples, the inverted-U shaped 
relation between distress-risk and B/M became more symmetric when only positive 
book-equity firms were examined, compared with when firms with both positive and 
negative book-equity were examined. The increase in symmetry related to the exclusion 
of firms with negative B/M from distress-risk (pos) decile 1, resulting in a higher mean 
B/M. The high proportion of NASDAQ firms in the ‘All Firms’ distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 and 2 largely drove the inverted-U shaped relation exhibited for the ‘All 
Firms’ sample.  
With all samples, trimming B/M values had the largest effect on the NegBE 
portfolio and a comparatively small effect on any of the positive book-equity deciles. 
Therefore, outliers did not drive the conclusions reached in relation to hypothesis 3b. 
The difference between trimmed and untrimmed B/M values for the NegBE 
portfolio was greatest for the NYSE-AMEX sample. This reflected the extreme negative 
B/M values of a small percentage of NYSE-AMEX firms. The effect of trimming the 
top 1% of B/M values was greater for the higher distress-risk (pos) deciles than the 
lower distress-risk (pos) deciles for each sample, but was not reflected strongly in any  
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single positive book-equity portfolio. This indicates that firms with extreme positive 
B/M values are not necessarily firms with high distress-risk. 
4.3.3.2.5.4 Bv/Mv  
Hypothesis 3c was tested by examining of the Bv/Mv values of the distress-risk 
(pos) deciles. 
H3c: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
value-weighted portfolio B/M. 
An inverted-U shaped relation was evident between distress-risk and Bv/Mv for 
the distress-risk (pos) deciles for all samples, rejecting hypothesis 3c. This is consistent 
with the distress-risk decile results. The rejection of a positive relation between distress-
risk and value-weighted B/M is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of firms with 
negative book-equity. Consistent with equal-weighted B/M results, the inverted-U 
shaped relation was more symmetrical when examining just positive book-equity firms. 
For all samples, each portfolio’s Bv/Mv was smaller than the mean B/M. This 
meant that, once distress-risk was controlled, larger firms, on average, had lower B/M 
values. The absolute size of the Bv/Mv ratio of the NegBE portfolio was much smaller 
than the absolute size of its mean B/M. Therefore, on average, smaller negative book-
equity firms had the most extreme negative B/M values. This is consistent with markets 
bidding down the price of firms as they accumulate losses and the firms with the largest 
accumulated losses having the lowest market value. 
4.3.3.2.6 Positive book-equity firms - Z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  The attributes of the z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles are examined to 
determine the robustness of conclusions drawn in relation to hypotheses 3b and 3c to the 
distress-risk measure. Portfolio attributes are reported in Table 4.9, Panel B.  
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4.3.3.2.6.1 Z-score and trimmed z-score  
  Similar to results reported previously, both positive and negative high distress-
risk NASDAQ firms had higher average distress-risk than NYSE-AMEX firms in 
corresponding portfolios. In addition, low distress-risk NASDAQ firms had lower 
average distress-risk than firms in the corresponding NYSE-AMEX portfolio.  
4.3.3.2.6.2 Size 
Consistent with previous results, firms with positive book-equity exhibited a 
negative relation between distress-risk and size for all samples. For the NYSE-AMEX 
sample, firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1 were, on average, the smallest positive 
book-equity firms, with an average size of $682.51m. Firms with the lowest distress-
risk, deciles (pos) 9 and 10, contained the firms with the largest average size of 
$1564.12m and $1576.69m, respectively. The average size of firms in deciles (pos) 2 
through 8 showed no pattern. In contrast, the relation between distress-risk and size for 
the NASDAQ sample was negative and nearly monotonic.  
4.3.3.2.6.3 B/M and trimmed B/M  
The pattern of the mean B/M values for the z-score distress-risk (pos) portfolios 
shows that conclusions reached in relation to hypothesis 3b are sensitive to the method 
used to measure distress-risk for the NYSE-AMEX and ‘All Firms’ samples, but not the 
NASDAQ sample. When z-score was used to measure distress-risk, for the NYSE-
AMEX (‘All firms’) sample, mean B/M decreased monotonically, from 1.27 (1.08) for 
distress-risk (pos) decile 1, through to 0.37 (0.35) for distress-risk (pos) decile 10. No 
inverted-U shaped relation was evident and hypothesis 3b cannot be rejected. In 
contrast, for the NASDAQ sample, an inverted-U shaped relation between B/M and 
distress-risk was still evident, but not as pronounced as observed for the o-score  
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distress-risk (pos) deciles. Therefore, for the NASDAQ sample, hypothesis 3b is 
consistently rejected.  
When the trimmed B/M values are observed, consistent with mean B/M results, 
hypothesis 3b cannot be rejected for NYSE-AMEX firms, but is rejected for NASDAQ 
firms. For the ‘All Firms’ sample, the hypothesis is not clearly rejected when trimmed 
B/M values are observed. The trimmed B/M of decile (pos) 1, of 0.98, was smaller than 
that observed for decile (pos) 2 of 1.04. A monotonic positive relation between distress-
risk and trimmed B/M was only observed for ‘All Firms’ deciles (pos) 2 through 10, 
where trimmed B/M decreased from 1.04 to 0.35. 
Trimming the bottom and top 1% of B/M values had the largest impact on the 
NegBE portfolio and distress decile (pos) 1, respectively, for all samples. This was 
expected for the NegBE portfolios, which had the lowest average B/M. It was also 
expected for the ‘All Firms’ and NYSE-AMEX decile (pos) 1 portfolios, which 
exhibited the highest average B/M values. However, NASDAQ decile (pos) 1 did not 
have the highest mean B/M. Evidence of high B/M outlier observations in decile (pos) 
1, along with a comparatively small mean B/M, suggests that the range of B/M ratios 
exhibited by firms allocated to NASDAQ distress-risk (pos) decile 1, is large.  
4.3.3.2.6.4 Bv/Mv  
The pattern in the Bv/Mv values shows that, for the NYSE-AMEX and ‘All 
Firms’ samples, conclusions regarding hypothesis 3c are sensitive to the distress-risk 
measure. This sensitivity does not exist for NASDAQ firms. Examining the positive 
book-equity portfolios, a clear monotonic positive relation is evident between distress-
risk and Bv/Mv for the NYSE-AMEX and ‘All Firms’ samples, so hypothesis 3c cannot 
be rejected when z-score is used to measure distress-risk. In contrast, the relation 
between distress-risk and Bv/Mv for the NASDAQ distress (pos) deciles was an 
inverted-U; hence hypothesis 3c is rejected.   
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Except for ‘All Firms’ distress-risk (pos) decile 1, the Bv/Mv for each portfolio 
was smaller than its mean B/M. This is consistent with previous findings of a negative 
correlation between firm size and firm B/M once distress-risk is controlled. 
4.3.3.2.7 Summary – Distress-risk B/M relation, positive book-equity firms 
The distress-risk (pos) decile results show that the negative relation between 
distress-risk and size is not sensitive to the distress-risk measure. NASDAQ firms 
exhibit levels of distress-risk that are both higher and lower, on average, than those 
exhibited by NYSE-AMEX firms. Size and B/M generally exhibit a negative relation 
once distress-risk is controlled, as evidenced by Bv/Mv being smaller than mean B/M.   
Hypotheses 3b and 3c, that a positive relation exists between distress-risk and 
book-to-market for positive book-equity firms, are rejected for the NASDAQ sample, 
for all scenarios. However, for NYSE-AMEX firms, the conclusion is dependent on the 
portfolio book-to-market weighting and the distress-risk measure. When o-score is used 
to measure distress-risk, an inverted-U shape relation is evident and the hypothesis is 
rejected when book-to-market is value-weighted. The inverted-U shape nearly 
disappears when book-to-market is equal-weighted. The relation between distress-risk 
and mean B/M is positive and monotonic for distress-risk (pos) deciles 2 through 10. 
When z-score is used to measure distress-risk, the hypothesis of a positive relation is not 
rejected for NYSE-AMEX firms. For the z-score portfolios, the positive relation is 
robust to the method used to weight book-to-market. 
4.3.3.3 Change in B/M as distress-risk increases. 
  The change in a firm’s B/M as distress-risk increases is explored next. Evidence 
to date has shown that high distress-risk firms may have either a high or a low B/M 
value. It has also shown that most firms with a negative B/M value have a high level of  
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distress-risk and have systematically different size and distress-risk characteristics, 
when compared with high distress-risk, positive book-equity firms.  
  Testing of hypotheses 3d and 3e explores whether, as distress-risk increases, the 
change in B/M is different for firms whose book-equity becomes negative, when 
compared with firms whose book-equity remains positive. If this is so, this difference 
could explain why some high distress-risk firms have a high B/M ratio, while others 
have a low B/M. It also clarifies whether firms with negative book-equity have high or 
low B/M prior to the book-equity becoming negative.  
4.3.3.3.1 Survivor bias in five-year sub-sample 
The change in B/M as distress-risk increases was tested using a sub-sample of 
firms with five years of data. Of the firms classified as having high distress-risk each 
year, 1989 through 1994, approximately 45% had data available for each of the four 
years prior. Therefore, prior to examining the results it was necessary to determine 
whether survivor bias existed in the sub-sample. Results, reported in Appendix 6, show 
that the hypothesis of no significant differences between firms included in the sub-
sample and those excluded, cannot be rejected at the 5% level for all NYSE-AMEX 
portfolios, half of the NASDAQ portfolios and three-quarters of the ‘All Firms’ 
portfolios. For the ‘All Firms’ portfolios, the hypothesis cannot be rejected for all o-
score portfolios but only for two of the four z-score portfolios. Results provide evidence 
against survivor bias existing in the NYSE-AMEX portfolios and the ‘All Firms’ o-
score portfolios. The evidence against survivor bias is not as strong for the NASDAQ 
portfolios or the ‘All Firms’ z-score portfolios. 
As the evidence on survivor bias is mixed, the reported results are treated with 
caution. The findings may not be representative of the B/M history of high distress-risk 
firms that do not have five years of data. This caution is especially relevant for 
NASDAQ firms.  
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4.3.3.3.2 Testing for changes in B/M as distress-risk increases  
  The hypotheses tested to explore change in B/M as distress-risk increased are: 
H3d: As distress-risk increases from low to high over time, B/M increases for 
firms that become financially distressed and their book-equity remains positive. 
H3e: As distress-risk increases from low to high over time, B/M decreases for 
firms that become financially distressed and their book-equity becomes negative. 
These hypotheses are tested by observing the changes in the standardised mean 
B/M, trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv values over a five-year period, for firms allocated to the 
tracking-portfolios described in section 3.3.3. Tracking-portfolio market value and 
book-value are observed first to clarify the reasons for the observed changes in portfolio 
book-to-market. These results are reported in Appendix 7 and discussed briefly in 
section 4.3.3.3.3.1. Mean B/M results for both o-score and z-score are presented in 
Table 4.10, Panels A and B and discussed in detail in section 4.3.3.3.3.2. The trimmed 
B/M and Bv/Mv results are reported in Appendix 7 and discussed briefly in section 
4.3.3.3.3.3. 
Each tracking-portfolio is identified by the decile the firms in the portfolio are 
allocated to at the start and end of the five-year period. For example the tracking-
portfolio of firms that commenced the five-year period in one of the low distress-risk 
(pos) deciles 8 through 10 and ended the period in distress-risk (pos) decile 1 is referred 
to as portfolio (8–10,1). The reported B/M values are standardised, as described in 
section 3.4.3, and interpreted as the tracking-portfolio average relative to the full sample 
average. For example, a standardised B/M value of 0.5 means that the tracking-portfolio 
B/M is half as large as the average B/M for the sample.  
When referring to Table 4.10, on pages 191 to 193, columns labeled 1 and 2 
present the firms that had relatively high distress-risk over the entire period. That is, the 
firms appeared in deciles 0 (the NegBE portfolio), or deciles (pos) 1, 2 or 3 (high  
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distress-risk portfolios) at the beginning and the end of the five-year period. Conversely, 
columns 3 and 4 show firms whose distress-risk increased over the five-year period. 
These portfolios consist of firms that were in low and medium distress-risk portfolios at 
June (t-4), portfolios (8-10) and (4-7), respectively, and declined to high distress-risk 
portfolios 0, 1, 2 or 3 at June (t). As the change in the level of distress-risk was more 
pronounced for firms reported in columns 3 and 4 than for firms reported in columns 1 
and 2, the pattern of changes in B/M should also be more pronounced. 
While some clear patterns are found in the data, the reported variables represent 
the average of standardised variables over six overlapping periods. For this reason it is 
difficult to comment on the statistical significance of any patterns in the data. Results 
reported in Appendix 7, Table A7.1.1 shows there are very few firms starting the five-
year period as high distress-risk with positive book-equity and ending the period with 
negative book-equity. The small number of firms in these portfolios does not affect the 
major findings, which are based on results for the tracking-portfolios whose distress-risk 
increased over the five years. 
4.3.3.3.3 Change in B/M – O-score results. 
4.3.3.3.3.1 Change in market-equity and book-equity 
Results reported in Appendix 7 Table A7.1.2, show that generally distress-risk 
increased evenly over time, from medium or low distress-risk to high. In general, firms 
whose distress-risk increased were typically just under average size or smaller at the 
beginning of the five-years, but become comparatively much smaller as distress-risk 
increased. Once distress-risk was high, firms remained relatively small. NYSE-AMEX 
portfolios generally had a smaller standardised market value than the related NASDAQ 
portfolio. This suggests that, on average, the market allows a NYSE-AMEX firm to  
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decrease in size by a larger proportion than a NASDAQ firm, before being delisted due 
to financial distress. 
In all cases, as distress-risk increased, both the market-equity and book-equity of 
the portfolio declined and the decline was generally monotonic. For most portfolios, 
market-equity declined by about 50%, whether book-equity became negative or 
remained positive. Market-equity also generally decreased over the five-year period for 
firms where distress-risk remained high, even when financial health increased slightly 
over the period. For portfolios whose book-equity became negative, the decrease in 
book-equity averaged about 135%. For positive book-equity portfolios, the size of the 
decline averaged 55%. Therefore, as distress-risk increased, book-equity generally 
decreased relative to average sample book-equity, but decreased at a much faster rate 
when a firm’s book-equity became negative. For book-equity to decrease relative to the 
average, these high distress-risk firms must have been generating low or negative 
earnings. 
4.3.3.3.3.2 Change in B/M 
B/M ratios for the o-score tracking-portfolios are reported in Table 4.10, Panel 
A. Changes in B/M when distress-risk increased (columns 3 and 4) are examined to test 
hypotheses 3d and 3e. Changes in B/M for portfolios of firms where distress-risk 
remained high (columns 1 and 2) are also examined.  
4.3.3.3.3.2.1 Change in B/M - portfolios where distress-risk increased 
In all samples, for firms whose distress-risk increased and book-equity remained 
positive, B/M generally increased as distress-risk increased. However, for some 
portfolios B/M first increased and then decreased slightly as distress-risk increased. 
There were 12 NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ portfolios that exhibited increasing risk 
but whose book-equity remained positive. For 4 of the 12 portfolios, the B/M increased 
from (t-5) to (t-1). For 6 of the 12 portfolios, the B/M increased from (t-5) to (t-2),   
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Table 4.10. Five years standardised B/M - tracking-portfolios 
June of each year (t), t = 1989 to 1994, a second sort was performed on firms with five full years of data prior to June (t) that were allocated to the Neg 
BE portfolio (referred to as portfolio 0) and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1, 2 and 3. These firms were sorted into 4 groups based on the distress-risk (pos) 
decile they appeared in at (t-4). The four groups consisted of firms that appeared in: 1) the Neg BE portfolio, portfolio 0, 2) distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 
through 3, 3) distress-risk (pos) deciles 4 through 7, and 4) distress-risk (pos) deciles 8 through 10. This procedure created 16 portfolios, referred to as 
tracking-portfolios. Standardised mean B/M was calculated for each tracking-portfolio for each of the five years prior to portfolio formation at June (t). 
To standardise variables, the tracking-portfolio average for each year was divided by the related total sample average of the relevant variable, for that 
year. The reported variables represent the simple average of the six annual averages for each of the five years prior to June (t). For example, reading 
down column 4 for NYSE-AMEX firms, the first five rows show that for firms with low distress-risk (ie. allocated to distress-risk deciles 8 through 10) 
five years prior to portfolio formation and with negative book-equity at the portfolio formation date, over the five years, their B/M changed from 2.05 
times the sample average B/M for NYSE-AMEX firms to negative 1.26 times.  
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Table 4.10. cont. Panel A – Five years standardised B/M - O-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3  4 1 2  3  4 1 2  3  4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -1.72 1.09  1.42 2.05 -1.10 0.43 0.90 0.94 -1.55 0.80 1.22 1.31 
0 t-4  -2.93 -2.86  1.58 0.16 -0.84 0.13 0.83 0.67 -1.66 -0.71 1.07 0.58 
0 t-3  -3.51 -4.34  1.32 -0.95 -0.62 -0.14 0.55 0.72 -1.86 -1.72 0.84 0.32 
0 t-2  -12.32 -12.32  -2.89 -0.73 -0.46 -0.43 0.22 0.05 -4.61 -3.69 0.20 -1.27 
0 t-1  -29.56 -19.09  -13.90 -1.26 -0.74 -1.07 -1.89 -1.22 -11.74 -6.39 -4.82 -3.31 
       
High   1  t-5  -1.59 1.29  1.26 0.81 -0.10 0.60 1.07 0.93 -0.69 0.80 1.26 0.97 
1 t-4  -2.99 1.78  2.46 1.37 0.04 0.52 1.13 1.18 -0.35 0.85 1.44 1.26 
1 t-3  -0.30 2.12  2.84 1.63 0.19 0.50 1.24 1.16 0.21 0.87 1.79 1.25 
1 t-2  0.07 2.25  3.04 2.27 0.20 0.53 1.44 1.41 0.41 1.01 1.79 1.50 
1 t-1  0.89 2.45  2.80 2.02 0.19 0.42 0.89 1.09 0.58 0.89 1.44 1.03 
       
2 t-5  -2.50 1.21  1.26 1.05 -0.54 0.84 1.21 1.08 -1.35 1.13 1.23 0.90 
2 t-4  -1.75 1.72  2.02 1.57 0.12 0.86 1.39 1.13 -1.25 1.24 1.53 1.11 
2 t-3  1.43 1.30  2.39 2.47 0.29 0.83 1.54 1.24 0.23 1.23 1.87 1.42 
2 t-2  1.33 2.33  2.45 2.34 0.48 0.90 1.78 1.23 0.36 1.48 1.87 1.63 
2 t-1  5.94 2.52  2.92 1.82 0.58 0.95 1.61 0.95 0.65 1.59 2.08 1.49 
       
3 t-5  -1.26 1.39  1.27 1.08 -0.28 1.02 1.22 1.01 -0.52 1.18 1.24 1.06 
3 t-4  -1.93 2.07  1.83 1.60 -0.00 1.11 1.42 1.14 0.04 1.26 1.42 1.21 
3 t-3  -0.71 2.23  2.14 2.23 0.09 0.99 1.48 1.34 0.46 1.40 1.62 1.66 
3 t-2  0.70 2.31  2.38 2.78 0.28 1.08 1.60 1.59 0.46 1.49 1.79 1.75 
3 t-1  1.14 2.36  2.60 2.54 0.43 1.16 1.92 1.79 0.59 1.60 1.94 1.71  
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Table 4.10. cont. Panel B – Five years standardised B/M - Z-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3  4 1 2  3  4 1 2  3  4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -1.75 1.38  1.23 0.62 -1.10 0.68 0.71 0.46 -1.58 1.08 1.09 0.48 
0 t-4  -2.94 -3.01  1.78 -0.07 -0.84 0.46 0.25 0.40 -1.68 -0.35 0.89 0.26 
0 t-3  -3.71 -4.52  0.98 -0.32 -0.62 0.29 -0.57 0.36 -1.96 -1.29 0.23 0.18 
0 t-2  -12.58 -11.54  -7.66 -1.41 -0.46 -0.03 -1.53 0.28 -4.69 -2.72 -2.68 -0.06 
0 t-1  -29.70 -20.21  -14.98 -8.74 -0.74 -1.45 -1.95 -0.62 -11.72 -6.56 -6.46 -1.40 
       
High   1  t-5  -2.72 1.66  1.11 0.73 -0.54 1.28 1.03 0.53 -1.19 1.51 1.07 0.56 
1 t-4  -3.65 2.27  1.75 0.98 -0.15 1.27 1.30 0.66 -0.06 1.58 1.33 0.73 
1 t-3  2.94 2.54  2.27 1.56 0.32 1.32 1.51 0.82 0.60 1.66 1.61 0.97 
1 t-2  0.90 2.73  2.94 2.61 0.38 1.50 1.74 1.00 0.35 1.81 1.79 1.17 
1 t-1  1.37 3.07  3.04 2.95 0.46 1.62 1.62 1.14 0.93 2.20 1.79 1.30 
       
2 t-5  -4.43 1.57  1.17 0.68 -0.52 1.57 1.14 0.79 -3.31 1.52 1.15 0.74 
2 t-4  1.20 2.08  1.87 1.34 0.09 1.55 1.19 0.94 -1.78 1.56 1.36 0.95 
2 t-3  1.46 2.43  2.23 1.72 0.08 1.45 1.46 1.15 1.63 1.57 1.61 1.21 
2 t-2  1.04 2.36  2.78 1.53 0.35 1.56 1.51 1.37 0.84 1.64 1.90 1.65 
2 t-1  4.66 2.39  3.17 2.02 1.89 1.62 1.67 1.46 2.26 1.60 2.02 1.67 
       
3 t-5  -1.53 1.37  1.17 0.62 -0.21 1.41 1.27 0.62 -0.75 1.41 1.17 0.66 
3 t-4  -3.73 2.00  1.83 1.08 0.08 1.41 1.48 0.79 -0.15 1.50 1.42 0.96 
3 t-3  0.08 2.13  2.23 2.17 0.17 1.32 1.58 1.10 -0.91 1.50 1.64 1.30 
3 t-2  1.07 2.11  2.48 2.35 0.21 1.40 1.79 1.34 0.56 1.51 1.78 1.50 
3 t-1  1.55 2.25  2.73 2.41 0.55 1.34 2.00 1.56 0.87 1.55 2.00 1.84  
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then decreased from (t-2) to (t-1). For the remaining 2 portfolios, the B/M increased 
from (t-5) to (t-3), decreased slightly to (t-2) and then decreased by a larger amount 
from (t-2) to (t-1). For all except two of the tracking-portfolios, the net change in B/M 
over the five-year period represented an increase. Only for NASDAQ portfolios (4-7,1) 
and (8-10,2), did the increase in B/M, followed by a decrease, result in a net decrease in 
B/M over the five-year period. The decreases in B/M were 16.82% and 12.04%, 
respectively. 
  The evidence provides general support for hypothesis 3d, that B/M increases as 
distress-risk increases when book-equity remains positive. However, the conclusion 
cannot be made that B/M increases monotonically with distress-risk. Portfolios where 
B/M increased over each of the five years were generally those whose distress-risk had 
decreased by a smaller amount, NYSE-AMEX portfolios (4-7,2) and (4-7,3) and 
NASDAQ portfolios (4-7,3) and (8-10,3). The percentage increase in B/M for NYSE- 
AMEX portfolios whose distress-risk increased and book-equity remained positive was 
typically 1.5 to 2 times as large as for the related NASDAQ portfolios. 
For every portfolio whose distress-risk increased and book-equity became 
negative, (4–7,0) and (8–10,0), the B/M decreased as distress-risk increased, providing 
support for hypothesis 3e.  
For all portfolios where distress-risk increased, both market-equity and book-
equity showed a negative relation with distress-risk. Whether the B/M ratio increased or 
decreased was dependent on whether market-equity or book-equity decreased at a faster 
rate. For firms whose distress-risk increased and book-equity became negative, market-
equity decreased by approximately 55% over the five years, while book-equity 
decreased on average by approximately 135% over this same period. Since market-
equity could not become negative, it could not decrease by as large a percentage as  
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book-equity. However, book-equity decreased at a faster rate than market-equity over 
the entire period, resulting in a B/M that decreased as the firm’s distress-risk increased.  
For firms whose book-equity remained positive as distress-risk increased, 
market-equity decreased by about 50% over the five-year period, while book-equity 
decreased by approximately 55%. At the same time, the B/M ratio increased by 
approximately 60%. As book-equity decreased by a slightly larger percentage than 
market-equity, the B/M was expected to decrease over the period. This apparent 
inconsistency was accounted for by two factors. First, the increase in B/M was larger for 
smaller firms than bigger firms, thus smaller companies drove the size of the increase in 
B/M.
65 Small firms with extreme B/M values did not have as large an effect on the 
change in book-equity and the change in market-equity, as they had on the change in 
B/M.  
The second factor was that the standardised variables were all expressed as a 
ratio to the sample average of the related variable. Thus, changes in the individual 
standardised variables could not be used directly to determine changes in the 
standardised ratio. However, the changes in the individual standardised variables did 
help explain why the path of B/M was different for firms whose book-equity became 
negative, compared with firms whose book-equity remained positive when distress-risk 
increased. 
4.3.3.3.3.2.2 Change in B/M - portfolios where distress-risk remained high 
For firms whose distress-risk remained high and whose book-equity became 
negative, B/M declined over the five years. However, when book-equity remained or 
became positive over the five-year period, B/M increased. This is generally consistent 
with results reported for firms whose distress-risk increased.  
                                                 
65 Comparison of Table 4.10 Panel A and Table A7.1.6 in Appendix 7, which reports the Bv/Mv for the 
tracking-portfolios, provides evidence that small firms had more extreme B/M values.   
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When firms remained within deciles 1 through 3, except for NASDAQ portfolio 
(1-3,1), B/M increased over the five-year period. This reflected a faster decline in 
market-equity relative to the decline in book-equity. Thus, for a firm with positive 
book-equity, when distress-risk remained high, the market price gradually adjusted 
downward. For firms whose distress-risk remained high but book-equity became 
negative, portfolio (1-3,0), B/M decreased steadily over the five-year period, because 
book-equity decreased by a substantially larger percentage than market-equity.  
  When book-equity changed from negative to positive, B/M increased over the 
five-year period. For most of the portfolios this increase occurred gradually over the 
five-years. The reason for this pattern in B/M was different for each of the samples. For 
the NYSE-AMEX portfolios, (0,1) and (0,3), market-equity increased. For these two 
portfolios, increasing B/M could be attributed to market-equity not increasing as fast as 
book-equity. In contrast, market-equity decreased for NYSE-AMEX portfolio (0,2) and 
all of the NASDAQ portfolios, causing the B/M to increase. This decline in market-
equity suggests that, although the book-equity was increasing, indicating positive 
profits, the market was either slow to incorporate the news of a turnaround, or did not 
believe the turnaround was sustainable.  
4.3.3.3.3.3 Change in trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv 
The trimmed B/M and the Bv/Mv results are reported in Appendix 7, Table 
A7.1.5 and A7.1.6, respectively. These results show that neither outliers, nor small 
firms, drive the direction of the change in B/M that provides support for hypotheses 3d 
and 3e. The same pattern was found for both the trimmed B/M values and the Bv/Mv 
values, as was found in the mean B/M.  
  While outliers and small firms did not drive the general pattern of change in 
B/M over the five-years, they did account for the extreme B/M results at (t-1), 
especially for the NYSE-AMEX sample. Both the trimming of outlier observations and  
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value-weighting of firm B/M had a larger effect on the size of portfolio book-to-market 
at (t-1), than at (t-5). The difference between B/M, and both trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv, 
at (t-1) was larger for NYSE-AMEX portfolios than for NASDAQ portfolios. The 
difference was particularly large for the NYSE-AMEX portfolios whose book-equity 
became negative. 
4.3.3.3.4 Change in B/M – Z-score results 
  The results from the z-score tracking-portfolios, reported in Table 4.10 Panel B, 
are consistent with the o-score tracking portfolios and provide support for hypotheses 3d 
and 3e. The z-score portfolios provide stronger support for hypothesis 3d, compared 
with o-score. B/M continues to increase as distress-risk increases for nearly all 
portfolios and does not begin to decline in periods (t-1) or (t-2). These results are 
discussed in full in Appendix 7, section A7.2. 
4.3.3.3.5 Summary – Change in B/M as distress-risk increases 
To summarize, the change in the B/M as distress-risk increases is different for 
firms where book-equity becomes negative compared with firms where book-equity 
remains positive. When book-equity becomes negative, B/M decreases steadily as 
distress-risk increases, because book-equity decreases at a much faster rate than market-
equity. Therefore, B/M is low prior to book-equity becoming negative. In contrast, for 
firms when book-equity remains positive, B/M generally increases steadily as distress-
risk increases. When z-score is used to measure distress-risk the increase in B/M is 
more consistent across the five-year period than when o-score is used to measure 
distress-risk. The patterns in the data are consistent across samples and robust to the 
method used to measure distress-risk. 
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4.4 What is the relation between distress-risk and return? 
 
Results reported in sections 4.2 and 4.3 show that no clear monotonic relation is 
found between distress-risk and the B/M ratio. This evidence does not support the view 
that the high returns earned by firms with high B/M represent a risk-premium related to 
financial distress. A firm with high distress-risk is equally likely to have a high, low or 
negative B/M ratio. In particular, NASDAQ firms with high distress-risk and very small 
NYSE-AMEX firms with high distress-risk, on average, have low average B/M ratios. 
Firms whose distress-risk is high because they have accumulated large losses have 
either low or negative B/M ratios.  
The view that the B/M premium, HML, represents a return to compensate 
investors for distress-risk is further explored through research question 4, which 
addresses the relation between distress-risk and return. Differences in the returns of 
negative and positive book-equity high distress-risk firms are examined first, followed 
by the returns earned by the distress-risk deciles and the distress-risk (pos) deciles. The 
main findings are based on returns that are adjusted for the negative delisting returns, as 
suggested by Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999). Average returns, 
excluding delisting returns, are reported in Appendix 8 and discussed briefly in section 
4.4.2.4. The main conclusions are not sensitive to the inclusion of delisting returns, 
although the evidence is stronger when they are included. 
4.4.1 Difference in returns - negative book-equity firms and high 
distress-risk positive book-equity firms  
Testing of hypotheses 4a and 4b shows whether firms with negative book-equity 
have different return characteristics, when compared to high distress-risk firms with 
positive book-equity. High distress-risk, positive book-equity firms are defined, 
alternatively, as firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1 and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 
through 3. Therefore, each of these hypotheses is tested twice. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum  
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W p-value is used to determine whether the differences in means are significant, as the 
distribution of returns within each portfolio is not normal. The results are reported in 
Table 4.11, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score).  
4.4.1.1 Equal-weighted returns  
  H4a: The average equal-weighted return is not significantly different for firms 
  with negative book-equity, relative to high distress-risk positive book-equity 
 firms.   
  When examining the o-score portfolios, the equal-weighted returns earned by 
firms with negative book-equity were not significantly different from those earned by 
the firms with high distress-risk and positive book-equity for the NYSE-AMEX and 
‘All Firms’ samples. For NASDAQ firms the returns earned by firms with negative 
book-equity were not significantly different from firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 1, 
but  were  significantly  lower  than  returns  earned  by  firms  in  deciles  1  through  3             
(p = 0.026). This reflects the difference between the negative returns earned by both the 
NASDAQ negative book-equity firms and the distress-risk (pos) 1 firms, compared with 
the low but positive returns earned by firms in distress-risk (pos) deciles 2 and 3. The z-
score portfolio results were consistent with the o-score results, except a significant 
difference was also observed for the ‘All Firms’ sample, for firms in distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 though 3. Therefore, hypothesis 4a cannot be rejected when considering firms 
in decile (pos) 1. When considering NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) firms in deciles (pos) 1 
through 3, hypothesis 4a cannot be rejected (is rejected). 
4.4.1.2 Value-weighted returns  
  H4b: The average value-weighted return is not significantly different for firms 
  with negative book-equity, relative to high distress-risk positive book-equity 
 firms.    
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Table 4.11. Equal- and value-weighted return – negative book-equity firms / high 
  distress-risk positive book-equity firms 
Four hypotheses were tested:  
H4a1: (H4a2:) The average equal-weighted return is not significantly different for 
firms with negative book-equity, relative to firms allocated to distress-risk (pos) 
decile 1 (deciles (pos) 1 through 3).  
H4b1: (H4b2:) The average value-weighted return is not significantly different for 
firms with negative book-equity, relative to firms allocated to distress-risk (pos) 
decile 1 (deciles (pos) 1 through 3). 
Returns are reported for the NegBE portfolio and the distress-risk (pos) decile (s). 
Reading across the top line, for the o-score NYSE-AMEX portfolios, the average equal-
weighted return for the NegBE portfolio and distress-risk (pos) decile 1 is 1.47% and 
1.44%, respectively. The Shapiro-Wilk test rejected the hypothesis that returns were 
normal; therefore, a Wilcoxon rank sum W test is used to test the hypotheses. 
Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) portfolios returns 
Equal-weighted return  Value-weighted return  Distress-risk 
(pos) decile  NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
Wilcoxon 
Rank sum 
W p-value 
NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
Wilcoxon 
Rank sum W 
p-value 
NYSE-AMEX            
Dec (pos) 1  1.47 1.44 0.463 1.44 0.90  0.572 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  1.47 1.24 0.353 1.44 1.07  0.608 
NASDAQ      
Dec (pos) 1  -0.88 -0.19 0.335 0.37 -0.99  0.047* 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  -0.88 0.21 0.026* 0.37 -0.26  0.325 
‘All Firms’      
Dec (pos) 1  0.27 0.11 0.985 1.24 -0.57  0.011* 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  0.27 0.68 0.158 1.24 0.46  0.234 
Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) portfolios returns 
 Equal-weighted  return  Value-weighted  return 
  NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
Wilcoxon 
Rank sum 
W p-value 
NegBE Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
Wilcoxon 
Rank sum W 
p-value 
NYSE-AMEX      
    
Dec (pos) 1  1.40 1.24 0.496 1.41 1.01  0.437 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  1.40 1.21 0.291 1.41 1.05  0.345 
NASDAQ      
Dec (pos) 1  -0.89 0.58 0.078 0.36 -0.17  0.272 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  -0.89 0.61 0.003** 0.36 0.62  0.635 
‘All Firms’      
Dec (pos) 1  0.24 0.73 0.349 1.22 0.88  0.654 
Dec (pos) 1 - 3  0.24 0.91 0.038* 1.22 1.02  0.618 
** Significant at the 1% level  
*   Significant at the 5% level   
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  When examining the differences in value-weighted returns for the o-score 
portfolios, hypothesis 4b cannot be rejected for the NYSE-AMEX sample. When 
examining the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ results, the hypothesis is rejected (not 
rejected) for the distress-risk (pos) decile 1 (deciles (pos) 1 though 3). The rejection for 
decile (pos) 1 reflects the large negative average returns earned by NASDAQ firms in 
decile (pos) 1 once firms were value-weighted, compared with the positive returns 
earned by firms with negative book-equity.  
  When examining the z-score portfolios, for all samples, no significant difference 
was found between the value-weighted returns earned by firms with negative book-
equity and high distress-risk firms with positive book-equity. The difference between 
the o-score and z-score results reflected the different returns earned by firms assigned to 
NASDAQ distress-risk (pos) decile 1 using the two distress-risk measures. The large 
negative value-weighted returns observed for the o-score portfolios were not observed 
for the z-score portfolios. 
4.4.2 Portfolio evidence of the relation between distress-risk and 
return 
Equal- and value-weighted monthly returns are examined to determine whether, 
on average, firms with high distress-risk earned a higher return than firms with low 
distress-risk. A t-test is used to determine whether monthly returns are significantly 
different from zero.  
Dichev (1998) reported that high distress-risk firms earned low equal-weighted 
returns when firms with positive and negative book-equity were aggregated. Returns 
earned by firms allocated to the distress-risk deciles are examined first, to determine 
whether the results are consistent with those reported by Dichev (1998) and to test 
hypothesis 4c. Second, returns earned by firms allocated to the distress-risk (pos) 
deciles are examined to test hypotheses 4d and 4e.  
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4.4.2.1 Distress-risk, return relation - positive and negative book-equity 
firms 
  The equal- and value-weighted returns earned by firms in the o-score and z-
score deciles are reported in Table 4.12, Panels A and B, respectively.  
4.4.2.1.1 Equal-weighted return - o-score distress-risk deciles 
  When distress-risk is measured using o-score, the equal-weighted monthly 
returns earned by firms in the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ distress-risk deciles are 
consistent with the pattern reported by Dichev (1998), except for NYSE-AMEX 
distress-risk decile 1. For NYSE-AMEX firms, those allocated to the highest distress-
risk decile, decile 1, earned the highest return on average, of 1.53%. Decile 2 firms 
earned a low average return of 1.13% and no trend was found across the other deciles, 
whose returns ranged from 1.12% to 1.40%. Returns earned by all deciles were 
significantly greater than zero, with all t-values greater than 2. Thus, the 10% of NYSE-
AMEX firms with the highest distress-risk earned the highest return. However, other 
high distress-risk firms did not earn comparatively high returns. In contrast, Dichev 
reported that the highest distress-risk decile earned the lowest return of 0.60%, with no 
real pattern evident across the other deciles.  
For the NASDAQ distress-risk deciles, the pattern in returns is consistent with 
that reported by Dichev (1998). Returns generally trended upward from decile 1, with a 
return of –0.46%, to decile 9, with a return of 1.23%. The average return of distress-risk 
decile 10 was slightly lower, at 1.19%. Average return earned by firms in distress-risk 
deciles 1 through 3 was not significantly different from zero, with t-values ranging from 
–0.61 to 0.89. Whereas, returns earned by all other deciles were significantly greater 
than zero at the 5% level. Thus, NASDAQ firms with higher distress-risk earn lower 
returns than NASDAQ firms with lower distress-risk. 
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Table 4.12. Portfolio returns of distress-risk deciles  
At June (t) each year, from 1985 to 1994, firms were assigned to decile portfolios according to their relative distress-risk. Firms with the highest 
(lowest) distress-risk were allocated to distress-risk decile 1 (10). O-score and z-score were calculated using data from the fiscal year ending in (t-1). A 
higher (lower) o-score (z-score) represented higher distress-risk.  For all firms that stopped trading for performance reasons, a delisting return was 
estimated for the month directly after the final CRSP return.  An average delisting return of –30% for NYSE and AMEX firms (Shumway (1997)) and 
-55% for NASDAQ firms (Shumway and Warther (1999)) was used. EWDRet is the equal-weighted average return, including delisting returns (in 
percent). MVDRet is the value-weighted monthly return, including delisting returns (in percent). Returns were weighted by the stock’s market value 
for the respective return month. Portfolio results for EWDRet and MVDRet were calculated for each month, from July (t) to June (t+1), then averaged 
across the 120 months, July 1985 to June 1995. A t-test was performed to determine whether the average monthly return was significantly different 
from zero. 
 
Panel A - O-score distress-risk deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ   ‘All Firms’ 
Distress-risk 
decile 
EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value 
High   1  1.53 2.25 1.01 1.72 -0.46 -0.61 -0.67  -1.00 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.13 
2  1.13 2.22 1.06 2.06 0.05 0.09 -0.04  -0.07 0.77 1.35 0.70 1.26 
3  1.21 2.75 1.17 2.59 0.50 0.89 0.16 0.26 1.00 2.00 1.08 2.16 
4  1.27 2.77 1.06 2.50 0.94 1.96 1.17 2.10 1.06 2.38 1.02 2.24 
5  1.34 3.15 1.28 3.17 0.99 2.06 0.43 0.87 1.16 2.54 1.00 2.38 
6  1.12 2.79 1.19 3.07 1.04 2.14 0.71 1.39 1.20 2.75 1.33 3.19 
7  1.27 3.11 1.12 3.02 1.04 2.28 1.44 2.77 1.13 2.74 1.10 3.00 
8  1.40 3.24 1.35 3.50 1.09 2.22 1.30 2.30 1.36 3.04 1.27 3.32 
9  1.31 3.00 1.42 3.41 1.23 2.59 1.40 2.35 1.33 2.98 1.43 3.43 
Low   10  1.21 2.73 1.01 2.57 1.19 2.49 1.63 2.59 1.18 2.60 1.19 2.66  
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Table 4.12. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ   ‘All Firms’ 
Distress-risk 
decile 
EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value 
High   1  1.42 2.52 1.06 2.90 0.19 0.25 -0.15  -0.22 0.65 0.96 0.77 1.47 
2  1.18 3.00 1.11 3.27 0.44 0.80 0.33 0.61 0.93 2.14 1.13 3.35 
3  1.16 2.77 1.13 3.19 0.70 1.42 1.22 2.42 0.92 2.15 1.08 3.03 
4  1.24 2.66 1.06 2.65 0.97 1.95 0.82 1.45 1.16 2.50 1.20 3.04 
5  1.42 2.96 1.37 3.03 1.07 2.28 1.26 2.25 1.19 2.60 1.33 2.99 
6  1.22 2.64 1.28 2.91 0.94 2.00 0.92 1.69 1.18 2.56 1.28 2.87 
7  1.34 2.88 1.33 2.92 0.96 2.02 1.21 2.15 1.17 2.52 1.26 2.85 
8  1.32 2.90 1.46 3.21 1.10 2.27 1.76 2.84 1.18 2.57 1.55 3.35 
9  1.39 3.04 1.29 2.95 0.94 1.90 1.41 2.43 1.14 2.50 1.32 2.91 
Low   10  1.01 2.17 1.21 2.68 0.52 0.96 1.22 1.90 0.74 1.47 1.18 2.36 
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The 'All Firms' deciles generally show that equal-weighted portfolio returns 
increased as distress-risk decreased, similar to the NASDAQ deciles. However, the 
range of returns for the ‘All Firms’ deciles was not as large as for the NASDAQ deciles 
and none of the 'All Firms' deciles earned negative average returns.  
4.4.2.1.2 Value-weighted return - o-score distress-risk deciles 
Value-weighted returns earned by firms allocated to the distress-risk deciles are 
examined to test hypothesis 4c. 
H4c: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are aggregated, a 
positive relation is observed between distress-risk and value-weighted portfolio 
return. 
  Hypothesis 4c is rejected for all samples. NYSE-AMEX firms in both the 
highest and lowest distress-risk deciles earned the lowest average monthly return of 
1.01%. For NYSE-AMEX deciles 1 through 9, returns generally increased as distress–
risk decreased, from 1.01% for decile 1 to 1.42% for decile 9. This pattern suggests that, 
except for the 10% of firms with the lowest distress-risk, the relation between distress-
risk and return is negative. Although the value-weighted return earned by firms in 
deciles 1 and 10 were equal, the return earned by decile 1 firms was only significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level (t = 1.72), whereas the return earned by decile 10 
firms was significantly different from zero at the 5% level (t = 2.57). The lower 
significance of the return earned by firms in decile 1 reflected a high dispersion in 
returns earned by these firms.  
For NASDAQ firms the relation between distress and value-weighted return was 
negative and returns ranged from –0.67% for decile 1, to 1.63% for decile 10. This was 
a larger range than found for equal-weighted returns. Only returns earned by firms in 
distress-risk decile 4 and deciles 7 through 10 were significantly greater than zero.  
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Value-weighted return earned by the 'All Firms' distress-risk deciles also showed 
a slightly negative relation between distress-risk and return. The proportion of 
NASDAQ and NYSE-AMEX firms in the portfolio largely influenced the pattern of 
returns. The low returns earned by ‘All Firms’ deciles 1 and 2 were a result of the large 
proportion of NASDAQ firms allocated to the portfolio. Also, the NYSE-AMEX firms 
allocated to the portfolio were comparatively small, so their higher returns did not 
dominate the value-weighted portfolio return. Returns earned by ‘All Firms’ deciles 3 
through 9 largely reflected the returns earned by the corresponding NYSE-AMEX 
deciles. Returns earned by deciles 3 through 10 were all significantly greater than zero. 
4.4.2.1.3 Equal-weighted return - z-score distress-risk deciles 
  When distress-risk is measured using z-score, Table 4.12 Panel B, the pattern of 
returns is similar to the inverted-U reported by Dichev for z-score portfolios, except for 
NYSE-AMEX distress-risk decile 1. For NYSE-AMEX firms, deciles 1 and 5 had the 
highest return of 1.42%. Low returns were earned by deciles 2, 3 and 10, with decile 10 
firms earning the lowest average return of 1.01%. All returns were significantly greater 
than zero. In contrast, for both the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ samples, the return pattern 
represented an inverted-U and both higher and lower distress-risk deciles earned returns 
that were not significantly different from zero. Therefore, equal-weighted returns earned 
by the NYSE-AMEX extreme deciles are consistent with a positive risk premium being 
earned to compensate for distress-risk. However, the pattern in returns earned by the 
other NYSE-AMEX deciles and by the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ deciles, does not 
support this view.  
4.4.2.1.4 Value-weighted return - z-score distress-risk deciles 
When z-score is used to measure distress-risk, Hypothesis 4c is rejected, as 
value-weighted returns described an inverted-U in all samples. However, the size and  
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significance of returns earned by the higher distress-risk distress deciles differed 
between samples. The average returns earned by firms allocated to the NYSE-AMEX 
deciles were all significantly greater than zero. Returns were lowest for deciles 1 
through 4, both earned a return of 1.06%, and highest for decile 8, with a return of 
1.46% (t = 3.21). For NASDAQ stocks, decile 1 returns were –0.15%, but not 
significant (t = -0.22). Firms allocated to decile 8 earned the highest return of 1.76%     
(t = 2.84). Consistent with equal-weighted NASDAQ returns, value-weighted returns 
earned by the highest and lowest distress-risk deciles were not significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. Thus, when z-score measures distress-risk and returns are 
value-weighted, results do not support the hypothesis that firms with higher distress-risk 
provide higher returns. 
4.4.2.1.5 Summary - distress-risk return relation, firms with positive and negative 
book-equity  
In summary, when the returns of firms with both positive and negative book-
equity are aggregated, except for NYSE-AMEX decile 1, the relation between distress-
risk and return is either negative or it describes an inverted-U. For NYSE-AMEX 
deciles 2 through 10 and for all NASDAQ deciles, the relation between distress-risk and 
equal-weighted return is generally negative. When considering value-weighted return, 
the relation is negative when o-score is used to measure distress-risk and describes an 
inverted-U when z-score is used. Thus, firms with high distress-risk do not generally 
earn higher returns than firms with low distress-risk. The high equal-weighted return 
earned by NYSE-AMEX distress-risk decile 1 firms provides the only support for the 
view that firms with high distress-risk earn high returns. This conclusion is robust to the 
method used to measure distress-risk.  
The high equal-weighted return earned by firms in NYSE-AMEX distress-risk 
decile 1, compared with the comparatively low value-weighted return earned by these  
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firms, suggests that the smallest of the high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms attract a 
distress return premium but higher distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms that are not the 
smallest, do not.  
4.4.2.2 Distress-risk return relation, positive book-equity firms 
The returns earned by the distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 10 are examined 
to test hypotheses 4d and 4e. Returns for the distress-risk (pos) deciles are reported in 
Table 4.13, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score).  
 4.4.2.2.1 Equal-weighted return - o-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
H4d: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
equal-weighted portfolio return.  
  Hypothesis 4d is rejected for all samples. For the NYSE-AMEX sample, firms 
with the highest distress-risk did earn the highest equal-weighted return of 1.44%. 
However, returns earned by firms in distress-risk (pos) decile 2 were low, at 1.10%, and 
no real pattern was observed across the other deciles. For NASDAQ portfolios, the 
relation between distress-risk and return was generally negative, ranging from –0.19% 
for decile (pos) 1 through to 1.19% for decile (pos) 10. These findings are consistent 
with the pattern in returns observed for the distress-risk deciles.  
4.4.2.2.2 Value-weighted return - o-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
H4e: When firms with negative and positive book-equity are segregated, firms 
with positive book-equity exhibit a positive relation between distress-risk and 
value-weighted portfolio return. 
  Hypothesis 4e is rejected for all samples. When examining the NYSE-AMEX 
value-weighted returns, firms in distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 and 10 earned the lowest  
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Table 4.13. Portfolio returns of distress-risk (pos) deciles   
At June (t) each year, from 1985 to 1994, firms with negative book-equity were assigned to the NegBE portfolio and firms with positive book-equity 
were assigned to decile portfolios according to their relative distress-risk. Firms with the highest (lowest) distress-risk were allocated to distress-risk 
(pos) decile 1 (10). O-score and z-score were calculated using data from the fiscal year ending in (t-1). A higher (lower) o-score (z-score) represented 
higher distress-risk. For all firms that stopped trading for performance reasons a delisting return was estimated for the month directly after the final 
CRSP return. An average delisting return of –30% for NYSE and AMEX firms (Shumway (1997)) and -55% for NASDAQ firms (Shumway and 
Warther (1999)) was used. EWDRet is the equal-weighted average return adjusted for delisting return (in percent). MVDRet is the value-weighted 
monthly return adjusted for delisting returns (in percent). Returns were weighted by the stock’s market value for the respective return month. Portfolio 
results for EWDRet and MVDRet were calculated for each month, from July (t) to June (t+1), then averaged across the 120 months, July 1985 to June 
1995. A t-test was performed to determine whether the average monthly return was significantly different from zero. 
Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ   ‘All Firms’ 
Distress 
(pos) decile 
EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value 
NegBE  1.47 1.88 1.44 2.22 -0.88 -1.17 0.37 0.60 0.27 0.39 1.24 2.00 
High   1  1.44 2.32 0.90 1.73 -0.19 -0.26 -0.99  -1.34 0.11 0.17 -0.57 -0.89 
2  1.10 2.24 1.19 2.38 0.05 0.09 -0.36  -0.58 0.86 1.59 0.87 1.64 
3  1.18 2.62 1.11 2.47 0.77 1.43 0.56 0.92 1.08 2.30 1.09 2.18 
4  1.29 2.88 1.19 2.83 0.98 2.09 0.99 1.87 1.05 2.33 0.98 2.23 
5  1.33 3.09 1.29 3.15 1.11 2.27 0.64 1.31 1.25 2.72 1.11 2.64 
6  1.09 2.73 1.11 2.92 0.98 2.04 0.70 1.35 1.16 2.70 1.21 2.95 
7  1.29 3.07 1.11 2.92 1.06 2.26 1.50 2.88 1.11 2.64 1.09 2.95 
8  1.40 3.26 1.41 3.62 1.19 2.43 1.28 2.17 1.37 3.04 1.33 3.41 
9  1.33 3.02 1.42 3.38 1.24 2.64 1.32 2.20 1.31 2.91 1.44 3.35 
Low   10  1.19 2.70 1.00 2.33 1.19 2.48 1.67 2.65 1.19 2.64 1.17 2.66  
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Table 4.13. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ   ‘All Firms’ 
Distress 
(pos) decile 
EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value EW 
DRet 
t-value MV 
DRet 
t-value 
Neg BE  1.40 1.82 1.41 2.81 -0.89 -1.19 0.36 0.59 0.24 0.35 1.22 1.98 
High   1  1.24 2.56 1.01 2.89 0.58 0.76 -0.17  -0.24 0.73 1.18 0.88 2.03 
2  1.14 2.97 1.11 3.21 0.42 0.81 0.85 1.54 1.02 2.53 1.11 3.35 
3  1.26 2.85 1.03 2.87 0.84 1.70 1.17 2.25 0.99 2.24 1.07 2.94 
4  1.34 2.85 1.33 3.12 0.97 2.06 0.76 1.44 1.12 2.48 1.30 3.08 
5  1.26 2.65 1.37 3.04 1.18 2.44 1.19 2.04 1.21 2.61 1.29 2.96 
6  1.32 2.85 1.27 2.86 0.84 1.79 0.91 1.69 1.16 2.50 1.27 2.74 
7  1.31 2.82 1.26 2.78 1.03 2.10 1.20 2.05 1.21 2.61 1.32 2.94 
8  1.35 2.95 1.60 3.48 1.11 2.33 1.81 2.92 1.18 2.55 1.53 3.38 
9  1.39 3.05 1.34 3.03 0.93 1.87 1.40 2.37 1.12 2.47 1.27 2.82 
Low   10  1.01 2.20 1.21 2.67 0.56 1.03 1.22 1.89 0.78 1.55 1.20 2.39 
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average return, of 0.90% and 1.00%, respectively and decile (pos) 1 average returns 
were only significantly greater than zero at the 10% level (t = 1.73). In addition, the 
relation between distress-risk and return was generally negative and the highest returns 
were earned by firms in deciles (pos) 8 and 9, with returns of 1.41% (t = 3.62) and 
1.42% (t = 3.38), respectively. For NASDAQ firms, a negative relation existed between 
distress-risk and value-weighted return, increasing from the distress-risk (pos) decile 1 
return of –0.99% (t = -1.34), to the decile (pos) 10 return of 1.67% (t = 2.65). Only 
deciles (pos) 7 through 10 earned a return that was significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level. These results are consistent with the pattern in returns observed for the 
distress-risk deciles.  
4.4.2.2.3 Equal-weighted return - z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  Hypothesis 4d is also rejected when z-score is used to measure distress-risk. For 
the NYSE-AMEX deciles, the 10% of the firms with the lowest distress-risk did earn a 
comparatively low return, of 1.01% (t = 2.20). However, firms in distress-risk (pos) 
decile 1 did not earn the highest return and the relation was generally negative for 
deciles (pos) 2 through 9, where returns increased from 1.14% (t = 2.97) through to 
1.39% (t = 3.05), respectively. For the NASDAQ sample the pattern of returns generally 
described an inverted-U; only firms in distress-risk (pos) deciles 4, 5, 7 and 8 earned an 
average return that was greater than zero at the 5% level.  
4.4.2.2.4 Value-weighted return - z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles 
  Consistent with the o-score results, hypothesis 4e is rejected when z-score is 
used to measure distress-risk. For both the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ sample, firms 
allocated to distress-risk (pos) decile 1 earned the lowest return, of 1.01% (t = 2.89) and 
–0.17% (t = -0.24), respectively. For both samples, the highest average return was  
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earned by firms allocated to decile (pos) 8; 1.60% (t = 3.48) for NYSE-AMEX and 
1.81% (t = 2.92) for NASDAQ.  
4.4.2.2.5 Summary - distress-risk return relation, firms with positive book-equity  
In summary, although the pattern of returns is slightly different when z-score is 
used to measure distress-risk, compared with when o-score is used, the conclusion that 
hypotheses 4d and 4e are rejected for all samples is robust to the method used to 
measure distress-risk. When the returns of firms with positive book-equity are 
considered, except for the equal-weighted return of NYSE-AMEX decile 1, the relation 
between distress-risk and return is either negative or describes an inverted-U, with the 
highest distress-risk firms returning comparatively low returns.  
4.4.2.3 Sensitivity of the distress-risk, return relation to inclusion of 
negative book-equity firms  
4.4.2.3.1 Equal-weighted return 
When returns were equal-weighted, aggregation of firms with positive and 
negative book-equity only changed the relation between distress-risk and returns for 
NYSE-AMEX z-score portfolios. For NYSE-AMEX o-score portfolios, firms with the 
highest distress-risk, whether they had positive or negative book-equity, had the highest 
equal-weighted returns. There was no other clear relation between distress-risk and 
equal-weighted return for NYSE-AMEX firms. For the z-score portfolios, although the 
returns earned by negative book-equity firms and high distress-risk positive book-equity 
firms were not significantly different, firms with negative book-equity drove the high 
return, of 1.42% (t = 2.52), earned by firms in distress-risk decile 1. When only the 10% 
of firms with the highest distress-risk and positive book-equity were considered, the 
equal-weighted return was 1.24% (t = 2.56), which was neither the lowest nor highest 
equal-weighted return reported for the distress-risk (pos) deciles.   
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When considering the NASDAQ portfolios, even though high distress-risk 
positive book-equity firms earned a higher return than those with negative book-equity, 
high distress-risk NASDAQ firms consistently earned a lower return than NASDAQ 
firms with lower distress-risk. For the o-score (z-score) portfolios, the clear negative 
(inverted-U) relation between equal-weighted return and distress-risk was robust to the 
inclusion or exclusion of firms with negative book-equity. 
4.4.2.3.2 Value-weighted return 
For both NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms, although firms with negative 
book-equity earned higher value-weighted returns than firms with high distress-risk and 
positive book-equity, the general pattern found in returns was robust to whether or not 
firms with negative and positive book-equity were aggregated. For both scenarios, the 
10% of firms with the highest distress-risk earned low value-weighted returns, when 
compared with lower distress-risk portfolios.   
4.4.2.4 Sensitivity of distress-risk, return relation to inclusion of delisting 
returns 
The main findings reflect returns that include estimated delisting returns. 
Returns were also calculated without the adjustment for delisting returns. The 
unadjusted returns are reported in Appendix 8 for both the distress-risk deciles and the 
distress-risk (pos) deciles.  
In brief, the observed pattern of return is not sensitive to the inclusion of 
delisting returns for any of the scenarios, except for the equal-weighted return earned by 
firms in both z-score distress-risk decile 1 and z-score distress-risk (pos) decile 1, for 
the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ samples. Prior to the inclusion of delisting returns, the 
average return earned by firms in these portfolios was comparatively high. After  
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delisting returns were included, the average return was low.
66 However, as the pattern of 
returns for z-score deciles and deciles (pos) 2 through 10 described an inverted-U, both 
with and without the adjustment, the conclusion to reject the hypothesis of a positive 
relation between distress-risk and equal-weighted return is not sensitive to the 
adjustment for delisting returns. Refer to Appendix 8 for further discussion. 
4.4.3 Return premium evidence of the relation between distress-risk 
and return 
Section 4.4.2 addresses the pattern of returns earned by sorted distress-risk 
portfolios. The relation between distress-risk and return is explored further through 
research question 5, which addresses whether a positive return premium is earned by 
high distress-risk firms, when compared with low distress-risk firms. A positive 
premium is expected if the market demands additional return for exposure to distress-
risk. This question is explored by testing whether the return premium is positive when 
the Fama and French factors of size and B/M are not (are) controlled, by testing 
hypothesis 5a (5b).  
4.4.3.1 Distress-risk return premium when B/M and size are not controlled 
H5a: The return earned by a zero investment trading strategy, long in a 
portfolio of firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with 
low distress-risk, is positive and significant when B/M and size are not 
controlled. 
The premia earned by four zero investment strategies are examined to test 
hypothesis 5a. The trading strategies are constructed using first the distress-risk decile 
                                                 
66 This is reasonable, as it is reported in Appendix 8, Table A8.1, that approximately 90% of firms that 
delisted for performance reasons were NASDAQ firms. In addition, section 4.1 shows that 30% or more 
of firms that delisted were allocated to distress-risk decile 1. Thus, the effect of adjusting for delisting 
returns was greatest for NASDAQ deciles and especially NASDAQ distress-risk decile 1 and ‘All Firm’ 
distress-risk decile 1, where more than 70% of the firms were listed on NASDAQ.  
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portfolios and then the distress-risk (pos) decile portfolios. Return premia for the 4 
strategies are calculated as:  
•  Strategies 1 and 2: Return earned by decile 1 firms minus return earned by decile 10 
firms, where the returns within the deciles are equal- and value-weighted, 
respectively (decile 1 minus decile 10), and 
•  Strategies 3 and 4: Return earned by the 30% of firms with the highest distress-risk 
minus return earned by the 30% of firms with the lowest distress risk, where returns 
are equal- and value-weighted, respectively, within the relevant three deciles 
(deciles 1-3 minus deciles 8-10).  
  Tables 4.14 and 4.15 report the return premia for strategies 1 through 4, 
constructed using the distress-risk deciles and the distress-risk (pos) deciles, 
respectively. O-score results are presented in Panel A and z-score in Panel B. 
4.4.3.1.1 O-score premia 
  None of the return premia for the trading strategies considered is positive and 
significantly greater than zero. Therefore, hypothesis 5a is rejected. Both with and 
without the inclusion of negative book-equity firms, the NYSE-AMEX return premium 
was positive only for strategy 1, but was not statistically significant. The hypothesis 
suggests a one-tailed test is appropriate. However, if a two-tailed test is applied, the 
NASDAQ premia are significantly negative at the 5% level. When negative book-equity 
firms were included, the NASDAQ premia ranged from –1.08% (t = -2.92) for strategy 
3, to –2.30% (t = -4.49%) for strategy 2. They were of similar size when only positive 
book-equity firms were included. These negative premiums are the opposite of what 
would be expected if investors receive a higher return for exposure to distress-risk. 
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Table 4.14. Return premia earned by zero investment strategies 1 through 4 - distress-risk deciles 
Zero investment return premiums were calculated for four investment strategies, long in firms with high distress-risk (Dist) and short in firms with low 
distress-risk (Solv). ‘Premium’ for strategies 1) and 2) represented return on distress-risk decile 1, minus return on distress-risk decile 10, where return 
was equal-weighted (value-weighted) for strategy 1 (2). Strategies 3) and 4) represented return on the three deciles with highest risk (distress-risk 
deciles 1 - 3) minus return on the three deciles with lowest risk (distress-risk deciles 8 - 10), where return was equal-weighted (value-weighted) across 
distress-risk deciles for strategy 3 (4). For each strategy, returns were calculated from distress-risk decile returns, including delisting returns. The t-
value indicates if the premium is significantly greater than zero. 
Panel A - O-score distress-risk deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Strategy  Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium % 
    Dist  Solv  Dist Solv   %  t  Dist Solv   %  t  Dist Solv   %  t 
1  Equal 1 10 1.53 1.21 + 0.32 0.62 -0.46 1.19 - 1.65 -2.94 0.03 1.18 - 1.15 -2.35 
2  Value 1 10 1.01 1.01 0.00 0.00 -0.67 1.63 - 2.30 -4.49 0.08 1.19 - 1.11 -2.58 
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10 1.29 1.31 - 0.02 -0.07 0.09 1.17 - 1.08 -2.92 0.60 1.29 - 0.69 -2.09 
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10 1.15 1.26 - 0.11 -0.46 -0.13 1.52 - 1.65 -4.71 0.88 1.30 - 0.42 -1.56 
 
Panel B - Z-score distress-risk deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium % 
    Dist  Solv  Dist Solv   %  t  Dist  Solv   %  t  Dist Solv   %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.42 1.01 + 0.41 0.98 0.19 0.52 - 0.33 -0.58 0.65 0.74 - 0.09 -0.18 
2 Value  1  10  1.06 1.21 - 0.15 -0.45 -0.15 1.22 - 1.37 -2.21 0.77 1.18 - 0.41 -0.95 
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.25 1.24 + 0.01 0.09 0.44 0.85 - 0.41 -1.25 0.83 1.02 - 0.19 -0.73 
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.10 1.30 - 0.20 -0.78 0.83 1.45 - 0.62 -1.77 1.07 1.35 - 0.28 -1.04 
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Table 4.15. Return premia earned by zero investment strategies 1 through 4 - distress-risk (pos) deciles 
Zero investment return premiums were calculated for four investment strategies, long in high distress-risk positive book-equity firms (Dist) and short 
in low distress-risk positive book-equity firms (Solv). ‘Premium’ for strategies 1) and 2) represented return on distress-risk (pos) decile 1, minus return 
on distress-risk (pos) decile 10, where return was equal-weighted (value-weighted) for strategy 1 (2). Strategies 3) and 4) represented return on the 
three deciles (pos) with highest risk (distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 - 3) minus return on the three deciles (pos) with lowest risk (distress-risk (pos) deciles 
8 - 10), where return was equal-weighted (value-weighted) across distress-risk (pos) deciles for strategy 3 (4). Strategy returns were calculated from 
distress-risk (pos) decile returns including delisting returns. The t-value indicates where the premium is significantly greater than zero.  
Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium % 
   Dist  Solv  Dist  Solv    %  t  Dist  Solv    %  t  Dist  Solv    %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.44 1.19 + 0.25 0.61 -0.19 1.19  -  1.38 -2.51 0.11 1.19 - 1.08 -2.28 
2 Value  1  10  0.90 1.00 - 0.10 -0.29 -0.99 1.67  - 2.66 -4.59 -0.57 1.17 - 1.74 -3.63 
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.24 1.31 - 0.07 -0.30 0.21 1.21  - 1.00 -2.78 0.68 1.28 - 0.60 -2.00 
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.12 1.28 - 0.16 -0.69 -0.14 1.51  - 1.65 -4.50 0.84 1.31 - 0.47 -3.93 
Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium %  Return %  Premium % 
    Dist  Solv  Dist Solv   %  t  Dist Solv   %  t  Dist Solv   %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.24 1.01 + 0.23 0.71 0.58 0.56 + 0.02 0.03 0.73 0.78 - 0.05 -0.11 
2 Value  1  10  1.01 1.21 - 0.20 -0.61 -0.17 1.22 - 1.39 -2.17 0.88 1.20 - 0.32 -1.19 
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.21 1.25 - 0.04 -0.21 0.61 0.86 - 0.25 -0.78 0.91 1.03 - 0.12 -0.50 
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.06 1.34 - 0.28 -1.14 0.99 1.47 - 0.48 -1.34 1.07 1.34 - 0.27 -1.04 
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4.4.3.1.2 Z-score premia 
  Examination of Tables 4.14 and 4.15, Panel B, shows that none of the strategies 
earn a significant positive premium when constructed using the z-score distress-risk 
deciles and hypothesis 5a is rejected. The signs of the premia were generally consistent 
with those exhibited for the o-score deciles. However, when z-score was used to 
measure distress-risk, both with and without the inclusion of negative book-equity 
firms, if a two-tailed test was applied, only the value-weighted premia earned by 
NASDAQ strategy 2 was significantly less than zero at the 5% level.  
4.4.3.2 Distress-risk return premium when B/M and size are controlled 
  Trading strategies 1 through 4 do not control for the size and B/M characteristics 
of firms. Thus, the relation between size and/or B/M and return, rather than distress-
risk, may drive these premia. Hypothesis 5b is tested to determine the robustness of the 
risk premium after controlling for size and B/M. 
H5b: The return earned by a zero investment strategy, long in a portfolio of 
firms with high distress-risk and short in a portfolio of firms with low distress-
risk, is not significantly different from zero when B/M and size are controlled. 
  The returns earned by the characteristic-balanced portfolios and the distress-risk 
premia are reported in Table 4.16. The premium earned when both positive and negative 
book-equity firms (only positive book-equity firms) are included is reported in Panel A 
(Panel B). When firms with negative book-equity were included, the return premium 
was negative; -0.29% (t = -2.16) for the o-score portfolios and - 0.44% (t = -2.10) for 
the z-score portfolios, and were significantly less than zero when using a two-tailed test. 
When firms with negative book-equity were excluded, both of the premia were only 
0.02% different from that reported when negative book-equity firms were included.  
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Table 4.16. Return premia earned by size and B/M balanced investment strategy 5  
June each year (t) firms were allocated independently into size, B/M and distress-risk 
portfolios. This process was followed for two samples; 1) all firm-years with all 
required data, and 2) all firm-years with positive book-equity and all required data. For 
each sample, two size portfolios were created; big and small. Three B/M portfolios were 
created; high B/M, medium B/M and low B/M. Two sets of three distress-risk portfolios 
were created; high distress-risk (distressed), medium distress-risk (grey) and low 
distress-risk (solvent). One set of distress-risk portfolios used o-score to measure 
distress-risk, the second used z-score. Eighteen portfolios were formed from the 
intersections of the size, B/M and distress-risk portfolios for both measures of distress-
risk. The value-weighted return was calculated for each intersecting portfolio, for each 
month July (t) until June (t+1). For each measure of distress-risk, the monthly distress-
risk return premium for strategy 5, Distressed Minus Solvent (DMS), was the difference 
between the average of the returns on the six distressed intersecting portfolios and the 
six solvent intersecting portfolios. This difference was then averaged across the 120 
months. Returns are reported including delisting returns. The premia for all firm-years 
and for positive book-equity firm-years are reported in Panels A and B, respectively. 
 Panel  A 
All Firm-years 
Panel B 
Positive book-equity  
firm-years 
Return 
weight  
Model Return  % 
 
Premium 
 % 
Return % 
 
Premium 
 % 
  Dist Solv   %  t  Dist  Solv    %  t 
Value oscore 0.98 1.27 - 0.29 -2.16 0.97 1.28  - 0.31 -2.38
 zscore  0.93 1.37 - 0.44 -2.10 0.90 1.32  - 0.42 -1.91
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
However, for the z-score portfolios, the premium of -0.42% (t = -1.91) was only 
significant at the 10% level. 
  These negative returns are consistent in sign with the value-weighted returns 
earned by strategies 2 and 4 for the ‘All Firms’ sample. They are also of comparable 
size to the strategy 4 premium for the ‘All Firms’ sample, which is the more diversified 
value-weighted strategy.   
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4.4.3.3 Sensitivity of return premia to delisting returns 
The main results are calculated from returns that include estimated delisting 
returns. The premia are also calculated without delisting returns, to determine the 
sensitivity of the results. The unadjusted premia are reported in Appendix 9.  
The conclusion to reject hypotheses 5a and 5b is generally not sensitive to the 
adjustment for delisting returns. The only exception is, when delisting returns were not 
adjusted for, the premium earned by z-score NASDAQ strategy 1, equal-weighted 
returns, was positive and significant at the 5% level when using a one-tailed test. The 
premium of 0.94% (t = 1.68) when firms with negative book-equity are included (Table 
A9.1 Panel B) and 1.09% (t = 1.87) for positive book-equity firms (Table A9.2 Panel 
B), provides support for hypothesis 5a. This contrasts with the negative premia earned 
when delisting returns were included. In practice, it is unlikely that delisting returns can 
be completely avoided when investing in high distress-risk firms. Therefore, the 
positive premium observed prior to the inclusion of estimated delisting returns provides 
a misleading indication of the return that can be earned if strategy 1 is followed.  
  When the characteristic-balanced strategy, strategy 5, was considered, the 
adjustment for delisting returns reduced the premia by a maximum of 0.02% and made 
little difference to the significance of the distress-risk premium, for any of the scenarios. 
 
4.5 Regression evidence of the relation between distress-risk 
and return 
  
  Time series regression is used to further examine the relation between distress-
risk and return and the view that the HML premium is a proxy for a distress-risk return 
premium. Research question 6 addresses the ability of the Fama and French factors and 
a distress-risk factor to capture the time-series of returns of the distress-risk deciles.  
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Research question 7 addresses the ability of these factors to capture the returns of 
characteristic-balanced portfolios. Seven time-series models are tested to provide 
evidence in relation to questions 6 and 7. Model 3.3.4, the three-factor SMB/HML 
model, differs from the Fama and French (1993) model, as the factor premia control for 
distress-risk, in addition to size and B/M. 
4.5.1 The Fama and French and distress-risk factor premia 
  The time-series regressions use the characteristic-balanced ‘small minus big’ 
(SMB), ‘high-minus-low B/M’ (HML) and ‘distressed minus solvent’ (DMS) return 
premia as the independent variables in the regressions.
67 The DMS premium is the size 
and B/M balanced distress-risk premium earned using trading strategy 5. Refer to 
section 4.4.3.2 for results. The average factor premia for the period July 1985 through 
June 1995 were: SMB = –0.25% (t = -1.14), HML = 0.34% (t = 1.69) and when o-score 
(z-score) was used to measure distress-risk, DMS = -0.29 (t = -2.16) (DMS = -0.44%    
(t = -2.10)). The size and distress-risk premia were negative and the B/M premium was 
positive, making it unlikely that the B/M premium is a proxy for distress-risk. The 
negative but insignificant size premium is consistent with the findings of Booth and 
Keim (2000) and Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000) for this period. The weakly 
significant, positive B/M premium is consistent with the B/M premium reported by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).  
  The correlations between the factor premia over the 120 months are reported in 
Table 4.17, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score). When o-score was used to measure 
distress-risk, significant correlations were found between SMB and both HML and 
DMS, of -0.329 and 0.389, respectively. The correlation between HML and DMS  
                                                 
67 The method of calculating average factor premia is detailed in section 3.4.4   
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Table 4.17. Correlation between SMB, HML and DMS factor premia 
The Pearson correlation was calculated between the monthly return premia; SMB, HML 
and DMS, for the 120 months, July 1985 through June 1995. 
Panel A - O-score  Panel B - Z-score 
 SMB  HML  DMS    SMB  HML  DMS 
SMB  1     SMB  1    
HML  -0.329** 1    HML  -0.314** 1   
DMS  0.389** 0.074  1  DMS  0.091 -0.061  1 
** Significant at the 1% level 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
was not significantly different from zero. When z-score was used to measure distress-
risk, only the correlation between HML and SMB, of -0.314, was significant. The 
insignificant correlation between HML and DMS reinforces the view that B/M and 
distress-risk are not directly related. However, even after characteristics were 
controlled, the strong relation between distress-risk and size was reflected in the premia 
when o-score was used to measure distress-risk, but not when z-score was used. Testing 
hypotheses using both sets of premia will demonstrate the robustness of conclusions to 
the positive correlation found between the o-score SMB and DMS premia. 
4.5.2 Regression evidence – distress-risk deciles 
Research question 6 is examined by testing hypotheses 6a and 6b: 
H6a: The Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-series of returns 
earned by sorted distress-decile portfolios. 
H6b: A distress-risk premium does not capture the time-series of returns earned 
by sorted distress-risk portfolios better than the Fama and French factors. 
4.5.2.1 O-score distress-risk decile regressions 
Prior to examining the results for the two- through four-factor models, the single 
factor model, incorporating only the market factor is examined, results are reported in 
Appendix 10. The model did not do a good job of describing the time series of returns  
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for the o-score distress-risk deciles, for either the NYSE-AMEX or the NASDAQ 
portfolios. The regression intercepts showed a pattern, changing from negative for the 
highest risk deciles, to positive for the lower risk deciles. The intercepts were significant 
for the NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) low (high) distress-risk deciles. The ‘All Firms’ 
decile intercepts changed from negative and significant, to positive and significant, 
when moving from high to low distress-risk. The R
2 values for deciles 1 and 2 were 
below 0.75 (0.50) for the NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) sample, but above 0.8 (0.6) for all 
other deciles. Models incorporating two- three- and four-factors all outperformed the 
single market-factor model.  
Regression results for the two- through four-factor models are reported in Table 
4.18; Panels A.1 and A.2 for the o-score NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ deciles, 
respectively, and Panels B.1 and B.2 for the z-score distress-risk deciles. The ‘All 
Firms’ results are reported in Appendix 11.  
Generally, for all models tested, the ‘All Firms’ results were consistent with the 
NYSE-AMEX results. The main difference was that, for the ‘All Firms’ sample, the 
models were not able to capture the time-series of returns earned by the highest distress-
risk decile. This was evidenced by a low adjusted R
2 and significant negative intercept 
reported for this portfolio for all models. In contrast, the models did capture the returns 
for this portfolio for the NYSE-AMEX sample. The inability of the models to capture 
the returns of the high distress-risk ‘All Firms’ portfolio was due to the large number of 
NASDAQ firms in the portfolio.  
4.5.2.1.1 NYSE-AMEX regressions 
4.5.2.1.1.1 NYSE-AMEX two-factor models 
  The results for the two-factor models, models (3.3.1) through (3.3.3), for the 
NYSE-AMEX o-score sample are presented in Table 4.18, Panel A.1. All three of the   
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Table 4.18. Regression results – Distress-risk deciles  
Seven time series regression models are tested to determine their ability to capture the returns 
earned by the distress-risk decile portfolios. All models incorporate the market factor plus 
various combinations of the SMB, HML and DMS factors. Models 3.3.1 through 3.3.6 are two- 
and three-factor models, as detailed in the table. Model 3.3.7 is the four-factor model:   
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi          (3.3.7) 
where (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio. SMB is the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks. HML is the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks and a portfolio of low B/M 
stocks and DMS is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high distress-risk stocks 
and a portfolio of low distress-risk stocks (Distressed Minus Solvent). The dependent variables 
are the monthly value-weighted excess returns earned by sorted distress-risk decile portfolios. 
Adjusted R
2 is reported for each regression. O-score (Z-score) NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ 
portfolio results are reported in Panel A.1 and A.2 (Panel B.1 and B.2), respectively. 
Panel A.1. - O-score - NYSE-AMEX sample  Two-factor models 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +εi                               (3.3.1)
High 1  -0.33  1.25 -0.01    -0.97 14.04 -0.08    0.70 
2  -0.25  1.19 0.03    -1.04  19.12 0.24    0.81 
3  -0.09  1.07 0.13    -0.43  19.96 1.23    0.82 
4  -0.21  1.07 0.19    -1.40  27.23 2.49    0.89 
5  0.03  1.03 0.20    0.23  29.70 2.87    0.90 
6  0.02  0.96 0.09    0.17  31.14 1.48    0.92 
7  -0.03  0.93 0.09    -0.23  31.66 1.64    0.92 
8  0.20  0.96 0.06    1.77  32.71 1.11    0.92 
9  0.31  0.98 -0.12    2.58 30.42 -1.86    0.92 
Low10  0.06  0.90 -0.41    0.39 23.64 -5.56    0.90 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB +εi                                   (3.3.2)
High 1  -0.11 1.19    0.74  -0.37 17.87    5.94  0.77 
2  -0.09 1.14    0.44  -0.44 23.72    4.97  0.84 
3  0.13 0.99    0.48  0.77 25.30    6.62  0.86 
4  -0.04 0.99    0.22  -0.28 30.65    3.63  0.90 
5  0.13 0.97    -0.01  0.99 31.99    -0.13  0.90 
6  0.01 0.95    -0.17  0.13 37.97    -3.71  0.92 
7  -0.05 0.92    -0.25  -0.55 41.95    -6.02  0.94 
8  0.15 0.96    -0.25  1.63 44.08    -6.07  0.94 
9  0.18 1.03    -0.23  1.67 40.62    -4.78  0.93 
Low10  -0.17 1.01    -0.03  -1.11 27.99    -0.47  0.87 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + di DMS +εi                                  (3.3.3)
High 1  0.16  1.19    1.52 0.63  20.36    8.86 0.82 
2  0.08  1.14    0.95 0.42  26.34    7.49 0.87 
3  0.30  0.99    0.97 1.98  29.22    9.73 0.90 
4  0.06  0.99    0.50 0.43  32.96    5.71 0.91 
5  0.22  0.96    0.27 1.71  33.06    3.13 0.91 
6  0.07  0.94    -0.00 0.58  35.54    -0.02 0.92 
7  -0.01  0.91    -0.10 -0.07  36.42    -1.34 0.92 
8  0.15  0.95    -0.25 1.43  40.25    -3.58 0.93 
9  0.09  1.03    -0.50 0.91  45.47    -7.46 0.95 
Low10  -0.36  1.04    -0.58 -2.58  33.43    -6.41 0.90  
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Table 4.18. cont. Regression results – distress-risk deciles  
Panel A.1. cont. - O-score - NYSE-AMEX sample   Three- and four-factor models 
Dist 
Decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                        (3.3.4) 
High 1  -0.23  1.26 0.28 0.80  -0.79  16.24 1.73 6.24  0.77 
2  -0.19  1.19 0.20 0.49  -0.87  21.30 1.78 5.32  0.85 
3  -0.02  1.08 0.33 0.56  -0.12  24.57 3.67 7.73  0.88 
4  -0.17  1.07 0.29 0.29  -1.28  29.79 4.00 4.84  0.91 
5  0.03  1.03 0.21 0.04  0.26  29.64 2.95 0.72  0.90 
6  0.00  0.96 0.03  -0.17  0.00  32.47 0.50  -3.40  0.92 
7  -0.06  0.92 0.01  -0.24  -0.56  35.60 0.13  -5.71  0.94 
8  0.17  0.96 -0.03 -0.25  1.70 37.11 -0.50 -5.94  0.94 
9  0.28  0.98 -0.22 -0.28  2.62 34.44 -3.71 -5.89  0.94 
Low10  0.04  0.89 -0.46 -0.14  0.27 24.02 -6.06 -2.25  0.90 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5) 
High 1  0.30  1.13 -0.23    1.57 1.11 16.06 -1.65    9.08 0.82 
2  0.14  1.11 -0.10    0.97 0.71 21.24 -1.03    7.56 0.87 
3  0.30  0.99 -0.00    0.97 1.89 24.07 -0.04    9.55 0.90 
4  -0.02  1.03 0.13   0.48 -0.14  28.57 1.80   5.36 0.91 
5  0.12  1.01 0.16   0.23 0.92  29.31 2.43   2.72 0.91 
6  0.02  0.96 0.09    -0.02 0.10  30.43 1.50    -0.28 0.92 
7  -0.08  0.94 0.11    -0.12 -0.66  31.58 1.91    -1.67 0.92 
8  0.09  0.98 0.10    -0.27 0.82  34.69 1.83    -3.88 0.93 
9  0.12  1.02 -0.05   -0.49 1.15 37.11 -0.94   -7.18 0.95 
Low10  -0.15  0.94 -0.34   -0.51 -1.13 27.70 -5.20   -6.07 0.92 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                          (3.3.6) 
High 1  0.21 1.16    0.43  1.26 0.87 20.87   3.89  7.23 0.84 
2  0.11 1.12    0.25  0.80 0.59 26.61   2.99  6.05 0.88 
3  0.33 0.98    0.29  0.80 2.39 30.78   4.61  8.03 0.91 
4  0.07 0.98    0.11  0.44 0.54 32.81   1.91  4.63 0.91 
5  0.21 0.97    -0.08  0.32 1.64 33.11   -1.42  3.45 0.91 
6  0.04 0.95    -0.20  0.12 0.40 37.97   -4.02  1.49 0.92 
7  -0.04 0.92    -0.26  0.06 -0.40 41.72   -5.87  0.80 0.94 
8  0.12  0.97   -0.22 -0.12 1.30 44.48   -5.01 -1.76 0.94 
9  0.08  1.04   -0.12 -0.42 0.78 46.73   -2.78 -6.07 0.95 
Low10  -0.34 1.03    0.13  -0.66 -2.50 33.33    2.04  -6.78 0.91 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                    (3.3.7)
High 1  0.23 1.15  -0.04  0.42  1.28 0.90 17.10 -0.25  3.47  6.91 0.84 
2  0.10  1.12 0.01 0.26 0.80 0.53  22.02 0.10 2.78 5.69 0.88 
3  0.25  1.02 0.15 0.34 0.74 1.71  26.87 1.90 5.03 7.10 0.91 
4  -0.05  1.04 0.21 0.18 0.35 -0.35  29.61 2.83 2.91 3.62 0.92 
5  0.13 1.00  0.15  -0.03  0.25 0.96 28.96 2.02  -0.55 2.67 0.91 
6  0.04 0.95  0.00  -0.20  0.12 0.37 31.38 0.03  -3.68 1.40 0.92 
7  -0.03  0.92 -0.01 -0.26  0.06 -0.34 34.38 -0.13 -5.44  0.80 0.94 
8  0.12  0.97 0.00  -0.22  -0.12 1.21  36.77 0.06  -4.58  -1.68 0.94 
9  0.15  1.01 -0.13 -0.17 -0.37 1.45 38.17 -2.26 -3.48 -5.14 0.95 
Low10  -0.15  0.94 -0.34  0.01 -0.52 -1.14 27.42 -4.68  0.24 -5.50 0.92 
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Table 4.18. cont. Regression results – distress-risk deciles  
Panel A.2. - O-score - NASDAQ sample  Two-factor models 
Distr 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +εi                                 (3.3.1)
High 1  -1.70  1.08 -0.56    -3.60  8.78 -2.29    0.55 
2  -1.07  0.99 -0.35    -2.32  8.15 -1.49    0.49 
3  -0.94  1.11 -0.39    -2.31 10.29 -1.84    0.61 
4  0.10  1.05 -0.38    0.29 11.78 -2.17    0.67 
5  -0.59  0.95 -0.32    -2.02 12.36 -2.10    0.69 
6  -0.36  1.01 -0.30    -1.22 13.17 -1.97    0.71 
7  0.37  1.04 -0.33    1.31 14.10 -2.28    0.74 
8  0.29  1.07 -0.57    0.96 13.95 -3.78    0.76 
9  0.42  1.11 -0.76    1.49 14.86 -5.19    0.80 
Low10  0.72  1.07 -0.88    2.05 11.63 -4.86    0.72 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB +εi                                   (3.3.2)
High 1  -1.58 1.12    1.34  -4.30 13.19    8.48  0.71 
2  -0.80 0.95    1.47  -2.05 12.87   10.69  0.74 
3  -0.77 1.10    1.21  -2.52 15.65    9.23  0.77 
4  0.19 1.07    0.93  0.70 17.32    8.12  0.78 
5  -0.50 0.97    0.84  -2.21 18.50    8.66  0.80 
6  -0.20 1.00    1.01  -1.06 23.25   12.68  0.87 
7  0.43 1.06    0.77  1.94 20.71    8.14  0.83 
8  0.26 1.15    0.92  1.17 22.09    9.56  0.85 
9  0.29 1.24    0.88  1.22 22.48    8.58  0.85 
Low10  0.49 1.24    0.79  1.50 16.27    5.56  0.74 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + di DMS +εi                                   (3.3.3)
High 1  -1.41  1.16    1.78 -3.50  12.73    6.67 0.66 
2  -0.68  1.01    1.77 -1.76  11.56    6.92 0.63 
3  -0.72  1.16    1.31 -1.98  14.01    5.39 0.67 
4  0.25  1.10    1.08 0.83  16.10    5.39 0.73 
5  -0.48  1.00    0.86 -1.79  16.53    4.81 0.73 
6  -0.23  1.05    0.85 -0.88  17.52    4.83 0.75 
7  0.39  1.10    0.61 1.44  18.16    3.40 0.75 
8  0.06  1.22    0.26 0.21  17.82    1.29 0.73 
9  0.03  1.32    0.03 0.09  18.84    0.15 0.75 
Low10  0.03  1.34    -0.66 0.09  16.23    -2.73 0.69 
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Table 4.18. cont. Regression results – distress-risk deciles  
Panel A.2. cont. - O-score - NASDAQ sample  Three- and four-factor models. 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4) 
High 1  -1.54  1.09 -0.90  1.32  -4.05 10.96 -0.43  7.97  0.71 
2  -0.89  1.00 0.19 1.52  -2.68  11.50 1.05  10.54  0.74 
3  -0.80  1.12 0.05 1.22  -2.51  13.41 0.28 8.88  0.76 
4  0.21  1.05 -0.15  0.92  0.76 14.50 -0.34  7.65  0.78 
5  -0.49  0.96 -0.02  0.83  -2.10 15.59 -0.16  8.21  0.80 
6  -0.23  1.02 0.07 1.03  -1.19  20.09 0.68  12.32  0.87 
7  0.46  1.04 -0.06  0.76  1.99 17.31 -0.47  7.63  0.83 
8  0.39  1.08 -0.26  0.86  1.68 17.96 -2.13  8.69  0.85 
9  0.51  1.11 -0.49  0.77  2.21 18.20 -3.87  7.58  0.86 
Low10  0.79  1.07 -0.65  0.64  2.45 12.63 -3.78  4.54  0.76 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5) 
High 1  -0.92  0.92 -0.83    1.96 -2.03  8.93 -4.10    7.71 0.70 
2  -0.31  0.83 -0.62    1.91 -0.79  8.18 -3.10    7.60 0.66 
3  -0.37  0.99 -0.59    1.43 -1.00 10.28 -3.12    6.04 0.70 
4  0.58  0.95 -0.54    1.20 1.91 11.99 -3.53    6.18 0.75 
5  -0.21  0.87 -0.45    0.95 -0.77 12.41 -3.27    5.49 0.75 
6  0.02  0.93 -0.43    0.95 0.09 13.29 -3.12    5.47 0.77 
7  0.65  0.98 -0.43    0.70 2.37 13.85 -3.08    4.00 0.77 
8  0.44  1.04 -0.63    0.40 1.47 13.42 -4.13    2.07 0.77 
9  0.50  1.09 -0.79    0.20 1.72 14.35 -5.30    1.08 0.80 
Low10  0.52  1.11 -0.81   -0.48 1.47 11.99 -4.49   -2.12 0.73 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6) 
High 1  -1.29 1.09    1.06  1.16 -3.75 13.97    6.77  4.72 0.75 
2  -0.54 0.93    1.22  1.05 -1.80 13.71    9.00  4.94 0.78 
3  -0.60 1.09    1.05  0.69 -2.20 16.00    7.68  3.22 0.78 
4  0.34 1.05    0.78  0.62 1.32 17.78   6.59  3.36 0.80 
5  -0.04 0.96    0.74  0.42 -1.76 18.73    7.24  2.62 0.81 
6  -0.12 0.99    0.94  0.30 -0.66 23.42   11.11  2.23 0.88 
7  0.47 1.06    0.73  0.17 2.10 20.59   7.14  1.08 0.83 
8  0.18 1.16    1.00  -0.33 0.80 22.49    9.79  -2.06 0.85 
9  0.15 1.25    1.01  -0.57 0.63 23.67    9.59  -3.42 0.86 
Low10  0.16 1.27    1.10  -1.31 0.56 19.18    8.31  -6.31 0.80 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
High 1  -1.06 0.98  -0.41  0.92  1.33 -2.97 10.58 -2.10  5.52  5.21 0.76 
2  -0.50 0.91  -0.08  1.20  1.08 -1.57 11.08 -0.44  8.10  4.81 0.78 
3  -0.53 1.05  -0.13  1.00  0.74 -1.66 12.81 -0.77  6.77  3.29 0.78 
4  0.47 0.99  -0.23  0.71  0.72 1.73 13.99 -1.51  5.53  3.68 0.80 
5  -0.32 0.92  -0.14  0.69  0.48 -1.35 14.95 -1.05  6.27  2.83 0.81 
6  -0.12 0.99  -0.00  0.94  0.30 -0.62 19.33 -0.01 10.20  2.11 0.88 
7  0.54 1.03  -0.11  0.70  0.22 2.27 16.58 -0.86  6.25  1.29 0.83 
8  0.30  1.10 -0.20  0.94 -0.25 1.25 17.89 -1.57  8.45 -1.47 0.85 
9  0.37  1.15 -0.39  0.89 -0.41 1.55 18.62 -2.98  7.99 -2.40 0.87 
Low10  0.37  1.17 -0.37  0.98 -1.16 1.24 14.93 -2.23  6.94 -5.37 0.81 
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Table 4.18. cont. Regression results – Distress-risk deciles  
Panel B.1. - Z-score - NYSE-AMEX sample  Two-factor models 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +εi                               (3.3.1)
High 1  -0.06  0.81 0.17    -0.26  15.41 1.66    0.69 
2  0.00  0.77 0.19    0.03  17.63 2.05    0.74 
3  -0.06  0.85 0.27    -0.34  20.26 3.05    0.79 
4  -0.19  0.96 0.23    -1.03  21.80 2.45    0.82 
5  -0.07  1.14 0.35    -0.41  29.76 4.28    0.89 
6  0.01  1.08 0.11    0.05  29.17 1.41    0.89 
7  0.13  1.09 -0.05    0.87 30.02 -0.65    0.90 
8  0.33  1.06 -0.16    2.14 28.53 -1.96    0.90 
9  0.30  0.98 -0.32    2.02 27.09 -4.16    0.90 
Low10  0.23  0.98 -0.35    1.33 22.80 -3.79    0.86 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB +εi                                   (3.3.2)
High 1  0.05 0.77    -0.03  0.24 16.05    -0.31  0.68 
2  0.02 0.74    -0.26  0.10 19.42    -3.80  0.76 
3  -0.02 0.80    -0.30  -0.10 22.14    -4.66  0.81 
4  -0.10 0.91    -0.13  -0.57 22.75    -1.87  0.81 
5  0.08 1.08    -0.18  0.49 29.73    -2.81  0.88 
6  0.06 1.05    -0.04  0.40 31.33    -0.74  0.89 
7  0.10 1.10    0.01  0.69 33.32    0.07  0.90 
8  0.18 1.09    -0.13  1.19 32.65    -2.15  0.90 
9  0.08 1.04    -0.04  0.54 29.75    -0.59  0.88 
Low10  -0.06 1.06    -0.17  -0.33 26.13    -2.41  0.85 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + di DMS +εi                                  (3.3.3)
High 1  0.22  0.85    0.49 1.21  19.33    6.03 0.76 
2  0.27  0.80    0.43 1.77  22.05    6.39 0.80 
3  0.25  0.86    0.41 1.64  23.91    6.10 0.83 
4  0.03  0.95    0.23 0.19  23.08    3.01 0.82 
5  0.17  1.08    0.03 1.02  27.60    0.43 0.87 
6  0.00  1.02    -0.23 0.03  30.54    -3.68 0.90 
7  0.01  1.06    -0.28 0.06  33.51    -4.76 0.92 
8  0.14  1.04    -0.28 1.00  31.88    -4.67 0.91 
9  0.01  1.00    -0.27 0.07  29.35    -4.29 0.90 
Low10  -0.13  0.98    -0.44 -0.81  26.34    -6.31 0.88 
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Table 4.18. cont. Regression results – distress-risk deciles  
Panel B.1. cont. - Z-score - NYSE-AMEX sample   Three- and four-factor models 
Dist 
Decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                        (3.3.4) 
High 1  -0.05  0.81 0.20 0.02  -0.24  15.30 1.64 0.24  0.69 
2  -0.03  0.76 0.09  -0.23  -0.18  17.94 0.95  -3.28  0.76 
3  -0.10  0.83 0.16  -0.26  -0.61  20.96 1.80  -3.87  0.81 
4  -0.20  0.95 0.19  -0.09  -1.11  21.61 1.94  -1.16  0.82 
5  -0.08  1.14 0.31  -0.11  -0.52  29.69 3.55  -1.63  0.89 
6  0.01  1.07 0.10  -0.02  0.03  28.88 1.23  -0.31  0.89 
7  0.13  1.09 -0.05 -0.01  0.85 29.73 -0.66 -0.15  0.90 
8  0.30  1.05 -0.24 -0.18  2.01 29.08 -2.90 -3.04  0.90 
9  0.28  0.97 -0.38 -0.13  1.90 27.15 -4.68 -2.12  0.90 
Low10  0.19  0.97 -0.48 -0.29  1.14 23.85 -5.20 -4.21  0.88 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5) 
High 1  0.03  0.92 0.33   0.55 0.18  19.45 3.37   6.86 0.78 
2  0.09  0.87 0.32   0.49 0.57  22.64 4.01   7.48 0.83 
3  0.02  0.94 0.40   0.47 0.13  25.98 5.29   7.73 0.86 
4  -0.14  1.01 0.30   0.28 -0.82  22.87 3.32   3.77 0.84 
5  -0.05  1.16 0.38   0.10 -0.32  28.50 4.50   1.41 0.89 
6  -0.03  1.03 0.06    -0.22 -0.19  27.37 0.71    -3.43 0.90 
7  0.08  1.03 -0.13   -0.30 0.60 29.19 -1.78   -5.07 0.92 
8  0.28  0.99 -0.24   -0.33 1.99 27.94 -5.45   -3.29 0.92 
9  0.25  0.91 -0.41   -0.34 1.87 26.86 -5.90   -6.01 0.92 
Low10  0.15  0.87 -0.49   -0.52 1.08 24.20 -6.53   -8.56 0.91 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                          (3.3.6) 
High 1  -0.19 0.85    -0.08  0.50 -1.03 19.35   -1.02  6.11 0.76 
2  0.15 0.82    -0.30  0.47 1.08 24.97   -5.46  7.69 0.84 
3  0.11 0.87    -0.34  0.45 0.85 28.29   -6.55  7.79 0.87 
4  -0.03 0.95    -0.16  0.25 -0.18 23.61   -2.30  3.30 0.83 
5  0.09 1.09    -0.18  0.05 0.58 28.57   -2.86  0.76 0.88 
6  -0.00  1.02   -0.02 -0.23 -0.03 30.36   -0.38 -3.60 0.90 
7  0.02 1.06    0.03  -0.28 0.15 33.27    0.61  -4.79 0.92 
8  0.10  1.05   -0.10 -0.27 0.71 32.23   -1.81 -4.49 0.91 
9  0.01  1.00   -0.01 -0.27 0.04 29.15   -0.16 -4.22 0.90 
Low10  -0.18  0.99   -0.13 -0.42 -1.15 26.79   -2.07 -6.13 0.89 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                    (3.3.7)
High 1  0.03 0.92  0.33  -0.00  0.55 0.17 19.31 3.18  -0.02 6.83 0.78 
2  0.05 0.86  0.21  -0.25  0.50 0.34 24.02 2.72  -4.49 8.27 0.86 
3  -0.03 0.93  0.28  -0.28  0.49 -0.19  28.45 3.94  -5.38 8.85 0.89 
4  -0.16 1.01  0.26  -0.10  0.29 -0.91  22.79 2.74  -1.40 3.85 0.84 
5  -0.07 1.16  0.33  -0.11  0.10 -0.42  28.52 3.79  -1.71 1.49 0.89 
6  -0.03  1.03 0.05  -0.01  -0.22 -0.20  27.16 0.62  -0.17  -3.41 0.90 
7  0.08  1.03 -0.13  0.00 -0.30 0.60 28.99 -1.66  0.07 -5.05 0.92 
8  0.25  0.98 -0.31 -0.17 -0.32 1.87 28.67 -4.22 -3.15 -5.51 0.92 
9  0.23  0.90 -0.46 -0.11 -0.34 1.76 27.03 -6.37 -2.15 -6.00 0.92 
Low10  0.11  0.86 -0.60 -0.26 -0.51 0.87 26.22 -8.42 -5.10 -9.21 0.93 
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Table 4.18. cont.  Regression results – distress deciles  
Panel B.2. - Z-score - NASDAQ sample  Two-factor models 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +εi                                 (3.3.1)
High 1  -0.99  0.96 -0.61    -1.70  6.97 -2.04    0.39 
2  -0.86  1.05 -0.01    -2.29 11.63 -0.04    0.59 
3  0.19  1.00 -0.25    0.59 13.18 -1.51    0.66 
4  -0.23  1.11 -0.37    -0.68 13.60 -2.13    0.68 
5  0.01  1.16 -0.03    0.00 14.00 -0.17    0.67 
6  -0.22  1.11 -0.20    -0.69 14.31 -1.18    0.69 
7  0.10  1.16 -0.33    0.31 15.79 -2.09    0.74 
8  0.64  1.20 -0.38    1.66 13.13 -1.93    0.67 
9  0.32  1.17 -0.39    0.98 15.21 -2.33    0.73 
Low10  0.20  1.23 -0.62    0.54 14.07 -3.28    0.72 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB +εi                                   (3.3.2)
High 1  -0.73 1.04    1.45  -1.62 10.20    8.09  0.60 
2  -0.55 1.03    0.72  -1.72 14.19    5.60  0.67 
3  0.37 1.02    0.76  1.46 18.14    7.69  0.77 
4  -0.08 1.16    0.88  -0.31 19.44    8.39  0.80 
5  0.41 1.14    0.97  1.67 20.60    9.97  0.82 
6  -0.02 1.13    0.75  -0.06 19.24    7.31  0.79 
7  0.23 1.21    0.78  0.97 22.28    8.23  0.83 
8  0.76 1.25    0.83  2.40 17.40    6.59  0.75 
9  0.27 1.24    0.46  0.91 18.35    3.88  0.75 
Low10  0.00 1.34    0.45  0.01 16.86    3.22  0.71 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + di DMS +εi                                   (3.3.3)
High 1  -1.19  1.17    0.55 -2.17  8.96    2.27 0.41 
2  -0.82  1.08    0.16 -2.27  12.65    1.02 0.58 
3  0.05  1.06    0.07 0.18  14.64    0.56 0.66 
4  -0.40  1.21    0.16 -1.26  15.44    1.13 0.68 
5  -0.16  1.10    -0.42 -0.50  14.55    -3.01 0.69 
6  -0.46  1.10    -0.32 -1.50  15.24    -2.41 0.70 
7  -0.24  1.17    -0.38 -0.83  17.08    -3.03 0.75 
8  0.24  1.20    -0.46 0.68  14.18    -2.92 0.68 
9  -0.18  1.13    -0.77 -0.68  17.61    -6.47 0.79 
Low10  -0.49  1.22    -0.90 -1.56  16.33    -6.46 0.77 
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Table 4.18. cont.  Regression results – distress deciles  
Panel B.2. cont. - Z-score - NASDAQ sample  Three- and four-factor models. 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4) 
High 1  -0.75  1.05 0.03 1.46  -1.58 9.22 0.12 7.66  0.59 
2  -0.73  1.10 0.34 0.80  -2.20  13.77 1.90 5.97  0.69 
3  0.31  1.04 0.10 0.79  1.20  16.64 0.69 7.48  0.77 
4  -0.09  1.16 0.01 0.88  -0.32  17.51 0.07 7.93  0.79 
5  0.18  1.22 0.44 1.08  0.72  20.80 3.30  10.89  0.83 
6  -0.10  1.16 0.15 0.79  -0.35  17.80 1.01 7.24  0.79 
7  0.22  1.21 0.01 0.79  0.89  20.07 0.10 7.78  0.83 
8  0.77  1.25 -0.02  0.83  2.31 15.61 -0.09  6.18  0.75 
9  0.38  1.20 -0.21  0.41  1.23 16.08 -1.23  3.28  0.75 
Low10  0.25  1.25 -0.47  0.34  0.70 14.49 -2.40  2.33  0.73 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5) 
High 1  -0.91  1.06 -0.49    0.47 -1.59  7.26 -1.62    1.89 0.41 
2  -0.84  1.08 0.04   0.17 -2.21  11.27 0.18   1.03 0.58 
3  0.19  1.00 -0.24    0.03 0.60 12.39 -1.42    0.24 0.66 
4  -0.22  1.13 -0.35    0.10 -0.63 12.97 -1.93    0.70 0.68 
5  -0.07  1.07 -0.15   -0.45 -0.22 12.51 -0.83   -3.11 0.69 
6  -0.29  1.03 -0.29   -0.37 -0.90 12.83 -1.77   -2.75 0.71 
7  0.02  1.07 -0.45   -0.46 0.07 14.29 -2.93   -3.67 0.77 
8  0.55  1.09 -0.52   -0.55 1.49 11.67 -2.71   -3.51 0.70 
9  0.17  0.99 -0.61   -0.88 0.65 14.79 -4.43   -7.75 0.82 
Low10  0.03  1.02 -0.89   -1.05 0.09 13.72 -5.81   -8.38 0.82 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6) 
High 1  -0.62 1.10    1.42  0.38 -1.38 10.42    7.93  1.92 0.61 
2  -0.53 1.04    0.71  0.08 -1.63 13.67    5.49  0.53 0.67 
3  0.36 1.02    0.77  -0.02 1.43 17.21    7.63  -0.17 0.77 
4  -0.07 1.17    0.87  0.06 -0.25 18.66    8.26  0.49 0.79 
5  0.25 1.05    1.03  -0.55 1.16 20.50   11.80  -5.71 0.86 
6  -0.14 1.06    0.80  -0.42 -0.55 18.30    8.12  -3.88 0.81 
7  0.09 1.13    0.83  -0.49 0.43 21.92    9.55  -5.06 0.86 
8  0.60 1.16    0.89  -0.57 2.01 16.57    7.51  -4.35 0.78 
9  0.03 1.10    0.54  -0.84 0.14 19.28    5.61  -7.84 0.84 
Low10  -0.27 1.19    0.55  -0.96 -0.92 17.32    4.71  -7.50 0.81 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
High 1  -0.69  1.13 0.13 1.45 0.40 -1.46 9.45 0.49 7.66 1.97 0.60 
2  -0.71  1.12 0.37 0.79 0.13 -2.14  13.23 2.03 5.92 0.90 0.69 
3  0.31  1.04 0.10 0.79  -0.01 1.19  15.54 0.67 7.44  -0.04 0.77 
4  -0.08  1.17 0.03 0.88 0.06 -0.28  16.57 0.17 7.87 0.52 0.79 
5  0.07  1.12 0.32 1.10  -0.50 0.44  19.85 2.61  12.31  -5.26 0.87 
6  -0.16  1.07 0.05 0.81  -0.41 -0.62  16.34 0.34 7.80  -3.73 0.81 
7  0.15  1.11 -0.11  0.81 -0.50 0.64 19.03 -0.85  8.81 -5.12 0.86 
8  0.68  1.13 -0.16  0.85 -0.59 2.19 14.27 -0.93  6.85 -4.45 0.78 
9  0.24  1.01 -0.42  0.45 -0.90 0.99 16.30 -3.15  4.56 -8.58 0.85 
Low10  0.08  1.04 -0.73  0.38 -1.07 0.30 14.55 -4.72  3.41 -8.90 0.84 
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two-factor models outperformed the single factor model. Most of the intercepts were not 
significant and all of the R
2 values were above 0.9 for the moderate and low risk deciles. 
The models had the most trouble capturing the returns of the highest risk deciles, with 
the HML model, (3.3.1), performing worst, displaying the lowest R
2 value for this 
decile, of 0.70. The HML model also left a pattern in the intercepts similar to the single 
factor model, although the intercepts were mostly not statistically significant. The DMS 
model, (3.3.3), exhibited a significant negative intercept of -0.36 (t = -2.58) for the 
lowest risk decile, decile 10, suggesting that it did not capture the comparatively low 
returns earned by stocks in this portfolio. 
  The pattern in the HML factor coefficients suggests that the portfolio 
characteristics, rather than risk, may be driving the results. Moving from the highest 
distress-risk to the lowest distress-risk portfolio, the HML coefficients did not change 
from positive to negative, as would be expected if the HML premium compensated 
investors for distress-risk. Instead, the loadings on the HML factor showed the same 
inverted-U shape as the portfolio B/M characteristics, with the highest coefficient for 
deciles 4 and 5, of 0.19 (t = 2.49) and 0.20 (t = 2.87), respectively. Although the HML 
coefficients for both the higher and lower distress-risk deciles were negative, only the 
coefficients for the lower risk deciles were statistically significant at the 10% level or 
higher. The insignificant coefficient of the highest risk decile may reflect the wide range 
of B/M values of stocks in this portfolio. Additional results (not reported in a table) 
show that the standard error of the B/M of the highest risk decile of NYSE-AMEX 
firms was a large 5.23. By comparison, the standard errors of mean portfolio B/M for 
the other NYSE-AMEX distress deciles ranged between 0.39 and 0.17.  
The SMB coefficients changed from positive and significant to negative and 
significant as distress-risk increased.
 68 This suggests that, on average, high distress-risk 
                                                 
68 The only exception was the SMB co-efficient for distress-risk decile 10, which at -0.03 (t = -0.47), was 
negative but not statistically significant.  
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firms behave like small firms and low distress-risk firms behave like big firms. This 
result reflects the positive relation between distress-risk and size, making it difficult to 
untangle the cause of the observed pattern.  
The DMS coefficients changed from significant and positive to significant and 
negative, when moving from the highest to lowest distress-risk decile. The pattern was 
almost monotonic.
69 When contrasted with the limited significance of HML in capturing 
return, the strong pattern in the DMS coefficients is consistent with a systematic relation 
between distress-risk and return, but is not consistent with the HML factor capturing 
this systematic relation.  
In summary, the two-factor models show that although augmenting the market 
model with HML does increase the performance of the model, both the SMB and DMS 
factors do a better job than HML of increasing the performance of the model. The DMS 
(HML) model has the highest (lowest) R
2 values, especially for the higher distress-risk 
deciles. In addition, the pattern in the HML coefficients reflects the B/M characteristic, 
whereas the pattern in the DMS coefficients reflects the change in distress-risk. 
4.5.2.1.1.2 NYSE-AMEX three- and four-factor models 
The three-factor models, models (3.3.4) through (3.3.6), for the NYSE-AMEX 
sample, support the view that size and distress-risk are the most important factors when 
describing the time series of returns for the distress-risk deciles. HML only appears to 
be important for capturing the returns of the medium and lowest risk deciles of firms. In 
terms of R
2, all three-factor models perform better than the two-factor HML model, 
(3.3.1), especially in relation to the higher risk portfolios. Augmenting the other two-
factor models with HML only marginally increases the R
2 values. The SMB/DMS 
three-factor model, (3.3.6), has marginally higher R
2 values for the higher and lower 
distress-risk deciles than the DMS two-factor model, (3.3.3). Similar to the DMS model, 
                                                 
69 The only exception to the monotonic relation was that the DMS coefficient for distress-risk decile 3, of 
0.97 (t = 9.73), was slightly higher, rather than lower, than the coefficient for decile 2, of 0.95 (t = 7.49).  
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the SMB/DMS model has trouble capturing the lower returns of the lowest risk decile, 
with a significant negative intercept of -0.34 (t = -2.50) observed for decile 10.  
  The patterns of the SMB and DMS coefficients in the three-factor models were 
consistent with those observed for the two-factor models. The HML coefficients showed 
the same pattern as the two-factor model for deciles 4 through 10; positive (negative) 
for deciles 4 through 7 (9 and 10), reflecting the high (low) average B/M of these 
portfolios. However, the HML coefficient for the highest distress-risk portfolios was 
dependent on the other factors incorporated in the model. When examining the 
SMB/HML model, (3.3.4), the HML coefficients for deciles 1 through 3 were positive 
and at least weakly significant, at 0.28 (t = 1.73), 0.20 (t = 1.78) and 0.33 (t = 3.67), 
respectively. In contrast, when examining the HML/DMS model, (3.3.5), the HML 
coefficients for deciles 1 and 2 were negative, at -0.23 (t = -1.65) and -0.10 (t = -1.03), 
although only the decile 1 coefficient was significant at the 10% level. This change in 
the pattern of the HML coefficients suggests that HML may capture both the B/M 
characteristic and distress-risk when DMS is not incorporated in the model, but just 
B/M when DMS is incorporated. However, z-score results, reported in section 4.5.2.2, 
refute this conclusion.  
The four-factor model, (3.3.7), for the NYSE-AMEX sample confirms the view 
that, although SMB and DMS are the most important factors required to capture the 
time series of returns for the distress-risk decile portfolios, HML adds explanatory 
power to the model. The R
2 values of the four-factor model were predominantly the 
same as for the SMB/DMS model. However, the significant positive (negative) intercept 
reported for deciles 3 (10) when HML was not incorporated in the model were not 
exhibited for the four-factor model. The pattern in the SMB and DMS coefficients were 
consistent with those observed in the two- and three-factor models and as expected. The  
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pattern in HML reflected the B/M characteristic; consistent with the other models where 
DMS was incorporated.  
4.5.2.1.2 NASDAQ regressions 
  Table 4.18 Panel A.2 reports the regression results for the o-score NASDAQ 
distress-risk deciles. The market wide factor premia did not capture the time-series of 
returns earned by NASDAQ stocks as well as they did NYSE-AMEX stocks. The 
NASDAQ R
2 values were considerably lower than those observed for the corresponding 
NYSE-AMEX regressions, with no adjusted R
2 greater than 0.88. A pattern in the 
intercepts was evident for all models tested. The intercepts changed from significant and 
negative to positive, when moving from the highest to lowest distress-risk deciles. The 
consistent negative intercept for the highest risk decile shows that the models were 
particularly poor in capturing the negative returns earned by NASDAQ high distress-
risk firms. 
4.5.2.1.2.1 NASDAQ two-factor models 
  When considering the HML two-factor model (3.3.1), unlike the NYSE-AMEX 
results, the HML coefficient was negative for all NASDAQ deciles. NASDAQ 
portfolios did not have a consistently higher distress-risk or lower B/M than NYSE-
AMEX firms. Thus, neither a risk nor characteristic explanation can explain the 
negative HML coefficients. However, the pattern in the HML coefficients across the 
distress-risk deciles did show some signs of the inverted-U shape relation between B/M 
and distress-risk, as the portfolios with the highest mean B/M values had the least 
significant negative HML coefficients.  
The SMB coefficients were highly significant and positive for all portfolios, 
reflecting the small average size of NASDAQ firms, compared with the average size of 
NYSE-AMEX firms. Also, the R
2 values of the SMB model were the highest of the  
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three models. When moving from the highest to lowest distress-risk decile, the DMS 
coefficients showed the expected pattern of changing monotonically from significant 
and positive, to insignificant for deciles 8 and 9, to significant and negative for decile 
10. Consistent with NYSE-AMEX results, this supports the view that a systematic 
relation exists between distress-risk and return. 
4.5.2.1.2.2 NASDAQ three- and four-factor models 
The results for the three- and four-factor models for the NASDAQ sample are 
examined next. The SMB/HML model, (3.3.4), left a strong pattern in the intercepts, 
which increased from -1.54 (t = -4.05) for distress-risk decile 1, to 0.79 (t = 2.45) for 
decile 10. The pattern suggests that an additional factor is required to capture the time 
series of NASDAQ returns. The SMB/DMS three-factor model, (3.3.6), outperformed 
the alternative three-factor models, with consistently higher adjusted R
2 values, 
especially for the higher distress-risk deciles.  
Similar to the NYSE-AMEX results, the pattern in the HML coefficients for the 
NASDAQ sample was dependent on the other variables in the model. Only the 
coefficients for deciles 8 through 10 were significant and negative when the SMB/HML 
model was used to describe returns. When DMS was incorporated with HML in the 
three- or four-factor model, model (3.3.5) or (3.3.7), the HML coefficients were 
consistently negative and the inverted-U shape was evident, consistent with the pattern 
in the B/M characteristic.  
The four-factor model, (3.3.7), performed marginally better than the best three-
factor model, (3.3.6). It had marginally higher R
2 values for the highest and lowest risk 
portfolios and one fewer significant intercept. The HML coefficients were negative for 
all deciles, but only significant for the higher and lower distress-risk deciles. As these 
were the deciles where R
2 values were higher compared with the SMB/DMS model, 
HML increased the explanatory power of the model for these deciles. This was  
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consistent with HML capturing the low average B/M characteristic of these portfolios. 
Thus, it appears that SMB and DMS are important in describing the time series of 
distress-risk portfolio returns for stocks that trade on NASDAQ. HML adds marginally 
to the explanatory power of the model for the higher and lower distress-risk deciles. 
4.5.2.1.3 Summary - O-score distress-risk decile regressions 
  Regression evidence relating to the o-score distress-risk deciles shows that SMB 
is important in capturing returns for both the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ distress-risk 
deciles, supporting hypothesis 6a for the SMB factor. HML does not do a good job of 
capturing return in the context of a two-factor model. In the context of a three- or four-
factor model, the role of HML in capturing return appears to relate to the inverted-U 
shaped relation between distress-risk and B/M. For the NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) 
deciles, incorporating HML in the regression improves the ability of the model to 
capture the returns of the moderate and lowest (higher and lower) distress-risk deciles. 
Therefore, hypothesis 6a cannot be rejected for HML. However, the importance of 
HML in capturing returns is marginal and appears to relate to the deciles with the 
highest and lowest B/M values. In addition, it cannot be concluded that the Fama and 
French factors, SMB and HML, together capture the time-series of returns for the 
distress-risk deciles, as the SMB/HML model does not perform as well as the alternative 
three-factor models. 
For both the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ samples, the pattern in the HML 
coefficients is dependent on the model. The pattern reflects changes in distress-risk for 
the SMB/HML model, but reflects the B/M characteristic for the HML/DMS and four-
factor models.  
  The DMS factor is important in capturing returns for all samples. The 
coefficients change from positive and significant to negative and significant as distress-
risk decreases and the change is predominantly monotonic. Adding DMS to each of the  
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other two-factor models and to the SMB/HML model increases the R
2 values in each 
case. Therefore, hypothesis 6b, that DMS does not capture the time-series of returns for 
the distress-risk deciles, is rejected. The DMS factor is as important as the SMB factor 
in capturing return and adds more to the explanatory power of the models than the HML 
factor does. 
4.5.2.2 Z-score distress-risk decile regressions 
Z-score regression results largely confirm conclusions reached when examining 
the o-score regressions. The results are reported in Table 4.18, Panel B.1 and Panel B.2 
for the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ samples, respectively. The conclusions reached in 
relation to hypotheses 6a and 6b for the z-score deciles are detailed in the summary, 
Section 4.5.2.2.3. The ‘All Firms’ results are reported in Appendix 11. Similar to the o-
score portfolios, the ‘All Firms’ results largely reflected those reported for NYSE-
AMEX. The main difference was that for all models incorporating SMB, the SMB 
coefficient for distress-risk decile 1 was not significant for the NYSE-AMEX sample 
but was positive and significant for the ‘All Firms’ sample, reflecting the large 
proportion of NASDAQ firms in ‘All Firms’ decile 1. 
4.5.2.2.1 NYSE-AMEX regressions 
4.5.2.2.1.1 NYSE-AMEX two-factor models 
In contrast to the o-score results, the two-factor models only performed 
marginally better than the single factor CAPM when describing the returns of the z-
score NYSE-AMEX distress-risk deciles. Consistent with o-score results, the higher 
distress-risk deciles exhibited the lowest R
2 values. The model that incorporated DMS 
had the highest R
2 values but one intercept significant at the 10% level. Only the model 
incorporating SMB had no intercepts that were significant at conventional levels. The 
pattern in the HML factor loadings reflected the inverted-U shape relation between  
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distress-risk and B/M. The highest loading was for decile 5, of 0.35 (t = 4.28). The 
DMS coefficients monotonically changed from positive and significant to negative and 
significant. 
In contrast to the o-score findings, the SMB coefficients were predominantly 
negative, with five significant at the 5% level but no pattern. This was consistent with 
NYSE-AMEX firms being larger, on average, than NASDAQ firms and the z-score 
deciles exhibiting a weaker relation between distress-risk and size.  
4.5.2.2.1.2 NYSE-AMEX three- and four-factor models 
Examination of the three-factor models, (3.3.4 through 3.3.6), shows R
2 values 
higher than for the related two-factor models. In particular, adding DMS to the other 
two-factor models led to the largest increase in R
2 values. The SMB/HML model had 
lower R
2 values than the other three-factor models and a pattern was left in the 
intercepts. The high (low) distress-risk deciles had negative (positive) intercepts. The 
best three-factor model in terms of R
2 was the HML/DMS model. However, the 
SMB/DMS model was best in terms of having no significant intercepts. The DMS 
coefficients changed monotonically from significant and positive to significant and 
negative, consistent with all other scenarios, and the SMB coefficients were generally 
negative.  
Consistent with the o-score deciles, the pattern in the HML coefficient was 
dependent on the other variables in the model. However, for the z-score regressions the 
inverted-U shaped pattern was more evident in the SMB/HML model, rather than the 
HML/DMS model. For both models, the HML coefficient for the lower risk deciles 
became more negative as distress-risk decreased and all were significant at the 5% level. 
For the SMB/HML model the coefficients for the higher risk deciles were positive, but 
only the decile 5 coefficient, of 0.31 (t = 3.55), was significant at the 5% level. In 
contrast, when HML was included with DMS, the HML factor loadings for all of the  
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high-risk deciles were positive and significant at the 5% level. Thus, for the HML/DMS 
model, the HML coefficients changed from significant and positive to significant and 
negative as distress-risk decreased. This pattern is consistent with HML being a proxy 
for distress-risk. However, given the unstable nature of the pattern of the HML 
coefficients, a distress-risk explanation is not likely.  
The four-factor model outperformed both the SMB/HML model and the 
HML/DMS model. The four-factor model had higher R
2 values and no intercepts 
significant at the 5% level, although the intercepts exhibited for deciles 8 and 9 were 
weakly significant, at 0.25 (t = 1.87) and 0.23 (t = 1.76), respectively. It was not clear 
that the four-factor model outperformed the SMB/DMS model. Although the R
2 values 
for the four-factor model were higher, the SMB/DMS model had no intercepts that were 
significant at conventional levels.  
4.5.2.2.2 NASDAQ regressions 
  As with the o-score regressions, the z-score results, reported in Table 4.18 Panel 
B.2, showed that the models had the greatest trouble capturing the returns of the high 
distress-risk NASDAQ deciles and were not able to capture the NASDAQ returns as 
well as they did the NYSE-AMEX returns.  
4.5.2.2.2.1 NASDAQ two-factor models 
The z-score two-factor model results are consistent with the o-score regressions. 
The SMB model had the highest R
2 values; ranging from 0.60 for decile 1, to 0.83 for 
decile 7. For the DMS model, all of the intercepts, except deciles 3 and 8, were 
negative. The intercepts for deciles 1 and 2 were significant, showing that the market 
wide distress-risk premium alone could not capture the low returns earned by these 
high-risk portfolios. There was no pattern in the intercepts for the other two models.   
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The SMB coefficients were consistently positive, reflecting the comparatively 
small size of NASDAQ firms. The DMS coefficients changed monotonically from 
positive and significant to negative and significant, as expected. The HML coefficient 
was consistently negative and no pattern was exhibited for the higher distress-risk 
deciles. In comparison, the coefficients of deciles 5 through 10 became monotonically 
more negative with lower distress-risk. As with the o-score deciles, the consistent 
negative HML coefficients were not consistent with either a risk or a B/M characteristic 
explanation.  
4.5.2.2.2.2 NASDAQ three-factor and four factor models 
Addition of a third independent variable to the model generally increased the R
2 
of the lower risk deciles. Incorporating HML with either SMB or DMS only marginally 
improved the explanatory power of the model, when compared with having only SMB 
or HML as the explanatory variable. 
The best three-factor model was SMB/DMS (3.3.6), with the highest R
2 values 
and only one significant intercept. The pattern in the SMB and DMS coefficients was as 
expected. The DMS coefficients for the higher risk deciles were generally not 
significant, only the decile 1 coefficient of 0.38 (t = 1.92) was significant at the 10% 
level. As NASDAQ distress-risk decile 1 had a very low average z-score, a strongly 
significant coefficient would have been expected. The weak significance may be due to 
the aggregation of negative and positive book-equity firms, which earned 
positive/negative value-weighted returns, respectively.  
Comparison of R
2 values exhibited by the three-factor models shows that models 
incorporating SMB did a better job of capturing the variability of return for the higher 
risk deciles, as evidenced by the comparatively low R
2 reported for these deciles for the 
HML/DMS model. The pattern in the HML coefficients was dependent on the other 
variables in the model. As distress-risk increased, the HML coefficients exhibited by the  
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HML/SMB (HML/DMS) model decreased from positive to negative (were consistently 
negative). For both the HML/SMB and HML/DMS models, the HML coefficients for 
deciles 5 through 10 decreased as distress-risk increased.  
The four-factor model did not clearly outperform the best three-factor model, 
SMB/DMS. The four-factor model exhibited marginally higher R
2 values, but also had 
two, rather than one, significant intercepts, for deciles 2 and 8. The HML coefficients 
changed from positive to negative as distress-risk decreased, but only the decile 2, 5, 9 
and 10 coefficients were significant. As these were the deciles where the four-factor 
model exhibited the higher R
2 values, when compared with the SMB/DMS model, 
HML increased explanatory power for these deciles. 
4.5.2.2.3 Summary - Z-score distress-risk decile regressions 
  Regression evidence relating to the z-score distress-risk deciles shows that 
conclusions reached in relation to hypotheses 6a and 6b are predominantly robust to the 
method used to measure distress-risk. SMB is important in capturing returns for both 
the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ distress-risk deciles and hypothesis 6a cannot be 
rejected for the SMB factor. However, the SMB and HML factors together do not 
capture the time-series of returns for the distress-risk deciles, as the SMB/HML model 
does not perform as well as the alternative three-factor models. 
It is not clear that hypothesis 6a can be rejected for the HML factor when z-
score is used to measure distress-risk. This contrasts with the o-score results, where, 
although the importance of HML is marginal, hypothesis 6a cannot be rejected for 
HML. For the z-score deciles, adding HML to the other models does marginally 
increase R
2 values. However, adding HML to the best three-factor model, SMB/DMS, 
increases the number of significant intercepts for both the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ 
samples. Therefore, support is weak for the hypothesis that HML is important in 
describing the returns earned by the z-score distress-risk deciles.   
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The evidence that the HML coefficients reflect the inverted-U shape relation 
between distress-risk and B/M is not as strong for the z-score deciles as for the o-score 
deciles. Consistent with o-score results, the HML coefficient consistently decreases 
when moving from decile 5 through 10. For the high-risk deciles, the pattern in the 
HML coefficients is dependent on the model.  
Comparing the pattern in the size coefficients for the o-score and z-score 
regressions suggests that the SMB coefficient is driven by the size characteristic. 
NYSE-AMEX o-score decile regressions exhibit a positive relation between distress-
risk and the SMB coefficients, consistent with the strong positive relation between 
distress-risk and size. In contrast, the z-score deciles exhibit SMB coefficients that are 
predominantly negative. This is consistent with the z-score deciles displaying a weaker 
relation between distress-risk and size. Also, when compared with the NASDAQ 
deciles, the average firm size for the NYSE-AMEX portfolios was large, even for high 
distress-risk firms. For both o-score and z-score, the SMB coefficients for the NASDAQ 
deciles were negative, reflecting the comparatively small size of NASDAQ firms. 
The DMS factor is important in capturing returns for all samples. The 
coefficients change from positive and significant to negative and significant, as distress-
risk decreases, and the change is predominantly monotonic. Adding DMS to each of the 
other two-factor models and to the SMB/HML model increases the R
2 values in each 
case. Therefore, consistent with o-score results, hypothesis 6b, that DMS does not 
capture the time-series of returns for the distress-risk deciles, is rejected.  
4.5.2.3 Distress-risk and the market factor coefficient 
In addition to providing evidence relating to the research questions, the decile 
regressions provide evidence that NASDAQ firms had greater sensitivity to the market 
factor than NYSE-AMEX firms but there was no clear indication of the importance of 
the market factor for high distress-risk firms. The market factor coefficient varied  
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depending on the sample examined, the variables in the model and the distress-risk 
measure.  
Generally NASDAQ firms had a higher loading on the market factor than 
NYSE-AMEX firms. The market coefficients for the NYSE-AMEX firms were mostly 
between 0.90 and 1.20 for the o-score deciles and between 0.80 and 1.10 for the z-score 
deciles. In contrast, for NASDAQ firms, the market factor coefficient was mostly 
greater than 1.  
The pattern in the coefficients was different for the o-score and z-score 
portfolios. For the NYSE-AMEX o-score deciles, higher distress-risk firms generally 
loaded more heavily on the market coefficient, although the pattern was more of a U-
shape when HML was not included in the model. For the z-score portfolios, the relation 
described an inverted-U when HML was included but was negative when HML was not 
included. For the NASDAQ o-score (z-score) deciles, for the two- and three-factor 
models, there was no real pattern in the coefficients when HML (DMS) was included in 
the model. However, when HML (DMS) was not included, firms with lower distress-
risk loaded more heavily on the market factor. For the NASDAQ o-score (z-score) four-
factor model, a negative relation (no relation) was found between distress-risk and the 
market coefficient.  
In summary, clear patterns were found in the market coefficients when 
regressions were examined individually. However, it is not clear what drives the pattern, 
as it was not consistently related to firm size, portfolio B/M or the other factors 
incorporated in the model.  
4.5.3 Regression evidence – characteristic-balanced portfolios 
Regression evidence presented in section 4.5.2 shows that the size and distress-
risk factors are important in capturing the time-series of returns earned by the distress-
risk decile portfolios and that the HML factor has marginal importance. As the decile  
  245
portfolios are only sorted by distress-risk, the factor coefficients exhibited in these 
regressions may reflect the variation in portfolio size and B/M characteristics. 
Therefore, regressions are also performed where the dependent variables are the excess 
returns earned by three sets of pair-wise intersecting quintile portfolios:  
•  5 size x 5 B/M,  
•  5 B/M x 5 distress, and  
•  5 size x 5 distress. 
  The three-factor models, 3.3.4 through 3.3.6, and the four-factor model, 3.3.7, 
are used to explore research question 7 and to test hypotheses 7a and 7b. 
H7a: The Fama and French (1993) factors capture the time-series of returns 
earned by size, B/M and distress-risk characteristic-balanced portfolios. 
H7b: A distress-risk premium does not outperform the Fama and French factors 
in capturing the time-series of returns earned by size, B/M and distress-risk 
characteristic-balanced portfolios. 
Prior to examining these results, it was confirmed that regressions performed 
using the Fama and French (1993) methodology and a sample of positive book-equity 
firms, referred to as the ‘Fama and French regressions’, did produce results consistent 
with those reported by Fama and French (1993). The SMB and HML premia used in the 
‘Fama and French regressions’ were size and B/M balanced, but were not distress-risk 
balanced. The ‘Fama and French regression’ results are reported in Appendix 12. 
In addition, comparison was made between the ‘Fama and French regression’ 
results and those obtained when testing the ability of the SMB/HML model,
70 (3.3.4), to 
capture the returns of the size-B/M portfolios, as reported in Table 4.19, Panel A.1, on 
page 248. The comparison shows the two sets of results to be similar. However, unlike 
the ‘Fama and French regressions’, once the SMB and HML factor premia are balanced 
                                                 
70 The SMB and HML premia in the SMB/HML model were balanced for distress-risk, in addition to size 
and B/M.  
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for distress-risk, the intercepts of the small-firm higher-B/M portfolios are not 
significant.  
4.5.3.1 Intersecting quintile portfolio characteristics  
The portfolio characteristics of the pair-wise intersecting portfolios are 
examined to determine whether the two characteristics the portfolios are sorted on are 
controlled and whether a pattern is evident for the characteristic that firms are not sorted 
on. These descriptive statistics are presented and the patterns discussed in Appendix 13. 
  In brief, the sorts did a good job of controlling for variation in the characteristics 
that firms were sorted on. However, there was generally evidence of a pattern in the 
extreme quintiles. For example, when firms were sorted by size and B/M, the low- and 
high-B/M quintiles showed a variation in average portfolio B/M across the size 
quintiles. In addition, a pattern was evident in the characteristic that was not sorted on, 
consistent with previous results. 
4.5.3.2 O-score intersecting quintile regressions 
The regression results, testing hypotheses 7a and 7b, are presented in Table 4.19. 
Panels A.1 through A.3 present the regression results for the o-score size-B/M, B/M-
distress and size-distress intersecting quintile portfolios, respectively. Each panel 
presents the results for each of the three-factor models (models 3.3.4 through 3.3.6), 
followed by the four-factor model (3.3.7).  
When discussing the quintile portfolio regression results; first, the performance 
of each of the three-factor models is compared through examination of the R
2 values and 
the intercepts. These results are then compared with the results for the four-factor 
model. The patterns in the coefficients are largely as expected and the coefficients for 
the three- and four-factor models are examined together. The conclusions reached  
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regarding hypotheses 7a and 7b are detailed in the summary of findings in section 
4.5.3.2.4. 
4.5.3.2.1 Three-factor models 
4.5.3.2.1.1 Variability of return: R
2 
The R
2 values for the three-factor models are presented at the bottom of each 
table. They show that the success of each of the models in capturing variability of return 
is dependant on the portfolio sort. For each portfolio sort, the R
2  values of the 
SMB/HML model were either the highest, or only slightly lower than the best 
alternative model. For the size-B/M portfolios, Table 4.19 Panel A.1, the SMB/HML 
model clearly displayed the highest R
2 values, with 20 above 0.90, compared with 5 and 
14 for the HML/DMS and SMB/DMS models, respectively.  
For the B/M-distress portfolios, Table 4.19 Panel A.2, the SMB/HML and 
HML/DMS models exhibited 3 and 4 R
2 values above 0.90, respectively. However, the 
SMB/HML model captured the greater proportion of variability overall, with 20 R
2 
values above 0.80, compared with 18 for the HML/DMS model.  
For the size-distress portfolios, Table 4.19 Panel A.3, the SMB/DMS model had 
21 R
2 values above 0.90, compared with 20 for the SMB/HML model. The R
2 values for 
the SMB/DMS model were also generally higher than those observed for the 
SMB/HML model, especially for the bigger-firm most-distress portfolios, where the 
lowest R
2 values were observed for both models.  
Thus, for all portfolio combinations, SMB and HML appear to be important in 
capturing variability in returns. DMS does not display good explanatory power for the 
size-B/M portfolios. However, when the portfolios are sorted on distress-risk in addition 
to size or B/M, DMS, in combination with the factor related to the other characteristic, 
performs at least as well as the SMB/HML model.  
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Table 4.19. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios  
Four time series regressions models were tested. Models 3.3.4 through 3.3.6 are three-factor 
models, as detailed in the tables. Model 3.3.7 is the four-factor model:   
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi        (3.3.7) 
where (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio. SMB is the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks. HML is the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks and a portfolio of low B/M 
stocks and DMS is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high distress-risk stocks 
and a portfolio of low distress-risk stocks (Distressed Minus Solvent). The dependent variables 
are the monthly value-weighted excess returns earned by the intersecting quintile portfolios. 
Adjusted R
2 is reported for each regression. O-score (Z-score) size-B/M, B/M-distress and 
distress-size portfolios are reported in Panels A.1 through A.3 (B.1 through B.3), respectively. 
Panel A.1. - O-score size-B/M portfolios 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2  3  4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.81 -0.04  0.29 0.19 0.21 -3.36 -0.32 2.35  1.61 1.50
2  -0.37 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.09 -2.42 0.28 0.43  1.44 0.58
3  0.22 0.13 0.29 0.12 -0.15 1.40 0.78 2.13  0.81 -1.00
4  0.25 0.12 0.08 -0.10 -0.02 1.61 0.87 0.55 -1.11 -0.10
Big  0.52 0.04  -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 4.33 0.31 -0.30 -0.61 -0.54
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.05 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.99 16.50 25.56 29.44  29.80 27.32
2  1.10 1.07 1.08 1.00 1.05 27.20 32.97 30.34  31.71 26.88
3  1.06 1.12 1.09 1.02 1.09 25.41 26.56 30.60  26.89 27.29
4  0.99 1.12 1.08 0.99 1.05 24.89 32.34 26.59  29.13 24.85
Big  0.86 1.08 1.06 0.92 1.00 27.50 31.78 22.33  26.72 25.14
  h  t(h) 
Small  0.00 0.08 0.09 0.41 0.65 0.03 0.98 1.34  6.50 8.72
2  -0.42 -0.09  0.17 0.41 0.65 -5.09 -1.40 2.37  6.34 8.12
3  -0.58 -0.09  0.14 0.34 0.53 -6.81 -1.02 1.92  4.32 6.50
4  -0.54 -0.03  0.16 0.34 0.52 -6.57 -0.36 1.90  4.84 5.93
Big  -0.73 -0.17  0.20 0.39 0.55 -11.34 -2.39 0.06  5.47 6.70
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.30 1.28 1.13 1.18 1.25 12.40 20.48 20.94  23.30 20.93
2  1.04 1.04 0.84 0.95 1.05 15.58 19.29 14.31  18.40 16.20
3  0.71 0.80 0.73 0.58 0.56 10.39 11.44 12.38  9.16 8.47
4  0.34 0.25 0.40 0.04 0.19 5.14 4.43 5.95  0.72 2.73
Big  -0.27 -0.12 -0.24 -0.27 -0.30 -5.21 -2.19 -3.06  -4.46 -4.50
  R
2       
Small  0.84 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.92  
2  0.94 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.91  
3  0.93 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.89  
4  0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.90  
Big  0.93 0.93 0.84 0.87 0.85   
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.1. cont. - O-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.27 0.24 0.55 0.46 0.53 -0.96 0.85 2.28 1.87 2.06
2  -0.22 0.22 0.13 1.35 0.31 -0.83 0.91 0.59 1.59 1.28
3  0.31 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.05 1.41 0.76 1.88 1.31 0.32
4  0.24 -0.08  0.16 -0.10 0.10 1.38 -0.54 0.93 -0.83 0.59
Big  0.39 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 3.14 -0.92 -0.67 -0.89 -0.73
  b  t(b) 
Small  0.89 0.87 0.87 0.82 0.88 12.05 12.02 13.88  12.86 13.11
2  1.03 1.00 1.04 0.93 0.97 15.28 16.22 17.84  16.21 15.17
3  1.01 1.09 1.04 0.97 1.03 17.89 17.61 19.85  20.48 22.88
4  0.98 1.00 1.05 0.99 1.02 21.84 25.14 22.91  28.38 23.94
Big  0.89 1.12 1.08 0.95 1.02 27.78 35.25 21.90  25.12 23.45
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.70 -0.53 -0.44 -0.15 0.04 -4.82 -3.76 -3.66 -1.24 0.28
2  -0.89 -0.57 -0.19 -0.03 0.16 -6.76 -4.71 -1.65 -0.29 1.25
3  -0.89 -0.42 -0.18 0.06 0.24 -8.07 -3.54 -1.76  0.68 2.72
4  -0.67 0.55  -0.03 0.31 0.40 -7.64 6.69 -0.31 4.59 4.79
Big  -0.58 -0.06  0.32 0.51 0.68 -9.17 -1.04 3.33  6.89 7.99
  d  t(d) 
Small  1.74 1.09 0.98 1.03 1.19 9.49 6.11 6.38 6.59 7.20
2  0.71 0.77 0.44 0.73 0.89 4.24 5.03 3.06 5.18 5.63
3  0.43 0.38 0.45 0.48 0.69 3.07 2.47 3.48 4.11 6.20
4  0.09 -0.30  0.32 0.10 0.34 0.78 -4.50 2.82  1.12 3.23
Big  -0.40 -0.42 -0.26 -0.20 -0.19 -4.98 -5.40 -2.10 -2.11 -1.80
  R
2       
Small  0.80 0.75 0.79 0.74 0.74  
2  0.84 083  0.82 0.79 0.76  
3  0.87 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.87  
4  0.90 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.86  
Big  0.93 0.94 0.83 0.86 0.83  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.1. cont. - O-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.57 0.06 0.40 0.48 0.67 -2.80 0.42 3.41 3.92 4.34
2  -0.61 -0.00  0.12 0.42 0.50 -3.69 -0.02 0.85  3.20 2.88
3  -0.12 0.03 0.35 0.33 0.23 -0.68 0.16 2.61 2.20 1.47
4  -0.10 0.06 0.19 0.07 0.34 -0.60 0.43 1.21 0.48 1.95
Big  0.05 -0.15  0.03 0.13 0.23 0.29 -1.27 0.18  0.92 1.33
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.03 0.94 0.93 0.80 0.81 22.17 30.00 34.69  28.66 23.18
2  1.21 1.10 1.04 0.89 0.87 32.11 39.19 33.50  29.38 22.12
3  1.21 1.15 1.05 0.93 0.94 29.62 32.25 34.16  27.19 26.04
4  1.14 1.13 1.03 0.90 0.91 29.85 38.98 29.62  28.86 23.34
Big  1.06 1.13 1.01 0.82 0.86 29.99 42.68 24.48  25.04 21.74
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.07 1.20 1.04 0.98 0.95 11.57 19.05 19.39  17.64 13.57
2  1.18 1.05 0.82 0.80 0.79 15.66 18.80 13.26  13.24 9.93
3  0.92 0.88 0.69 0.44 0.30 11.25 12.30 11.25 6.48 4.15
4  0.56 0.30 0.33 -0.09 -0.04 7.28 5.25 4.78  -1.44 -0.46
Big  0.03 0.02  -0.28 -0.38 -0.48 0.40 0.44 -3.42  -5.75 -6.09
  d  t(d) 
Small  0.95 0.27 0.27 0.42 0.64 6.56 2.69 3.25 4.80 5.87
2  -0.19 0.02  -0.09 0.25 0.46 -1.57 0.25 -0.89 2.67 3.70
3  -0.31 -0.24  0.00 0.24 0.56 -2.41 -2.10 0.03  2.20 4.97
4  -0.39 -0.20  0.12 0.22 0.45 -3.25 -2.09 1.05  2.21 3.67
Big  -0.54 -0.45 -0.02 0.14 0.24 -4.86 -5.40 -0.15  1.34 1.93
  R
2       
Small  0.87 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.90  
2  0.93 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.87  
3  0.91 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.88  
4  0.90 0.93 0.89 0.88 0.83  
Big  0.89 0.94 0.83 0.84 0.80  
  
  251
Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.1. cont. - O-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2  3  4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.43 0.05 0.39 0.29 0.36 -2.02 0.35 3.11  2.49 2.07
2  -0.38 0.06  -0.01 0.21 0.16 -2.35 0.46 -0.05  1.67 1.06
3  0.19 0.05 0.27 0.16 -0.01 1.18 0.28 1.90  1.04 -0.09
4  0.18 0.04 0.10 -0.10 0.08 1.14 0.31 0.65 -0.84 0.49
Big  0.42 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 -0.08 3.52 -0.92 -0.51  -0.66 -0.48
  b  t(b) 
Small  0.96 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.95 17.46 24.87 28.88  29.45 27.56
2  1.10 1.07 1.10 0.99 1.03 26.36 31.83 30.19  30.61 26.00
3  1.06 1.14 1.09 1.01 1.05 24.81 26.44 29.82  25.92 27.01
4  1.01 1.13 1.07 0.99 1.03 24.77 32.38 25.66  28.09 24.06
Big  0.88 1.12 1.07 0.93 1.00 28.44 34.86 21.89  25.94 24.32
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.25 0.01 0.03 0.34 0.55 -2.19 0.16 0.48  5.36 7.51
2  -0.42 -0.11  0.22 0.39 0.60 -4.77 -1.55 2.83  5.68 7.18
3  -0.56 -0.04  0.16 0.31 0.44 -6.23 -0.39 2.01  3.78 5.34
4  -0.49 0.02 0.14 0.32 0.45 -5.77 0.31 1.64  4.31 5.01
Big  -0.66 -0.06  0.23 0.40 0.54 -10.16 -0.94 2.22  5.24 6.29
  s  t(s) 
Small  0.99 1.20 1.05 1.09 1.13 10.00 17.56 17.97  20.18 18.11
2  1.05 1.02 0.89 0.93 0.98 13.89 16.85 13.68  15.96 13.75
3  0.74 0.87 0.74 0.55 0.44 9.55 11.16 11.29  7.77 6.32
4  0.39 0.31 0.38 0.02 0.11 5.36 4.94 5.08  0.24 1.47
Big  -0.19 0.00  -0.21 -0.25 -0.30 -3.42 0.04 -2.35 -3.85 -4.06
  d  t(d) 
Small  1.06 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.42 7.02 2.49 2.95  3.36 4.38
2  -0.01 0.07  -0.18 0.09 0.21 -0.10 0.73 -1.77  1.05 1.93
3  -0.08 -0.22 -0.06 0.11 0.38 -0.66 -1.86 -0.61  1.00 3.54
4  -0.18 -0.20  0.06 0.09 0.26 -1.65 -2.07 0.48  0.88 2.24
Big  -0.26 -0.42 -0.11 -0.03 0.01 -3.10 -4.82 -0.85  -0.25 0.12
  R
2       
Small  0.89 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93  
2  0.94 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.91  
3  0.93 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90  
4  0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.86  
Big  0.94 0.94 0.84 0.87 0.85  
  
  252
Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.2. - O-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  -0.30 -0.07  0.18 -0.30 0.10 -1.71 -0.30 0.92 -1.25 0.50
2  0.29  0.01 -0.12 -0.12 -0.02 1.53 0.08 -0.54 -0.82 -0.14
3  0.33 -0.06 -0.27 0.09 -0.04 1.43 -0.35 -1.60  0.62 -0.19
4  0.61 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.10 4.04 0.57 0.32  -0.32 -0.54
Least  0.49 0.18 0.21 -0.07 0.30 3.35 0.97 0.84  -0.27 0.99
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.15 1.17 1.01 1.02 1.19 23.32 18.42 19.24  15.03 21.61
2  0.92 1.05 1.15 1.02 1.06 18.49 23.74 19.68  27.81 26.61
3  1.00 1.21 1.10 0.82 0.83 16.84 24.75 24.81  20.98 16.91
4  0.93 1.01 1.02 0.97 1.05 23.68 28.69 21.03  20.60 22.49
Least  0.84 1.08 1.05 1.05 1.04 22.06 22.66 15.77  14.99 12.78
  h  t(h) 
Most  -0.13 0.16 0.28 0.57 0.73 -1.28 1.25 2.64 4.12 6.50
2  -0.51 0.16 0.50 0.37 0.63 -5.00 1.77 4.17 4.96 7.68
3  -0.55 0.10 0.25 0.24 0.33 -4.49 0.97 2.73 3.00 3.28
4  -0.67 -0.22  0.09 0.40 0.65 -8.31 -3.03 0.87  4.17 6.84
Least  -0.77 -0.24  0.09 0.57 0.41 -9.92 -2.48 0.66  4.01 2.45
  s  t(s) 
Most  0.65 0.94 0.62 0.76 0.88 8.02 8.99 7.14 6.76 9.73
2  0.17 0.32 0.31 0.23 0.23 2.11 4.37 3.15 3.79 3.53
3  -0.25 0.11 0.06 -0.19 -0.07 -2.56 1.36 0.78  -2.92 -0.86
4  -0.20 -0.08 -0.12 -0.20 -0.03 -3.10 -1.36 -1.49 -2.61 -0.39
Least  -0.15  0.07 -0.04 -0.17 0.25 -2.32 0.85 -0.38 -1.51 1.89
  R
2       
Most  0.89 0.83 0.82 0.73 0.84  
2  0.86 0.87 0.80 0.89 0.87  
3  0.82 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.73  
4  0.91 0.92 0.83 0.80 0.82  
Least  0.91 0.88 0.74 0.68 0.62  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.2. cont. - O-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  0.09 0.31 0.48 0.01 0.48 0.52 1.13 2.28 0.05 2.06
2  0.41 0.16 0.03 -0.01 0.15 2.12 0.89 0.01  -0.06 0.98
3  0.33 -0.09 -0.25 0.12 -0.01 1.36 -0.45 -1.42  0.77 -0.05
4  0.51 -0.01  0.02 -0.08 -0.10 3.29 -0.04 0.13 -0.44 -0.53
Least  0.32 -0.03  0.04 -0.18 0.28 2.30 -0.18 0.17 -0.64 0.87
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.05 1.06 0.93 0.93 1.08 24.30 15.03 17.14  13.01 17.87
2  0.89 1.01 1.12 0.99 1.02 17.77 22.11 18.48  26.31 26.33
3  1.01 1.21 1.09 0.82 0.82 16.19 24.06 24.13  19.84 14.45
4  0.96 1.03 1.04 0.98 1.05 23.72 29.22 20.71  19.95 11.04
Least  0.88 1.12 1.09 1.06 1.04 24.72 24.87 16.44  14.84 12.28
  h  t(h) 
Most  -0.53 -0.34 -0.06 0.16 0.25 -6.30 -2.50 -0.60  1.12 2.13
2  -0.62 -0.02  0.34 0.25 0.48 -6.34 -0.18 2.86  3.32 6.33
3  -0.45 0.06 0.22 0.30 0.35 -3.68 0.63 2.46 3.78 3.56
4  -0.56 -0.16  0.15 0.49 0.66 -7.09 -2.32 1.50  5.12 7.16
Least  -0.66 -0.20  0.16 0.54 0.31 -9.46 -2.25 1.28  3.87 1.91
  d  t(d) 
Most  1.22 1.23 0.92 1.07 1.20 11.46 7.10 6.88 6.12 8.08
2  0.35 0.45 0.40 0.34 0.49 2.82 4.02 2.69 3.63 5.13
3  -0.07 -0.02  0.07 0.02 0.04 -0.46 -0.18 0.64  0.17 0.35
4  -0.29 -0.23 -0.12 -0.13 -0.01 -2.92 -2.61 -0.99 -1.05 -0.10
Least  -0.47 -0.50 -0.43 -0.21 0.02 -5.36 -4.49 -2.66 -1.17 0.10
  R
2       
Most  0.92 0.80 0.82 0.71 0.82  
2  0.86 0.87 0.79 0.89 0.88  
3  0.81 0.87 0.87 0.80 0.73  
4  0.91 0.92 0.83 0.79 0.82  
Least  0.92 0.89 0.75 0.68 0.61  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.2. cont. - O-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  -0.20 0.18 0.48 0.16 0.69 -1.15 0.84 2.65 0.63 3.36
2  0.07 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.43 0.33 1.05 0.94 1.04 2.60
3  0.05 -0.04 -0.12 0.27 0.18 0.19 -0.20 -0.71  1.82 0.93
4  0.18 -0.10  0.10 0.17 0.27 1.03 -0.73 0.53  0.92 1.35
Least  -0.06 -0.12  0.15 0.16 0.49 -0.34 -0.73 0.60  0.57 1.58
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.17 1.11 0.92 0.85 0.98 33.39 22.20 22.20  15.12 21.05
2  1.05 1.00 1.02 0.92 0.89 22.45 27.09 19.48  27.95 23.71
3  1.15 1.18 1.03 0.75 0.74 20.86 28.37 26.64  22.34 17.13
4  1.11 1.08 1.00 0.86 0.87 27.67 35.71 24.05  20.19 18.87
Least  1.05 1.16 1.04 0.90 0.93 27.51 32.24 18.66  14.23 13.14
  s  t(s) 
Most  0.49 0.73 0.39 0.42 0.48 6.99 7.29 4.71 3.70 5.15
2  0.28 0.20 0.09 0.06 -0.06 2.99 2.74 0.84 0.89 -0.86
3  -0.10  0.10 -0.03 -0.31 -0.20 -0.90 1.24 -0.44 -4.56 -2.36
4  0.06  0.04 -0.14 -0.34 -0.25 0.77 0.66 -1.65 -3.97 -2.68
Least  0.21 0.30 0.04 0.07 0.16 2.74 4.10 0.34 0.57 1.13
  d  t(d) 
Most  0.81 0.73 0.68 0.86 0.98 7.41 4.64 5.18 4.86 6.71
2  0.05 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.63 0.32 2.84 2.60 3.46 5.39
3  -0.11 -0.07  0.14 0.26 0.24 -0.65 -0.53 1.14  2.51 1.77
4  -0.45 -0.29 -0.10 0.18 0.28 -3.56 -3.02 -0.07  1.35 1.93
Least  -0.74 -0.72 -0.42 -0.13 -0.00 -6.14 -6.36 -2.40 -0.66 -0.02
  R
2       
Most  0.93 0.86 0.85 0.74 0.85  
2  0.82 0.87 0.78 0.88 0.84  
3  0.79 0.88 0.86 0.81 0.72  
4  0.87 0.92 0.83 0.78 0.75  
Least  0.87 0.90 0.75 0.64 0.61  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.2. cont. - O-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress  Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  0.03 0.19 0.41 -0.07 0.38 0.19 0.83 2.14  -0.28 1.94
2  0.40  0.12 -0.03 -0.03 0.13 2.04 0.70 -0.15 -0.23 0.87
3  0.37 -0.11 -0.26 0.16 0.01 1.58 -0.56 -1.46  1.04 0.03
4  0.54 -0.00  0.04 -0.05 -0.09 3.49 -0.02 0.21 -0.28 -0.50
Least  0.32 -0.07  0.03 -0.22 0.24 2.29 -0.44 0.11 -0.82 0.73
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.07 1.11 0.96 0.96 1.12 27.36 18.26 19.17  14.56 22.17
2  0.89 1.02 1.13 1.00 1.03 17.75 23.00 18.89  26.98 26.50
3  0.99 1.22 1.10 0.80 0.82 16.17 24.25 23.96  20.18 16.23
4  0.95 1.03 1.03 0.97 1.05 23.63 28.88 20.46  19.93 21.76
Least  0.88 1.14 1.10 1.08 1.06 24.43 26.24 16.42  15.29 12.61
  h  t(h) 
Most  -0.36 -0.02  0.13 0.40 0.55 -4.42 -0.13 1.27  2.91 5.16
2  -0.58 0.09 0.44 0.32 0.53 -5.47 0.95 3.51 4.08 6.48
3  -0.58 0.13 0.24 0.19 0.30 -4.49 1.20 2.47 2.33 2.84
4  -0.62 -0.17  0.10 0.40 0.65 -7.40 -2.22 0.94  3.90 6.43
Least  -0.66 -0.08  0.21 0.67 0.46 -8.74 -0.83 1.52  4.53 2.58
  s  t(s) 
Most  0.37 0.72 0.44 0.55 0.66 5.24 6.64 4.85 4.64 7.24
2  0.09 0.23 0.23 0.16 0.11 0.97 2.90 2.17 2.45 1.58
3  -0.29 0.15 0.04 -0.24 -0.10 -2.63 1.61 0.54  -3.39 -1.14
4  -0.15 -0.02 -0.11 -0.21 -0.03 -2.00 -0.24 -1.16 -2.38 -0.38
Least  -0.01 0.27 0.11 0.30 0.31 -0.13 3.46 0.90 2.32 2.06
  d  t(d) 
Most  0.96 0.73 0.62 0.69 0.75 8.97 4.42 4.52 3.83 5.40
2  0.29 0.29 0.24 0.22 0.41 2.07 2.39 1.47 2.20 3.89
3  0.13 -0.12  0.04 0.18 0.11 0.76 -0.89 0.32  1.69 0.82
4  -0.19 -0.22 -0.05 0.02 0.01 -1.73 -2.21 -0.36  0.12 0.09
Least  -0.46 -0.69 -0.51 -0.41 -0.19 -4.71 -5.76 -2.77 -2.11 -0.84
  R
2       
Most  0.94 0.86 0.85 0.75 0.87  
2  0.86 0.87 0.80 0.89 0.88  
3  0.82 0.88 0.87 0.82 0.73  
4  0.91 0.92 0.83 0.80 0.82  
Least  0.92 0.90 0.75 0.69 0.63  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.3. - O-score size-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4)
Distress quintile 
Size    Most 2  3  4 Least  Most 2  3  4 Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.41 0.09 0.06 0.18 0.35 -2.08 0.71 0.42 1.22 2.91
2  -0.33 0.01  -0.02 0.30 0.08 -2.02 0.06 -0.11 1.81 0.58
3  0.09 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.26 0.40 0.17 0.95 1.32 1.50
4  -0.10 -0.18 -0.00 0.11 0.31 -0.34 -1.35 -0.02  0.72 2.06
Big  0.13 0.06  -0.08 0.15 0.28 0.38 0.39 -0.67 1.67 2.21
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.03 1.01 0.96 0.96 0.84 19.93 31.53 24.42  25.17 26.76
2  1.09 1.06 1.06 1.08 1.01 25.59 33.22 27.71  25.03 27.07
3  1.16 1.00 1.04 1.12 1.08 20.33 28.73 26.20  28.58 24.23
4  1.20 1.03 0.95 1.14 1.01 16.23 29.87 32.37  27.85 25.95
Big  1.10 1.06 0.96 0.96 0.93 12.53 24.16 29.92  40.93 28.27
  h  t(h) 
Small  0.32 0.32 0.33 0.27 -0.10 3.04 4.93 4.17 3.52 -1.59
2  0.17 0.24 0.05 0.02 -0.11 1.97 3.64 0.58 0.22 -1.44
3  0.09 0.13  -0.02 -0.14 -0.15 0.76 1.78 -0.28  -1.75 -1.67
4  0.04 0.22 0.17 0.12 -0.36 0.28 3.10 2.81 1.38 -4.50
Big  0.29 0.31  -0.00 -0.03 -0.45 1.62 3.41 -0.05  -0.53 -6.66
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.33 1.24 1.14 1.22 1.01 15.50 23.49 17.60  19.48 19.40
2  1.07 0.97 1.11 0.90 0.89 15.16 18.28 17.53  12.68 14.53
3  0.72 0.52 0.66 0.68 0.83 7.64 9.00 10.12  10.47 11.30
4  0.43 0.10 0.05 0.47 0.29 3.48 1.83 1.03 6.99 4.52
Big  0.17 0.05  -0.32 -0.34 -0.22 1.21 0.67 -6.09  -8.69 -4.15
  R
2       
Small  0.88 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.94  
2  0.91 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.93  
3  0.85 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.91  
4  0.77 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.91  
Big  0.62 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.92  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.3. cont. - O-score size-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5)
Distress quintile 
Size    Most 2  3  4 Least  Most 2  3  4 Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  0.08 0.39 0.31 0.41 0.54 0.31 1.55 1.19 1.47 2.34
2  -0.01 0.18 0.17 0.39 0.09 -0.03 0.82 0.64 1.53 0.38
3  0.37 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.24 1.51 0.89 1.42 1.40 0.94
4  0.27 -0.08  0.04 0.13 0.21 1.00 -0.63 0.38  0.67 1.30
Big  0.52 0.22  -0.09 0.07 0.06 1.66 1.35 -0.63 0.61 0.58
  b  t(b) 
Small  0.89 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.77 12.80 13.78 12.86  12.09 12.95
2  0.99 1.00 0.98 1.03 0.97 15.93 17.10 14.42  15.75 15.52
3  1.08 0.96 0.99 1.08 1.06 17.22 22.35 19.16  20.20 16.12
4  1.11 1.01 0.94 1.12 1.02 16.09 29.39 31.61  22.71 23.82
Big  1.01 1.03 0.97 0.98 0.98 12.45 24.27 26.01  34.62 35.18
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.38 -0.27 -0.20 -0.29 -0.57 -2.78 -2.15 -1.55 -2.08 -4.90
2  -0.36 -0.21 -0.46 -0.37 -0.47 -2.99 -1.81 -3.44 -2.90 -3.82
3  -0.29 -0.12 -0.33 -0.44 -0.48 -2.40 -1.46 -3.31 -4.23 -3.73
4  -0.25 0.15 0.13 -0.08 -0.44 -1.87 2.17 2.30  -0.81 -5.31
Big  0.09 0.24 0.13 0.14 -0.28 0.54 2.84 1.75 2.45 -5.24
  d  t(d) 
Small  1.64 1.14 0.96 0.94 0.78 9.58 7.03 5.79 5.33 5.28
2  1.12 0.73 0.80 0.49 0.29 7.34 5.10 4.74 3.05 1.89
3  0.91 0.47 0.55 0.43 0.21 5.91 4.43 4.31 3.28 1.26
4  1.04 0.27 0.13 0.18 -0.14 6.09 3.17 1.78 1.48 -1.33
Big  1.03 0.40  -0.12 -0.30 -0.60 5.16 3.84 -1.28  -4.34 -8.78
  R
2       
Small  0.79 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.78  
2  0.82 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.80  
3  0.83 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.81  
4  0.81 0.91 0.92 0.87 0.90  
Big  0.69 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.95  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.3. cont. - O-score size-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6)
Distress quintile 
Size    Most 2  3  4 Least  Most 2  3  4 Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.02 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.31 -0.14 2.97 2.00 2.45 2.63
2  -0.12 0.16 0.02 0.27 -0.07 -0.81 1.30 0.14 1.69 -0.55
3  0.26 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.06 1.20 0.97 1.06 0.72 0.41
4  0.14 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.55 0.02 1.08 0.89 0.04
Big  0.55 0.34  -0.05 0.11 -0.10 1.86 2.18 -0.46 1.30 -0.92
  b  t(b) 
Small  0.93 0.91 0.86 0.88 0.87 25.61 34.12 25.12  26.38 32.02
2  1.03 1.00 1.05 1.08 1.04 30.70 35.21 32.09  29.47 35.22
3  1.13 0.97 1.04 1.16 1.13 24.26 32.54 30.93  34.33 31.59
4  1.17 0.97 0.90 1.11 1.12 20.27 33.14 35.64  31.77 34.44
Big  1.00 0.97 0.96 0.96 1.06 14.78 27.04 35.30  48.85 41.06
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.02 1.05 0.98 1.11 1.02 14.10 19.68 14.24  16.51 18.82
2  0.90 0.87 1.08 0.93 1.01 13.41 15.31 16.58  12.74 17.11
3  0.58 0.45 0.65 0.73 0.98 6.23 7.51 9.56  10.86 13.71
4  0.21 -0.02 -0.03 0.47 0.50 1.81 -0.36 -0.64  6.76 7.75
Big  -0.17 -0.15 -0.35 -0.31 0.04 -1.25 -2.12 -6.44 -7.76 0.86
  d  t(d) 
Small  0.95 0.45 0.34 0.23 0.05 8.36 5.39 3.18 2.20 0.57
2  0.51 0.18 0.06 -0.14 -0.41 4.83 1.97 0.58  -1.21 -4.38
3  0.51 0.18 0.10 -0.10 -0.48 3.48 1.92 0.90  -0.92 -4.27
4  0.86 0.31 0.18 -0.12 -0.53 4.74 3.41 2.25  -1.05 -5.25
Big  1.15 0.54 0.12 -0.09 -0.69 5.44 4.82 1.37  -1.51 -8.55
  R
2       
Small  0.92 0.95 0.90 0.91 0.94  
2  0.93 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.94  
3  0.87 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92  
4  0.81 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92  
Big  0.69 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.94  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel A.3. cont. - O-score size-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
 Distress quintile 
Size    Most 2  3  4 Least  Most 2  3  4 Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.08 0.22 0.14 0.22 0.39 -0.47 1.84 0.95 1.50 3.11
2  -0.15 0.04 0.00 0.24 -0.06 -0.96 0.30 0.00 1.41 -0.47
3  0.28 0.08 0.18 0.18 0.09 1.29 0.54 1.19 1.16 0.52
4  0.24 -0.09  0.04 0.05 0.15 0.91 -0.66 0.36  0.29 1.04
Big  0.55 0.23  -0.03 0.12 0.07 1.74 1.43 -0.27 1.25 0.66
  b  t(b) 
Small  0.96 0.98 0.94 0.95 0.83 21.88 31.82 23.61  24.25 25.80
2  1.05 1.06 1.06 1.09 1.04 25.75 32.07 26.75  24.74 29.00
3  1.16 0.99 1.03 1.12 1.12 19.86 27.74 25.25  27.78 25.86
4  1.12 1.10 0.94 1.15 1.05 16.14 29.15 31.29  27.63 27.91
Big  1.00 1.02 0.95 0.96 0.97 12.25 24.00 28.90  40.30 34.86
  h  t(h) 
Small  0.10 0.24 0.28 0.24 -0.13 1.10 3.67 3.35 2.95 -1.87
2  0.05 0.22 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.62 3.16 0.41 0.63 -0.16
3  -0.04 0.09  -0.05 -0.13 -0.04 -0.33 1.24 -0.59  -1.53 -0.45
4  -0.19 0.16 0.14 0.16 -0.26 -1.27 2.19 2.21 1.82 -3.25
Big  0.01 0.20  -0.04 -0.00 -0.31 0.07 2.18 -0.51  -0.06 -5.29
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.06 1.13 1.07 1.19 0.98 13.45 20.52 15.00  16.87 16.82
2  0.92 0.94 1.09 0.95 1.01 12.57 15.87 15.40  11.96 15.66
3  0.57 0.48 0.63 0.69 0.97 5.60 7.42 8.56 9.49 12.43
4  0.15 0.03 0.01 0.53 0.42 1.19 0.51 0.26 7.00 6.18
Big  -0.16 -0.09 -0.36 -0.31 -0.06 -1.12 -1.15 -6.12 -7.15 -1.16
  d  t(d) 
Small  0.91 0.36 0.23 0.13 0.10 7.59 4.22 2.08 1.22 1.14
2  0.49 0.08 0.05 -0.16 -0.40 4.37 0.94 0.42  -1.34 -4.09
3  0.52 0.14 0.12 -0.04 -0.46 3.39 1.44 1.04  -0.39 -3.89
4  0.94 0.25 0.12 -0.18 -0.43 4.91 2.59 1.47  -1.58 -4.14
Big  1.15 0.46 0.13 -0.09 -0.56 5.11 3.95 1.45  -1.41 -7.32
  R
2       
Small  0.92 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.94  
2  0.92 094  0.93 0.91 0.94  
3  0.86 0.92 0.91 0.93 0.92  
4  0.81 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92  
Big  0.69 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.95  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.1. - Z-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.61 0.00 0.36 0.24 0.32 -2.58 0.02 2.44 1.84 2.14
2  -0.43 0.01  -0.03 0.16 0.20 -1.99 0.06 -0.17 1.23 1.18
3  0.12 0.08 0.25 0.10 -0.13 0.54 0.40 1.65 0.68 -0.81
4  0.10 0.06 0.09 -0.09 -0.02 0.50 0.44 0.58  -0.67 -0.14
Big  0.45 -0.04 -0.13 -0.01 -0.01 3.13 -0.28 -0.73 -0.07 -0.05
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.11 1.06 1.03 0.96 1.00 19.74 25.59 29.24  30.24 27.88
2  1.25 1.18 1.16 1.04 1.05 24.05 28.62 31.17  32.52 25.53
3  1.21 1.22 1.14 1.04 1.07 22.97 26.53 31.32  29.09 28.80
4  1.12 1.16 1.10 0.96 1.01 23.85 34.68 29.16  28.71 24.98
Big  0.93 1.11 1.04 0.84 0.90 27.24 35.50 24.10  22.50 20.22
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.12 0.16 0.12 0.43 0.56 -0.91 1.66 1.47 5.94 6.89
2  -0.18 0.05 0.38 0.49 0.52 -1.55 0.51 4.45 6.79 5.67
3  -0.27 0.09 0.24 0.39 0.49 -2.35 0.84 2.94 4.86 5.81
4  -0.26 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.47 -2.41 1.01 2.13 3.16 5.09
Big  -0.57 -0.07  0.27 0.21 0.35 -7.42 -1.07 2.77  2.46 3.51
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.23 1.15 1.09 1.08 1.17 13.06 16.52 17.03  20.23 19.43
2  0.86 0.88 0.74 0.87 0.95 9.86 12.76 11.77  16.14 13.80
3  0.56 0.67 0.65 0.51 0.55 6.31 8.71 10.57 8.53 8.79
4  0.21 0.20 0.36 0.07 0.19 2.71 3.53 5.73 1.27 2.83
Big  -0.30 -0.17 -0.21 -0.18 -0.20 -5.28 -3.28 -2.95 -2.88 -2.67
  R
2       
Small  0.86 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.91  
2  0.88 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.88  
3  0.87 0.89 0.91 0.89 0.89  
4  0.87 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.85  
Big  0.91 0.93 0.85 0.83 0.79  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.1. cont. - Z-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.80 -0.23  0.16 0.05 0.14 -2.17 -0.73 0.59  0.18 0.46
2  -0.67 -0.20 -0.19 0.01 0.06 -2.49 -0.80 -0.87  0.03 0.22
3  -0.08 -0.10  0.10 0.01 -0.20 -0.36 -0.44 0.50  0.07 -0.98
4  -0.03 -0.01  0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.17 -0.07 0.09 -0.54 -0.14
Big  0.43 -0.04 -0.07 0.08 0.09 3.24 -0.35 -0.40  0.62 0.51
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.04 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.95 11.15 11.84 13.44  12.28 12.12
2  1.09 1.04 1.06 0.98 1.01 15.92 16.30 18.76  15.93 14.26
3  1.05 1.10 1.05 1.01 1.06 19.09 18.69 20.07  20.76 21.04
4  1.00 1.10 1.06 0.99 1.04 23.91 31.32 23.50  29.32 24.07
Big  0.87 1.07 1.09 0.93 0.99 25.66 33.03 23.11  26.92 22.68
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.64 -0.41 -0.38 -0.07 0.07 -3.33 -2.54 -2.66 -0.47 0.44
2  -0.71 -0.44 -0.02 0.09 0.13 -5.04 -3.37 -0.18  0.72 0.90
3  -0.69 -0.31 -0.11 0.16 0.28 -6.06 -2.58 -0.99  1.64 2.68
4  -0.49 -0.07  0.00 0.26 0.43 -5.73 -0.96 0.00  3.71 4.84
Big  -0.55 -0.06  0.40 0.39 0.54 -7.86 -0.86 4.15  5.45 6.00
  d  t(d) 
Small  -0.04 -0.27 -0.21 -0.10 0.09 -0.24 -1.99 -1.82 -0.80 0.67
2  -0.57 -0.41 -0.29 -0.09 0.08 -4.96 -3.82 -3.00 -0.84 0.67
3  -0.63 -0.41 -0.26 -0.02 0.12 -6.76 -4.10 -2.93 -0.29 1.39
4  -0.55 -0.23 -0.09 0.20 0.19 -7.84 -3.89 -1.20  3.49 2.62
Big  -0.41 -0.22  0.15 0.40 0.39 -7.10 -4.01 1.84  6.82 5.27
  R
2       
Small  0.65 0.68 0.73 0.65 0.61  
2  0.82 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.69  
3  0.87 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82  
4  0.91 0.93 0.87 0.90 0.85  
Big  0.92 0.93 0.84 0.87 0.82  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.1. cont. - Z-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.67 -0.01  0.34 0.41 0.60 -2.94 -0.06 2.62  2.95 3.52
2  -0.69 -0.09  0.07 0.37 0.47 -3.95 -0.67 0.48  2.52 2.51
3  -0.20 -0.00  0.29 0.28 0.14 -1.12 -0.01 2.12  1.79 0.82
4  -0.18 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.26 -1.13 0.26 0.98 0.57 1.42
Big  0.06 -0.13  0.04 0.20 0.27 0.38 -1.10 0.24  1.52 1.57
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.13 0.98 0.97 0.85 0.89 21.21 27.19 31.31  25.89 22.05
2  1.20 1.10 1.03 0.92 0.94 29.18 34.31 30.82  26.63 21.49
3  1.17 1.14 1.05 0.95 0.98 28.11 30.02 32.60  25.85 24.57
4  1.09 1.10 1.04 0.93 0.94 28.72 37.72 29.22  29.33 22.38
Big  1.00 1.09 1.01 0.86 0.88 27.28 38.93 24.10  27.39 21.60
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.26 1.15 1.01 1.00 1.04 13.99 18.83 19.30  18.02 15.32
2  0.96 0.92 0.68 0.77 0.83 13.87 16.91 12.06  13.21 11.20
3  0.69 0.70 0.62 0.43 0.43 9.73 10.88 11.43 6.89 6.36
4  0.33 0.20 0.33 -0.00 0.07 5.08 4.11 5.50  -0.03 0.98
Big  -0.13 -0.13 -0.29 -0.27 -0.32 -2.18 -2.83 -4.10 -5.04 -4.58
  d  t(d) 
Small  -0.36 -0.33 -0.27 -0.21 -0.05 -0.04 -4.98 -4.67 -3.38 -0.66
2  -0.57 -0.45 -0.37 -0.20 -0.04 -7.37 -7.47 -5.85 -3.05 -0.54
3  -0.59 -0.44 -0.32 -0.10 0.02 -7.62 -6.19 -5.28 -1.51 0.24
4  -0.51 -0.24 -0.13 0.16 0.11 -7.14 -4.45 -1.97  2.61 1.37
Big  -0.29 -0.19  0.11 0.36 0.33 -4.31 -3.70 1.43  6.23 4.37
  R
2       
Small  0.86 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.87  
2  0.92 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.85  
3  0.91 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.86  
4  0.90 0.94 0.90 0.88 0.82  
Big  0.88 0.94 0.84 0.87 0.80  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.1. cont. - Z-score size-B/M portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2  3  4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.61 -0.05  0.32 0.22 0.32 -2.58 -0.29 2.32  1.70 2.16
2  -0.53 -0.06 -0.08 0.14 0.21 -3.05 -0.43 -0.55  1.09 1.21
3  0.01 0.01 0.21 0.09 -0.11 0.09 0.04 1.47  0.62 -0.72
4  0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.05 0.18 0.47 -0.47 0.04
Big  0.39 -0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.05 3.32 -0.57 -0.61  0.41 0.33
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.10 0.99 0.98 0.93 1.01 18.39 24.52 28.06  28.22 26.27
2  1.13 1.09 1.10 1.02 1.05 25.50 30.04 30.73  30.30 24.05
3  1.08 1.13 1.08 1.03 1.09 24.95 26.44 30.47  27.01 27.64
4  1.01 1.11 1.08 1.00 1.05 25.49 33.46 27.02  29.37 24.90
Big  0.85 1.06 1.08 0.92 0.98 28.87 34.06 23.64  28.06 23.28
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.12 0.08 0.05 0.39 0.57 -0.93 0.89 0.72  5.48 6.85
2  -0.33 -0.06  0.30 0.46 0.53 -3.43 -0.79 3.86  6.37 5.63
3  -0.44 -0.02  0.17 0.38 0.51 -4.68 -0.20 2.25  4.63 5.99
4  -0.39 0.02 0.16 0.28 0.51 -4.58 0.26 1.81  3.89 5.60
Big  -0.67 -0.13  0.31 0.31 0.45 -10.47 -1.87 3.14  4.30 4.93
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.23 1.16 1.02 1.09 1.17 13.00 18.16 18.54  20.86 19.32
2  0.89 0.90 0.75 0.88 0.95 12.72 15.80 13.33  16.51 13.72
3  0.59 0.69 0.66 0.52 0.55 8.60 10.24 11.76  8.54 8.76
4  0.24 0.21 0.37 0.06 0.19 3.81 3.97 5.84  1.17 2.78
Big  -0.29 -0.16 -0.22 -0.20 -0.22 -6.13 -3.31 -3.08  -3.08 -3.25
  d  t(d) 
Small  -0.02 -0.32 -0.26 -0.15 0.03 -0.21 -4.71 -4.44  -2.68 0.51
2  -0.61 -0.46 -0.32 -0.13 0.03 -8.22 -7.47 -5.36  -2.28 0.46
3  -0.66 -0.44 -0.29 -0.05 0.09 -9.01 -6.10 -4.86  -0.75 1.40
4  -0.56 -0.24 -0.11 0.20 0.18 -8.45 -4.30 -1.62  3.44 2.57
Big  -0.39 -0.21  0.16 0.41 0.40 -7.86 -4.02 2.04  7.37 5.62
  R
2       
Small  0.86 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.91  
2  0.93 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.88  
3  0.92 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.89  
4  0.92 0.93 0.90 0.90 0.86  
Big  0.94 0.94 0.85 0.88 0.83  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.2. - Z-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  -0.26 -0.13 -0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.92 -0.35 -0.29  0.19 0.56
2  0.12 -0.35 -0.18 -0.05 -0.15 0.43 -1.33 -0.78 -0.32 -0.66
3  0.07 0.01  -0.12 0.02 0.09 0.33 0.05 -0.60 0.09 0.39
4  0.59 -0.06  0.22 0.26 0.30 3.09 -0.34 1.17  1.05 1.46
Least  0.36 0.24 0.28 -0.22 0.69 2.28 1.27 1.03  -0.74 2.16
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.17 1.13 0.93 0.71 0.80 17.04 12.23 14.21  13.92 15.95
2  1.22 1.06 0.99 0.86 1.03 18.11 16.90 18.29  21.96 19.99
3  1.08 1.15 1.09 1.13 1.22 20.28 28.96 21.83  19.63 22.97
4  0.96 1.12 1.23 1.12 1.01 21.08 25.42 26.39  18.43 20.30
Least  0.95 1.12 1.13 1.06 0.90 25.18 24.84 17.42  14.84 11.90
  h  t(h) 
Most  -0.10 -0.05  0.12 0.08 0.21 -0.67 -0.26 0.81  0.70 1.87
2  -0.23 0.09 0.24 0.20 0.61 -1.47 0.66 1.96 2.32 4.96
3  -0.42 0.01 0.31 0.58 0.65 -3.53 0.08 2.79 4.43 5.40
4  -0.50 -0.09  0.33 0.26 0.60 -4.86 -0.92 3.09  1.91 5.35
Least  -0.55 -0.08  0.05 0.74 0.20 -6.44 -0.75 0.35  4.60 1.17
  s  t(s) 
Most  0.54  0.22 -0.01 -0.25 -0.07 4.71 1.46 -0.07 -2.90 -0.89
2  0.22 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 0.24 1.97 -0.61 -0.94 -0.54 2.63
3  -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 0.21 0.52 -0.35 -0.71 -0.36  2.18 5.86
4  -0.28 0.01 0.37 0.40 1.00 -3.73 0.15 4.76 3.89 12.03
Least  -0.18 0.21 0.18 0.72 0.65 -2.87 2.78 1.67 6.00 5.12
  R
2       
Most  0.77 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.70  
2  0.79 0.74 0.76 0.82 0.76  
3  0.83 0.90 0.82 0.77 0.83  
4  0.85 0.87 0.87 0.77 0.83  
Least  0.89 0.87 0.76 0.68 0.61  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.2. cont. - Z-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distres Low  2  3  4  High Low  2  3  4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  -0.29 -0.12 -0.02 0.16 0.21 -0.96 -0.30 -0.09  0.84 1.14
2  0.07 -0.28 -0.10 0.02 -0.18 0.24 -1.12 -0.47  0.11 -0.79
3  0.04 -0.03 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.16 -0.19 -0.60  0.01 0.02
4  0.57 -0.13  0.12 0.17 0.10 3.10 -0.77 0.60  0.64 0.31
Least  0.31 0.14 0.18 -0.43 0.56 2.56 0.78 0.69 -1.34 1.59
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.21 1.19 1.00 0.84 0.90 15.75 12.18 14.95  16.91 19.38
2  1.19 1.13 1.07 0.94 1.03 16.38 17.70 20.08  26.01 17.24
3  1.03 1.10 1.08 1.14 1.19 18.78 27.82 20.46  18.30 18.60
4  0.90 1.04 1.16 1.05 0.90 19.10 24.87 22.16  15.59 11.52
Least  0.86 1.02 1.03 0.90 0.84 28.36 23.37 15.71  11.11 9.38
  h  t(h) 
Most  -0.25 -0.07  0.21 0.32 0.37 -1.55 -0.34 1.53  3.16 3.83
2  -0.35 0.21 0.38 0.32 0.51 -2.31 1.58 3.42  4.27 4.18
3  -0.48 -0.04  0.32 0.51 0.43 -4.25 -0.54 2.93  3.97 3.22
4  -0.47 -0.19  0.09 0.04 0.10 -4.80 -2.26 0.87  0.28 0.60
Least  -0.61 -0.28 -0.14 0.29 -0.12 -9.74 -3.08 -1.02  1.71 -0.68
  d  t(d) 
Most  0.36 0.33 0.34 0.50 0.48 2.79 2.01 3.02  6.03 6.06
2  -0.09 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.03 -0.74 3.13 4.31  6.17 0.28
3  -0.26 -0.28 -0.04 0.10 0.02 -2.83 -4.20 -0.40  0.92 0.20
4  -0.35 -0.38 -0.27 -0.19 -0.26 -4.46 -5.39 -3.10  -1.69 -2.00
Least  -0.52 -0.42 -0.42 -0.55 -0.15 -10.21 -5.71 -3.80  -4.00 -1.02
  R
2       
Most  0.75 0.62 0.69 0.72 0.77  
2  0.78 0.76 0.79 0.86 0.74  
3  0.84 0.91 0.82 0.77 0.78  
4  0.86 0.90 0.86 0.75 0.62  
Least  0.94 0.89 0.78 0.63 0.53  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.2. cont. - Z-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2 3 4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  -0.22 -0.07  0.07 0.22 0.35 -0.82 -0.20 0.28  1.23 1.93
2  -0.02 -0.21  0.05 0.15 0.15 -0.06 -0.86 0.24  1.05 0.64
3  -0.21 -0.06  0.02 0.33 0.40 -0.93 -0.43 0.10  1.30 1.69
4  0.25 -0.21  0.31 0.33 0.51 1.28 -1.32 1.68  1.38 2.46
Least  -0.05 0.08 0.19 -0.02 0.74 -0.33 0.51 0.75  -0.06 2.41
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.24 1.20 0.95 0.78 0.83 19.82 13.86 15.93  18.38 19.25
2  1.26 1.09 0.99 0.87 0.91 19.51 19.08 20.36  25.72 16.03
3  1.13 1.11 1.01 1.02 1.08 21.69 31.54 20.94  17.34 19.32
4  1.01 1.08 1.12 1.03 0.83 22.32 28.55 26.06  18.08 17.08
Least  0.99 1.07 1.05 0.81 0.83 27.39 28.44 18.29  12.43 11.65
  s  t(s) 
Most  0.53  0.21 -0.07 -0.32 -0.17 5.03 1.43 -0.66 -4.45 -2.32
2  0.28 -0.12 -0.18 -0.12 010 2.61 -1.23 -2.14 -2.06 1.05
3  0.09 -0.03 -0.10 0.07 0.38 1.02 -0.38 -1.20  0.73 3.97
4  -0.14 0.07 0.33 0.36 0.90 -1.80 1.07 4.51 3.71 10.89
Least  -0.01 0.27 0.21 0.61 0.63 -0.14 4.24 2.18 5.50 5.18
  d  t(d) 
Most  0.34 0.32 0.31 0.49 0.43 2.91 1.98 2.79 6.15 5.40
2  -0.07 0.32 0.34 0.33 -0.07 -0.55 2.96 3.77 5.29 -0.70
3  -0.19 -0.27 -0.08 -0.00 -0.10 -1.95 -4.11 -0.87 -0.10 -0.93
4  -0.26 -0.36 -0.33 -0.24 -0.39 -3.04 -5.04 -4.10 -2.29 -4.27
Least  -0.42 -0.41 -0.42 -0.67 -0.21 -6.13 -5.79 -3.94 -5.53 -1.56
  R
2       
Most  0.79 0.63 0.68 0.74 0.76  
2  0.78 0.76 0.78 0.85 0.71  
3  0.82 0.91 0.80 0.73 0.79  
4  0.83 0.90 0.88 0.77 0.81  
Least  0.89 0.90 0.79 0.70 0.62  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.2. cont. - Z-score B/M-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distres Low  2  3  4  High Low  2  3  4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Most  -0.21 -0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.19 -0.75 -0.22 -0.10  0.66 1.06
2  0.15 -0.29 -0.11 0.01 -0.15 0.37 -1.16 -0.54  0.05 -0.64
3  0.03 -0.03 -0.13 0.04 0.09 0.15 -0.22 -0.62  0.14 0.38
4  0.53 -0.12  0.18 0.23 0.25 3.03 -0.74 0.98  0.93 1.28
Least  0.28 0.17 0.21 -0.31 0.66 2.46 0.03 0.82 -1.15 2.07
  b  t(b) 
Most  1.23 1.20 1.00 0.82 0.90 17.45 12.30 14.83  17.46 19.28
2  1.20 1.13 1.07 0.93 1.04 16.70 17.56 20.00  25.84 17.81
3  1.02 1.10 1.08 1.15 1.21 18.63 27.61 20.29  18.69 21.46
4  0.89 1.04 1.17 1.07 0.94 19.84 24.74 24.81  16.85 18.80
Least  0.85 1.03 1.04 0.94 0.87 29.37 24.64 16.00  13.60 10.75
  h  t(h) 
Most  -0.02 0.02 0.20 0.21 0.33 -0.15 0.11 1.39  2.02 3.25
2  -0.25 0.18 0.33 0.29 0.61 -1.60 1.26 2.89  3.78 4.88
3  -0.49 -0.06  0.31 0.60 0.65 -4.09 -0.69 2.66  4.50 5.28
4  -0.58 -0.18  0.26 0.21 0.53 -6.01 -2.02 2.51  1.53 4.85
Least  -0.68 -0.18 -0.05 0.60 0.16 -10.80 -1.99 -0.37  4.03 0.90
  s  t(s) 
Most  0.53 0.21  -0.02 -0.27 -0.09 4.71 1.39 -0.20 -3.66 -1.29
2  0.23 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 0.24 2.00 -0.78 -1.20  -0.90 2.61
3  -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.21 0.52 -0.24 -0.57 -0.34  2.14 5.83
4  -0.27 0.03 0.39 0.40 1.02 -3.82 0.41 5.16  4.02 12.82
Least  -0.16 0.23 0.20 0.74 0.66 -3.53 3.46 1.95  6.81 5.19
  d  t(d) 
Most  0.34 0.32 0.34 0.52 0.48 2.82 1.95 3.01  6.50 6.12
2  -0.10 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.02 -0.84 3.15 4.36  6.20 0.17
3  -0.26 -0.28 -0.03 0.09 -0.00 -2.80 -4.16 -0.38  0.83 -0.03
4  -0.34 -0.38 -0.29 -0.21 -0.31 -4.54 -5.39 -3.65  -1.98 -3.68
Least  -0.51 -0.43 -0.43 -0.59 -0.19 -10.53 -6.13 -3.93  -5.02 -1.36
  R
2       
Most  0.79 0.62 0.68 0.75 0.77  
2  0.79 0.76 0.79 0.86 0.76  
3  0.84 0.91 0.81 0.77 0.83  
4  0.87 0.90 0.88 0.78 0.84  
Least  0.95 0.90 0.78 0.73 0.62  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.3. - Z-score size-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                         (3.3.4)
Distress quintile 
Size    Most 2  3  4 Least  Most 2  3  4 Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.31 -0.19  0.20 0.26 0.06 -0.07 -1.28 1.48  1.80 0.31
2  -0.08 -0.17  0.01 0.19 -0.14 -0.40 -0.90 0.09  1.13 -0.70
3  -0.08 0.12  -0.05 0.24 0.17 -0.44 0.75 -0.27 1.35 0.82
4  -0.08 -0.29 -0.06 0.20 0.24 -0.49 -1.77 -0.31  1.26 1.26
Big  0.02 -0.13 -0.02 0.23 0.39 0.08 -0.74 -0.15  1.53 2.54
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.06 1.06 1.03 1.02 1.02 15.39 29.29 31.85  29.31 23.63
2  1.05 1.15 1.18 1.11 1.21 21.68 25.84 30.46  27.83 25.46
3  0.98 1.07 1.23 1.20 1.20 24.19 27.70 29.23  28.15 24.34
4  0.87 1.08 1.23 1.18 1.08 21.11 27.53 26.47  31.48 23.89
Big  0.75 0.88 1.09 1.04 0.95 15.40 21.33 33.97  29.22 25.84
  h  t(h) 
Small  0.27 0.45 0.42 0.20 -0.01 1.71 5.49 5.71 2.51 -0.11
2  0.28 0.42 0.35 0.28 -0.02 2.59 4.22 3.99 3.07 -0.20
3  0.30 0.20 0.32 0.07 -0.09 3.25 2.30 3.36 0.73 -0.84
4  0.20 0.18 0.34 0.20 -0.26 2.15 2.05 3.25 2.36 -2.54
Big  0.03 0.21 0.15 -0.27 -0.54 0.30 2.21 2.10  -0.29 -6.44
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.38 1.11 1.08 1.13 1.02 11.93 18.25 20.03  19.28 13.93
2  0.79 0.87 0.96 0.91 0.77 9.72 11.69 14.84  13.69 9.66
3  0.35 0.58 0.75 0.64 0.59 5.15 8.91 10.59 8.91 7.13
4  0.02 0.17 0.42 0.34 0.16 0.31 2.64 5.42 5.42 2.12
Big  -0.29 -0.23 -0.16 -0.25 -0.28 -3.86 -3.36 -3.01 -4.25 -4.55
  R
2       
Small  0.78 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.89  
2  0.84 0.88 0.91 0.90 0.89  
3  0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.87  
4  0.81 0.88 0.87 0.91 0.87  
Big  0.71 0.81 0.92 0.91 0.90  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.3. cont. - Z-score size-distress portfolios  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                         (3.3.5)
Distress quintile 
Size    Most 2  3  4 Least  Most 2  3  4 Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.44 -0.37  0.00 0.05 -0.17 -1.07 -1.26 0.01  0.15 -0.60
2  -0.15 -0.33 -0.18 -0.03 -0.37 -0.58 -0.91 -0.66 -0.10 -1.63
3  -0.09 0.02  -0.21 0.06 -0.03 -0.50 0.11 -0.85 0.29 -0.15
4  -0.01 -0.30 -0.17 0.08 0.13 -0.09 -1.79 -0.83  0.52 0.81
Big  0.15 -0.01  0.01 0.00 0.36 0.78 -0.08 0.00  1.50 2.76
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.10 0.99 0.94 0.92 0.89 10.43 13.18 13.03  12.18 12.26
2  1.08 1.07 1.08 0.97 1.03 16.18 15.48 15.64  15.01 17.81
3  1.01 1.03 1.14 1.06 1.03 22.34 19.39 18.54  20.14 19.79
4  0.97 1.09 1.15 1.09 0.96 26.58 25.88 21.61  27.30 24.31
Big  0.87 0.99 1.09 0.99 0.87 18.45 26.38 30.91  27.12 26.43
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.19 -0.03 -0.09 -0.35 -0.55 -0.89 -0.21 -0.60 -2.24 -3.69
2  0.03 0.01  -0.12 -0.22 -0.52 0.21 0.08 -0.89  -1.68 -4.37
3  0.21 -0.06 -0.07 -0.33 -0.51 2.28 -0.52 -0.51 -3.00 -4.77
4  0.31 0.14 0.09 -0.04 -0.46 4.11 1.59 0.78  -0.54 -5.70
Big  0.29 0.43 0.21 -0.24 -0.54 2.99 5.57 2.93  -3.17 -7.98
  d  t(d) 
Small  0.55 0.01  -0.12 -0.20 -0.38 3.12 0.05 -1.00  -1.57 -3.07
2  0.35 -0.12 -0.21 -0.39 -0.64 3.13 -1.02 -1.80 -3.56 -6.50
3  0.26 -0.02 -0.22 -0.46 -0.63 3.45 -0.21 -2.13 -5.15 -7.14
4  0.45 0.12  -0.27 -0.37 -0.52 7.33 1.74 -3.03  -5.49 -7.82
Big  0.49 0.48  -0.04 -0.33 -0.49 6.24 7.53 -0.65  -5.33 -8.84
  R
2       
Small  0.55 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.72  
2  0.74 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.85  
3  0.83 0.82 0.81 0.86 0.87  
4  0.90 0.88 0.85 0.91 0.91  
Big  0.76 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.93  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.3. cont. - Z-score size-distress portfolios 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.6)
Distress quintile 
Size   Most  2  3  4  Least Most  2  3  4  Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.04 0.01 0.36 0.29 -0.07 -0.16 0.08 2.56  2.19 -0.44
2  0.14 -0.01  0.11 0.20 -0.34 0.75 -0.03 0.74  1.50 -2.54
3  0.14 0.21 0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.84 1.30 0.22  1.01 -0.39
4  0.14 -0.17  0.03 0.19 -0.03 0.94 -1.06 0.15  1.46 -0.22
Big  0.17 0.11 0.05 0.01 -0.00 1.04 0.76 0.35  0.07 -0.02
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.08 0.95 0.91 0.94 0.96 17.30 25.18 28.00 30.38 27.02
2  1.04 1.03 1.06 0.98 1.11 22.94 23.60 29.53 30.98 35.56
3  0.95 1.02 1.12 1.11 1.12 24.61 27.46 28.79 34.28 32.03
4  0.90 1.06 1.11 1.08 1.05 26.14 28.24 26.00 35.60 28.50
Big  0.82 0.91 1.06 1.05 0.99 21.01 27.48 34.19 32.18 27.73
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.28 1.01 1.01 1.11 1.06 12.08 15.75 18.30 21.17 17.57
2  0.70 0.79 0.91 0.89 0.84 9.10 10.69 14.92 16.68 15.91
3  0.26 0.54 0.70 0.67 0.67 3.95 8.55 10.64 12.23 11.42
4  -0.07 0.12 0.37 0.33 0.27 -1.16 1.91 5.17  6.50 4.34
Big  -0.34 -0.33 -0.19 -0.16 -0.11 -5.30 -5.83 -3.72  -2.97 -1.88
  d  t(d) 
Small  0.43 -0.11 -0.23 -0.27 -0.41 3.72 -1.56 -3.77  -4.74 -6.14
2  0.26 -0.22 -0.30 -0.46 -0.65 3.11 -2.66 -4.43  -7.78 -11.12
3  0.20 -0.07 -0.30 -0.48 -0.62 2.71 -1.07 -4.06  -8.04 -9.56
4  0.41 0.09  -0.33 -0.40 -0.47 6.30 1.22 -4.16 -7.09 -6.89
Big  0.49 0.44  -0.05 -0.27 -0.38 6.71 7.17 -0.91 -4.39 -5.72
  R
2        
Small  0.80 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.92  
2  0.85 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.95  
3  0.85 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.93  
4  0.85 0.88 0.88 0.93 0.90  
Big  0.79 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.89  
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Table 4.19. cont. Regression results – Intersecting quintile portfolios   
Panel B.3. cont. - Z-score size-distress portfolios 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM  – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi                  (3.3.7)
 Distress quintile 
Size   Most  2  3  4  Least Most  2  3  4  Least 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.23 -0.20  0.17 0.22 -0.01 -0.85 -1.33 1.32  1.64 -0.07
2  -0.03 -0.19 -0.03 -0.12 -0.25 -0.16 -0.15 -0.17  -0.86 -0.84
3  -0.04 0.11  -0.09 -0.16 0.06 -0.22 0.70 -0.53 -1.14 0.44
4  -0.01 -0.27 -0.11 0.14 0.15 -0.09 -1.67 -0.57  1.02 1.03
Big  0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.18 0.32 0.56 -0.37 -0.18  1.33 2.75
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.16 1.05 0.99 0.97 0.94 16.92 27.20 29.94 28.09 23.46
2  1.12 1.11 1.13 1.02 1.07 22.84 23.89 28.96 29.02 31.01
3  1.03 0.06 1.08 1.10 1.06 25.08 25.72 27.58 30.09 28.02
4  0.97 1.10 1.17 1.10 0.97 26.39 26.63 24.90 32.43 25.32
Big  0.85 0.98 1.09 0.98 0.85 19.55 28.16 31.61 28.86 29.23
  h  t(h) 
Small  0.38 0.44 0.37 0.14 -0.11 2.59 5.25 5.23  1.83 -1.31
2  0.36 0.38 0.29 0.17 -0.18 3.41 3.82 3.42  2.26 -2.46
3  0.36 0.19 0.26 -0.05 -0.25 4.02 2.13 2.79 -0.61 -3.07
4  0.31 0.21 0.27 0.11 -0.39 3.91 2.34 0.67  1.47 -4.67
Big  0.16 0.32 0.15 -0.34 -0.65 1.65 4.31 1.96 -4.66 -10.30
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.36 1.11 1.09 1.14 1.03 12.56 18.23 20.89 20.90 16.35
2  0.78 0.88 0.98 0.93 0.80 10.10 11.93 15.89 16.83 14.69
3  0.34 0.58 0.76 0.66 0.62 5.24 8.91 11.27 11.40 10.30
4  0.00 0.17 0.44 0.36 0.18 0.04 2.58 5.87  6.67 3.03
Big  -0.31 -0.25 -0.16 -0.24 -0.26 -4.56 -4.61 -2.97  -4.51 -5.66
  d  t(d) 
Small  0.49 -0.04 -0.17 -0.25 -0.42 4.22 -0.72 -3.11  -4.36 -6.30
2  0.32 -0.16 -0.26 -0.43 -0.67 3.82 -2.05 -3.91  -7.35 -11.62
3  0.25 -0.05 -0.26 -0.49 -0.66 3.59 -0.67 -3.58  -7.99 -10.30
4  0.45 0.12  -0.29 -0.39 -0.53 7.29 1.66 -3.70 -6.73 -8.22
Big  0.51 0.50  -0.03 -0.32 -0.48 6.95 8.36 -0.53 -5.55 -9.69
  R
2        
Small  0.81 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.92  
2  0.86 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.95  
3  0.86 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.93  
4  0.87 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.92  
Big  0.79 0.88 0.92 0.93 0.94  
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For each portfolio combination, the models had the most trouble capturing the 
variability of return for the extreme portfolios. For the size-B/M portfolios, Panel A.1, 
the lowest R
2 values for the SMB/HML and the SMB/DMS (HML/DMS) models were 
reported for the corner medium- to big-firm, medium- to high-B/M (small-firm, 
medium- to high-B/M) portfolios. For the B/M-distress portfolios, Panel A.2, all models 
displayed the lowest R
2 values for the medium- to least-distress, medium- to high-B/M 
portfolios. Thus, for portfolios sorted on B/M, all models had trouble capturing 
variability of return for the medium- to high-B/M portfolios. Finally, for the size-
distress portfolios, Panel A.3, the SMB/HML and SMB/DMS (HML/DMS) models 
exhibited the lowest R
2 values for the medium- to big-firm, more-distress (small-firm) 
portfolios. Thus, for portfolios sorted on size, the HML/DMS model exhibited the 
lowest R
2 values for the small-firm portfolios. This suggests that when firms are sorted 
by size, the SMB factor is required to capture the variability of return for the small-firm 
portfolios. In addition, for all portfolio sorts, the SMB/HML and SMB/DMS models 
had trouble capturing variability of return for similar portfolios.  
4.5.3.2.1.2 Magnitude of return: Intercepts 
The intercepts and associated t-values are presented at the top of each table. For 
the size-B/M and size-distress (B/M-distress) portfolios, the HML/DMS (SMB/HML) 
model outperformed in terms of having the fewest significant intercepts. Therefore, for 
the size-B/M and the size-distress portfolios, the model that exhibited the fewest 
significant intercepts, was also the model with the lowest R
2 values. This suggests that 
for these portfolios, the HML and DMS factors, in combination, are important in 
capturing the magnitude of returns, but do not capture the variability of return. Although 
all models had trouble capturing the variability of return for the B/M-distress portfolios, 
as shown by the comparatively low R
2 values, the SMB/HML model exhibited both the  
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highest R
2 values and the lowest number of significant intercepts. Therefore, it clearly 
outperformed the alternative three-factor models for the B/M-distress portfolios. 
Significant intercepts were mostly observed within the extreme portfolios. For 
both the size-B/M and the B/M-distress portfolios, the models had trouble capturing the 
returns earned by the low-B/M portfolios. For the low-B/M portfolios, the intercepts for 
the small firms and the high-distress firms were similar, as were the intercepts for the 
big-firms and low-distress firms, reflecting the strong relation between distress-risk and 
size when o-score was used as the distress-risk measure. For the size-B/M (B/M-
distress) portfolios, the SMB/HML model intercepts for the low-B/M portfolios 
changed from negative and at least weakly significant for the small-firm (most-distress) 
portfolio, to positive and significant for the big-firm (least-distress) portfolio. When the 
HML/DMS model was tested on these portfolios, a significant positive intercept was 
exhibited for the low-B/M big-firm (low-B/M least-distress) portfolio. When the 
SMB/DMS model was tested, significant negative intercepts were exhibited for low-
B/M smaller size portfolios, but the model was able to capture the returns earned by the 
low-B/M distress portfolios, with no intercepts significant at conventional levels.  
The strong relation between size and distress-risk was also reflected in the 
intercepts of the medium- to high-B/M portfolios for both the size-B/M and B/M-
distress portfolios. When the SMB/DMS model was tested on the size-B/M (B/M-
distress) portfolios, the corner higher-B/M smaller-firm (high-B/M more-distress) 
portfolios exhibited significant positive intercepts. This pattern in the intercepts was 
much stronger for the size-B/M portfolios than for the B/M-distress portfolios. 
With regard to the size-B/M portfolios, the SMB/DMS model intercepts 
exhibited a clear pattern, with seven significant positive intercepts exhibited for the 
corner portfolios with medium- to high-B/M and small- to medium-size. This pattern  
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was not evident for the other models, all of which incorporated HML, suggesting that 
HML is important in capturing the returns earned by these portfolios. 
For the size-distress portfolios, the SMB/HML model exhibited significant 
negative intercepts for the smaller-firm most-distress portfolios and significant positive 
intercepts for the small- and bigger-firm, least-distress portfolios. For the SMB/DMS 
model, four of the small-firm portfolios and the big-firm, distress-2 portfolio displayed 
significant positive intercepts. These patterns in the intercepts disappeared for the 
HML/DMS model, with only the small-firm, least-distress portfolio displaying an 
intercept significant at the 5% level. This suggests that, although the HML and DMS 
factors alone cannot capture portfolio returns, they are both important in capturing the 
returns earned by firms in the more extreme portfolios. 
4.5.3.2.2 Four-factor model 
The additional explanatory power of the four-factor model compared with the 
best three-factor models was dependent on the portfolios examined. In all cases the 
four-factor, SMB/HML and SMB/DMS models had the most trouble capturing 
variability of returns for similar portfolios.  
For the size-B/M portfolios, the four-factor model did not outperform the 
SMB/HML model in terms of R
2 values, or the HML/DMS model in terms of 
significant intercepts. When comparing the four-factor model with the SMB/HML 
model, only the explanatory power for the small-firm, low-B/M portfolio was improved 
by augmenting the model with DMS. The R
2 of this portfolio increased, from 0.84 to 
0.89, and the significance of the intercept was reduced, from -0.81 (t = -3.36) to -0.43    
(t = -2.02), although it was still significant. Although the HML/DMS model had the 
lowest number of significant intercepts, adding DMS to the SMB/HML model increased 
the number of significant intercepts. The four-factor model had one (three) more 
significant intercept than the SMB/HML (HML/DMS) model. The pattern displayed in  
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the low-B/M portfolio intercepts was the same as for the SMB/HML model. In addition, 
the small-firm, medium- to high-B/M intercepts were significant and positive. Thus, the 
SMB and HML factors are important in describing the returns of the size-B/M 
portfolios. The DMS factor does not subsume the role of the SMB or the HML factor 
and only adds to the explanatory power of the model for the small-firm, low-B/M 
portfolio.  
For the B/M-distress portfolios, when compared with the SMB/HML model, the 
four-factor model exhibited higher R
2 values for all of the most- and least-distress 
portfolios, the largest increase being for the most-distressed portfolios. However, the 
four-factor model exhibited two more significant intercepts. Adding DMS to the model 
eliminated the weak significant negative intercept exhibited for the low-B/M, most-
distress portfolio, but not the positive significant intercepts found for the low-B/M, 
lower-distress portfolios. In addition, intercepts that were positive and at least weakly 
significant were now exhibited for the low-B/M, distress-2 portfolio and for the 
medium- and high-B/M, most-distress portfolios, consistent with the pattern observed 
for the HML/DMS model. Thus, both the SMB and HML factors are important in 
capturing the returns earned by the B/M-distress portfolios. The DMS factor is also 
important, as it improves the explanatory power of the model for the most- and least-
distress portfolios. However, when DMS and HML are incorporated together in the 
model, some of the higher distress-risk portfolios earn a higher return than predicted by 
the model.  
For the size-distress portfolios, the four-factor model outperformed all of the 
three-factor models. The R
2 values were only marginally higher than for the SMB/DMS 
model, but the number of significant intercepts was much lower. Consistent with the 
HML/DMS model, the only intercept significant at the 5% level was for the small-firm, 
least-distress portfolio, of 0.39 (t = 3.11). Therefore, adding HML to the model was  
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important in capturing the magnitude of returns for the small-firm, medium-distress 
portfolios and the big-firm, more-distress portfolios, as evidenced by no significant 
intercepts being observed for these portfolios when HML was included in the model.  
4.5.3.2.3 Patterns in coefficients – three- and four-factor models 
For all portfolio sorts and all models, the coefficients mostly exhibited expected 
patterns. However, once a characteristic was controlled, patterns in the coefficients 
suggest that they were, at least partially, driven by something in addition to portfolio 
characteristics. 
4.5.3.2.3.1 Patterns in coefficients where the characteristic is controlled 
When a characteristic was controlled, the related factor coefficient mostly 
changed from positive and significant to negative and significant as expected. For 
example, for the B/M-distress and the size-distress portfolios, the DMS coefficients 
changed from positive and significant to negative and significant, when moving from 
the most-distress to the least-distress portfolios. However, some of the coefficients for 
the extreme corner portfolios were not significant. For example, for the size-B/M 
portfolios and the SMB/HML (HML/DMS) model, the HML coefficient was not 
significant for the small-firm, low-B/M (small-firm, high-B/M) portfolio, even though 
the B/M characteristic observed for the portfolio, of -0.54 (1.85), was the lowest 
(highest) observed for all of the size-B/M portfolios.  
Except for the portfolios being corner portfolios and therefore, having more 
extreme portfolio characteristics, there was no general pattern to which portfolio 
coefficients were not significant. They did not consistently coincide with portfolios 
where R
2 values were low or intercepts were significant. However, the insignificant 
factor loadings were generally related to the patterns observed in the factor coefficients 
when the related characteristic was controlled, as discussed next.  
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When a characteristic was controlled the portfolio characteristics generally 
showed a pattern in the extreme quintile portfolios, but not in the middle quintile 
portfolios. However, the factor coefficients did not consistently reflect these residual 
patterns, as would be expected if factor loadings are driven by firm characteristics.
71 For 
example, given the B/M characteristics of the size-B/M portfolios, the HML coefficient 
is expected to be positively (negatively) related to firm size for the low-B/M (high-B/M) 
portfolios but not dependent on size for the medium-B/M portfolios. When the 
SMB/HML model was tested, the HML coefficient for both the low-B/M and the high-
B/M portfolios showed a negative relation with size; the significance of the HML 
coefficient became more negative and less positive, respectively, when moving from the 
small- to big-firm portfolio. Therefore, once B/M was controlled, the pattern in the 
HML coefficients for the high B/M, but not the low B/M portfolios, reflected the pattern 
in the B/M characteristics. 
The patterns in the coefficients when a characteristic is controlled are detailed 
next, along with the effect of the pattern on the significance of the coefficients exhibited 
for the extreme portfolios 
4.5.3.2.3.1.1 Specific issues 
Size-B/M portfolio results show that the way firms loaded on HML was 
dependent on firm size. When SMB was incorporated in the model, the relation between 
the HML loading and size was most pronounced for the low-B/M portfolios and was 
negative. So, smaller firms had a smaller negative loading. For the SMB/HML model, 
this resulted in the HML loading for the small-firm, low-B/M portfolio not being 
significant. When SMB was not incorporated in the model, the relation between the 
HML coefficient and size was positive for all B/M portfolios, resulting in the HML 
                                                 
71 Intersecting quintile portfolio characteristics are discussed briefly in section 4.5.3.1 and presented in 
Appendix 13.  
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coefficient for the small-firm, high-B/M portfolio not being significant when the 
HML/DMS model was tested.  
B/M-distress portfolio results show that, for the SMB/HML and four-factor 
models, the way the low B/M firms loaded on the HML factor was dependent on 
distress-risk. The HML coefficient changed from being a small, to a larger negative 
value and the significance increased. The pattern was still exhibited, but not as strong, 
for the SMB/HML model and the B/M-2 quintile. As a consequence, for the SMB/HML 
model, the HML coefficient was not significant for the low-B/M, most-distress 
portfolio. In addition, for all models incorporating DMS, the DMS coefficient exhibited 
a pattern across the B/M portfolios for the distress-4 and least-distress quintiles. The 
pattern was stronger for the three-factor models than for the four-factor model. Moving 
from low-B/M to high-B/M, the DMS coefficient became less negative and less 
significant. This resulted in the DMS coefficients for the least-distress higher-B/M 
portfolios not being significant. Thus, the distress-risk premium was important in 
capturing the returns of higher distress-risk firms and lower distress-risk firms with low- 
to medium-B/M, but not important for lower distress-risk higher-B/M firms.  
Size-distress portfolio results show that the way firms loaded on the DMS factor 
was dependent on firm size. The pattern was stronger for the three-factor models 
incorporating DMS, than for the four-factor model. For the more-distress quintiles, the 
pattern was U-shaped and the small- and big-firm portfolios had the largest, and 
generally the most significant, positive loading on DMS. For the less-distress portfolios, 
a negative correlation existed between size and the DMS coefficient, resulting in the 
small-firm, less-distress portfolios exhibiting a positive, rather than negative, loading on 
DMS. In the extreme, for the HML/DMS model, the DMS coefficient for the small-firm 
least-distress portfolio was positive and significant at the 5% level (t = 5.28). This 
suggested that, when firms are sorted by size and distress-risk, smaller firms load  
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positively on the DMS factor, regardless of their o-score. The SMB coefficient was 
dependent on distress-risk for the bigger-firm portfolios. The SMB coefficient exhibited 
a U-shaped pattern across the distress quintiles. For the SMB/DMS and four-factor 
(SMB/HML) models, this pattern resulted in the more-distress and least-distress (more-
distress) big-firm portfolios not exhibiting coefficients that were significantly different 
from zero.  
4.5.3.2.3.2 Patterns in coefficients when the characteristic is not controlled 
The patterns exhibited by the factor coefficients when the related characteristic 
was not controlled are examined next. The patterns largely reflected portfolio 
characteristics. Examining the size-B/M portfolios, the DMS coefficients were generally 
positive and significant for the smaller-firm and higher-B/M portfolios and negative and 
significant for the bigger-firm and lower-B/M portfolios, reflecting the pattern in the 
portfolio o-scores.  
Examining the B/M-distress portfolios, the higher distress-risk portfolios and the 
high-B/M, least-distress portfolios had a smaller average firm size and exhibited a 
corresponding positive SMB coefficient. Firms in distress quintiles 3 and 4 were bigger 
firms and mostly exhibited a negative SMB loading. In contrast, although the average 
firm size for the lower-B/M least-distress portfolios was very large, the sign and 
significance of the SMB loading varied with the model. 
Examining the size-distress sorted portfolios, for all models, within each size 
quintile; the pattern in the HML coefficients across the distress-risk quintiles reflected 
the inverted-U pattern of the B/M characteristic. For the bigger-firm, medium-distress 
portfolios and all models, the HML coefficient was significant and positive. The sign of 
the HML coefficients for the remaining portfolios was dependent on whether size was 
included in the model. For the HML/DMS model, the loading on the majority of 
remaining portfolios was negative and significant. Whereas, for the SMB/HML and  
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four-factor models, the HML coefficients exhibited for the majority of the remaining 
portfolios were positive. Only the bigger-firm, least-distress portfolios exhibited 
significant negative HML coefficients, reflecting the low B/M of these portfolios. 
Significant negative HML coefficients were not exhibited for the most-distress 
portfolios, which also had low B/M values. Thus, although the pattern in the HML 
coefficient generally described an inverted-U, it did not consistently reflect the pattern 
in the B/M characteristic.  
In summary, some patterns were observed in factor loadings after controlling for 
a characteristic. These patterns were not consistently related to portfolio characteristics 
and resulted in some extreme portfolios exhibiting insignificant coefficients, when the 
coefficients were expected to be significant. When a characteristic was not controlled, 
the coefficients for all models were mostly consistent with expectations and reflected 
portfolio characteristics.  
4.5.3.2.4 Summary - O-score intersecting quintile regressions. 
The regression results for the intersecting quintile portfolios show that the 
importance of a factor in describing returns is dependent upon the portfolio sorting 
procedure. However, hypothesis 7a, that the SMB and HML factors are able to capture 
the portfolio returns, cannot be rejected for any of the portfolio sorts. The evidence is 
stronger in relation to variability of returns, than for magnitude of returns.  
The Fama and French factors do a good job of capturing the variability of 
returns earned by all three sets of portfolios. The evidence is stronger (weaker) for the 
size-B/M and size-distress (B/M-distress) portfolios, where most R
2 values were above 
(below) 0.90. In particular, SMB is important in capturing the variability of returns for 
the small firm portfolios. Furthermore, patterns in the characteristics show that, for the 
size-B/M sorted portfolios, SMB is required to minimise the pattern in the HML 
coefficients across the size quintiles.   
  281
The SMB and HML factors capture the magnitude of returns for most portfolios. 
In particular, for the size-B/M portfolios, HML is important in capturing the magnitude 
of returns earned by firms with medium- to high-B/M and small- to medium-size. 
However, the SMB and HML factors, in combination, have trouble capturing the 
magnitude of returns earned by the low-B/M portfolios, when both the size-B/M and the 
B/M-distress portfolios are considered. They also have trouble with the most- and least-
distress portfolios, when considering the size-distress portfolios.  
The conclusion regarding the role of DMS in capturing returns is dependent on 
the portfolio sorting procedure. For the size-B/M portfolios, when comparing the R
2 
values of the three-factor models, the SMB/HML model clearly outperforms the 
alternative models. Although the HML/DMS model had the fewest significant 
intercepts, it also exhibited lower R
2 values and, except for the small-firm low-B/M 
portfolio, DMS did not have additional explanatory power when added to the 
SMB/HML model. Therefore, hypothesis 7b, that DMS does not capture portfolio 
returns better than the Fama and French factors, cannot be rejected for the size-B/M 
portfolios. 
For the B/M-distress portfolios, the SMB/HML model outperforms the 
HML/DMS model, with marginally higher R
2 values and fewer significant intercepts, 
particularly for the most-distress portfolios. However, adding DMS to the SMB/HML 
model increased the ability of the model to capture the variability of returns earned by 
the most- and least-distress portfolios. Therefore, the DMS factor is important in 
capturing portfolio returns and does not subsume the role of either HML or SMB. 
Hypothesis 7b is rejected for the B/M-distress portfolios. 
For the size-distress portfolios, DMS is clearly important in explaining returns. 
The SMB/DMS model outperforms the SMB/HML model in terms of R
2  values, 
especially for the portfolios where both models exhibit lower R
2 values. The HML/DMS  
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model had fewer significant intercepts than the SMB/HML model. In addition, the four-
factor model outperformed all of the three-factor models, with marginally higher R
2 
values than the SMB/DMS model and only one intercept significant at the 5% level. 
Furthermore, all of the small firm portfolios had a positive loading on DMS, suggesting 
that small firms behave like high distress-risk firms, regardless of their actual distress-
risk. Therefore, hypothesis 7b is clearly rejected for the size-distress sorted portfolios.  
DMS does not subsume the role of SMB or HML in capturing the returns of the 
size-distress portfolios. SMB and DMS are important in capturing the variability of 
returns. HML is important in capturing the magnitude of returns, especially for the 
smaller-firm, most-distress portfolios and for the bigger-firm, least-distress portfolios.  
4.5.3.3 Z-score intersecting quintile regressions. 
  The regressions results for z-score intersecting quintile portfolios, reported in 
Table 4.19, Panels B.1 through B.3, are predominantly consistent with those of the o-
score portfolios. The most important difference is that the DMS factor is found to be 
important in describing the returns earned by the z-score size-B/M portfolios, whereas it 
is not important for the corresponding o-score portfolios. This is discussed further when 
discussing results that relate to hypothesis 7b. 
  In general, when compared with the o-score portfolios, all models captured a 
smaller proportion of the variability of returns for the z-score portfolios, as evidenced 
by the lower R
2 values. However, the patterns in the R
2 values were similar; showing 
that the portfolios the models had the most trouble capturing variability of returns for 
was robust to the distress-risk measure. The number of significant intercepts was either 
similar or fewer for the z-score portfolios and fewer patterns were observed in the 
intercepts. For example, for the o-score (z-score) size-distress portfolios, the SMB/HML 
model exhibited 20 (11) R
2 values of at least 0.90 and 5 (1) intercepts significant at the  
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5% level. Both scenarios displayed the lowest R
2 values for the most-distress portfolios 
and for the big-firm, distress-2 portfolio. 
When hypothesis 7a is tested using the z-score portfolios, due to the lower R
2 
values, the evidence that SMB and HML capture the variability of returns is weaker 
than for the o-score portfolios. In relation to magnitude of return, when the SMB/HML 
model intercepts were examined for the size-distress portfolios, as detailed above, the 
number of significant intercepts was fewer for the z-score size-distress portfolios than 
for the corresponding o-score portfolios. In contrast, for the size-B/M and B/M-distress 
portfolios, the z-score and o-score portfolio intercepts were similar. Therefore, in terms 
of magnitude of returns, the z-score size-distress (size-B/M and B/M-distress) portfolio 
results provide slightly stronger (similar) support of hypothesis 7a, when compared with 
the related o-score results.   
Patterns in the coefficients and the ability of DMS to capture returns are 
examined next. The z-score results are mostly consistent with those observed for the o-
score portfolios, with similar patterns in the R
2 values, intercepts and factor coefficients. 
However, DMS is important in capturing returns for all z-score portfolio sorts. 
Therefore, hypothesis 7b is consistently rejected for the z-score portfolios. In 
comparison, hypothesis 7b could not be rejected for the o-score size-B/M portfolios. 
The differences between the z-score and o-score results are detailed below. 
The conclusion regarding the importance of the DMS factor in capturing the 
returns of the size-B/M portfolios is sensitive to the distress-risk measure. This is 
because the relative magnitude of the R
2 values exhibited by the models varied with the 
measure of distress-risk. For the z-score portfolios, the SMB/DMS model exhibited 
slightly higher R
2 values than the SMB/HML model, with 14 and 12 at 0.90 or greater, 
respectively. However, the SMB/DMS model also had the larger number of significant 
intercepts. Consistent with the o-score results, the HML/DMS model had the least  
  284
significant intercepts but the lowest R
2 values. The four-factor model outperformed all 
of the three-factor models in terms of R
2 values, with generally higher R
2 values and 17 
of at least 0.90. The four-factor model also exhibited fewer significant intercepts than 
both the SMB/HML and the SMB/DMS models. Therefore, for the z-score size-B/M 
portfolios, adding DMS to the SMB/HML model increased the ability of the model to 
capture the variability of returns and hypothesis 7b is rejected.  
For all of the portfolio sorts, some of the patterns in the coefficients differed 
depending on the measure of distress-risk. For the size-B/M portfolios, once size was 
controlled, the pattern in the SMB coefficients were closer to what was expected for z-
score portfolios than o-score, as significant negative SMB coefficients were observed 
for all big-firm portfolios. When examining the z-score B/M-distress portfolios, across 
all models, the HML coefficient for the low-B/M portfolios was dependent on distress-
risk. In contrast, for the o-score B/M-distress portfolios, the HML coefficient was only 
dependent on distress-risk for the SMB/HML and four-factor models. When considering 
the z-score results for the HML/DMS and four-factor models, this dependence meant 
that the HML coefficients for the low-B/M, more-distress portfolios were not 
significant. Finally, for the z-score size-distress portfolios, the patterns in the SMB and 
DMS coefficients consistently reflected the portfolio characteristics. As a result, the 
extreme portfolio coefficients were significant, as expected.  
Comparison of the pattern in the z-score and o-score DMS and SMB coefficients 
strengthens the evidence that when a characteristic is not controlled, the related factor 
coefficients are driven by the portfolio characteristic. For the size-B/M (B/M-distress) 
portfolios, the pattern in the DMS (SMB) coefficients was different, depending on 
whether o-score or z-score was used to measure distress-risk. The different pattern in 
the coefficients reflected the different pattern in the portfolio characteristics.  
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4.6 Consistency of relations - NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ  
 
  The final issue addressed is whether the relations observed between distress-risk, 
B/M and return are consistent for firms that trade on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges 
and firms that trade on the NASDAQ. While the results in sections 4.1 through 4.5 
show that the relations observed for NASDAQ firms are not always consistent with 
those observed for NYSE-AMEX firms, especially in relation to high distress-risk 
firms. However, the conclusion reached to accept or reject each hypothesis is generally 
consistent for the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ samples, with the major differences 
pertaining to the distress-risk B/M relation.  
When addressing the relation between distress-risk and B/M, the main 
differences between the two samples relate to the interrelation between distress-risk, 
B/M and size. For the NASDAQ sample, the relation between distress-risk and B/M 
was an inverted-U for all scenarios and the hypothesis of a positive relation between 
distress-risk and B/M was consistently rejected. For the NYSE-AMEX sample, the 
reported results, and consequently the conclusions reached, was dependent upon the 
method used to weight the portfolio book-to-market, the method used to measure 
distress-risk and whether negative book-equity firms were aggregated with positive 
book-equity firms. This sensitivity was caused by the relative size of firms within the 
portfolios. In addition, a positive correlation existed between B/M and size for z-score 
distress-risk decile 1, whereas the correlation was negative for all other portfolios. 
The relation between distress-risk and return for the high distress-risk firms is 
dependent on whether they are listed on the NYSE-AMEX or NASDAQ. However, the 
differences do not result in different conclusions regarding the hypotheses tested; in no 
scenario did high distress-risk firms consistently earn a higher return than low distress-
risk firms. On average, high distress-risk NASDAQ firms earned negative returns. The 
largest negative returns were earned by the smaller negative book-equity firms and the  
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bigger of the high distress-risk positive book-equity firms. In contrast, returns earned by 
high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms were on average positive and were only 
dependent on firm size for the 10% of positive book-equity firms with the highest 
distress-risk. Of these firms, the smallest earned high returns, while those that were not 
the smallest earned lower returns. All firms with negative book-equity earned 
comparatively high returns.  
The difference in the magnitude of the return earned by high distress-risk 
portfolios resulted in the return earned by trading strategies long in high-distress firms 
and short in low-distress firms being not significantly different from zero for NYSE-
AMEX firms and predominantly negative and significant for NASDAQ firms. 
Therefore, the hypothesis of a positive distress-risk premium was rejected for both 
samples.  
When regression results for the distress-risk decile portfolios were examined, the 
models better described the returns earned by the NYSE-AMEX portfolios than the 
NASDAQ portfolios. Also, the relation between the B/M characteristic and the HML 
coefficient was stronger for the NYSE-AMEX portfolios. However, the regression 
results led to consistent conclusions for the two samples.  
In summary, some differences were found in the relations between distress-risk, 
B/M and return when comparing NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms. These differences 
resulted in the hypothesis of a positive relation between distress-risk and B/M not being 
rejected for some scenarios when NYSE-AMEX firms were examined, but constantly 
rejected for NASDAQ firms. In contrast, conclusions whether or not to reject 
hypotheses regarding the distress-risk return relation were robust to the sample 
examined. The conclusions regarding the return premium were stronger for NASDAQ 
firms than NYSE-AMEX firms. In contrast, the regression results were stronger for the 
NYSE-AMEX firms.   
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4.7 Summary 
 
  Results presented do not show a consistent positive relation between distress-
risk and B/M. Firms with high distress-risk are equally likely to have a high, low or a 
negative B/M ratio. High distress-risk firms with low B/M are, on average, small firms 
and firms that accumulate large losses, so that eventually book-equity becomes 
negative. Market value does decline as distress-risk increases, but it also continues to 
decline when a firm’s distress-risk remains high. This results in low returns being 
earned on a low B/M ratio for smaller high distress-risk firms. This effect is more 
prevalent for NASDAQ firms than for NYSE-AMEX firms.  
The return premium earned for exposure to distress-risk is, on average, negative; 
not positive as expected if the HML premium is a proxy for distress-risk. Regression 
evidence shows that both the SMB and HML factors are important in describing returns. 
However, HML is of limited importance when the dependent variables are the returns 
earned by sorted distress-risk portfolios. Although, the pattern in the HML coefficients 
is not stable for higher distress-risk firms, the coefficients predominantly reflect the 
B/M characteristic, rather then distress-risk. The DMS factor is also important in 
describing returns, especially for firms with higher and lower distress-risk. A four-factor 
model, incorporating the SMB and HML factors and the distress-risk factor, is superior 
to other models considered.  
The combined evidence suggests that the B/M factor, HML, is not a proxy for 
distress-risk, but that the market does separately price distress-risk. Evidence that the 
HML coefficients are related to the B/M characteristic and that a negative distress-risk 
premium is priced is not consistent with rational pricing. Implications of these results in 
relation to the current literature are discussed in detail in the following chapter and 
further areas of research are suggested.  
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Chapter 5 Implications and Conclusions  
  
Chapter 2 reviews the equity pricing literature and identifies an ongoing debate 
about why the HML factor in the Fama and French model captures the time series of 
returns. Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) argue that the model is consistent with 
rational pricing; that the HML factor is a proxy for a return premium demanded by 
investors for undertaking the risk of financial distress. The alternative view is that the 
HML premium is the result of systematic irrational pricing behaviour by investors. 
Preliminary examination of the relation between distress-risk, B/M and return has not 
supported the rational pricing explanation for the HML premium. However, the 
evidence suggests that a systematic relation may exist between the risk of financial 
distress and return.  
A number of unresolved issues regarding the relation between distress-risk, B/M 
and return are identified in Chapter 2 and a series of research questions developed. The 
methodology used to answer these research questions is described in detail in Chapter 3 
and the results are reported in Chapter 4. In section 5.1 below, each research question is 
considered in turn and the implications of the findings are presented. Many of the 
results have implications for the debate regarding rational pricing, market inefficiencies 
and investor behaviour. These implications are noted in section 5.1 and discussed in 
more detail in section 5.2. In addition, the implications for the use of asset pricing 
models in practice and in empirical research are discussed in section 5.3. Section 5.4 
provides a summary and areas of further research are detailed in section 5.5. 
 
 
  
  289
5.1 Implications - relation between distress-risk, B/M and return 
 
5.1.1 Ability of B/M to classify firms on the basis of relative financial 
distress 
Section 4.2 shows that firms which delist due to financial distress are equally 
likely to have a high, low or negative B/M ratio. Therefore, B/M cannot be used to 
discriminate between firms that will or will not suffer a financial distress event, defined 
as bankruptcy or delisting for performance reasons. This result is inconsistent with the 
Fama and French proposition that high (low) B/M firms have high (low) distress-risk. A 
possible reason for the inconsistency is that Fama and French (1995) used profitability 
to measure distress-risk. The bankruptcy prediction literature shows that univariate 
measures, such as profitability, are not good predictors of distress related events. 
Financial distress results from a number of interrelated aspects of financial performance, 
resulting in multivariate models displaying superior predictive ability (Altman (1993)).  
Evidence that firms which delist due to financial distress may have either a high 
or a low B/M ratio is consistent with evidence presented by Loughran (1997), that 
small-low B/M firms have the highest level of non-merger delistings. Also, Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) find that, for high distress-risk firms, those with a low B/M ratio are 
slightly more likely to delist for performance reasons than those with a high B/M ratio.  
The Fama and French (1995) evidence, that a strong relation exists between B/M 
and profitability, combined with the evidence presented here, that B/M cannot be used 
to predict financial distress, could be argued to be consistent with the view put forward 
by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), LaPorta (1996), LaPorta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (2000) and Danielson and 
Dowell (2001), that high (low) B/M values are driven by investors extrapolating past 
earnings too far into the future. For example, a firm may have poor past profitability, 
resulting in high debt/equity, poor liquidity and high distress-risk. Alternatively, a firm  
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may have high levels of profitability, but rapid growth may have resulted in poor 
liquidity, a high debt/equity ratio and high distress-risk. If the market prices distress-
risk, in both instances the market value will be bid down, resulting in a high B/M ratio. 
However, if the market overreacts to past earnings growth, the first firm will have a 
high B/M, while the second firm will have a low B/M.  
However, evidence presented by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) suggests that the 
earnings extrapolation hypothesis may not apply to firms with the highest levels of 
distress-risk. Although low B/M firms are generally found to have higher profitability 
than high B/M firms, the position is reversed for high distress-risk firms. High distress-
risk firms with low B/M have low profitability. In addition, high-distress, low-B/M 
(high-B/M) firms experience negative (positive) earnings surprises, suggesting that the 
market is actually slow to incorporate past earnings growth into the prices of the firms 
with the highest distress-risk.   
5.1.2 Distress-risk and size characteristics of firms with negative 
book-equity 
  While most studies that examine the reason for the HML factor capturing the 
time-series of returns have excluded firms with negative book-equity, Dichev (1998) 
included firms with negative book-equity and aggregated the results. It has not 
previously been determined how these different approaches affect empirical results. 
Section 4.3.1 shows that although firms with negative book-equity represent less than 
4% of firms, on average, they have high distress-risk and represent nearly one quarter of 
the firms in the highest distress-risk decile.  
  The distress-risk of NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) firms with negative book-equity 
is, on average, higher than (equivalent to) the distress-risk of the highest distress-risk 
decile of positive book-equity firms. For firms listed on NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ), 
negative book-equity firms are, on average, larger than higher distress-risk positive  
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book-equity firms when o-score (both o-score and z-score) is used to measure distress-
risk.   
  The relative distress-risk and size of negative book-equity firms compared with 
high distress-risk positive book-equity firms means that, when firms are sorted into 
distress-risk deciles, results may not be robust to the inclusion or exclusion of firms 
with negative book-equity. The effect will be greatest for the highest distress-risk decile 
of firms, where negative book-equity firms are concentrated. For NASDAQ firms, the 
relatively large size of negative book-equity firms means that both equal- and value-
weighted results may differ. For NYSE-AMEX firms, when o-score measures distress-
risk, both equal-weighted results and value-weighted results may vary with the 
treatment of firms with negative book-equity. In contrast, when z-score is used to 
measure distress-risk, the comparatively small size of NYSE-AMEX negative book-
equity firms means that inclusion/exclusion of these firms is unlikely to change value-
weighted results. Results addressing research questions 3 through 5 show the robustness 
of sorted distress-risk decile attributes to different methods of treating firms with 
negative book-equity, including the robustness of results reported by Dichev (1998) to 
the exclusion of firms with negative book-equity.  
Exclusion of firms with negative book-equity may also affect reported results 
when firms are sorted by B/M. When size-B/M intersecting quintile portfolios are 
formed, as in Fama and French (1993), the small-firm portfolios consist largely of 
NASDAQ stocks plus smaller NYSE-AMEX stocks. Inclusion of negative book-equity 
firms would have the largest effect on the smaller-firm low-B/M portfolios, as these 
portfolios would be largely constituted of negative book-equity firms with high distress-
risk. Similarly, when Griffin and Lemmon (2002) sorted firms by B/M and distress-risk, 
inclusion of negative book-equity firms would increase the average distress-risk of 
firms allocated to the low-B/M, high-distress portfolio. For both studies, the Fama and  
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French model had the greatest trouble explaining returns earned by these portfolios. 
Results reported in section 4.5.3 show that including negative book-equity firms does 
not substantially change the explanatory power of the SMB/HML model in relation to 
these portfolios.  
  The higher average distress-risk found for NYSE-AMEX negative book-equity 
firms, when compared with high distress-risk positive book-equity firms, is consistent 
with these firms having accumulated large losses. For the NASDAQ firms, the 
comparatively large average size of negative book-equity firms is contrary to what 
would be expected given the losses accumulated by these firms. Results show that the 
average size of NASDAQ negative book-equity firms is similar to the size of NASDAQ 
decile (pos) 6 firms. One possible explanation is that smaller NASDAQ firms that 
accumulate large losses are delisted, while larger NASDAQ firms that suffer losses are 
able to continue trading. This is consistent with the larger NYSE-AMEX firms 
continuing to trade after accumulating large losses. 
5.1.3 Relation between distress-risk and B/M 
  The relation between distress-risk and B/M is examined in two parts. First it is 
shown that the previously reported relation between distress-risk and B/M for distress-
risk sorted portfolios is robust to changes in methodology for NASDAQ firms but not 
for NYSE-AMEX firms. Second, examination of the change in B/M as distress-risk 
increases shows that whether B/M decreases or increases as distress-risk increases is 
determined by whether or not the firm accumulates large losses, resulting in B/M 
becoming negative.  
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5.1.3.1 Relation between distress-risk, size and B/M at a point in time 
5.1.3.1.1 Distress-risk size relation 
  The relation between distress-risk and size is discussed prior to considering 
B/M. Results in section 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2 show that, within each sample, a negative 
relation is found between distress-risk and size. This relation is robust to the inclusion 
or exclusion of firms with negative book-equity and is stronger (weaker) when o-score 
(z-score) is used to measure distress-risk.
72 The relation is also stronger for NASDAQ 
firms than NYSE-AMEX firms. However, it cannot be concluded that generally smaller 
firms have higher distress-risk than larger firms. Both NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ 
firms exhibit a wide range of distress-risk scores. As NYSE-AMEX firms are generally 
larger than NASDAQ firms, high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms and lower distress-
risk NASDAQ firms are of equivalent average size.  
  This negative relation between distress-risk and size is consistent with results 
reported by Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002), with Chan, Chen and Hsieh 
(1985) and Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) finding the bond default risk premium to be 
important in describing the returns earned by size portfolios, and with Chan and Chen’s 
(1991) conclusion that for NYSE firms, the size effect is driven by a premium for 
financial distress. It is also consistent with Chan and Chen’s (1991) finding that, on 
average, a NASDAQ firm is financially healthier than a NYSE firm of the same size. In 
contrast, Fama and French (1995) found only a weak relation between distress-risk and 
size and concluded that the size effect of profitability is dependent on B/M. 
Several factors may explain the inconsistency with the Fama and French (1995) 
results. The first is that Fama and French (1995) used profitability to measure distress-
risk, rather than a multivariate measure. As profitability only captures one aspect of 
                                                 
72 As detailed in section 4.3.3.1, the stronger relation between distress-risk and size when o-score is used 
to measure distress-risk is expected, as Ohlson’s (1980) model explicitly incorporates size as a predictive 
variable, whereas all variables in Altman’s (1968) model are scaled for size.  
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distress-risk, what they found was a weak relation between size and profitability, rather 
than distress-risk per se. Second, the time period examined is different. Fama and 
French drew their conclusions from the 1962 to 1991 period. They also reported that 
small firms were significantly less profitable than big firms after 1980. Therefore, their 
conclusion may have been different if only the post-1980 sub-period was examined. 
Equivalently, the finding here of a strong negative relation between distress-risk and 
size may be period specific. Third, the sample examined by Fama and French included 
both NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms. Therefore, the majority of firms in the small-
firm (big-firm) portfolios were NASDAQ (NYSE-AMEX) firms. If NASDAQ firms 
have the same range of profitability as NYSE-AMEX firms, the average profitability of 
the small and big firm portfolios may not be significantly different. However, if NYSE-
AMEX and NASDAQ firms are examined separately, a stronger relation may be found 
between profitability and size within firms trading on each exchange.    
5.1.3.1.2 Distress-risk B/M relation, positive and negative book-equity firms 
Correlation and distress-risk decile portfolio results, examining the relation 
between distress-risk and B/M, are reported in section 4.3.3.1 and sections 4.3.3.2.2 
through 4.3.3.2.4. They mostly support Dichev’s (1998) conclusion; that a positive 
relation does not exist between distress-risk and B/M when firms with positive and 
negative book-equity are aggregated. For all exchange groupings, the highest mean B/M 
values are for deciles 3 or 4. Mean portfolio B/M then monotonically declines to 
distress-risk decile 10. This demonstrates that firms which are not clearly solvent but 
also do not have the highest distress-risk, have the highest B/M values. Whereas, firms 
that are clearly solvent and those with the highest distress-risk have lower B/M values.  
For NASDAQ firms and the ‘All Firms’ sample, this conclusion is robust to the 
book-to-market weighting and whether o-score or z-score is used to measure distress-
risk. For the NYSE-AMEX sample, the relation also describes an inverted-U for all  
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scenarios where o-score is used to measure distress-risk. In contrast, when z-score 
measures distress-risk and returns are value-weighted, (Bv/Mv results), a positive 
relation is observed between distress-risk and book-to-market. This result is consistent 
with the Fama and French proposition that high (low) B/M firms have high (low) 
distress-risk and inconsistent with Dichev’s (1998) results. However, section 4.1 shows 
the o-score to be the superior distress-risk measure. Therefore, when the B/M ratios of 
positive and negative book-equity firms are aggregated, the general conclusion that the 
relation between distress-risk and B/M is not monotonic and positive cannot be rejected. 
The monotonic positive relation between distress-risk and B/M for the medium- 
to low-distress deciles suggests that the market price of these firms may have adjusted 
to reflect relative distress-risk. This is consistent with Fama and French’s proposition 
that high (low) B/M firms have high (low) distress-risk. In contrast, firms in the highest 
distress-risk deciles have low mean B/M values, refuting their proposition. Results 
reported for the distress-risk (pos) deciles, in section 4.3.3.2.5 and 4.3.3.2.6, show that 
these low B/M values are partly driven by the inclusion of negative book-equity firms, 
especially for NYSE-AMEX firms. The implications in relation to market efficiency are 
clearer once the B/M of firms with negative book-equity is segregated. These results are 
discussed further in section 5.3.1.3. 
The inverted-U shaped relation between distress-risk and B/M is not evident 
from preliminary correlation results. A negative (positive) correlation is reported when 
o-score (z-score) is used to measure distress-risk. Examination of the correlation results 
in conjunction with the portfolio results shows that the correlation is sensitive to 
whether the high or the low distress-risk portfolio has the lowest B/M. Thus, correlation 
may be a misleading indicator of the true relation between distress-risk and B/M.  
As the relation between distress-risk and size is negative, the average size of 
firms in these high distress-risk portfolios is very small, when compared with other  
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firms in the respective sample. The only exception is for the NYSE-AMEX z-score 
portfolios where, although the average firm size for the high distress-risk portfolios is 
comparatively small, it is not as small as for the o-score portfolios. Correlation evidence 
shows a general negative relation between B/M and size. Comparison of equal- and 
value-weighted B/M for each portfolio shows that the negative relation between B/M 
and size still exists once distress-risk is controlled; bigger firms within each portfolio 
have lower B/M. Again the only exception is the z-score deciles, where a positive 
relation is found between B/M and size for decile 1 firms. The positive correlation, in 
conjunction with the comparatively large size of positive book-equity firms in this 
portfolio, resulted in a high value-weighted B/M being observed for the NYSE-AMEX 
z-score high distress-risk portfolios.  
Outliers drive the large negative mean B/M exhibited for NYSE-AMEX 
distress-risk decile 1, with the mean trimmed B/M of this portfolio being low but not 
negative. However, conclusions reached regarding the relation between distress-risk and 
book-to-market are robust to whether unadjusted B/M or trimmed B/M is used in the 
analysis. The negative B/M of this portfolio supports Dichev’s finding that the book-
equity of high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms is often completely wiped out by 
losses. In contrast, the B/M for NASDAQ distress-risk decile 1 is low but not negative. 
Thus, even though high distress-risk NASDAQ firms have higher average distress-risk 
compared with high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms, they are not as likely as NYSE-
AMEX firms to have large accumulated losses.  
This finding is consistent with evidence presented in section 4.1, that NYSE-
AMEX firms are more likely to delist due to bankruptcy rather than performance 
delisting. In contrast, only 2% of NASDAQ firms that delisted for performance reasons 
were bankrupt. In combination, this evidence suggests that the market views high 
distress-risk NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms differently. A larger proportion of  
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NYSE-AMEX firms continue trading until they either turn-around or accumulate large 
losses and delist due to bankruptcy. In comparison, a larger proportion of NASDAQ 
firms delist for performance reasons before they accumulate large losses that completely 
wipe out book-equity. The negative average B/M of NYSE-AMEX distress-risk decile 1 
also illustrates the importance of including negative book-equity firms in the sample 
when investigating distress-risk. 
5.1.3.1.3 Distress-risk B/M relation, positive book-equity firms    
  Correlation and portfolio results, reported in sections 4.3.3.1 and sections 
4.3.3.2.5 through 4.3.3.2.7, document the distress-risk B/M relation when firms with 
positive and negative book-equity are examined separately. For the NYSE-AMEX 
sample, the B/M ratio of the NegBE portfolio is a very large –4.70 (-4.68) when o-score 
(z-score) is used to measure distress-risk, compared with the NASDAQ NegBE 
portfolio B/M ratio of –0.90 (-0.93) for the o-score (z-score) portfolios. Therefore, the 
differences between results that include and exclude negative book-equity firms are 
larger for NYSE-AMEX firms than for NASDAQ firms. 
NASDAQ results are consistent with those observed when positive and negative 
book-equity firms are aggregated. However, the inverted-U shaped relation between 
distress-risk and B/M is more symmetric when only positive book-equity firms are 
observed, as the extremely low B/M values of the higher distress-risk deciles are driven 
by negative B/M values. These results show that the inclusion of negative book-equity 
firms does not drive Dichev’s conclusion that for NASDAQ firms the relation between 
distress-risk and B/M is not positive. They also show that the inverted-U shape relation 
between distress-risk and Bv/Mv, reported previously, is not driven by firms with 
negative book-equity. Therefore, high distress-risk NASDAQ firms with both positive 
and negative book-equity have low B/M values. The aggregation of positive and 
negative B/M values in the higher distress-risk portfolios does not mask a positive  
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relation between distress-risk and B/M for NASDAQ positive book-equity firms, but it 
does lead to the extreme low B/M values reported for the high distress-risk portfolios.  
In contrast, for the NYSE-AMEX and ‘All Firms’ portfolios, the relation 
between distress-risk and B/M is dependent on firm size. When only firms with positive 
book-equity are considered, only firms with the highest distress-risk that are small, but 
not the tiniest, have low B/M ratios. Other positive book-equity high distress-risk firms 
have high B/M ratios. For the NYSE-AMEX sample, when o-score is used to measure 
distress-risk, the only portfolio of high distress-risk firms with a low mean B/M is 
distress-risk (pos) decile 1. For deciles (pos) 2 through 10, B/M decreases 
monotonically with decreased distress-risk. This is consistent with the very small firms 
in distress-risk (pos) decile 1 having comparatively low B/M values. Similarly, for the 
‘All Firms’ sample, the very small firms in deciles (pos) 1 and 2 have low B/M.  
In contrast, the value-weighted ratio, Bv/Mv, shows a clear inverted-U shaped 
pattern and for each portfolio it is smaller than the equal-weighted B/M. Therefore, 
generally small high distress-risk firms have comparatively low B/M ratios. However, 
once distress-risk is controlled, the larger firms in the portfolio still have the lower B/M 
ratios and the tiniest of these high distress-risk firms have a higher B/M. 
The z-score NYSE-AMEX distress-risk (pos) decile results show a positive 
relation between distress-risk and B/M for all measures of portfolio B/M. This result is 
consistent with the Fama and French proposition that high (low) B/M firms have high 
(low) distress-risk and inconsistent with the result reported by Dichev (1998). When z-
score is used to measure distress-risk for NYSE-AMEX firms, the aggregation of firms 
with negative and positive book-equity masks the true positive relation that exists 
between distress-risk and B/M for positive book-equity firms. As with the distress-risk 
deciles, due to the weaker relation between distress-risk and size, the average size of 
firms in the z-score, high distress-risk (pos) deciles is much larger than in the related o- 
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score portfolios. The difference is even more pronounced once negative book-equity 
firms are excluded. The average firm size for the z-score decile (pos) 1, of $682.51m, 
being much larger than the average firm size of o-score decile (pos) 1 firms, of 
$70.73m, and of similar size to o-score decile (pos) 4 firms of $555.34m. As a result, 
the low B/M of the smaller high distress-risk firms is not able to be discerned when the 
z-score decile (pos) results are examined. 
In summary, the relation between distress-risk and B/M is different for NYSE-
AMEX firms and NASDAQ firms. High distress-risk, positive book-equity NASDAQ 
firms have comparatively low B/M ratios. For NYSE-AMEX firms, only the firms with 
the highest distress-risk that are small, but not the very smallest, have low B/M ratios. 
The smallest of the firms in the highest risk decile, as well as firms in high-risk (pos) 
deciles 2 and 3, do have higher B/M values, consistent with the view that high distress-
risk firms have high B/M. This systematic difference between the B/M of NYSE-
AMEX and NASDAQ firms is consistent with evidence provided by Loughran (1997), 
that NASDAQ is heavily weighted towards small low-B/M firms, while small firms on 
the NYSE are predominantly high B/M firms. 
Comparison of these results with those when positive and negative book-equity 
firms are aggregated, shows that although firms with negative book-equity should be 
included in the sample when examining the relation between distress-risk and B/M, the 
B/M characteristics of firms with positive and negative book-equity should not be 
aggregated. For NYSE-AMEX firms, the large negative B/M of the negative book-
equity firms masks the true positive relation between distress-risk and B/M. In addition, 
it is shown that the relation reported between distress-risk and B/M for NYSE-AMEX 
firms is sensitive to the relative size of firms in the portfolio and the weighting method 
used.   
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A possible explanation for the low B/M values exhibited by both the high 
distress-risk NASDAQ firms and the small highest distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms, is 
that market inefficiencies or irrational investor behaviour inhibit the ability of the prices 
of these small, high distress-risk firms from adjusting to reflect the firm’s true value. 
This problem appears to affect a larger proportion of firms that trade on NASDAQ, 
compared with those that trade on the NYSE-AMEX, consistent with the smaller 
average size of firms trading on NASDAQ.  
5.1.3.2 Change in B/M as distress-risk increases 
  Griffin and Lemmon (2002) reported that high distress-risk firms may have 
either a high or a low B/M ratio. Results reported earlier also show that firms with high 
distress-risk are equally likely to exhibit a low or a negative B/M ratio, as a high B/M 
ratio. There has been considerable investigation into the reason for observing high B/M 
values; whether they are related to distress-risk, or result from irrational investor 
behaviour, such as extrapolating past high earnings too far into the future (Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994), LaPorta (1996), LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (2000)), or from investor overconfidence (Hong 
and Stein (1999), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001)). In comparison, there 
has been little investigation into why firms with high distress-risk have low B/M values.  
  Griffin and Lemmon (2002) examined the characteristics of high-distress low-
B/M firms and found that these firms are in growth-orientated industries but lagged 
other firms in their industry in terms of sales and current earnings. They suggested that, 
for high-distress low-B/M firms, rather than investors extrapolating earnings too far into 
the future, they underestimate the importance of current fundamentals and overestimate 
the payoffs from future growth opportunities.  
  The results reported in section 4.3.3.3, examining the change in B/M as distress-
risk increases, provide additional insight into the reason why some high distress-risk  
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firms have a high B/M ratio, while others have a low B/M ratio. The firm’s B/M ratio is 
found to be dependent on whether the firm accumulates large losses, such that book-
equity becomes negative, and how quickly the firm’s market value adjusts to the change 
in financial health. For firms where book-equity remains positive, B/M first increases as 
distress-risk increases and in some cases B/M then begins to decrease. However, even 
when B/M does begin to decrease at the end of the five-year period, it remains 
comparatively high. In contrast, when a firm’s book-equity becomes negative due to 
accumulated losses, B/M consistently decreases as distress-risk increases, resulting in 
low B/M values prior to B/M becoming negative.  
  This finding, that high-distress low-B/M firms are firms that are accumulating 
large losses, is not inconsistent with the insights into the nature of high-distress low-
B/M firms provided by Griffin and Lemmon (2002). Firms in high growth industries 
that are not competitive often accumulate large losses. If the market incorrectly believes 
that the firm will be able to catch up with the other firms in the industry, then the market 
value will not be bid down as far as it should be given the firm’s fundamentals. If the 
book-equity is concurrently declining as losses accumulate, the B/M will gradually 
decline until it becomes negative. 
  One explanation for why the market may incorrectly believe these firms will 
catch-up is provided by Hong, Lim and Stein (2000), who suggest that the information 
available to the market may not reflect the true circumstances of the firm, because firms 
tend to delay dissemination of bad news. Another possibility is that available 
information indicates that the firm’s operating performance will continue to deteriorate, 
but market value does not fully reflect this information due to irrational behaviour or 
market inefficiencies. 
  Whether book-equity remains positive or becomes negative as distress-risk 
increases, market value is shown to decline over the five-year period, but the decline  
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appears to be less exaggerated when z-score is used to measure distress-risk. This 
decline in market value is consistent with rational pricing and the market adjusting 
prices downward to reflect the decline in financial health. Market value also continues 
to decline for firms that begin and end the five-year period as high distress-risk firms. 
The continuing decline in market value is consistent with rational pricing and market 
efficiency, if the time a firm has been in a state of financial distress represents 
information to the market regarding the probability that the firms is able to turn around.  
Alternatively, the continued decline in market value supports the findings of 
Beaver (1968) and Dichev (1998), who conclude that low returns resulting from the 
continual decline in market value is the result of market inefficiency. Investors are slow 
to adjust to available information and appear to adjust to the new solvency positions of 
failed firms continuously over a five-year period.  
Their conclusion is supported here by evidence that market value continues to 
decline for NASDAQ firms that start the five-year period with negative book-equity and 
end the period with positive book-equity and high distress-risk. For these firms, 
decreasing distress-risk is accompanied by decreasing market value. A possible 
explanation is that the market does not perceive the decrease in distress-risk. 
Alternatively, the market is initially slow to react to the high distress-risk, consequently 
the price is too high and a continuing downward adjustment is required, even given the 
relative decrease in distress-risk. A third possibility is that the market initially 
underreacts and then overreacts to the high distress-risk, resulting in price continuing to 
decline even though distress-risk decreases.  
  The small size of high distress-risk firms, compared with the respective sample, 
also shows that the HML premium is unlikely to be driven by distress-risk. Previous 
results show that both the high-B/M and the low-B/M portfolios will incorporate firms 
with high distress-risk. As the HML premium is value weighted, returns earned by these  
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high distress-risk firms will have a comparatively small effect on portfolio returns. In 
addition, they will have off-setting effects when calculating the HML premium.  
As market value consistently declines for all firms where distress-risk increases, 
whether B/M increases or decreases is dependent on how quickly market value declines 
relative to book-equity. For firms whose book-equity remains positive and distress-risk 
increases, market value initially declines faster than the decline in book-equity. This 
results in B/M increasing as financial distress increases. Although book-equity does 
decline, implying that many of these firms are incurring losses, these losses are not 
sufficient to entirely wipe out shareholder’s equity over the five-year period.  
This pattern of B/M initially increasing and then decreasing for some o-score 
portfolios, but generally monotonically increasing for z-score portfolios, is consistent 
with the inverted-U shaped relation between B/M and financial distress being more 
persistent for the o-score than the z-score portfolios. When viewed in conjunction with 
the smaller market value of firms in the o-score tracking-portfolios, especially for the 
NYSE-AMEX sample, the pattern in B/M over time strengthens previous evidence that 
market inefficiencies inhibit the adjustment of prices for very small, high distress-risk 
firms.  
An alternative explanation for the decline in B/M from (t-2) to (t-1) is provided 
by DeBondt and Thaler (1987). They also document reversals in B/M values for loser 
stocks. They argue that the reversal occurs because extreme B/M values are a proxy for 
market price deviations from fundamental value. This explanation suggests that at first, 
(t-5) to (t-2), the market overreacts to the increase in distress-risk and market value 
declines faster than book-equity. Once the market realizes that market value has been 
bid down too low, the market value generally continues to decline from (t-2) to (t-1), 
but not as fast as book-equity. This explanation is also consistent with the reversal in 
B/M observed for firms whose market value has become very low.   
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The percentage decrease in standardised market value as distress-risk increases 
is larger for NYSE-AMEX firms than for NASDAQ firms. When distress-risk increases 
while book-equity remains positive, this difference results in the percentage increase in 
standardised B/M being typically 1.5 to 2 times as large for NYSE-AMEX tracking-
portfolios, when compared with the related NASDAQ portfolios. This result is 
consistent with the market being more efficient for NYSE-AMEX firms than for 
NASDAQ firms; both the market value and B/M of high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX 
firms adjust to reflect the higher risk, as is expected assuming rational pricing.  
The larger percentage decrease in market value, combined with the large losses 
accumulated by some NYSE-AMEX firms, explains the observation that the B/M 
values of NYSE-AMEX firms are more likely than the B/M values of NASDAQ firms 
to be extremely high or extremely negative. One implication of this is that, when 
portfolios are formed based on levels of distress-risk, there will be a wider range of B/M 
values exhibited by firms in high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX portfolios, than in 
NASDAQ portfolios. This is consistent with reported portfolio B/M being more 
sensitive to a change in weighting for NYSE-AMEX firms, than for NASDAQ firms. 
5.1.4 Relation between distress-risk and return 
If the HML premium represents a return premium relating to the risk of financial 
distress, then high distress-risk firms are expected to earn higher returns than low 
distress-risk firms. Dichev (1998) showed that portfolios of firms with high distress-risk 
earn low equal-weighted returns. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) concluded that these low 
equal-weighted returns are driven by high-distress firms with low-B/M. Results reported 
in sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 extend the findings of Dichev (1998) and Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002). The results show that the low returns observed for high distress-risk 
firms is mostly robust to whether returns are equally or value weighted and whether or 
not firms with negative and positive book-equity are aggregated. As the HML premium  
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is value-weighted, the finding that high distress-risk firms earn low value-weighted 
returns, as well as low equal-weighted returns, strengthens the evidence that the high 
returns earned by high B/M firms is not related to these firms having high distress-risk.  
5.1.4.1 Difference in returns – negative book-equity firms and high 
distress-risk positive book-equity firms 
  Comparison of returns earned by firms with negative book-equity and high 
distress-risk positive book-equity firms, reported in section 4.4.1, shows that generally 
no systematic differences exist between the two groups. The hypothesis that returns are 
different is consistently rejected for NYSE-AMEX firms and is rejected for most 
scenarios for NASDAQ firms. This result confirms that the aggregation of the returns of 
negative book-equity firms and positive book-equity firms should not result in 
misleading conclusions regarding the returns earned by high distress-risk firms.  
Although these results suggest that systematic differences do not exist between 
the returns of high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms with positive and negative book-
equity, further comparison of the equal- and value-weighted returns, for both the 
positive and negative book-equity high distress-risk firms, reported in 4.4.2.2, show that 
the relation between size and returns differs depending on whether book-equity is 
positive or negative.  
For negative book-equity NYSE-AMEX firms, both equal- and value-weighted 
returns are high compared with the returns earned by firms in the positive book-equity 
deciles. Therefore, no relation is evident between size and return for these negative 
book-equity firms. In contrast, for the highest distress-risk decile of positive book-
equity firms, equal-weighted returns are comparatively high and value-weighted returns 
are lower, suggesting that the smaller (larger) of the firms earn higher (lower) returns.  
Thus, both negative book-equity firms and the smallest of the high distress-risk 
positive book-equity firms drive the high equal-weighted returns earned by the 10% of  
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NYSE-AMEX firms with the highest distress-risk. The slightly larger, but still very 
small, high distress-risk positive book-equity firms earn comparatively low returns.  
The high return earned by the negative book-equity firms is consistent with 
Fama and French (1992) reporting that the negative book-equity firms excluded from 
their sample earned high returns and with the high returns reported to be earned by 
firms with negative earnings (Jaffe, Keim and Westerfield (1989)). It provides further 
support, albeit indirectly, for the view put forward by Danielson and Dowell (2001), that 
high returns are earned by firms that restructure and turnaround, producing 
comparatively large returns on a very small market value. In addition, Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) find that high-distress high-B/M firms have the largest positive 
abnormal earnings surprises. This supports the view that these are firms that have been 
undervalued by the market and subsequently large positive returns are experienced 
when the market recognizes that prices have deviated from fundamental value.  
The finding that low-B/M high-distress firms earn comparatively low returns is 
consistent with Griffin and Lemmon (2002) reporting that these firms have negative 
earnings surprises and concluding that the low returns found by Dichev for high 
distress-risk firms is driven by positive book-equity, low-B/M high distress-risk firms.  
The hypothesis of a difference between the returns of negative book-equity firms 
and high distress-risk positive book-equity firms is also rejected for NASDAQ firms, 
for most scenarios. The two instances where it is not rejected relate to o-score 
portfolios: 1) when comparing the negative equal-weighted returns earned by negative 
book-equity firms, with the low but positive average returns of distress-risk deciles 1 
through 3, and 2) when comparing the positive value-weighted returns earned by the 
negative book-equity portfolio, with the negative value-weighted returns of decile (pos) 
1. These differences relate to the strong negative relation between distress-risk and 
return for the NASDAQ firms, combined with the strong negative relation between size  
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and return, which results in the average return earned by the negative book-equity firms 
being negative when equal-weighted but positive when value-weighted.  
Although high distress-risk NASDAQ firms earn low average returns regardless 
of whether book-equity is positive or negative, the relation between return and size is 
different for the two groups of firms. For the negative book-equity firms, the smaller of 
these firms earn negative average returns, while the larger of these firms earn positive 
average returns. In comparison, for distress-risk (pos) decile 1, the larger firms earn 
negative returns.  
This relation between return and size for the negative book-equity firms may be 
explained by the fact that many of the smaller of these firms eventually fail, resulting in 
large negative returns. The larger of the negative book-equity firms continue to operate, 
resulting in the returns earned by these firms being positive but not high. This is 
consistent with negative book-equity NYSE-AMEX firms restructuring and producing 
positive returns. However, NASDAQ firms do not appear to enjoy the same high 
turnaround returns earned by NYSE-AMEX firms.  
The conclusion that many of the smaller negative book-equity firms fail, is 
strengthened by the comparison of returns with and without the inclusion of estimated 
delisting returns, reported in Appendix 8, Table A8.3. These show that, prior to the 
adjustment, the negative book-equity firms earn high equal-weighted returns and that 
the adjustment for delisting returns has a much larger effect on equal-weighting returns 
than value-weighted. This suggests that, on average, it is the smaller negative book-
equity firms that delist.  
The relation between size and return for NASDAQ high distress-risk positive 
book-equity firms is also consistent with the relation found for NYSE-AMEX firms. It 
is these slightly larger high distress-risk firms that have the lowest B/M. Again, 
comparison of returns before and after adjustment for delisting returns, reported in  
  308
Appendix 8 Table A8.3, help to clarify what is occurring. These results show that the 
adjustment for delisting returns causing a much larger reduction in equal-weighted 
returns than in value-weighted returns. This suggests that many of the smaller 
NASDAQ positive book-equity firms delist and earn negative returns.  
Losses incurred when firms delist is not the only factor driving the near zero or 
negative returns earned by these NASDAQ portfolios. Both before and after the 
adjustment for delisting returns, o-score distress-risk (pos) decile 1 firms, on average, 
earn large negative value-weighted returns and the z-score distress-risk (pos) decile 1 
firms earn a value-weighted return of only 0.04% prior to the adjustment. The low 
returns earned by these portfolios prior to the inclusion of delisting returns are 
consistent with the market continuing to adjust downward the value of many of these 
firms.  
5.1.4.2 Distress-risk return relation, positive and negative book-equity 
firms 
The relation between distress-risk and return was further clarified by examining 
the returns earned by the distress-risk decile portfolios, reported in section 4.4.2.1. 
These results show that when positive and negative book-equity firms are aggregated, 
firms with high distress-risk generally earn low, not high returns. This result is stronger 
when returns are value-weighted than when they are equal-weighted. The only support 
for the hypothesis that firms with higher distress-risk earn a high return comes from the 
high equal-weighted return earned by NYSE-AMEX distress-risk decile 1 firms. In 
comparison, decile 2 firms earn the lowest equal-weighted return. The value-weighted 
returns earned by decile 1 firms are also comparatively low, suggesting that the high 
equal-weighted return is driven by the smallest of the NYSE-AMEX firms. Distress-risk 
decile 1 firms, that are not the smallest, actually earn low returns. When returns are 
value-weighted, both the highest and lowest risk NYSE-AMEX firms earn the lowest  
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average returns and the relation between distress-risk and return is generally negative. 
The highest returns are earned by firms in the low-risk deciles, 8 and 9.  
The decile 8 and 9 firms, which earn the highest returns, also have 
comparatively low B/M values and are on average larger firms. The high returns earned 
by these firms may be explained by Danielson and Dowell’s (2001) finding that low 
B/M mature firms meet or exceed market expectations and consequently earn high 
returns. 
The finding of a very high equal-weighted return for NYSE-AMEX decile 1 is 
inconsistent with Dichev’s finding of a low return, of 0.60%, for this portfolio. This 
difference may result from Dichev setting the extreme high and low returns each period 
at the 1% and 99% levels, respectively, decreasing the effect of very high returns earned 
by very small firms. Alternatively, as the sample period examined by Dichev included 
the period examined here, plus the period 1981 through 1985, the observed high return 
for July 1985 through June 1995 may be period specific. However, Conrad, Cooper and 
Kaul (2003) present evidence that appending a shorter period to the original data 
generally does not lead to a change to the conclusion. 
A possible explanation for the high returns earned by the very small, high 
distress-risk firms is that the market initially overreacts to the high levels of distress-
risk, bidding the market value down too far. A positive return results when the firm 
outperforms market expectations and investors realise that B/M has moved away from 
fundamental values (DeBondt and Thaler (1987)). This explanation is consistent with 
the very small average size observed for high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms and the 
finding that B/M first increases then decreases as distress-risk increases. It is not 
consistent with market value continuing to decline when distress-risk remains high. An 
alternative explanation is that when a NYSE-AMEX firm has accumulated losses and 
then restructures, the firm earns positive returns on a very small market value  
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(Danielson and Dowell (2001)). As the period examined includes the recession of 1988 
through 1991, results may be driven by high returns earned by turnaround firms after 
this economic downturn. 
The NASDAQ and 'All Firms' o-score portfolios exhibit a consistent negative 
relation between distress-risk and return. This relation is robust to whether returns are 
equally or value weighted. The relation describes an inverted-U for the z-score 
portfolios, with the highest return being earned by decile 7 firms, in all scenarios. For 
both o-score and z-score portfolios, the relation is stronger for the NASDAQ sample, 
where returns earned by the highest distress-risk portfolio are negative in almost all 
scenarios. Even where portfolios of higher distress-risk firms earn positive returns, they 
are generally not significantly different from zero. In contrast, the returns for the lower 
distress-risk firms are generally significantly greater than zero. Therefore, there is no 
support for a positive relation between distress-risk and return for these samples.  
The low returns earned by the high distress-risk NASDAQ firms and all but the 
tiniest of NYSE-AMEX distress-risk decile 1 firms, combined with the fact that these 
are also the high distress-risk firms with low B/M values, strengthens the view that, for 
these firms, market inefficiencies or irrational investor behaviour result in market values 
being slow to adjust to a firm’s declining financial health. These issues affect NASDAQ 
firms to a greater extent than NYSE-AMEX firms and result in low returns as market 
values are continually adjusted downwards.  
The fact that high returns are earned by the very smallest of the high distress-risk 
NYSE-AMEX firms, but not by NASDAQ firms, could result from NASDAQ firms 
being more likely than NYSE-AMEX firms to delist for performance reasons, rather 
than to continue to trade. This would result in less opportunity for reversal of 
performance and for firms to earn positive returns on a very small market value.   
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5.1.4.3 Distress-risk return relation, positive book-equity firms 
  The HML premium calculated by Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) is 
calculated from a sample that only includes firms with positive book-equity. Results 
presented in section 4.4.2.2 show that, even when only firms with positive book-equity 
are considered, firms with high distress-risk earn lower returns than firms with low 
distress-risk and the relation between distress-risk and return is not driven by the 
negative book-equity firms. This conclusion is generally robust to whether equal- or 
value-weighted returns are examined. The only exception is that the very high equal-
weighted return earned by z-score distress-risk decile 1 is driven by negative book-
equity firms. When just examining the returns of the positive book-equity firms, 
distress-risk (pos) decile 1 exhibits high returns, but not the highest for the distress-risk 
(pos) deciles.  
  In conclusion, aggregation of the returns of positive and negative book-equity 
firms does not cause misleading results when returns are value-weighted and generally 
does not produce misleading results for equal-weighted returns. This conclusion is quite 
different to that reached for B/M, where the aggregation of positive and negative B/M 
values leads to misleading results, especially for NYSE-AMEX firms. 
5.1.5 Return premia 
  The return premia earned by a range of trading strategies, long in high distress-
risk firms and short in low distress-risk firms, reinforces the conclusion reached from 
examination of sorted distress-risk portfolio returns. That is, high distress-risk firms do 
not earn higher returns than low distress-risk firms. The results, reported in section 
4.4.3.1, show that for NYSE-AMEX firms the return premium is consistently not 
significantly different from zero, even where the highest distress-risk NYSE-AMEX 
firms have comparatively high equal-weighted returns. For NASDAQ firms and the ‘All 
Firms’ samples, the premium is negative for all scenarios and often significant.   
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  These results extend Dichev’s finding of a negative equal-weighted distress-risk 
return premium. The conclusion that the distress-risk premium is not significant and 
positive is robust to returns being either equally or value-weighted, to the inclusion or 
exclusion of firms with negative book-equity and to the level of diversification. In 
addition, the size and B/M balanced trading strategy has a significant negative return 
that is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of negative book-equity firms. The size and 
B/M balanced distress-risk premium is calculated using the same methodology as the 
HML premium. Finding a negative characteristic-balanced distress-risk premium 
strengthens the conclusion that the positive HML premium is not a proxy for a distress-
risk return premium. 
  The size and significance of the premium is also mostly robust to whether or not 
delisting returns are adjusted for. Only when considering the equal-weighted returns 
earned by the extreme NASDAQ deciles, is a significant positive premium found prior 
to adjusting for delisting returns. The general lack of sensitivity to the adjustment, 
especially when returns are value-weighted, can be attributed to the comparatively small 
size of firms that delist.  
Thus, it appears that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that the HML 
return premium in the Fama and French three-factor model relates to the risk of 
financial distress. There is, however, evidence that a systematic relation may exist 
between distress-risk and return. As the distress-risk premium is significant and 
negative once B/M and size are controlled, the HML and DMS premia must be 
capturing different aspects of return. This finding, that the two premia capture different 
aspects of return, is consistent with Griffin and Lemmon’s (2002) finding that the 
market reacts differently to firms with high distress-risk and high-B/M, compared with 
firms with high distress-risk and low-B/M. These results led them to conclude that B/M 
and Ohlson’s o-score are capturing different aspects of financial distress. In addition, as  
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the DMS premium is negative, it cannot be interpreted as a price for undertaking risk. If 
the distress premium can be used to describe returns, it suggests that the market is not 
efficient in incorporating the risk of financial distress into prices. 
5.1.6 Regression results – distress-risk deciles 
  Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) argue that the three-factor model is 
successful in capturing the time-series of returns because the SMB and HML factors 
represent return premia that compensate investors for undertaking systematic risk. They 
argue that the evidence supports rational pricing and that the three-factor model is a 
version of the APT or Merton’s ICAPM. Results discussed in sections 5.1.1 through 
5.1.5 are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the HML factor is a return premium 
relating to the risk of financial distress. A consistent positive relation is not apparent 
between distress-risk and either B/M or return and a size and B/M balanced distress-risk 
return premium is negative, not positive. Combined, these results show that the distress-
risk premium explanation for the HML factor is unlikely. They do not provide evidence 
of irrational pricing. It is possible that the HML factor captures an alternative source of 
systematic risk that is yet unidentified.  
An alternative view is that the success of the three-factor model is due to 
irrational pricing. Several studies have examined whether the time-series of return is 
captured by the HML factor or the B/M characteristic. Evidence that the B/M 
characteristic captures return variation has been interpreted as consistent with irrational 
pricing. Daniel and Titman (1997), Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Brennan, Chordia 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) have all provided evidence that returns are related to the 
B/M characteristic. In contrast, Davis, Fama and French (2000) and Lewellen (1999) 
report evidence in favour of the factor model and Davis, Fama and French (2000) report 
that Daniel and Titman’s results are period specific.   
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Even if the HML premium represents a risk premium, regression evidence does 
not support the explanation that it relates to the risk of financial distress. In addition to 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) finding that the loading on the HML factor is not driven by 
distress-risk, Lewellen (1999) concludes that although HML appears to be driven by 
risk, it appears to proxy for more than just the distress-risk in returns. Also Dichev 
(1998) finds that both the B/M and the distress-risk characteristics are important in 
capturing the cross-section of returns earned by distress-risk decile portfolios and 
neither subsumes the role of the other.  
The regressions reported in section 4.5.2 examine the role of the Fama and 
French factors, in addition to the distressed-minus-solvent (DMS) factor, in capturing 
the time-series of returns earned by distress-risk decile portfolios. The ability of the 
Fama and French factors or of a distress-risk return factor to capture the returns earned 
by firms sorted only by distress-risk has not previously been examined. The results 
reported here provide new evidence that the ability of the HML factor to capture returns 
is driven by the B/M characteristic, rather than distress-risk.  
A four-factor model, incorporating the SMB and HML factors as well as the 
DMS factor, captures the time series of returns better than the other models. The models 
all do a better job of describing the returns earned by NYSE-AMEX firms than 
NASDAQ firms. The models are particularly poor in describing returns earned by the 
high distress-risk NASDAQ portfolios. This suggests that market-wide systematic 
factors are more important in determining the returns of NYSE-AMEX firms than 
NASDAQ firms and is consistent with market inefficiencies affecting small, high-
distress NASDAQ firms more than NYSE-AMEX firms.
73 A significant positive 
correlation exists between the SMB and DMS factors when o-score is used to measure 
                                                 
73 Refer to sections 2.5.3.1 and 2.11.4 for details of relevant references.   
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distress-risk but not when z-score is used. Consistency of the regression results for the 
o-score and z-score deciles shows that this correlation does not drive the conclusions. 
The pattern in the HML coefficients generally reflects the pattern in the B/M 
characteristic, rather than the change in distress-risk. However, the pattern in the HML 
coefficient for high distress-risk firms varies with the variables included in the model 
and is consistently negative for NASDAQ firms, even though the B/M ratios of 
NASDAQ firms are not consistently low. In addition, although the hypothesis that the 
HML factor is important in capturing the time-series of returns cannot be clearly 
rejected, the performance of the two-factor model incorporating HML is inferior to all 
other models considered. In the four-factor model, HML is only important for the 
medium and low distress-risk NYSE-AMEX portfolios and for the low and high 
distress-risk NASDAQ portfolios.  
The lack of importance of the HML factor in capturing the returns of distress-
risk portfolios, in addition to the instability of the pattern of the HML coefficients, is 
contradictory to what would be expected if the HML premium is a proxy for the risk of 
financial distress. These results, in combination, provide support for the proposition that 
the HML factor captures the time series of returns related to the B/M characteristic, 
rather than distress-risk or another unidentified risk factor. This evidence is stronger for 
NYSE-AMEX firms than NASDAQ firms. However, as the period examined, 1985 to 
1995, is a sub-period of the period examined by Daniel and Titman (1997), evidence 
presented by Davis, Fama and French (2000) suggests that further investigation is 
required to determine whether results are period specific. 
In contrast to HML, both the SMB and DMS factors have an important role in 
capturing the returns earned by the distress-risk deciles. Both the size factor premium 
and the distress-risk premium are, on average, negative over this period; however the 
size premium is not significantly different from zero. The negative but not significant  
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size premium is consistent with results reported by Booth and Keim (2000) and 
Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000). It is also consistent with the Dichev (1998) 
finding that the size characteristic is not important in capturing the cross-section of 
returns.  
Further investigation is required to determine whether this result is consistent 
with rational pricing. Fama and French (1996) argue that the SMB and HML premiums 
not being positive in all periods is consistent with rational pricing, as the variability of 
the return premia means they do not represent an arbitrage opportunity. Following this 
line of argument, finding the SMB premium to be important in capturing returns, even 
when, on average, it is negative over the period, may be consistent with rational pricing.  
Other evidence casts doubt on this explanation. Small firms are argued to have 
greater sensitivity than big firms to changes in the economic climate (Chen (1988), 
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000)). The period 
examined covers periods of both growth and recession. The importance of the SMB 
premium in describing returns may reflect the common variation of value for small 
firms compared with big firms, as the market moved from growth to recession and back 
to growth over the period. If this is so, then the negative return premium was earned for 
exposure to the more volatile returns of small firms.  
The negative return earned for exposure to greater volatility, combined with the 
importance of size when capturing the time-series but not the cross-section of returns 
(Dichev (1998)), provides greater support for the common variation of the returns 
explanation for the SMB factor, than the risk based explanation.  
Evidence that a distress-risk premium that is significant and negative is 
important in capturing returns when firms are sorted by distress-risk suggests that 
investors systematically pay too much for firms with high distress-risk. This result is 
consistent with the distress-risk return relation discussed previously. Although the small  
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average size of these high distress-risk stocks suggests that investors have previously 
bid down the price as they become aware of the increased distress-risk, the systematic 
low returns of these stocks suggest that the price does not fully reflect the true level of 
distress-risk and prices continue to be bid down over time. 
Investors in firms with high distress-risk are investing in the thirty percent of 
firms with the highest probability of delisting due to bankruptcy, liquidation or other 
performance reasons. As the average return earned by these firms is less than the 
average return earned by the thirty percent of firms with the lowest probability of 
delisting for negative reasons, it appears that the markets penalize investors who invest 
in these high distress-risk firms. This conclusion is consistent with that reached by 
Dichev (1998). However, further analysis is required to determine whether this result is 
period specific and whether the distress-risk premium is positive and important in 
capturing returns in other periods. If so, similar to SMB, finding that the negative DMS 
premium is priced in the period examined may be consistent with DMS not representing 
an arbitrage opportunity. If, however, it is found that the distress-risk premium is 
consistently negative over a variety of periods, then the premium cannot be interpreted 
as a risk premium.  
Given the evidence available, results which show that the negative return 
premia, SMB and DMS, play an important role in capturing returns, in conjunction with 
evidence that the HML coefficients are driven by the B/M characteristic, support an 
irrational behaviour or inefficient markets explanation for the success of the models 
tested. The results do not support the view that prices are driven by positive risk 
premiums. Therefore, it is unlikely that any of the models tested, including the Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor model, is an empirically determined APT model or an 
ICAPM.  
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  In addition to providing evidence regarding the ability of the SMB, HML and 
DMS premia to capture returns, regression results provide insight into the relation 
between distress-risk and the importance of the market factor. All of the models tested 
perform better than the CAPM, which leaves a pattern in the intercepts, particularly for 
the o-score deciles. The market factor predicts too high a return for the high distress-risk 
o-score deciles and generally predicts too low a return for the low distress-risk deciles. 
In addition, the market factor coefficients are generally close to 1. These results are 
consistent with previous evidence that the market factor is important in capturing the 
difference between the return of stocks and the risk-free rate. However, it cannot 
capture variation in return (Chan and Chen (1991), Fama and French (1993)).  
Lewellen (1999) suggests that market risk becomes less important as distress-
risk increases. He based his conclusion on an observed negative relation between B/M 
and the market coefficient for industry portfolios, in conjunction with the proposition 
that B/M is positively related to distress-risk. Results in section 4.5.2 are inconsistent 
with this conclusion.  
When only the market factor is used as an explanatory factor, NYSE-AMEX 
(NASDAQ) firms with the highest (lowest) distress-risk have the highest market beta. 
When examining the two- to four-factor models, a negative relation is observed between 
distress-risk and the loading on the market factor for approximately half of the 
scenarios. There is no real pattern to which scenarios result in firms with higher 
distress-risk having a low beta. In addition, results presented in section 4.3.3 and 
discussed in section 5.1.3, show that the relation between distress-risk and mean B/M is 
not consistently positive and the scenarios where a negative relation is found between 
distress-risk and the market coefficient are not the scenarios where a positive relation is 
found between distress-risk and B/M. Therefore, Lewellen’s observation of a negative  
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relation between B/M and the loading on the market factor may be specific to the 
industry portfolios examined.  
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) provide additional evidence against a negative 
relation between distress-risk and the market loading. Although they do not comment on 
the relation, their results
74 show that when the Fama and French (1993) model is used to 
describe the returns of B/M-distress portfolios, loadings on the market factor are larger 
for higher distress-risk firms than lower distress-risk firms. This supports a positive 
relation between distress-risk and B/M when o-score is used to measure distress-risk 
and HML is included in the model. As the positive relation is reported for both small 
and big firms, it is not driven by size. 
  The generally larger betas reported for NASDAQ firms relative to NYSE-
AMEX firms shows that the returns of NASDAQ firms have the greater sensitivity to 
variability in market returns. As the market portfolio proxy is value-weighted, market 
return predominantly reflects the return of larger NYSE-AMEX stocks. Therefore, 
observing NYSE-AMEX portfolio betas that vary around 1 is expected. As NASDAQ 
firms are on average smaller than NYSE-AMEX firms, the higher betas observed for the 
NASDAQ portfolios, as well as the high betas observed for the small high distress-risk 
NYSE-AMEX firms when o-score is used to measure distress-risk, are consistent with 
previous evidence that the returns of small firms fluctuate more with business cycles 
than those of larger firms and that smaller firms are riskier in times of economic 
recession (Chen (1988), Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Perez-Quiros, Timmermann 
(2000)). As the sample period, 1985 to 1994, includes the market downturn during the 
period 1989 to 1991, the higher betas exhibited by the NASDAQ firms and by the very 
small high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms, may be period specific. 
                                                 
74 The results are reported in Griffin and Lemmon (2002) Table III, page 2327.  
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5.1.7 Regression results – characteristic-balanced portfolios 
  The distress-risk decile regression results do not control for the size or B/M 
characteristics of the firms. Fama and French (1993) show that the three-factor model is 
generally able to capture portfolio returns once size and B/M are controlled. However, 
the model has trouble capturing the returns of the low-B/M portfolios. In addition; 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) find that the Fama and French model is generally able to 
capture the returns of B/M-distress portfolios but not of low-B/M, high-distress firms. 
Regression results for the intersecting quintile portfolios, reported in section 4.5.3, 
confirm and extend the findings of both Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) and 
Griffin and Lemmon (2002), by examining the ability of the SMB and HML factors to 
capture returns of size-distress sorted portfolios. They also show the importance of the 
DMS factor in capturing returns of size-B/M, B/M-distress and size-distress portfolios. 
These results also extend the distress-risk decile regression results discussed in section 
5.1.6.  
  The four-factor model generally shows superior performance when compared 
with the three-factor models. In contrast to the decile regression results, once 
characteristics are controlled, both SMB and HML are important in capturing returns 
and the importance of DMS is dependent on the portfolio sorting procedure. Consistent 
with the decile portfolio results, it appears that the loading on the factors is driven by 
firm characteristics rather than risk and market inefficiencies may drive the returns of 
extreme portfolios. As the DMS factor does not subsume the role of HML, it cannot be 
argued that the premium is a proxy for the risk of financial distress.  
For all sets of portfolios, the SMB and HML factors, in combination, are found 
to be important in capturing the time series of returns, extending previous findings that 
SMB and HML are able to capture the returns of a wide range of portfolios (Fama and 
French (1995, 1996)). It also reinforces the Fama and French (1995) argument that the  
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ability of the SMB and HML factors to capture returns does not emanate from the 
dependent and the explanatory variables being sorted on a similar basis.  
Contrary to previous evidence that the B/M effect is stronger for small firms 
than big firms (Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995), Loughran (1997), Kothari and 
Shanken (2000), Chen and Dong (2001)), but consistent with results reported by Fama 
and French (1993), the HML coefficients were equally significant for the big-firm and 
small-firm portfolios. 
As the HML factor premium is positive and significant at the 10% level, the 
systematic relation between HML and returns may be consistent with rational pricing. 
However, when B/M is not controlled (size-distress portfolios) the pattern in the HML 
coefficient is not stable. The pattern in the HML coefficients does not reflect distress-
risk when any of the models are tested. When SMB is included in the model, the pattern 
in the HML coefficient reflects the pattern in the B/M characteristics of the portfolios. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that HML is a proxy for distress-risk. The unstable nature of the 
HML coefficients may be consistent with Berk’s (2000) contention that B/M reflects 
risk factors not incorporated in the model. 
In contrast to the HML factor, the SMB premium is negative, although not 
significantly different from zero. Fama and French (1993) reported an insignificant 
SMB premium of 0.27% (t = 1.73), for the period 1963 to 1990. However, because the 
loading on the SMB factor covered a range of 1.7 and the estimated spread in expected 
returns due to size was large, the factor was considered important in capturing return. 
Similarly, results in section 4.5.3 show a range of SMB loadings up to 1.67, depending 
on the model tested, and the SMB factor is important in explaining a wide range of 
returns.  
  The DMS factor is important in capturing returns for all portfolio sorts, except 
for the o-score portfolios when firms are sorted by size and B/M. In no scenario did  
  322
DMS subsume the role of SMB or HML. DMS is important in capturing returns of the 
most- and least-distress portfolios, for both the B/M-distress and size-distress portfolios, 
o-score and z-score. It also helps to capture the variability of returns for the z-score size-
B/M portfolios, especially for low-B/M firms and bigger, high-B/M firms. The 
importance of DMS in capturing returns of the z-score but not o-score size-B/M 
portfolios, may relate to the weaker relation between distress-risk and size for the z-
score portfolios. A significant positive (no) correlation is observed between SMB and 
DMS when o-score (z-score) is used to measure distress-risk, resulting in only SMB 
(both SMB and DMS) being necessary to capture returns.  
Results for the size-B/M portfolios show that, except for the small-firm 
portfolios which all have a positive loading on DMS, high-B/M (low-B/M) firms do 
have a positive (negative) loading on DMS. This suggests that they behave like high-
distress (low-distress) firms. However, on average, the HML premium is positive and 
the DMS premium is negative. Therefore, similar factor loading does not imply that the 
HML factor is a proxy for risk of financial distress. Instead, it supports the view that the 
HML and DMS factors are capturing different aspects of return. 
Consistent with distress-risk decile results, the negative distress-risk premium is 
important in capturing returns when firms are sorted by distress-risk, supporting the 
previous conclusion that investors systematically pay too much for firms with high 
distress-risk. Also, although HML and DMS in combination are able to capture the 
magnitude of returns, SMB is required in the model to capture the variability of return, 
especially for the small-firm portfolios. This relates back to previous discussion 
regarding the different reaction of small and big firms to changes in economic 
conditions (refer to section 5.1.6). 
A systematic difference between returns of small and big firms is also suggested 
by the strong association between the SMB coefficients and the size characteristic,  
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when size is not controlled. As none of the factors in the model represent indicators of 
economic sources of risk, such as bond spreads or changes in GDP, consistent with 
Berk’s (1995, 2000) contention,
75 the SMB factor may be capturing economic risk 
factors not incorporated in the model and the different reaction of small and big firms to 
changes in economic conditions.  
  Previous discussion suggested that SMB is important in capturing variability of 
return but HML and DMS are important in capturing magnitude. Consistent with this, 
all models had the greatest trouble capturing the variability of returns earned by the 
B/M-distress portfolios. At the same time, these portfolios exhibited the least number of 
significant intercepts. Even the HML/DMS model did not exhibit comparatively high R
2 
values for these portfolios. This suggests that, compared with the size premium, which 
can, on average, be either positive or negative over long periods (Brown, Kleidon and 
Marsh (1983), Liew and Vassalou (2000)), the average returns of high-B/M and low-
distress firms are systematically higher than the average returns of low-B/M and high-
distress firms, respectively. It appears there is less of a tendency for these firms to react 
systematically differently to changes in economic conditions. This result is consistent 
with previous evidence that value stocks perform better than glamour stocks in both up 
and down markets and that value stocks do not expose investors to downside risk 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), LaPorta (1996)). 
Results for the size-B/M portfolios confirm the findings of Fama and French 
(1993) that the SMB/HML model has trouble capturing returns earned by low B/M 
portfolios. The SMB/HML model predicted too high (low) a return for the smaller-firm 
(bigger-firm) portfolio for both the o-score and z-score portfolios.  
Similarly, the B/M-distress portfolio results confirm Griffin and Lemmon’s 
(2002) finding that the SMB/HML model has trouble capturing the low returns earned 
                                                 
75 Berk (1995, 2000) argues that size, as measured by market value, is a proxy for any risk factor omitted 
from the model being tested.  
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by the low-B/M, most-distress portfolio, when o-score is used to measure distress-risk. 
When z-score is used to measure distress-risk, the intercept for this portfolio is not 
significant. Therefore, this result is not robust to the method used to measure distress-
risk. 
In contrast to the Griffin and Lemmon (2002) findings, for the B/M-distress 
portfolios, the SMB/HML model had the greatest trouble capturing the comparatively 
high returns earned by the low-B/M, least-distress portfolios. The significant positive 
intercepts found here for these portfolios appear to be driven by the strong negative 
loading on the HML factor, as significant intercepts are observed for models that 
incorporated HML, but not for the SMB/DMS model. Thus, it appears that when both 
distress-risk and B/M are low, firms earn a higher return than would be suggested given 
their low B/M. 
Returns earned by the intersecting quintile portfolios are reported in Appendix 
14. They provide further information on the interrelation between distress-risk, B/M, 
size and return. Sorting firms by size and B/M produces the widest range of portfolio 
returns. Small low-B/M firms earn the lowest returns and all models, except for the o-
score HML/DMS model, have trouble capturing the very low returns earned by this 
portfolio. The B/M-distress and size-distress portfolios that have the lowest returns are 
those that consist of the low-B/M, most-distress firms and the small, most-distress 
firms, respectively. The returns earned by these firms are not as extremely low as those 
earned by the small, low-B/M firms. This suggests that it is the size, B/M combination 
that drives the extreme low returns. In contrast to the low return earned by the low-B/M 
high-distress portfolio, the high-B/M most-distress portfolio earns comparatively high 
returns. This confirms the finding of Griffin and Lemmon’s (2002), that whether a high 
distress-risk firm earns high or low return is dependent on its B/M. Also, the highest  
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portfolio return is reported for the high-B/M least-distress portfolio, again refuting the 
view that the high returns earned by high B/M firms are related to distress-risk.  
The extreme return results are not consistent with a risk explanation of returns. 
The characteristics of firms that earn the lowest returns are consistent with previous 
findings of market inefficiencies inhibiting the market value of very small, low-B/M 
firms and of high distress-risk firms, from decreasing to reflect true value. The very 
high return earned by high-B/M, least-distress firms is consistent with these firms being 
undervalued by the market. High returns are then earned when the market recognizes 
the deviation from fundamental value.  
Factor coefficients are predominantly related to portfolio characteristics. When a 
factor is not controlled, the pattern in factor loadings represents the pattern in the 
portfolio characteristics. When a characteristic is controlled, the coefficients mostly 
change from positive to negative in a manner consistent with portfolio characteristics. 
However, the patterns in the coefficients once the characteristic is controlled do not 
consistently reflect any residual patterns in the portfolio characteristics.  
Results show that, although firms with low B/M, on average, display a negative 
loading on the HML coefficient, the significance of the loading is less for low-B/M 
firms that are smaller and for those with higher distress-risk. This suggests that B/M is 
less important in capturing the returns of these extreme portfolios, than other low-B/M 
portfolios. These firms are primarily viewed as small firms and high distress-risk firms, 
regardless of their low B/M. Similarly, the DMS factor is not important in capturing the 
returns of the high-B/M, least-distress portfolio. When firms are sorted by size and 
distress-risk, smaller firms load positively on DMS regardless of their distress-risk. 
Also, the returns of bigger firms, with both high and low distress-risk, are driven by size 
and the level of distress-risk is less important.  
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5.1.8 Consistency of relations – NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ 
  Dichev (1998), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Chou (2000) 
report different findings for NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms. Many studies do not 
segregate NYSE-AMEX firms from NASDAQ firms. In a combined sample, these 
differences are not discernable and may result in misleading conclusions. When 
considering the results reported here, mostly the ‘All Firms’ sample results represent an 
average of the NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ results and do not cause misleading 
conclusions about the relations between the variables. However, when examining the 
results for firms with higher distress-risk, differences are found between high distress-
risk firms that trade on the NYSE and AMEX and those that trade on NASDAQ.  
Some high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms do exhibit high B/M ratios and earn 
high returns, as suggested by Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), and as expected if 
pricing were rational. In contrast, high distress-risk NASDAQ firms consistently display 
low B/M values and low returns. These differences relate predominantly to the relative 
size of these firms; it appears that market inefficiencies inhibit the ability of the prices 
of small high distress-risk firms to adjust downward. These inefficiencies appear to 
affect NASDAQ firms more than NYSE-AMEX firms.  
As NASDAQ firms have more extreme levels of distress-risk than NYSE-
AMEX firms, a large proportion of the ‘All Firms’ highest distress-risk decile consists 
of NASDAQ firms. These firms have a very low market value. Therefore, the ‘All 
Firms’ equal-weighted portfolio statistics reflect the behaviour of NASDAQ firms, 
whereas the ‘All Firms’ value-weighted portfolio statistics predominantly reflect the 
behaviour of NYSE-AMEX firms. Examination of an ‘All Firms’ sample does not 
provide sufficient information to differentiate between the two. 
  Examination of regression results also shows that the ability of market-wide 
factors to capture returns is stronger for NYSE-AMEX firms, than for NASDAQ firms.  
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Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), also found that a larger portion of the 
returns earned by NYSE-AMEX firms is explained by systematic factors, compared 
with NASDAQ firms. As NASDAQ firms represent a slightly large proportion of the 
market in terms of numbers of firms, but not market value, the ability of market-wide 
factors to describe returns is likely to be overestimated when examining value-weighted 
returns, when NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms are not considered separately.  
 
5.2 Implications - rational pricing, market efficiency and 
investor behaviour 
 
Equilibrium asset pricing models are based on the proposition that investors are 
rational and require additional return to compensate for undertaking additional 
systematic risk. They are based on assumptions of perfect capital markets. The risk 
factors in the ICAPM and the APT represent fundamental sources of economic risk. The 
Fama and French three-factor model is empirically determined. Fama and French (1993, 
1995) argue that the reason why the HML loading captures return is because it proxies 
for the risk of financial distress and that the model is consistent with rational pricing. 
They show that high B/M firms, on average, have lower profitability and conclude that 
they have higher distress-risk. However, Loughran (1997) and Griffin and Lemmon 
(2002) show that small firms, both with low B/M and with high B/M, have low 
profitability, and that high-distress low-B/M firms have the lowest profitability. Also, 
high B/M firms were not found to be fundamentally riskier than low B/M firms 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), LaPorta (1996)). 
Results are not consistent with the proposition that positive returns, on average, 
are earned for exposure to systematic risk. A positive relation is not found between 
distress-risk and B/M, the distress-risk premium is negative and it is important in 
describing returns. The loading on the HML premium is unstable and is more closely  
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related to the B/M characteristic, than to distress-risk. This result is not consistent with 
rational pricing (Daniel and Titman (1997)). Therefore, unless the HML coefficient is a 
proxy for an as yet unidentified risk factor, the success of the HML factor in capturing 
return cannot be attributed to it representing a fundamental source of economic risk.  
It has been argued that the success of the HML factor in capturing returns relates 
to investors extrapolating past performance too far into the future (Lakonishok, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1994), LaPorta (1996), LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Mun, Vasconcellos and Kish (2000)). This hypothesis is not directly tested. The only 
evidence supporting this view relates to the very high returns earned by the tiniest of 
high distress-risk, positive book-equity NYSE-AMEX firms and NYSE-AMEX firms 
with negative book-equity.  
These firms earn a very high return on a low market value, suggesting that their 
market value may have been bid down too far. However, the change in B/M over time 
shows that, on average, firms that accumulate large losses actually have low, not high 
B/M prior to book-equity becoming negative. This is not consistent with the high B/M 
of the tiny positive book-equity firms resulting from investors extrapolating past losses 
too far into the future. However, B/M increases when distress-risk increases and losses 
are not large enough to potentially wipe out shareholder’s equity. Thus, the evidence 
may be consistent with investors overreacting when a range of financial factors 
indicates high distress-risk. Conversely, it could be argued that the decrease in market 
value for these firms and the related increase in B/M are appropriate. The subsequent 
high return earned by these firms may also be appropriate, given the level of risk 
involved. Further investigation is required to distinguish between these competing 
views.  
Consistent with rational pricing, market value does generally decrease and B/M 
increase, as distress-risk increases. Also, for most NYSE-AMEX firms and for  
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NASDAQ firms where distress-risk does not become high, a positive relation does exist 
between distress-risk and B/M. However, rational pricing is not unequivocally 
supported. High-distress-risk firms that are small and those that accumulate large losses, 
exhibit low B/M ratios. Also, high distress-risk firms do not, on average, earn a positive 
return premium. In fact, except for when only NYSE-AMEX firms are considered,
76 the 
distress-risk premium is consistently negative. The negative return premium earned by 
these small high distress-risk firms appears to be a consequence of investors under-
reacting to the deteriorating financial health of the firm.  
The underreaction explanation is supported by results showing that small, high 
distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms and most high distress-risk NASDAQ firms have low 
B/M. In addition, market value continues to decline when firms remain in a state of high 
distress-risk, suggesting that the markets are slow to adjust prices downward. The 
combined effect is that these firms earn low returns. The increase in B/M as distress-risk 
increases is, on average, 2.5 times as great for NYSE-AMEX firms than for NASDAQ 
firms. It is likely that this difference in the increase in B/M results from the effect of 
market inefficiencies which inhibit the downward adjustment of prices being greater for 
NASDAQ firms than for NYSE-AMEX firms.  
The underreaction explanation is also consistent with evidence regarding the 
short-term momentum in returns (Fama and French (1998a), Poterba and Summers 
(1998), Jegadeesh (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990b), Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter 
(1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996), Chordia 
and Shivakumar (2002)). Markets are found to react slowly to both firm-specific 
information and common economic factors, causing short-term momentum profits from 
a strategy of being long in past winners and short in past losers. Momentum earnings are 
more pronounced for firms with negative earnings surprises and smaller stocks, 
                                                 
76 The distress-risk premium for NYSE-AMEX firms is positive for some trading strategies, but not 
significantly greater than zero.  
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especially those that trade infrequently. In addition, analyst forecasts are found to react 
slowly to earnings surprises; this is more pronounced for firms with negative surprises. 
The market being slow to incorporate declining financial health may result from 
market inefficiencies and/or irrational investor behaviour. Market inefficiencies result 
from information not being available for investors to properly assess the true value of a 
firm, also from trading restrictions that inhibit traders from acting to reduce the value of 
the firms. Analysts are less likely to cover small firms and firms with poor prospects. 
The discretion to drop firms from coverage when their financial health deteriorates is 
greater for smaller firms than bigger. Consequently less information is available for 
small firms and firms with high distress-risk, mispricing has been shown to be greater 
and earnings announcements provide more information to the market. In addition, 
analyst forecasts are shown to be overly optimistic and analysts are less likely and 
slower to disseminate bad news compared with good news (LaPorta, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), McNichols, O'Brien and Francis (1997), Franknel and Lee 
(1998), Griffin and Lemmon (2002)).  
This lack of unbiased timely information for small high-distress firms is 
consistent with these firms exhibiting low B/M ratios and with market value continuing 
to decline when distress-risk remains high over five-years. The low returns earned by 
these firms is also consistent with evidence presented by McNichols, O'Brien and 
Francis (1997) and Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), that small, poorly performing 
firms, have lower analyst coverage, a wide dispersion of earnings forecasts and also 
earn low average returns. 
Other factors that inhibit the ability of prices of small high-distress firms to 
decrease to reflect their true financial health are; 1) high transaction costs on relatively 
small firms, reducing the profitability of trading away mispricing (Stoll and Whaley 
(1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), and 2) restrictions on short sales. Restrictions on  
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short-sales are shown to result in negative information being under-weighted (Figlewski 
and Webb (1993), Aitken, Frino and McCorry (1998), Jones and Lamont (2002), Desai, 
Ramesh, Thiagarajan and Balachandran (2002), Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)) 
and a reduction in the speed with which prices adjust to private information (Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987)). Consistent with results showing that a greater proportion of 
high distress-NASDAQ stocks have low B/M than NYSE-AMEX stocks, the effect of 
short-sales restrictions has also been shown to be greater for NASDAQ stocks (Diether, 
Malloy and Scherbina (2002)).  
Studies of investor behaviour document a range of behaviour patterns that are 
consistent with underreaction and market prices being slow to react to the deteriorating 
health of the firm. In particular, both the tendency for investors to underreact to abstract 
statistical information and to believe that prices are mean reverting, result in 
underreaction to negative earnings announcements and negative returns being realized 
following negative announcements (Odean (1998b), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998)). In addition, investors are shown to hold losing investments too long, thus 
decreasing supply and reducing the speed at which prices adjust downward (Odean 
(1998a)). Finally, in a market where some investors trade on fundamentals and others 
on momentum and news travels slowly across the population, negative information 
diffuses more slowly than positive information, especially for small firms and firms 
with low analyst coverage (Hong and Stein (1999), Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)).  
 
5.3 Implications - investing, abnormal returns and cost of 
capital 
 
The findings discussed in section 5.1 also have implications for investment 
strategies, measurement of abnormal returns and determination of the cost of capital for 
project evaluation. Results show that a strategy of being long in firms with high  
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distress-risk and short in firms with low distress-risk, at best, earns returns that are not 
significantly different from zero when only NYSE-AMEX firms are included in the 
portfolio. At worst, such a strategy earns significant negative returns when only 
NASDAQ firms, or when ‘All Firms’, are incorporated in the portfolio.  
The negative returns earned by the high distress-risk NASDAQ firms are related 
to low returns earned as market values continue to adjust downwards, negative returns 
on delisting and the comparatively high incidence of high distress-risk NASDAQ firms 
delisting, rather than being able to restructure. This combination of effects makes it 
difficult for investors to construct a portfolio of high distress-risk NASDAQ firms that 
provides a positive return sufficient to compensate for risk.  
In contrast, NYSE-AMEX firms with negative book-equity, as well as the tiniest 
of positive book-equity, high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms, do earn high positive 
returns. It appears that negative book-equity NYSE-AMEX firms are more likely to 
restructure than NASDAQ firms, resulting in these NYSE-AMEX firms enjoying higher 
returns on a low market value. Also, NYSE-AMEX firms that delist do not have a large 
negative effect on average portfolio returns. However, as the returns earned by these 
high distress-risk NYSE-AMEX firms are similar to those earned by NYSE-AMEX 
firms with low distress-risk, again it would be difficult for investors to construct a 
portfolio of high distress-risk firms that provides a superior risk-return trade-off.  
Asset pricing models are used extensively, both as a benchmark to identify 
abnormal returns and to determine an appropriate cost of capital when undertaking 
project evaluation. Models used in practice include the CAPM, the Fama and French 
three-factor model and multivariate models incorporating a variety of potential 
economic risk factors (Ibbotson (2000), Graham and Harvey (2001)). Incorrect 
interpretation of model coefficients and incorrect application of the model can lead to 
incorrect decisions. The four-factor model, incorporating both the HML and the  
  333
distress-minus-solvent (DMS) factors, is shown to be superior to other models 
considered, including the Fama and French model. In particular, adding the distress-
minus-solvent (DMS) factor to the model improves the ability of the model to capture 
variation in returns relating to variation in financial distress. The four-factor model 
provides an alternative to both the CAPM and the Fama and French (1993) model, both 
to identify abnormal returns and to determine the cost of capital. 
  Although the HML factor is important in capturing return, it cannot be 
interpreted as a proxy for distress-risk. When identifying sources of abnormal returns, it 
has become common practice to adjust returns for systematic sources of economic risk 
using the Fama and French model. However, unless B/M is related to an as yet 
unidentified risk factor, this methodology can only be interpreted as adjusting for 
common sources of variation of return; not an adjustment for undiversifiable economic 
risk. In addition, finding that the Fama and French model captures variation in returns 
cannot be interpreted as evidence that the return pattern being examined is driven by the 
risk of financial distress. Consistent with this, Loughran and Ritter (2000) argue that the 
empirical three-factor model cannot be used to test market efficiency, only to detect 
patterns in returns that are independent of previously documented patterns. As the 
negative DMS premium cannot be interpreted as a risk premium, adjustment of returns 
using the four-factor model should also be interpreted as adjustment for common 
variation in return, rather than systematic risk.  
In theory the cost of capital should reflect the systematic risk of the project being 
considered. However, empirically determined models have been shown to be superior to 
the CAPM when describing return and it is impossible to measure the true market 
return. Therefore, empirical models may be more useful than the CAPM in practice. 
When either the Fama and French model or the four-factor model is used to determine 
the cost of capital, the resultant discount rate should be interpreted as representing the  
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required return given empirically determined drivers of returns, not systematic sources 
of economic risk.  
 
5.4 Conclusion  
  
  In summary, the results are not consistent with returns being consistently driven 
by rational pricing, or with the HML premium representing a proxy for a distress-risk 
premium. Previous evidence that a positive relation does not exist between distress-risk 
and B/M is shown to be sensitive to changes in methodology. Aggregation of the B/M 
ratios of NYSE-AMEX firms with positive and negative book-equity results in 
misleading conclusions about the relation between distress-risk and B/M. However, for 
NASDAQ firms, conclusions regarding the relation between distress-risk and B/M are 
not sensitive to aggregation of positive and negative B/M values.  
  When only firms with positive book-equity are considered, a positive relation is 
found between distress-risk and B/M for most NYSE-AMEX firms, but not for 
NASDAQ firms. Both small high-distress NYSE-AMEX firms and high-distress 
NASDAQ firms have low B/M. Also, new evidence is presented that, when a firm 
accumulates large losses so that book-equity becomes negative, B/M decreases as 
distress-risk increases. In contrast, when book-equity remains positive, B/M increases as 
distress-risk increases.  
Previous evidence disputing a positive relation between distress-risk and equal-
weighted return is shown to be robust to consideration of a range of both equal- and 
value-weighted trading strategies and the inclusion or exclusion of firms with negative 
book-equity. A size and B/M balanced distress-risk premium, distressed-minus-solvent 
(DMS), is also shown to be significant and negative. This significant negative premium 
is not consistent with the high returns earned by high B/M firms representing reward for  
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exposure to high levels of distress-risk. However, it does suggest that a systematic 
relation exists between distress-risk and return.  
Regression evidence shows that a four-factor model incorporating SMB, HML 
and DMS captures the returns of sorted distress-risk portfolios. However, the HML 
premium has only limited importance and the loading on the HML factor is more 
closely related to the B/M characteristic, rather than distress-risk. The systematic 
pricing of DMS, which is negative, and the HML coefficient being related to the B/M 
characteristic, is consistent with irrational pricing or market inefficiencies, rather than 
risk, driving returns.  
When the returns of characteristic-balanced distress-risk portfolios are 
considered, the four-factor model is generally superior. For these portfolios, both the 
SMB and HML factors are important in capturing returns and DMS adds explanatory 
power for the most- and least-distressed portfolios and for the low B/M and bigger-firm 
high-B/M portfolios. When B/M is not controlled, the HML coefficient reflects the B/M 
characteristic. 
Results support a systematic relation between distress-risk and return, but are not 
consistent with either B/M or the HML premium capturing that relation. The market 
value of a firm does adjust downward as distress-risk increases, consistent with rational 
pricing. However, many high distress-risk firms either are or become small firms and it 
appears that the market value of these small high distress-risk firms adjusts slowly to the 
firm’s deteriorating financial health. This results in the observed low B/M of small high 
distress-risk firms and in low returns being earned as the price continues to adjust 
downwards and some firms delist. The effect is more pronounced for NASDAQ than 
NYSE-AMEX firms, due to their lower market value. These findings are consistent with 
previous evidence that market inefficiencies inhibit the downward adjustment of the  
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prices of small and high distress-risk firms and behavioural evidence that investors 
initially underreact to bad news and are slow to incorporate it into prices.  
The Fama and French (1993) model is used in practice to measure abnormal 
returns and to determine the cost of capital. The four-factor model presented here 
represents an alternative to the Fama and French model, especially when capturing the 
variation in returns related to distress-risk. Both models should be interpreted as 
providing a measure of required return given empirically determined drivers of return, 
not systematic sources of risk. 
 
5.5 Areas for further research 
 
The above results point to several areas of further research. These include: 
•  robustness of the relations between distress-risk, B/M and return to different 
measures of distress-risk, such as bond ratings,  
•  stability of the relations across a variety of periods, including up and down states of 
the economy and months of the year, 
•  consistency of relations across industries, examining both sub-groups of industries 
and extending the analysis to examine finance firms, 
•  determine whether the inverted-U shape relation between distress-risk and B/M can 
be captured using a non-linear regression, and whether this can be used to improve 
the ability of the model to explain returns, 
•  determine the ability of the models examined to capture the returns earned by 
portfolios where stocks have been sorted based on characteristics such as cash 
flow/price (C/P), dividend/price (D/P) and earnings/price (E/P), 
•  examination of the ability of the models to capture returns earned by NYSE-AMEX 
and NASDAQ intersecting quintile portfolios,   
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•  further examination of the contention that the low returns of small high distress-risk 
firms relate to the market value being slow to incorporate bad news, 
•   examine whether risk factors or market inefficiencies drive the comparatively high 
returns earned by firms with low, but not the lowest distress-risk, and 
•  determine the factors which result in a larger proportion of NYSE-AMEX firms, 
compared with NASDAQ firms, continuing to trade when they have accumulated 
large losses.  
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Appendix 1. Financial distress prediction models 
  
  There has been considerable criticism of both the sampling methods used to 
develop financial distress prediction models and the suitability of the statistical 
methodologies in relation to the sample characteristics of accounting data. It has been 
argued that the sampling procedures used in developing and testing the models may 
have resulted in an upward bias in their reported classification accuracy. The main areas 
where the sampling methodology has been criticised were: 1) the use of choice based 
samples resulting in non-random sampling (Zmijewski (1984)), 2) not adjusting for 
posterior probabilities of financial distress (Joy and Tollefson (1975), Pinches (1980), 
Lo (1986)), 3) not incorporating the relative cost of Type I and Type II errors (Altman, 
Haldeman and Narayanan (1977), Pinches (1980)), and 4) the use of small sample sizes 
with skewed accounting data (Stone and Bishop (1991)). Never the less, prediction 
models are used by practitioners to predict bankruptcies and to assess the 
creditworthiness of loan applicants and by academics in financial distress studies (Scott 
(1981), Taffler (1983), Altman (1993)). A listing of a sample of bankruptcy prediction 
models is presented on the following page, Table A1.1. 
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Table A1.1. Financial distress prediction models 
Author(s) Year  Country Methodology  Industry  Failure  definition  Sample 
Failed/healthy 
Classification in 
sample % 
Validation 
sample % 
Altman 1968  US  DA    Manufacturers  Bankrupt  33/33  95  96 
Edmister`  1972  US  DA   Small firms all 
industries 
Loan default  281/281  93  N/A 
Altman et al  1977  US  DA  Manufacturer & 
retail 
Bankrupt 53/58  92.8  92  * 
Ohlson 1980  US  Logit  Industrials    Bankrupt  105/2058  85.1  N/A 
Taffler 1983  UK  DA    Manufacturing  Bankrupt  46/46  98  98 
Izan  1984  Australia  DA & probit  Industrials   Receiver/liquidator 
appointed 
 
51/48 
91.9 100 
Fryman et al  1985  US  Recursive 
partitioning 
Industrials Bankrupt  58/142 94  84 
Lau 1987  US  Logit  Non-finance  Bankrupt/liquidation/loan 
default/div reduction 
50/350 96  80 
Platt and Platt  1990  US  Logit  Industrials  Bankrupt/liquidation/merger  57/57  90  90 
Bahnson & 
Bartley 
1992  US  Logit  Non-finance  Bankrupt / insolvent / 
technical default 
119/1742 N/A  N/A 
Fletcher & Goss  1993  US  Logit / NN  Industrials  Bankruptcy  18/18  Logit: 71.3 
NN: 82.4 
Logit: 70 
NN: 82.4 
Coats & Fant  1993  US  NN / DA  Industrials & 
services 
Auditor's going concern  94/188  NN: 95 
MDA: 88 
N/A 
Ward 1994  US  Logit  Non-finance  Bankruptcy/loan 
default/accom/dividend 
reduction 
63/164  RPS of 209 out 
of a possible 227 
RPS of 140 out 
of  possible 158 
Dorsey et al  1995  US  NN  Non-finance  Bankrupt  50/150  96  68 
Ward & Foster  1997  US  Logit  Non-finance   Bankrupt  29/253  N/A  85 * 
Ward & Foster  1997  US  Logit  Non-finance   Loan default & 
accommodation 
35/253 N/A  85  * 
* A weighted average of the classification accuracy of failed and healthy firms reported in the study. 
DA – Discriminant Analysis 
NN – Neural Networks 
RPS – Rank Probability Score  
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Appendix 2. Industry relative models  
 
Two main approaches have been taken to account for different industry norms. 
Altman (1993) re-estimated the Altman (1968) model without the industry sensitive 
variable ‘asset turnover’. Edmister (1972), Izan (1984) and Platt and Platt (1990) 
developed models that incorporate ratios measured relative to the industry norm, 
referred to as industry relative models. In addition to accounting for differences between 
industries, industry relative ratios account for ratio instability caused by factors such as 
changes in corporate strategy and technology (Platt and Platt (1990)).  
Altman (1993) argued that the ‘asset turnover’ variable, sales/total assets, in the 
1968 model, was an industry sensitive variable and that excluding asset turnover from 
the model should minimize the industry effect. However, the model was re-estimated 
using the original sample of manufacturing firms. Also, the book-value of equity was 
used to estimate leverage, rather than using the market value of equity. ‘Asset turnover’ 
was ranked second in terms of its contribution to the overall discriminating power of the 
1968 model. Therefore, exclusion of this variable, combined with the use of book-value 
to estimate leverage, may decrease the classification accuracy of the re-estimated 
model. No evidence was provided regarding the classification accuracy of the re-
estimated model. To my knowledge, the re-estimated model has not been used in the 
literature as a predictor of financial distress. 
The distress prediction models of Edmister (1972), Izan (1984) and Platt and 
Platt (1990) incorporated industry relative ratios, where an industry relative ratio was 
calculated by dividing the firm ratio by the average ratio for the industry. The variables 
in the model represented the position of the firm in relation to the industry. Platt and 
Platt cited Etebari and Horrigan (1987) as suggesting that the industry average of a 
financial ratio was the optimal level for firms in that industry. Both Izan (1984) and 
Platt and Platt (1990) reported the classification accuracy of their proposed industry  
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relative model to be superior to the accuracy of a model developed from the same data, 
but using raw financial ratios.
77 However, Theodossiou, Kahya, Saidi and Philippatos 
(1996) disputed the superiority of industry relative models over models developed using 
unadjusted ratios. They argued that, because of the scaling of variables, adjusted models 
implicitly assumed that failure rates were homogeneous across industries and time. 
Consequently, error rates would vary with the failure rate in the period and industry. 
The Edmister (1972) and Izan (1984) models were developed from a sample of small 
firms and Australian firms, respectively. Therefore, these models may not be relevant 
for measuring the financial distress of firms trading on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. The Platt and Platt (1990) model was developed from a sample of NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ firms and is therefore relevant.  
The ability of the Platt and Platt model to rank firms based on their risk of 
financial distress was examined using the methodology detailed in section 3.5.2, the 
same methodology used to evaluate the Ohlson (1980) and Altman (1968) models. The 
results of using the Platt and Platt model were inferior to the Ohlson and Altman models 
and the Platt and Platt model was considered not to be appropriate for use in the sample 
period. 
                                                 
77 Izan (1984) reported classification accuracy of 89.9% for the model using unadjusted ratios and 91.9% 
accuracy for the model using industry relative ratios. Platt and Platt (1990) reported classification 
accuracy of 78% for the model using unadjusted ratios and 90% accuracy for the model using industry 
relative ratios.  
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Appendix 3. 1
st and 99
th percentile values  
 
Table A3.1. 1
st and 99
th percentile values for o-score, z-score and B/M  
To calculate trimmed variables: o-score, z-score and B/M, the observations below the 1
st 
percentile and above the 99
th percentile were set to the 1
st and 99
th percentile value, 
respectively. The figures reported are the 1
st and 99
th percentile values for each variable, 
for each year, corresponding to calendar year-end December (t-1). 
O-scores - 1
st and 99
th percentile values  
%ile  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990  1991 1992 1993 
1st  10.23 12.06 12.08 14.07 16.04 14.12 12.24 14.08 12.84 15.00
99th  -3.78 -3.93 -4.02 -4.40 -4.53 -4.12 -4.44 -4.30 -4.77 -4.19
Z-scores - 1
st and 99
th percentile values  
1st  -2.51 -4.26 -3.69 -4.66 -6.48 -7.31 -8.03 -4.64 -3.59 -3.64
99th  27.66 37.68 35.78 43.85 36.37 34.98 29.48 76.77 55.92 62.85
B/M - 1
st and 99
th percentile values (firms with data to calculate o-score)  
1st  -0.79 -0.96 -1.17 -1.33 -1.46 -1.23 -2.71 -2.43 -1.94 -0.73
99th  3.00 3.12 2.97 3.31 3.06 3.48 5.82 4.41 3.16 2.62
B/M - 1
st and 99
th percentile values (firms with data to calculate z-score)  
1st  -0.68 -1.01 -1.17 -1.33 -1.56 -1.23 -2.88 -2.43 -1.41 -0.73
99th  3.06 3.03 3.01 3.31 3.06 3.48 5.82 4.32 3.16 2.62 
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Appendix 4. Portfolio-years in intersecting quintile portfolios  
 
Table A4.1. Three-way intersecting portfolios: portfolio-years with ten or fewer 
firms 
Each June (t), t = 1985 to t = 1994, firms were sorted independently into size, B/M and 
distress-risk quintiles. 125 intersecting size-B/M-distress portfolios were formed. The 
total number of portfolio-years was 1250. The number of firms in each intersecting 
portfolio, for each year, was determined. The reported figure represents the number of 
portfolio-years when zero firms, fewer than 5 firms and fewer than 10 firms were 
allocated to any of the size-B/M-distress intersecting portfolios. 
Number of  
firms in 
portfolio 
Number of portfolio – years 
 O-score  Z-score 
0  122 58
< 5  282 267
< 10  492 475
 
 
Table A4.2. Pair-wise intersecting portfolios: minimum and maximum number of 
firms 
Each year June (t), t = 1985 to t = 1994, firms were sorted independently into size, B/M 
and distress-risk quintile portfolios. Three sets of 25 intersecting pair-wise portfolios 
were formed: size-B/M, B/M-distress and size-distress. The total number of portfolio-
years for each set of pair-wise portfolios was 250. The number of firms in each 
intersecting portfolio was determined each year. The minimum and maximum number 
of firm-years allocated to an intersecting portfolio for each pair-wise set of intersecting 
portfolios is reported. 
  5 size x 5 B/M  5 B/M x 5 distress  5 Size x 5 distress 
  Min Max Min Max Min Max 
o-score  14 757 44 580 3*  1264
z-score  14 757 33 497 32 652
* 8 of the o-score size-distress portfolio-years had 10 or fewer firms. In all years, the 
portfolio concerned was the big-firm most-distress portfolio. 
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Appendix 5. Correlation results 
 
Table A5.1. Spearman rank correlation  
The o-score, z-score, market value (MV) and B/M were calculated each year, t = 1985 to t = 1994, for each firm that had all required data. Panel A 
reports the Spearman Rank correlation for all firm-years: 34,162 firm-years in total; 15,973 NYSE-AMEX and 18,189 NASDAQ. Panel B reports the 
Spearman Rank correlation for all firm-years where book-equity was positive: 32,858 firm-years in total; 15,366 NYSE-AMEX and 17,492 NASDAQ. 
Panel A – All Firm-years  Panel B – Positive book-equity firm-years 
NYSE-AMEX   NYSE-AMEX 
 Z  O  MV  B/M   Z  O  MV  B/M 
Z  1      Z   1      
O  -0.647** 1      O  -0.626** 1     
MV  0.118**  -0.465** 1    MV  0.073**  -0.443** 1   
B/M  -0.319** 0.057**  -0.208** 1  B/M  -0.449** 0.172**  -0.287** 1 
NASDAQ NASDAQ 
 Z  O  MV  B/M   Z  O  MV  B/M 
Z  1      Z   1      
O  -0.596** 1      O  -0.575** 1     
MV  0.415**  -0.444** 1    MV  0.410**  -0.441** 1   
B/M  -0.180** -0.215** -0.252** 1  B/M  -0.292** -0.138** -0.307** 1 
‘All Firms’  ‘All Firms’ 
 Z  O  MV  B/M   Z  O  MV  B/M 
Z  1      Z   1      
O  -0.603** 1      O  -0.581** 1     
MV  0.221**  -0.484** 1    MV  0.194**  -0.474** 1   
B/M  -0.236** -0.107** -0.162** 1  B/M  -0.356** -0.015** -0.219** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 1% level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 6. Survivor bias in five-year sub-sample 
 
Hypotheses relating to the change in B/M as distress-risk increases were tested 
using a sub-sample of firms with five years of data. Of the firms classified as having 
high distress-risk each year, 1989 through 1994, approximately 45% had data available 
for the entire five years prior. Therefore, prior to examining the results it was necessary 
to determine whether survivor bias existed in the sub-sample.  
Survivor bias was tested for by splitting the firms in the NegBE portfolio and in 
each of distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3 into two groups: 1) firms without five 
years of data, referred to as group 1 firms – excluded from the sample, and 2) firms with 
five years of data, referred to as group 2 firms - included in the sample. The hypothesis 
tested for each portfolio is: 
H0: The mean B/M at (t-1) of group 1 (excluded) firms is not significantly 
different from the mean B/M of group 2 (included) firms.  
The mean B/M of group 1, excluded firms, and group 2, included firms, for each 
portfolio is reported in Table A6.1, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score). Initial inspection 
shows that survivor bias may exist in the sub-sample. Portfolios where book-equity was 
positive (negative) exhibited a lower (small negative) mean B/M for firms that were 
excluded, than for firms that were included. For example, for the NYSE-AMEX 
distress-risk (pos) deciles, the mean B/M for group 1 (excluded) firms ranged between 
0.79 and 0.99. Whereas, for group 2 (included) firms mean B/M ranged from 1.02 to 
1.07. The only exception was for the z-score NYSE-AMEX distress-risk (pos) decile 1, 
when the group 1 mean B/M was 1.38, compared with a group 2 mean B/M of 1.25.  
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test and a parametric t-test were used to test the 
significance of these differences. The test used depended on whether the data were  
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normal, as indicated by the Shapiro-Wilk p-value. The hypothesis of no significant 
differences between the two groups cannot be rejected at the 5% level for all NYSE-
AMEX portfolios, half of the NASDAQ portfolios and three quarters of the ‘All Firms’ 
portfolios. For the ‘All Firms’ portfolios, the hypothesis cannot be rejected for all o-
score portfolios, but only for two of the four z-score portfolios. Therefore, there is 
evidence against survivor bias existing in the NYSE-AMEX portfolios and the o-score 
‘All Firms’ portfolios. However, the evidence against survivor bias is not as strong for 
the NASDAQ portfolios or the z-score ‘All Firms’ portfolios. 
As the evidence on survivor bias is mixed, the reported results are treated with 
caution. The findings may not be representative of the B/M history of high distress-risk 
firms that do not have five years of data. This caution is especially relevant for the 
NASDAQ results. 
  
  348
Table A6.1. Test of survivor bias: Mean B/M - High distress-risk firms without five years of data 
Each June (t), t = 1989 to t = 1994, firms in each of the 4 high distress-risk portfolios: Neg BE and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1, 2 and 3, were sorted 
into two groups. Group 1 within each portfolio consisted of firms that did not have data to determine distress-risk and B/M for five years prior to June 
(t), fiscal years ending (t-5) to (t-1). Group 2 within each portfolio consisted of firms that did have data to determine distress-risk and B/M for fiscal 
year ending in all of the five years prior to June (t). For each portfolio, the hypothesis was tested that the mean B/M for fiscal year ending in (t-1), of 
group 1 firms was not significantly different from the mean B/M of group 2 firms. Wilcoxon Rank Sum W test and a parametric difference of means t-
test were used to test the significance of the differences. Except where indicated, the parametric test for difference of means assumed equality of 
variances. Equality of variances was not assumed where the F-test showed that variances were significantly different at the 5% level. The Shapiro-Wilk 
test for normality is reported.    
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Table A6.1. cont. Test of survivor bias: Mean B/M - High distress-risk firms without five years of data 
  Panel A - O-score  Panel B - Z-score 
Distress 
(pos)decile  
Mean B/M  Wilcoxon  
p-value 
T-test 
p-value 
Shapiro-Wilk 
p-value 
Mean B/M  Wilcoxon 
p-value 
T-test 
p-value 
Shapiro-Wilk 
p-value 
 Group 
1 
Group 
2 
   Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
   Group 
1 
Group 
2 
NYSE-
AMEX 
              
NegBE  -5.44 -6.50  0.818  0.783 0.011*  0.011*  -5.56 -6.44  0.818  0.821 0.012*  0.010** 
1  0.79  1.02  0.262  0.345 0.154 0.975  1.38 1.25  0.818  0.576 0.055 0.985 
2  0.82  1.07  0.240  0.142 0.106 0.016*  0.92 1.05  0.485  0.362 0.990 0.011* 
3  0.99  1.04  0.150  0.862 0.010**  0.798  0.94 0.99  0.699  0.709 0.490 0.422 
NASDAQ                   
NegBE  -0.69 -0.97  0.310  0.274 0.910 0.318  -0.78 -0.97  0.485  0.512 0.702 0.313 
1  0.38 0.49  0.394  0.299
1  0.380 0.477  0.77 1.12  0.065  0.049
1  0.119 0.822 
2  0.59  0.93  0.041*  0.049* 0.097  0.858  0.86 1.25  0.015*  0.022* 0.350  0.464 
3  0.73  1.24  0.009**  0.027*  0.793 0.401  0.93 1.28  0.041*  0.053 0.389 0.201 
‘All Firms’                   
NegBE  -2.26 -4.21  0.310  0.326
1  0.010** 0.014*  -2.26 -4.19  0.310  0.327
1  0.010* 0.011* 
1  0.45  0.68  0.240  0.111 0.096 0.674  0.45 1.24  0.002**  0.001**  0.096 0.833 
2  0.76  1.12  0.093  0.054 0.691 0.864  0.76 1.09  0.015*  0.026*  0.691 0.583 
3  0.83  1.13  0.041*  0.077 0.326 0.290  0.83 1.11  0.065  0.081 0.326 0.495 
1Equality of variances not assumed.   
** Significant at the 1% level  
*   Significant at the 5% level  
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Appendix 7. Change in B/M as distress-risk increases. 
 
Section 4.3.3.3 presents and discusses results showing the change in B/M values 
as distress-risk increases, used to test hypotheses 3d and 3e. These results are discussed 
in full for the o-score portfolios. The z-score results are discussed briefly, as they are 
largely consistent. Supplementary results that assist in interpreting the causes for the 
change in B/M are also discussed briefly in section 4.3.3.3. The supplementary results 
for both o-score and z-score are presented here and discussed in full. The z-score mean 
B/M results, presented in Table 4.10 Panel B, are also discussed here in full. 
For both the o-score and z-score results, the change in the average distress-risk 
of firms is discussed first, followed by changes in market-equity and book-equity, which 
help to explain the reasons for the observed changes in portfolio book-to-market. For z-
score, the mean B/M results are discussed next. Finally, for both sets of portfolios, 
trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv are presented, to show whether the main results are driven by 
outliers or small firms, respectively. 
Each tracking-portfolio is identified by the decile the firms in the portfolio are 
allocated to at the start and end of the five-year period. For example, the tracking-
portfolio of firms that commenced the five-year period in one of the low distress-risk 
(pos) deciles, 8 through 10, and ended the five-year period in distress-risk (pos) decile 
1, is referred to as portfolio (8–10,1). The reported variables, except for the average 
distress-risk (pos) decile, are all standardised, as described in section 3.4.3 and 
interpreted as the tracking-portfolio average relative to the full sample average. For 
example, a standardised book-equity of 0.5 means, the tracking-portfolio book-equity is 
half as large as the average book-equity for the sample.   
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A7.1 Change in B/M as distress-risk increases - O-score results 
Tracking-portfolio results for the o-score portfolios are presented in Tables 
A7.1.1 through A7.1.6, pages 355 to 360. Columns labeled 1 and 2 present the firms 
that had relatively high distress-risk over the entire period. That is, firms that appeared 
in deciles 0 (the NegBE portfolio), 1, 2 or 3 (high distress-risk portfolios) at the 
beginning and the end of the five-year period. Conversely, columns 3 and 4 show firms 
whose distress-risk increased over the five-year period. These portfolios consist of firms 
that were in low and medium distress-risk portfolios at June (t-4), portfolios (8-10) and 
(4-7), respectively, and declined to the high distress-risk portfolios, portfolios 0, 1, 2 or 
3, at June (t). 
A7.1.1 Change in average distress-risk (pos) portfolio allocation 
 
Examination of Table A7.1, shows that approximately 85% of firms with high 
distress-risk at June (t) were either allocated to deciles 1 through 3 (high distress-risk) or 
deciles 4 though 7 (medium distress-risk) at June (t-4). Only 10% were allocated to 
deciles 8 through 10 (low distress-risk) four years prior to being classified as high 
distress-risk. Therefore, a firm classified as low distress-risk has only a small chance of 
being classified as high distress-risk within four years, whereas the chance is much 
higher for firms classified as medium distress-risk. 
Table A7.1.2 reports the portfolio in which the firms appear over the five years, 
(t-4) to (t), showing how distress-risk changed over the period. For example, consider 
firms in the NYSE-AMEX NegBE portfolio at (t) that had low distress-risk at (t-4). At 
(t-4), the average of the deciles for these firms was 9.2. This was because all of these 
firms appeared in deciles (pos) 8 through 10 at (t-4). At (t-3) the average for these same 
firms was 6.5 (medium distress-risk). As these firms approached a negative book-equity 
at (t), their average approached 0.  
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For all portfolios reported in columns 3 and 4, as distress-risk increased, the 
average distress-risk (pos) decile that firms appeared in changed monotonically from a 
portfolio of low or medium distress-risk firms, to a high distress-risk portfolio. In 
contrast, when distress-risk remained relatively high, reported in columns 1 and 2, for 5 
(7) of the NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) tracking-portfolios, the pattern in the average 
decile described an inverted-U.  
A7.1.2 Change in market-equity 
 
A7.1.2.1 Comparative size 
 
Standardised market-equity is reported in Table A7.1.3. A value less than 1.0 
indicates that on average firms in the portfolio are smaller than the average firm size for 
the sample. In general, firms with high distress-risk were comparatively small. The only 
exceptions were the NASDAQ (8–10,0) and (0,0) portfolios and the ‘All Firms’ (8-
10,0) portfolio. Firms where distress-risk increased, columns 3 and 4, were typically just 
under average size or smaller at the beginning of the five-years, but become 
comparatively much smaller as distress-risk increased. This was shown by the 
substantial decrease in standardized market-equity to below 0.70 at (t-1) for all 
portfolios, except for the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ portfolios (8–10,0). 
Firms where distress-risk remained high over the five years, columns 1 and 2, 
generally had very low standardized market-equity over the entire period. The majority 
ranged between 0.04 and 0.40.
78 NYSE-AMEX portfolios generally displayed a smaller 
value than the related NASDAQ portfolio. This suggests that the market allows NYSE-
AMEX firms to decrease in size by a larger proportion than NASDAQ firms, before 
they are delisted due to financial distress. 
                                                 
78 This means that generally the size of firms that remain high distress-risk was between 4% and 40% of 
the average size of firms in the related sample.  
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A7.1.2.2 Change in market-equity 
 
In all cases, as distress-risk increased, the market-equity of the portfolio declined 
and the decline was generally monotonic. The size of the decline in market-equity was 
about 50% for most portfolios, but ranged from 71.62% (NASDAQ (8-10,1)) to 24.59% 
(NASDAQ (4-7,3)). The direction of change in market-equity was consistent with the 
market negatively reacting to the decline in financial health of the firm. 
  Inspection of the change in market-equity for firms that remained in the high 
distress-risk portfolios shows a less distinct pattern. The pattern of changes in market-
equity generally reflected the change in average financial health for NYSE-AMEX 
firms, but not NASDAQ firms. 
Portfolios where book-equity changed from negative to positive, but distress-
risk remained high, column 1, were examined next. For NYSE-AMEX portfolios (0,1) 
and (0,3) the market-equity increased over the five-year period. However, market-equity 
decreased over the five years for NYSE-AMEX portfolio (0,2) and all NASDAQ 
portfolios. It is reported in section 4.3.2, that NYSE-AMEX (NASDAQ) firms with 
negative book-equity had significantly higher distress-risk than firms in distress-risk 
(pos) deciles 1 through 3 (deciles (pos) 2 and 3). Therefore, the change in market-equity 
was only consistent with the market reacting positively to decreased distress-risk for 
NYSE-AMEX portfolios (0,1) and (0,3). 
A7.1.3 Change in book-equity 
 
Book-equity is shown in Table A7.1.4. In all portfolios, as distress-risk 
increased, book-equity declined and the decline was mostly monotonic. For portfolios 
whose book-equity became negative, the decrease in book-equity ranged from 115.92% 
(NASDAQ (4-7,0)) to 149.49% (NYSE-AMEX (4-7,0)). For positive book-equity  
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portfolios, the size of the decline averaged 55%, but ranged from 20.73% (NYSE-
AMEX (4-7,3)) to 74.29% (NASDAQ (8-10,1)). Therefore, as distress-risk increases, 
book-equity decreases relative to average book-equity. Also, book-equity decreases at a 
much faster rate for firms whose book-equity becomes negative, than for firms whose 
book-equity remains positive. For book-equity to decrease relative to the average, these 
high distress-risk firms must have been generating low or negative earnings. 
A7.1.4 Change in trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv 
 
The trimmed B/M and the Bv/Mv results are reported in Tables A7.1.5 and 
A7.1.6, respectively. These results show that neither outliers, nor small firms drive the 
B/M results that provided support for hypotheses 3d and 3e. The trimmed B/M and 
Bv/Mv values displayed the same pattern as the mean B/M values.  
The effect of both trimming outliers and value-weighting firm B/M had a larger 
effect on the size of the portfolio book-to-market at (t-1) than at (t-5). The difference 
between B/M and both trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv at (t-1) was larger for NYSE-AMEX 
portfolios than for NASDAQ portfolios, and was particularly large for the NYSE-
AMEX portfolios whose book-equity became negative. For example, for NYSE-AMEX 
portfolio (4-7,0), B/M at (t-1), reported in Table 4.10, Panel A on page 192, was –13.90, 
whereas, the trimmed B/M (Bv/Mv) value was –1.42 (–1.87). While outliers and small 
firms did not drive the general pattern of changes in B/M over the five-years prior to a 
firm being classified as high distress-risk, they did account for the extreme B/M results 
at (t-1), especially for the NYSE-AMEX sample. 
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Tables A7.1.1. – A7.1.6. Five-year history of firms with high distress-risk – o-score 
June of each year (t), t = 1989 to 1994, a second sort was performed on firms with five full years of data prior to June (t) that were allocated to the 
NegBE portfolio (referred to as portfolio 0) and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1, 2 and 3. These firms were sorted into 4 groups based on the distress-risk 
(pos) decile they appeared in at (t-4). The four groups consisted of firms that appeared in: 1) the NegBE portfolio, portfolio 0, 2) distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 through 3, 3) distress-risk (pos) deciles 4 through 7, and 4) distress-risk (pos) deciles 8 through 10. This procedure created 16 portfolios, 
referred to as tracking-portfolios. Number of firms in each tracking-portfolio, average distress-risk (pos) decile allocation, standardised mean book-
equity, standardised mean market-equity, standardised mean B/M, standardised mean trimmed B/M and standardised Bv/Mv were calculated for each 
tracking-portfolio for each of the five years prior to portfolio formation at June (t). Bv/Mv was calculated as (sum of book-equity for all firms in the 
tracking-portfolio)/(sum of market-equity for all firms in the tracking-portfolio). To standardise variables, the tracking-portfolio average for each year 
was divided by the related total sample average of the relevant variable for that year. The reported variables represent the simple average of the six 
annual averages for each of the five years prior to June (t). O-score B/M tracking-portfolio results are presented in section 4.3.3.3, Table 4.10 Panel A. 
All other tracking-portfolio results are presented here, in Tables A7.1.1 through A7.1.6.  
Table A7.1.1. Average number of firms in each O-score tracking-portfolio 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4   
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE 0  10 26  10 3 5 16 9  4 15 40 21 7
High   1  6 65  24 7 3 36 16  8 7 84 35 13
2  3 64  38 10 3 38 34 12 6 99 69 19
3  2 56  43 12 2 34 50 13 4 85 97 28
Total  21 211  115 32 13 124 109  37 32 308 222 67
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Table A7.1.2. Average O-score distress-risk (pos) decile that firms appeared in, (t-4) to (t) 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  0.0 1.6  5.4 9.2 0.0 2.0 5.1 8.9 0.0 1.9 5.3 9.0
0 t-4  0.4 1.6  3.3 6.5 0.6 2.0 3.9 5.8 0.4 1.8 3.9 6.2
0 t-3  0.4 1.1  2.2 3.0 0.4 1.5 2.9 3.8 0.5 1.3 2.6 3.9
0 t-2  0.2 0.5  1.3 1.0 0.2 0.9 2.4 2.2 0.3 1.7 1.5 1.7
0 t-1  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       
High   1  t-5  0.0 1.7  5.1 9.0 0.0 1.7 5.2 9.0 0. 1.7 5.2 9.0
1 t-4  0.5 2.1  3.9 5.8 1.8 2.4 4.5 6.2 1.0 2.3 4.1 6.2
1 t-3  0.8 1.9  3.1 4.7 1.7 2.2 3.9 5.6 0.7 2.2 3.5 5.0
1 t-2  1.3 1.7  2.5 3.8 2.7 2.0 2.9 4.0 0.4 1.9 2.8 3.5
1 t-1  1.0 1.0  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
       
2 t-5  0.0 2.0  5.2 8.8 0.0 2.1 5.2 8.8 0.0 2.1 5.1 9.0
2 t-4  0.9 2.5  4.1 6.2 2.5 2.8 4.4 6.5 1.5 2.8 4.4 6.8
2 t-3  1.2 2.5  3.7 5.2 2.0 2.9 4.1 5.4 1.3 2.8 3.9 5.8
2 t-2  2.8 2.5  3.6 4.9 2.7 2.9 3.4 4.6 2.1 2.7 3.5 4.7
2 t-1  2.0 2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
       
3 t-5  0.0 2.3  5.1 8.9 0.0 2.3 5.3 9.0 0.0 2.4 5.1 8.9
3 t-4  1.1 2.8  4.7 6.8 1.8 3.4 4.9 7.2 1.9 3.2 4.5 6.7
3 t-3  1.8 2.9  4.2 5.4 2.1 3.4 4.4 6.1 2.7 3.2 4.3 5.5
3 t-2  2.3 3.0  4.1 5.0 4.0 3.4 4.1 5.6 3.5 3.3 4.1 5.0
3 t-1  3.0 3.0  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
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Table A7.1.3. Five years standardised market-equity - O-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  0.17 0.12  0.86 1.04 2.36 0.83 1.25 9.99 0.35 0.16 0.93 2.10
0 t-4  0.18 0.10  0.69 0.95 2.38 0.83 1.25 9.88 0.35 0.14 0.78 2.14
0 t-3  0.18 0.08  0.51 0.74 2.11 0.69 0.89 8.64 0.35 0.12 0.57 2.19
0 t-2  0.21 0.07  0.42 0.66 1.89 0.61 0.87 6.59 0.40 0.12 0.48 1.64
0 t-1  0.23 0.08  0.37 0.59 1.66 0.68 0.70 5.67 0.42 0.14 0.42 1.47
       
High   1  t-5  0.04 0.05  0.16 0.16 0.29 0.30 0.34 0.74 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.12
1 t-4  0.04 0.05  0.14 0.13 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.53 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08
1 t-3  0.04 0.05  0.11 0.09 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.62 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.09
1 t-2  0.06 0.04  0.09 0.08 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.55 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.09
1 t-1  0.05 0.04  0.07 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.15 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05
       
2 t-5  0.36 0.13  0.48 0.97 0.42 0.28 0.32 0.69 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.31
2 t-4  0.36 0.12  0.45 0.78 0.43 0.23 0.27 0.55 0.10 0.07 0.18 0.24
2 t-3  0.32 0.12  0.36 0.64 0.38 0.22 0.23 0.46 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.20
2 t-2  0.36 0.12  0.34 0.60 0.29 0.19 0.19 0.45 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.16
2 t-1  0.31 0.12  0.32 0.45 0.32 0.20 0.12 0.49 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.16
       
3 t-5  0.71 0.19  0.64 0.56 0.18 0.25 0.61 0.81 0.67 0.13 0.39 0.79
3 t-4  0.62 0.18  0.64 0.52 0.27 0.24 0.59 0.73 0.96 0.12 0.37 0.75
3 t-3  0.91 0.19  0.55 0.41 0.22 0.20 0.61 0.66 0.75 0.12 0.32 0.56
3 t-2  0.95 0.17  0.50 0.36 0.20 0.20 0.54 0.37 0.84 0.12 0.30 0.52
3 t-1  1.10 0.19  0.48 0.33 0.14 0.21 0.46 0.23 0.81 0.12 0.28 0.40
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Table A7.1.4. Five years standardised book-equity - O-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2 3 4  1  2 3 4  1  2 3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -0.27 0.10  0.99 1.00 -2.89 0.32 2.01 3.43 -0.50 0.11 1.05 1.42
0 t-4  -0.26 0.08  0.55 0.67 -2.57 0.14 1.69 1.05 -0.47 0.06 0.66 1.02
0 t-3  -0.26 -0.01  0.24 0.07 -2.16 0.03 0.93 -0.04 -0.45 -0.01 0.16 0.41
0 t-2  -0.32 -0.06  -0.15 -0.31 -1.76 -0.09 0.48 -1.16 -0.53 -0.05 -0.24 -0.27
0 t-1  -0.31 -0.10  -0.49 -0.37 -1.35 -0.38 -0.32 -2.00 -0.52 -0.12 -0.59 -0.63
       
High   1  t-5  -0.03 0.07  0.17 0.11 -0.02 0.11 0.30 0.70 -0.02 0.02 0.10 0.09
1 t-4  -0.03 0.05  0.17 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.28 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.09
1 t-3  0.01 0.05  0.16 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.25 0.66 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.09
1 t-2  0.02 0.05  0.13 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.20 0.52 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.08
1 t-1  0.02 0.04  0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.18 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
       
2 t-5  -0.19 0.15  0.65 1.03 -0.13 0.19 0.44 0.83 -0.05 0.07 0.21 0.29
2 t-4  -0.08 0.14  0.62 0.95 0.09 0.20 0.41 0.78 -0.03 006 0.21 0.29
2 t-3  0.06 0.05  0.52 0.85 0.20 0.19 0.38 0.71 0.05 0.06 0.19 0.27
2 t-2  0.15 0.05  0.51 0.82 0.20 0.18 0.33 0.60 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.24
2 t-1  0.20 0.15  0.39 0.42 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12
       
3 t-5  -0.39 0.22  0.82 0.57 -0.06 0.23 0.83 0.92 -017 0.14 0.52 0.98
3 t-4  -0.30 0.24  0.83 0.55 0.05 0.22 0.81 0.88 0.12 0.04 0.51 0.86
3 t-3  -0.08 0.24  0.78 0.50 0.06 0.22 0.76 0.75 0.39 0.15 0.45 0.80
3 t-2  0.10 0.23  0.78 0.47 0.12 0.22 0.68 0.67 0.43 0.15 0.45 0.97
3 t-1  0.18 0.26  0.65 0.35 0.12 0.21 0.55 0.41 0.45 0.16 0.37 0.48
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Table A7.1.5. Five years standardised trimmed B/M - O-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -0.97 1.03  1.34 0.84 -0.68 0.44 0.90 0.94 -0.90 0.79 1.19 0.86
0 t-4  -1.05 0.70  0.95 0.33 -0.61 0.20 0.83 0.73 -0.92 0.45 1.03 0.59
0 t-3  -1.13 0.22  0.80 -0.34 -0.53 0.06 0.62 0.73 -0.96 0.07 0.84 0.34
0 t-2  -1.14 -0.48  0.42 -0.43 -0.46 -0.19 0.34  0.25 -0.94 -0.43 0.43 -0.11
0 t-1  -1.16 -1.25  -1.42 -0.52 -0.52 -0.65 -0.76 -0.68 -0.99 -0.99 -1.17 -0.64
       
High   1  t-5  -0.71 1.20  1.20 0.77 -0.10 0.53 1.04 0.93 -0.35 0.74 1.20 0.95
1 t-4  -0.46 1.19  1.37 0.91 0.04 0.53 1.10 1.19 -0.04 0.78 1.30 1.17
1 t-3  0.04 1.17  1.52 1.05 0.19 0.50 1.20 1.16 0.25 0.76 1.40 1.14
1 t-2  0.20 1.21  1.69 1.26 0.20 0.54 1.22 1.42 0.39 0.87 1.42 1.33
1 t-1  0.55 1.19  1.45 1.00 0.19 0.42 0.79 1.09 0.48 0.73 1.10 0.89
       
2 t-5  -0.78 1.15  1.19 0.93 -0.36 0.84 1.16 1.09 -0.62 1.08 1.20 0.88
2 t-4  -0.27 1.11  1.29 0.99 0.12 0.86 1.30 1.13 -0.28 1.13 1.32 1.02
2 t-3  0.87 1.20  1.36 1.13 0.29 0.83 1.38 1.21 0.17 1.10 1.40 1.21
2 t-2  0.55 1.28  1.46 1.19 0.48 0.91 1.58 1.19 0.30 1.17 1.54 1.37
2 t-1  1.27 1.36  1.57 1.02 0.59 0.94 1.55 0.96 0.56 1.25 1.59 1.27
       
3 t-5  -0.57 1.31  1.20 1.03 -0.28 1.02 1.22 1.01 -0.36 1.14 1.20 1.01
3 t-4  -0.34 1.34  1.25 1.09 -0.00 1.10 1.36 1.12 0.01 1.14 1.27 1.08
3 t-3  -0.07 1.29  1.30 1.23 0.09 1.06 1.41 1.30 0.31 1.20 1.37 1.27
3 t-2  0.52 1.29  1.41 1.45 0.28 1.08 1.48 1.54 0.29 1.26 1.48 1.38
3 t-1  0.88 1.33  1.47 1.44 0.43 1.17 1.63 1.65 0.51 1.34 1.56 1.44 
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Table A7.1.6. Five years standardised Bv/Mv - O-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -1.54 0.90  1.38 0.93 -1.37 0.45 1.61 0.52 -1.46 0.70 1.26 0.74
0 t-4  -1.39 0.74  0.99 0.29 -1.05 0.26 1.49 0.11 -1.28 0.43 0.87 0.49
0 t-3  -1.50 -0.22  0.66 -0.50 -0.96 0.18 1.21  0.01 -1.22 -0.05 0.28 0.21
0 t-2  -1.79 -0.93  -0.62 -0.57 -0.87 -0.16 0.66  0.01 -1.60 -0.55 -0.54 -0.17
0 t-1  -1.45 -1.65  -1.87 -0.61 -0.80 -0.69 -1.05 -0.52 -1.40 -1.04 -1.67 -0.47
       
High   1  t-5  -1.34 1.22  1.09 0.74 -0.10 0.36 0.99 1.10 -0.51 0.51 1.05 0.84
1 t-4  -1.46 1.18  1.21 0.90 0.07 0.36 0.99 1.36 0.08 0.55 1.18 1.14
1 t-3  -0.01 1.10  1.41 1.13 0.28 0.35 1.04 1.36 0.48 0.52 1.28 1.21
1 t-2  0.29 1.22  1.59 1.47 0.29 0.41 1.06 1.58 0.49 0.58 1.48 1.49
1 t-1  0.41 1.12  1.21 1.02 0.31 0.31 0.65 1.06 0.48 0.38 1.07 0.93
       
2 t-5  -0.63 1.16  1.38 1.05 -0.60 0.74 1.38 1.28 -1.06 1.02 1.10 0.86
2 t-4  -0.5 1.19  1.40 1.11 0.08 0.94 1.48 1.50 -1.17 1.00 1.19 1.06
2 t-3  1.04 1.27  1.43 1.19 0.61 0.91 1.65 1.68 0.47 1.01 1.30 1.22
2 t-2  0.88 1.26  1.48 1.34 0.85 0.97 1.67 1.64 0.54 1.09 1.33 1.39
2 t-1  0.93 1.27  1.26 1.03 0.93 0.75 1.59 1.12 0.67 0.01 1.18 0.99
       
3 t-5  -0.93 1.19  1.28 1.05 -0.32 0.98 1.40 1.19 -0.31 0.10 1.33 1.23
3 t-4  -0.41 1.30  1.28 1.02 0.14 1.00 1.47 1.27 0.05 1.17 1.36 1.26
3 t-3  0.13 1.29  1.44 1.27 0.21 1.12 1.43 1.26 0.38 1.29 1.41 1.47
3 t-2  0.49 1.37  1.59 1.11 0.47 1.20 1.52 1.85 0.41 1.24 1.49 1.57
3 t-1  0.90 1.39  1.43 1.23 0.92 1.15 1.44 2.23 0.54 1.32 1.31 1.32
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A7.2 Change in B/M as distress-risk increases - Z-score results 
Z-score results show that, as distress-risk increases, B/M increases for firms 
whose book-equity remains positive and B/M decreases when book-equity becomes 
negative. Therefore, the conclusion that hypotheses 3d and 3e cannot be rejected is 
robust to the use of z-score as the distress-risk measure. Tracking-portfolio results for 
the z-score portfolios are presented in Tables A7.2.1 through A7.2.6 on pages 366 to 
371.  
A7.2.1 Change in average distress-risk (pos) decile allocation 
 
The average z-score distress-risk (pos) decile portfolio allocation of the firms in 
the tracking-portfolios for the five years to June (t) is reported in Table A7.2.2. 
Consistent with o-score results, when financial distress increased over the five years, the 
average distress portfolio allocation of the firms monotonically changed from a lower to 
a higher distress-risk (pos) decile. This change was gradual over the five-year period. 
Thus, on average, firms did not suddenly move from low to high distress-risk. In 
contrast, when firms remained high distress-risk over the five years, the average 
distress-risk (pos) decile allocation mostly described an inverted-U.  
A7.2.2 Change in market-equity. 
 
Results for the change in standardised market-equity are presented in Table 
A7.2.3. When distress-risk increased over the five-year period, except for the NYSE-
AMEX portfolio (8-10,2), portfolio market-equity declined, mostly monotonically. As 
with o-score tracking-portfolios, the decline in market-equity was consistent with the 
market reacting negatively to the decline in financial health. 
  Change in market-equity for tracking-portfolios where distress-risk remained 
high showed a less distinct pattern. For the NYSE-AMEX and ‘All Firms’ samples, the  
  362
changes generally reflected the change in distress-risk. NASDAQ results show a pattern 
consistent with market-equity-continuing to decrease when distress-risk remains high 
and book-equity remains positive. However, the large increase in market-equity for 
tracking-portfolio (0,1) and the decline for portfolio (0,3), were not consistent with a 
negative correlation between distress-risk and market-equity. This result may be due to 
small number of firms in these portfolios. 
In summary, the change in market-equity is generally consistent with the market 
bidding down firm value as distress-risk increases. When distress-risk remains high, 
changes in market-equity generally reflects changes in financial health, although the 
relation is stronger for the NYSE-AMEX firms than NASDAQ. These findings are 
consistent with those reported for the o-score tracking-portfolios. 
A7.2.3 Change in book-equity  
 
Change in book-equity is reported in Table A7.2.4. When distress-risk increased, 
the book-equity value decreased for 13 of the 18 portfolios and increased for the other 5. 
This result was different from the o-score portfolios, where book-equity decreased for 
all portfolios where distress-risk increased.  
Consistent with o-score results, when distress-risk increased and book-equity 
decreased, book-equity decreased at a much faster rate for firms where book-equity 
became negative, when compared with firms whose book-equity remained positive.  
A7.2.4 Change in B/M 
 
A7.2.4.1 Change in B/M when distress-risk increases 
 
The change in standardised B/M, reported in Table 4.10, Panel B on page 193, 
shows that, as distress-risk increases, B/M decreases when book-equity becomes  
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negative, but increases when book-equity remains positive. This provides support for 
the conclusion that hypotheses 3d and 3e cannot be rejected. 
Previous results showed that a negative relation exists between market-equity 
and distress-risk. However, book-equity did not show a consistently positive or negative 
relation with distress-risk. For tracking-portfolios where market-equity decreased while 
book-equity increased, the B/M value had to increase. However, for portfolios where 
both market-equity and book-equity decreased, or both variables increased, the change 
in B/M was dependent on whether market-equity or book-equity changed at a faster 
rate. 
  When book-equity became negative, book-equity decreased at a faster rate than 
market-equity over the entire period, resulting in a consistent decline in B/M as distress-
risk increased.  
When both market–equity and book-equity decreased and book-equity remained 
positive, the decrease in market-equity was, on average, larger than the decrease in 
book-equity. Consequently, the B/M values for these tracking-portfolios increased by 
approximately 133%, on average. This was a much larger change than observed for the 
related o-score tracking-portfolios. B/M also increased for the single z-score tracking-
portfolio where both book-equity and market-equity increased, NYSE-AMEX (8-10,2). 
For z-score tracking-portfolios, the increase in B/M was monotonic across the 
five-year period for all portfolios, except NYSE-AMEX (8-10,2) and NASDAQ (4-7,1). 
In contrast, for 8 of the 12 corresponding o-score portfolios, B/M decreased from either 
(t-3) or (t-2), to (t-1). Therefore, the z-score results provide stronger evidence than o-
score, that B/M increases when distress-risk increases and book-equity remains positive.  
This different pattern in B/M for the z-score and o-score tracking-portfolios is consistent 
with results from distress-risk (pos) deciles. The z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
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generally showed a monotonic increasing relation between distress-risk and B/M. In 
comparison, the o-score distress-risk (pos) deciles showed an inverted U-shaped relation 
between distress-risk and B/M. 
In summary, when distress-risk increased, there was a consistent difference 
between the B/M of firms whose book-equity became negative and firms whose book-
equity remained positive. When book-equity became negative, B/M decreased over the 
five-years prior to portfolio formation and the decrease was generally monotonic. 
However, when book-equity remained positive, B/M increased over the five-year 
period.  
A7.2.4.2 Change in B/M when distress-risk remains high. 
 
The change in B/M when distress-risk remained high was also dependent on 
whether book-equity remained positive or became negative. When distress-risk 
remained high and book-equity became negative, portfolio (1-3,0), B/M decreased 
steadily over the period. In contrast, when firms remained allocated to distress-risk (pos) 
decile 1 through 3, both market-equity and book-equity either decreased or remained 
stable. This is consistent with market-equity generally declining as distress-risk 
increases, or remains high for a period of time.  
When book-equity changed from negative to positive, market-equity generally 
increased, but book-equity increased at a faster rate, resulting in an increase in B/M. 
The stable or increasing market-equity observed for all but one of these z-score 
tracking-portfolios (NASDAQ (0,3)) is not consistent with the related o-score results. 
The increasing market-equity for both NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms suggests that 
the market reacts positively to the turnaround of firms in both samples and believes that 
both NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ firms are equally likely to be able to sustain the 
turnaround. In contrast, the o-score results suggest that the market believes NYSE- 
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AMEX firms are more likely to be able to sustain the turnaround than NASDAQ firms 
are. 
A7.2.5 Change in trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv 
 
The trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv values for the z-score tracking-portfolios are 
reported in Tables A7.2.5 and A7.2.6. Comparison with mean B/M shows that the 
conclusion not to reject hypotheses 3d and 3e is not driven by the effect of outliers or 
small firms. The same patterns were found in the trimmed B/M and Bv/Mv values, as 
was found in mean B/M. However, outliers and small firms did account for the extreme 
B/M ratios exhibited by high distress-risk firms, especially for the NYSE-AMEX 
sample. 
The effect of trimming outliers and value-weighting B/M had a larger effect on 
the size of the portfolio book-to-market at (t-1) than at (t-5). The difference at (t-1) was 
larger for NYSE-AMEX tracking-portfolios than for NASDAQ tracking-portfolios. 
This reflected the difference in outliers in the two samples, as noted in section 
4.3.3.2.2.3. It also meant that the firms did not have extreme B/M values when the 
portfolios were formed, but the B/M became extreme as a result of distress-risk 
increasing over the period. The difference in the size of both the trimmed B/M and 
Bv/Mv compared with mean B/M at (t-1) was particularly large for NYSE-AMEX 
tracking-portfolios  where  book-equity  became  negative.  For  example,  for  portfolio     
(4-7,0), B/M at (t-1), reported in Table 4.10 Panel B, was –14.98, compared to a 
trimmed B/M of –1.25 and Bv/Mv of -4.12.  
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Tables A7.2.1. – A7.2.6. Five-year history of firms with high distress-risk – Z-score 
June of each year (t), t = 1989 to 1994, a second sort was performed on firms with five full years of data prior to June (t) that were allocated to the 
NegBE portfolio (referred to as portfolio 0) and distress-risk (pos) deciles 1, 2 and 3. These firms were sorted into 4 groups based on the distress-risk 
(pos) decile they appeared in at (t-4). The four groups consisted of firms that appeared in: 1) the NegBE portfolio, portfolio 0, 2) distress-risk (pos) 
deciles 1 through 3, 3) distress-risk (pos) deciles 4 through 7, and 4) distress-risk (pos) deciles 8 through 10. This procedure created 16 portfolios, 
referred to as tracking-portfolios. Number of firms in each tracking-portfolio, average distress-risk (pos) decile allocation, standardised mean book-
equity, standardised mean market-equity, standardised mean B/M, standardised mean trimmed B/M and standardised Bv/Mv were calculated for each 
tracking-portfolio for each of the five years prior to portfolio formation at June (t). Bv/Mv was calculated as (sum of book-equity for all firms in the 
tracking-portfolio)/(sum of market-equity for all firms in the tracking-portfolio). To standardise variables, the tracking-portfolio average for each year 
was divided by the related total sample average of the relevant variable for that year. The reported variables represent the simple average of the six 
annual averages for each of the five years prior to June (t). Z-score B/M tracking-portfolio results are presented in section 4.3.3.3, Table 4.10 Panel B. 
All other tracking-portfolio results are presented here, in Tables A7.2.1 through A7.2.6.  
Table A7.2.1. Average number of firms in each Z-score tracking-portfolio 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4   
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE  0  11 22  15 3 4 15 6  7 15 37 20 11
High   1  5 89  15 5 4 49 20 17 8 117 38 25
2  3 96  19 6 3 54 34 17 6 170 47 18
3  1 68  43 5 2 38 58 15 4 109 104 21
Total  20 275  92 19 13 156 118  56 33 433 209 75
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Table A7.2.2. Average Z-score distress-risk (pos) decile that firms appeared in, (t-4) to (t) 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  0.0 1.8  4.8 9.2 0.0 2.0 5.3 9.4 0.0 1.9 4.9 9.3
0 t-4  0.5 1.5  3.6 6.1 0.4 1.9 2.3 7.6 0.5 1.7 3.6 7.0
0 t-3  0.5 1.2  2.4 4.1 0.2 1.4 2.5 5.2 0.4 0.3 2.5 4.9
0 t-2  0.6 0.5  1.4 2.2 0.1 0.9 1.7 2.8 0.4 0.6 1.5 2.6
0 t-1  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       
High   1  t-5  0.0 1.5  4.9 9.0 0.0 1.7 5.4 9.2 0.0 1.7 5.2 9.3
1 t-4  0.3 0.5  3.6 6.2 2.6 2.0 4.0 6.8 1.4 0.9 3.9 7.0
1 t-3  1.1 0.4  2.8 4.6 2.2 2.0 3.1 4.6 1.6 0.8 3.2 4.7
1 t-2  1.4 1.3  1.9 2.9 2.0 1.6 2.3 3.1 1.7 0.5 2.2 3.3
1 t-1  1.0 1.0  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
       
2 t-5  0.0 1.9  4.8 8.8 0.0 2.2 5.0 8.9 0.0 2.1 5.1 9.0
2 t-4  0.5 2.1  4.2 6.9 1.0 2.5 4.3 7.3 0.7 2.3 4.2 7.1
2 t-3  1.0 2.2  3.4 5.5 2.4 2.6 3.7 5.7 2.2 2.3 3.7 5.6
2 t-2  1.0 2.1  2.7 4.9 2.7 2.4 2.9 42 2.5 2.2 2.9 4.2
2 t-1  2.0 2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
       
3 t-5  0.0 2.3  4.9 9.0 0.0 2.4 5.2 8.9 0.0 2.5 5.0 8.9
3 t-4  0.9 2.6  4.4 7.4 3.8 2.8 4.8 7.0 0.7 2.8 4.6 7.0
3 t-3  2.4 2.8  4.1 5.7 2.9 2.9 4.2 6.0 2.8 3.0 4.1 5.9
3 t-2  4.0 2.9  3.6 4.3 2.9 3.0 3.7 4.7 3.4 2.9 3.7 4.4
3 t-1  3.0 3.0  3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
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Table A7.2.3. Five years standardised market-equity - Z-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  0.17 0.25  0.39 0.99 2.36 1.23 1.07 4.82 0.35 0.38 0.57 1.12
0 t-4  0.17 0.20  0.34 0.80 2.39 1.23 0.70 5.03 0.35 0.33 0.52 1.02
0 t-3  0.17 0.15  0.27 0.64 2.12 0.96 1.23 4.17 0.35 0.26 0.43 0.88
0 t-2  0.21 0.12  0.27 0.48 1.89 0.94 0.89 2.35 0.40 0.24 0.38 0.72
0 t-1  0.23 0.11  0.24 0.39 1.66 0.91 0.88 2.60 0.42 0.26 0.30 0.66
       
High   1  t-5  0.09 0.96  0.77 0.17 0.56 0.38 0.44 0.65 0.15 0.69 0.47 0.14
1 t-4  0.09 0.91  0.76 0.13 1.74 0.28 0.31 0.48 0.22 0.63 0.46 0.11
1 t-3  0.11 0.84  0.69 0.08 1.11 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.20 0.56 0.41 0.07
1 t-2  0.12 0.79  0.64 0.06 1.06 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.19 0.51 0.38 0.06
1 t-1  0.11 0.77  0.60 0.04 1.03 0.20 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.50 0.36 0.04
       
2 t-5  0.21 1.28  1.58 1.03 0.29 0.84 0.81 0.77 0.16 1.93 1.55 0.40
2 t-4  0.17 1.26  1.37 1.16 0.30 0.86 0.70 0.76 0.13 1.96 1.42 0.40
2 t-3  0.27 1.25  1.26 1.32 0.38 0.87 0.54 0.70 0.24 1.93 1.30 0.39
2 t-2  0.29 1.24  0.89 1.21 0.45 0.78 0.40 0.42 0.27 1.88 0.99 0.33
2 t-1  0.37 1.27  0.75 1.29 0.30 0.69 0.26 0.27 0.31 1.86 0.86 0.27
       
3 t-5  0.14 1.50  1.42 1.08 0.10 0.97 0.73 0.91 0.21 1.98 1.58 0.59
3 t-4  0.16 1.49  1.36 0.73 0.25 0.98 0.68 0.91 0.26 2.02 1.50 0.45
3 t-3  0.14 1.47  1.17 0.50 0.13 0.85 0.55 0.86 0.23 1.99 1.31 0.38
3 t-2  0.14 1.47  1.18 0.46 0.09 0.91 0.44 0.70 0.23 2.0 1.27 0.30
3 t-1  0.19 1.44  1.00 0.34 0.09 1.10 0.31 0.50 0.27 1.99 1.13 0.23
  
  369
Table A7.2.4. Five years standardised book-equity - Z-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -0.27 0.34  0.41 0.74 -2.90 1.30 0.99 1.44 -0.50 0.49 0.59 0.57
0 t-4  -0.26 0.22  0.27 0.29 -2.58 0.97 -0.21 1.03 -0.47 0.34 0.41 0.23
0 t-3  -0.25 0.11  0.06 -0.08 -2.17 0.46 -0.30 0.45 -0.46 0.15 0.15 -0.02
0 t-2  -0.32 -0.02  -0.04 -0.65 -1.77 0.11 -0.54 -0.08 -0.53 -0.04 -0.07 -0.39
0 t-1  -0.31 -0.11  -0.18 -0.94 -1.35 -0.51 -0.78 -0.59 -0.52 -0.18 -0.30 -0.75
       
High   1  t-5  -0.11 1.76  0.89 0.07 -0.13 0.49 0.65 0.42 -0.10 1.26 0.57 0.06
1 t-4  -0.05 1.72  0.90 0.08 0.98 0.48 0.59 0.40 0.04 1.19 0.56 0.06
1 t-3  0.06 1.64  0.87 0.07 1.81 0.40 0.45 0.36 0.14 1.12 0.55 0.06
1 t-2  0.08 1.62  0091 0.08 1.39 0.34 0.29 0.27 0.15 1.09 0.54 0.05
1 t-1  0.09 1.65  0.96 0.06 0.97 0.30 0.16 0.14 0.14 1.14 0.59 0.03
       
2 t-5  -0.25 2.07  1.78 1.39 -0.12 1.56 1.13 0.66 -0.25 3.24 1.78 0.42
2 t-4  -0.15 2.03  1.78 1.47 0.03 1.53 1.03 0.73 -0.19 3.26 1.81 0.44
2 t-3  -0.02 2.01  1.72 1.42 0.10 1.46 0.95 0.75 0.04 3.24 1.72 0.44
2 t-2  0.06 2.03  1.52 1.44 0.38 1.37 0.80 0.64 0.11 3.25 1.58 0.44
2 t-1  0.25 2.05  1.25 1.62 0.38 1.23 0.60 0.43 0.24 3.25 1.36 0.43
       
3 t-5  -0.17 2.12  1.57 0.91 -0.03 1.51 1.30 0.67 -0.13 2.84 1.74 0.56
3 t-4  -0.05 2.10  1.56 0.95 0.04 1.52 1.29 0.78 -0.02 2.88 1.76 0.57
3 t-3  0.04 2.06  1.53 0.94 0.03 1.50 1.21 0.82 0.05 2.84 1.82 0.55
3 t-2  0.10 2.06  1.55 0.90 0.04 1.51 1.10 0.80 0.17 2.85 1.79 0.49
3 t-1  0.16 2.07  1.44 0.68 0.09 1.41 093 0.83 0.21 2.82 1.59 0.42
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Table A7.2.5. Five years standardised trimmed B/M - Z-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -0.99 1.17  1.16 0.59 -0.68 0.68 0.71 0.46 -0.91 0.98 1.07 0.47
0 t-4  -1.09 0.66  1.00 0.24 -0.62 0.47 0.47 0.40 -0.95 0.58 0.92 0.30
0 t-3  -1.16 0.20  0.70 0.01 -0.53 0.29 0.17 0.37 -0.97 0.24 0.61 0.22
0 t-2  -1.12 -0.41  0.16 -0.56 -0.46 -0.04 -0.21  0.29 -0.93 -0.25 0.07 0.03
0 t-1  -1.14 -1.22  -1.25 -1.02 -0.52 -0.72 -0.86 -0.41 -0.97 -0.98 -1.22 -0.61
       
High   1  t-5  -0.86 1.53  1.05 0.69 -0.37 1.22 1.04 0.53 -0.53 1.41 1.05 0.54
1 t-4  -0.55 1.48  0.19 0.77 0.05 1.23 1.30 0.67 0.03 1.40 1.21 0.67
1 t-3  0.67 1.48  1.35 1.05 0.32 1.25 1.48 0.82 0.44 1.38 1.40 0.86
1 t-2  0.54 1.54  1.48 1.35 0.38 1.40 1.69 1.00 0.51 1.51 1.53 1.03
1 t-1  0.89 1.64  1.53 1.39 0.46 1.46 1.56 1.10 0.79 1.63 1.47 1.07
       
2 t-5  -1.20 1.42  1.11 0.65 -0.49 1.51 1.13 0.80 -0.92 1.43 1.12 0.73
2 t-4  0.21 1.37  1.26 0.80 0.07 1.45 1.19 0.95 -0.41 1.37 1.23 0.86
2 t-3  0.22 1.36  1.28 0.95 0.08 1.38 1.45 1.13 0.37 1.34 1.38 1.02
2 t-2  0.26 1.38  1.54 0.97 0.39 1.40 1.49 1.34 0.51 1.35 1.58 1.34
2 t-1  1.16 1.38  1.66 1.11 0.90 1.52 1.61 1.46 1.10 1.37 1.65 1.41
       
3 t-5  -0.75 1.29  1.11 0.59 -0.21 1.36 1.24 0.62 -0.48 1.36 1.14 0.64
3 t-4  -0.54 1.29  1.18 0.78 0.08 1.38 1.43 0.79 -0.01 1.34 1.27 0.86
3 t-3  0.22 1.25  1.28 1.12 0.18 1.37 1.53 1.09 0.14 1.32 1.38 1.09
3 t-2  0.85 1.22  1.39 1.31 0.21 1.38 1.76 1.30 0.52 1.30 1.50 1.25
3 t-1  0.90 1.26  1.46 1.38 0.55 1.34 1.93 1.49 0.75 1.32 1.62 1.50
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Table A7.2.6. Five years standardised Bv/Mv - Z-score tracking-portfolios 
NYSE-AMEX NASDAQ  ‘All  Firms’  Decile 
(pos) (t) 
(t-5) 
-(t-1)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4)  Distress-risk (pos) decile (t-4) 
1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4 1 2  3 4    
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
0 
NegBE 
1-3 
High 
4-7 
Medium 
8-10 
Low 
NegBE0 t-5  -1.56 1.42  1.21 0.71 -1.37 1.13 1.05 0.50 -1.46 1.32 1.14 0.54
0 t-4  -1.42 1.01  0.85 -0.09 -1.05 0.88 0.54 0.37 -1.29 0.96 0.72 0.23
0 t-3  -1.55 0.68  0.28 -0.78 -0.96 0.66 0.55 0.35 -1.23 0.57 0.14 -0.02
0 t-2  -1.84 -0.04  -1.83 -1.74 -0.87 0.33 -0.95  0.22 -1.61 -0.01 -1.86 -0.94
0 t-1  -1.54 -1.17  -4.12 -2.42 -0.80 -0.73 -2.69 -0.42 -1.42 -0.78 -3.93 -1.46
       
High   1  t-5  -1.59 1.85  1.00 0.47 -0.24 1.42 1.47 0.65 -0.86 1.82 1.08 0.45
1 t-4  -1.23 0.90  1.04 0.65 0.22 1.62 1.92 0.88 0.11 1.90 1.15 0.60
1 t-3  2.02 0.96  1.19 1.09 0.81 1.64 1.82 1.11 0.75 2.00 1.26 0.85
1 t-2  0.74 2.04  1.47 1.76 0.68 1.94 1.87 1.22 0.87 2.12 1.56 1.04
1 t-1  1.09 2.14  1.50 1.87 0.78 2.14 2.03 1.19 1.02 2.27 1.85 1.05
       
2 t-5  -4.76 1.61  1.07 0.80 -0.53 1.90 1.46 0.94 -3.78 1.69 1.10 0.71
2 t-4  -2.83 1.60  1.15 0.79 0.53 1.82 1.52 1.04 -3.21 1.67 1.15 0.77
2 t-3  0.15 1.62  1.24 0.81 0.32 1.75 1.73 1.18 0.02 1.70 1.21 0.87
2 t-2  0.65 1.63  1.60 0.96 1.12 1.91 2.02 1.55 0.69 1.74 1.48 1.16
2 t-1  1.25 1.61  1.64 1.33 2.03 1.95 2.44 1.72 1.32 1.76 1.49 1.48
       
3 t-5  -1.50 1.41  1.14 0.73 -0.32 1.70 1.72 0.74 -1.21 1.43 1.11 0.79
3 t-4  -1.90 1.42  1.18 1.04 0.06 1.77 1.91 0.90 -0.04 1.42 1.18 0.97
3 t-3  -0.50 1.42  1.29 1.60 0.11 1.97 2.22 0.99 0.15 1.43 1.34 1.22
3 t-2  1.03 1.43  1.35 1.82 0.33 1.96 2.56 1.20 0.91 1.44 1.41 1.44
3 t-1  1.09 1.44  1.45 1.93 1.02 1.83 2.99 1.82 0.98 1.42 1.47 1.68
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Appendix 8. Portfolio returns – with and without inclusion of 
delisting returns  
 
The main findings reflect returns that are adjusted for delisting returns. Returns were 
also calculated without inclusion of estimated delisting returns, showing the sensitivity 
of the results to the adjustment. Results reported in Table A8.1 show that, of the firms 
that delisted for performance reasons, approximately 90 percent were listed on 
NASDAQ. In addition, it is reported in section 4.3.1 that over 40% (30%) of NYSE-
AMEX (NASDAQ) firms that delisted were allocated to distress-risk (decile) 1. Thus, 
the effect of including delisting returns was greatest for NASDAQ deciles and 
especially NASDAQ distress-risk decile 1. In addition, the effect would be 
comparatively large for ‘All Firms’ distress-risk decile 1, where more than 70% of the 
stocks were listed on NASDAQ. For these samples, inclusion of estimated delisting 
returns would bias results against finding a positive relation between distress-risk and 
return.  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table A8.1. Number of firms with delisting returns by exchange 
There were 1260 (1288)
79 firms that delisted for performance reasons and had available 
data to calculate o-score (z-score). ‘Num’ is the number of firms listed on each 
exchange for which an estimated delisting return was included; ‘%’ is the percentage of 
total firms with delisting returns that this represents. 
  O-score Z-score 
  Num % Num % 
NYSE  34 2.70 34 2.64 
AMEX  100 7.94 101 7.84 
NASDAQ  1126 89.36 1153 89.52 
Total  1260 100.00 1288 100.0 
                                                 
79 This represents the total number of firms that delisted for performance reasons with required data to 
calculate o-score (z-score), as distinct from firms which had this data for the year prior to the CRSP 
delisting date in year (t+1), as detailed in Table 4.1.  
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A8.1 Effect of delisting returns - positive and negative book-equity 
firms 
  Distress-risk decile returns, with and without the inclusion of estimated delisting 
returns, are reported in Table A8.2, Panels A (o-score) and B (z-score). When the 
returns of firms with both positive and negative book-equity were aggregated, 
conclusions regarding the relation between distress-risk and both equal- and value-
weighted return were not sensitive to the adjustment for delisting returns.  
For all NYSE-AMEX distress-risk deciles, except for the equal-weighted return 
of distress-risk decile 1, inclusion of delisting returns made approximately zero 
difference to portfolio returns.  
The adjustment had a larger effect on the returns reported for the NASDAQ and 
‘All Firms’ high distress-risk deciles than for the NYSE-AMEX deciles. For the o-score 
distress-risk deciles, the negative relation between distress-risk and return was not 
sensitive to the adjustment for delisting returns. However, the pattern was not as strong 
when delisting returns were not included.  
For the z-score portfolios, without delisting returns both NASDAQ and ‘All 
Firms’ decile 1 firms earned higher equal-weighted returns than other portfolios in the 
respective sample, of 1.61% (t = 2.10) and 1.57% (t = 2.27), respectively. In contrast, 
these firms earned very low returns when delisting returns were included.  
The results provide some support for the view that firms with higher distress-
risk earn higher returns. However, investors could only earn these returns if they were 
able to sell their stock in these high distress-risk firms immediately prior to the firm 
delisting, thus avoiding the negative delisting returns. In addition, an inverted-U shaped 
relation still existed for deciles 2 through 10. Therefore, the hypothesis that a positive 
relation exists between distress-risk and return is rejected.    
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Table A8.2. Distress-risk decile returns – with and without delisting returns 
At June (t) each year, 1985 to 1994, firms were assigned to decile portfolios according to distress-risk. Firms with the highest (lowest) distress-risk 
were allocated to distress-risk decile 1 (10). A higher (lower) o-score (z-score) represented higher distress-risk. For all firms that stopped trading for 
performance reasons, a delisting return was estimated for the month directly after the final CRSP return. An average delisting return of –30% for 
NYSE and AMEX firms (Shumway (1997)) and -55% for NASDAQ firms (Shumway and Warther (1999)) was used. EWRet (EWDRet) is the equal-
weighted monthly return, delisting returns not included (included). MVRet (MVDRet) is the value-weighted monthly return, delisting returns not 
included (included). All returns are in percent. Portfolio results were calculated for each month from July (t) to June (t+1), then averaged across the 
120 months, July 1985 to June 1995. T-values, in parentheses, show whether the return was significantly different from zero.  
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Table A8.2. cont. Panel A - O-score distress-risk deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ  ‘All Firms’ 
Distress 
decile 
EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet 
High  1  1.71 
(2.49) 
1.53 
(2.25) 
1.02 
(1.72)
1.01
(1.72)
0.89 
(1.17)
-0.46 
(-0.61)
-0.50 
(-0.75) 
-0.67
(-1.00)
1.07 
(1.07)
0.03 
(0.05)
0.19 
(0.30)
0.08 
(0.13) 
2  1.16 
(2.22) 
1.13 
(2.22) 
1.06 
(2.06)
1.06
(2.06)
0.92 
(1.57)
0.05 
(0.09)
0.10 
(0.16) 
-0.04
(-0.07)
1.18 
(2.05)
0.77 
(1.35)
0.74 
(1.33)
0.70 
(1.26) 
3  1.22 
(2.75) 
1.21 
(2.75) 
1.17 
(2.59)
1.17
(2.59)
0.94 
(1.66)
0.50 
(0.89)
0.24 
(0.39) 
0.16
(0.26)
1.16 
(2.33)
1.00 
(2.00)
1.09 
(2.16)
1.08 
(2.16) 
4  1.28 
(2.77) 
1.27 
(2.77) 
1.06 
(2.50)
1.06
(2.50)
1.17 
(2.44)
0.94 
(1.96)
1.19 
(2.15) 
1.17
(2.10)
1.15 
(2.58)
1.06 
(2.38)
1.03 
(2.24)
1.02 
(2.24) 
5  1.34 
(3.15) 
1.34 
(3.15) 
1.28 
(3.17)
1.28
(3.17)
1.15 
(2.39)
0.99 
(2.06)
0.46 
(0.93) 
0.43
(0.87)
1.21 
(2.64)
1.16 
(2.54)
1.00 
(2.38)
1.00 
(2.38) 
6  1.13 
(2.79) 
1.12 
(2.79) 
1.19 
(3.07)
1.19
(3.07)
1.16 
(2.38)
1.04 
(2.14)
0.74 
(1.45) 
0.71
(1.39)
1.23 
(2.81)
1.20 
(2.75)
1.33 
(3.19)
1.33 
(3.19) 
7  1.28 
(3.11) 
1.27 
(3.11) 
1.12 
(3.02)
1.12
(3.02)
1.10 
(2.41)
1.04 
(2.28)
1.45 
(2.78) 
1.44
(2.77)
1.15 
(2.78)
1.13 
(2.74)
1.11 
(3.00)
1.10 
(3.00) 
8  1.40 
(3.24) 
1.40 
(3.24) 
1.35 
(3.50)
1.35
(3.50)
1.22 
(2.48)
1.09 
(2.22)
1.31 
(2.31) 
1.30
(2.30)
1.38 
(3.08)
1.36 
(3.04)
1.27 
(3.32)
1.27 
(3.32) 
9  1.31 
(3.00) 
1.31 
(3.00) 
1.42 
(3.41)
1.42
(3.41)
1.28 
(2.70)
1.23 
(2.59)
1.41 
(2.36) 
1.40
(2.35)
1.35 
(3.03)
1.33 
(2.98)
1.44 
(3.43)
1.43 
(3.43) 
Low  10  1.21 
(2.73) 
1.21 
(2.73) 
1.01 
(2.57)
1.01
(2.57)
1.25 
(2.63)
1.19 
(2.49)
1.64 
(2.60) 
1.63
(2.59)
1.21 
(2.67)
1.18 
(2.60)
1.19 
(2.66)
1.19 
(2.66)  
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Table A8.2. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ  ‘All Firms’  
Distress 
decile 
EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet 
High  1  1.54 
(2.74) 
1.42 
(2.52) 
1.06 
(2.91)
1.06
(2.90)
1.61 
(2.10)
0.19 
(0.25)
0.09 
(0.13) 
-0.15
(-0.22)
1.57 
(2.27)
0.65 
(0.96)
0.81 
(1.54)
0.77 
(1.47) 
2  1.20 
(3.05) 
1.18 
(3.00) 
1.11 
(3.27)
1.11
(3.27)
1.04 
(1.87)
0.44 
(0.80)
0.37 
(0.69) 
0.33
(0.61)
1.17 
(2.70)
0.93 
(2.14)
1.13 
(3.36)
1.13 
(3.35) 
3  1.17 
(2.81) 
1.16 
(2.77) 
1.13 
(3.19)
1.13
(3.19)
1.11 
(2.23)
0.70 
(1.42)
1.27 
(2.51) 
1.22
(2.42)
1.08 
(2.53)
0.92 
(2.15)
1.08 
(3.03)
1.08 
(3.03) 
4  1.26 
(2.70) 
1.24 
(2.66) 
1.06 
(2.65)
1.06
(2.65)
1.20 
(2.43)
0.97 
(1.95)
0.85 
(1.50) 
0.82
(1.45)
1.28 
(2.76)
1.16 
(2.50)
1.20 
(3.04)
1.20 
(3.04) 
5  1.43 
(2.98) 
1.42 
(2.96) 
1.37 
(3.03)
1.37
(3.03)
1.21 
(2.58)
1.07 
(2.28)
1.27 
(2.28) 
1.26
(2.25)
1.25 
(2.75)
1.19 
(2.60)
1.33 
(2.99)
1.33 
(2.99) 
6  1.24 
(2.66) 
1.22 
(2.64) 
1.28 
(2.91)
1.28
(2.91)
1.05 
(2.24)
0.94 
(2.00)
0.93 
(1.71) 
0.92
(1.69)
1.25 
(2.70)
1.18 
(2.56)
1.28 
(2.87)
1.28 
(2.87) 
7  1.34 
(2.89) 
1.34 
(2.88) 
1.33 
(2.92)
1.33
(2.92)
1.04 
(2.20)
0.96 
(2.02)
1.21 
(2.16) 
1.21
(2.15)
1.23 
(2.65)
1.17 
(2.52)
1.26 
(2.85)
1.26 
(2.85) 
8  1.33 
(2.92) 
1.32 
(2.90) 
1.46 
(3.21)
1.46
(3.21)
1.19 
(2.45)
1.10 
(2.27)
1.77 
(2.87) 
1.76
(2.84)
1.22 
(2.66)
1.18 
(2.57)
1.55 
(3.35)
1.55 
(3.35) 
9  1.39 
3.05) 
1.39 
(3.04) 
1.29 
(2.95)
1.29
(2.95)
1.05 
(2.13)
0.94 
(1.90)
1.43 
(2.46) 
1.41
(2.43)
1.20 
(2.63)
1.14 
(2.50)
1.32 
(2.91)
1.32 
(2.91) 
Low  10  1.01 
(2.18) 
1.01 
(2.17) 
1.21 
(2.68)
1.21
(2.68)
0.67 
(1.22)
0.52 
(0.96)
1.22 
(1.90) 
1.22
(1.90)
0.84 
(1.66)
0.74 
(1.47)
1.18 
(2.36)
1.18 
(2.36) 
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A8.2. Effect of delisting returns - positive book-equity firms 
Distress-risk (pos) decile returns, with and without the adjustment for delisting 
returns, are reported in Table A8.3, Panels A and B. For NYSE-AMEX firms with positive 
book-equity, the pattern in both equal- and value-weighted returns was not sensitive to the 
adjustment for delisting returns. The decrease in the equal-weighted return for the NegBE 
portfolio, of -0.26% (1.73% to 1.47%), was greater than for distress-risk (pos) decile 1, of -
0.10% (1.54% to 1.44%). The equal-weighted return earned by firms in the NegBE 
portfolio changed from significant and positive prior to the inclusion of delisting returns, to 
not statistically significant after the inclusion. The adjustment had minimal effect on equal-
weighted returns reported for all other distress-risk (pos) deciles, or the value-weighted 
returns reported for NYSE-AMEX portfolios.  
The adjustment for delisting returns also made little difference to value-weighted 
returns earned by NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ portfolios. It did alter the equal-weighted 
return earned by z-score distress-risk (pos) decile 1. When delisting returns were included, 
these firms earned a comparatively low return. Without delisting returns, the decile (pos) 1 
return of 1.79% (t = 2.29) for NASDAQ and 1.46% (t = 2.32) for ‘All Firms’, was higher 
than the average return earned by the other deciles. However, although not as strong, the 
pattern in returns earned by distress-risk (pos) deciles 2 through 10 was not sensitive to the 
inclusion of delisting returns. Therefore, the hypothesis of a positive relation between 
distress-risk and return is rejected. Adjusting for delisting returns also had a large effect on 
the equal-weighted return of the NASDAQ and ‘All Firms’ NegBE portfolios; decreasing 
o-score NegBE returns by 1.43% and 0.88%, respectively. For NASDAQ portfolios, 
inclusion of delisting returns changed returns from positive to negative, but not statistically 
significant.   
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Table A8.3. Distress-risk (pos) decile returns - with and without delisting returns 
At June (t) each year, 1985 to 1994, firms with negative book-equity were assigned to the NegBE portfolio. Firms with positive book-equity 
and the highest (lowest) distress-risk were allocated to distress-risk (pos) decile 1 (10). For all firms that stopped trading for performance 
reasons, a delisting return was estimated for the month directly after the final CRSP return. An average delisting return of –30% for NYSE 
and AMEX firms (Shumway (1997)) and -55% for NASDAQ firms (Shumway and Warther (1999)) was used. EWRet (EWDRet) is the 
equal-weighted return, delisting returns not included (included). MVRet (MVDRet) is the value-weighted monthly return, delisting returns 
not included (included). All returns are in percent. Portfolio results were calculated for each month, and then averaged across the 120 
months, July 1985 to June 1995. T-values, in parentheses, show whether the return was significantly different from zero. 
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Table A8.3. cont. Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ   ‘All Firms’ 
Distress 
(pos) decile 
EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet
Neg BE  1.73 
(2.22) 
1.47 
(1.88) 
1.46 
(2.25)
1.44
(2.22)
0.55 
(0.73)
-0.88 
(-1.17)
0.50 
(0.81) 
0.37
(0.60)
1.15 
(1.62)
0.27 
(0.39)
1.28 
(2.06)
1.24 
(2.00)
High  1  1.54 
(2.48) 
1.44 
(2.32) 
0.91 
(1.75)
0.90
(1.73)
1.09 
(1.47)
-0.19 
(-0.26)
-0.81 
(-2.03) 
-0.99
(-1.34)
1.03 
(1.56)
0.11 
(0.17)
-0.44 
(-0.69)
-0.57 
(-0.89)
2  1.12 
(2.29) 
1.10 
(2.24) 
1.19 
(2.38)
1.19
(2.38)
0.70 
(1.23)
0.05 
(0.09)
-0.26 
(1.03) 
-0.36
(-0.58)
1.15 
(3.13)
0.86 
(1.59)
0.90 
(1.70)
0.87 
(1.64)
3  1.19 
(2.64) 
1.18 
(2.62) 
1.11 
(2.47)
1.11
(2.47)
1.10 
(2.00)
0.77 
(1.43)
0.63 
(1.91) 
0.56
(0.92)
1.20 
(2.55)
1.08 
(2.30)
1.10 
(2.20)
1.09 
(2.18)
4  1.29 
(2.87) 
1.29 
(2.88) 
1.19 
(2.83)
1.19
(2.83)
1.16 
(2.47)
0.98 
(2.09)
1.01 
(1.91) 
0.99
(1.87)
1.13 
(2.51)
1.05 
(2.33)
0.98 
(2.23)
0.98 
(2.23)
5  1.33 
(3.09) 
1.33 
(3.09) 
1.29 
(3.15)
1.29
(3.15)
1.26 
(2.57)
1.11 
(2.27)
0.67 
(1.37) 
0.64
(1.31)
1.29 
(2.80)
1.25 
(2.72)
1.11 
(2.64)
1.11 
(2.64)
6  1.09 
(2.73) 
1.09 
(2.73) 
1.11 
(2.92)
1.11
(2.92)
1.07 
(2.23)
0.98 
(2.04)
0.72 
(1.38) 
0.70
(1.35)
1.20 
(2.79)
1.16 
(2.70)
1.21 
(2.95)
1.21 
(2.95)
7  1.29 
(3.07) 
1.29 
(3.07) 
1.11 
(2.92)
1.11
(2.92)
1.11 
(2.36)
1.06 
(2.26)
1.51 
(2.90) 
1.50
(2.88)
1.13 
(2.69)
1.11 
(2.64)
1.09 
(2.95)
1.09 
(2.95)
8  1.41 
(3.28) 
1.40 
(3.26) 
1.41 
(3.62)
1.41
(3.62)
1.23 
(2.51)
1.19 
(2.43)
1.29 
(2.19) 
1.28
(2.17)
1.39 
(3.09)
1.37 
(3.04)
1.33 
(3.41)
1.33 
(3.41)
9  1.33 
(3.02) 
1.33 
(3.02) 
1.42 
(3.38)
1.42
(3.38)
1.29 
(2.74)
1.24 
(2.64)
1.34 
(2.23) 
1.32
(2.20)
1.33 
(2.96)
1.31 
(2.91)
1.44 
(3.35)
1.44 
(3.35)
Low  10  1.19 
(2.70) 
1.19 
(2.70) 
1.00 
(2.33)
1.00
(2.33)
1.24 
(2.58)
1.19 
(2.48)
1.67 
(2.65) 
1.67
(2.65)
1.22 
(2.71)
1.19 
(2.64)
1.17 
(2.66)
1.17 
(2.66) 
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Table A8.3. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
  NYSE-AMEX   NASDAQ   ‘All Firms’ 
Distress 
(pos) 
decile 
EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet EWRet EWDRet MVRet MVDRet
Neg BE  1.66 
(2.14) 
1.40 
(1.82) 
1.43
(2.19)
1.41
(2.81)
0.55
(0.74)
-0.89
(-1.19)
0.49 
(0.80) 
0.36
(0.59)
1.12
(1.60)
0.24
(0.35)
1.26
(2.04)
1.22
(1.98)
High  1  1.30 
(2.68) 
1.24 
(2.56) 
1.01
(2.89)
1.01
(2.89)
1.79
(2.29)
0.58
(0.76)
0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.17
(-0.24)
1.46
(2.32)
0.73
(1.18)
0.89
(2.06)
0.88
(2.03)
2  1.16 
(3.01) 
1.14 
(2.97) 
1.11
(3.21)
1.11
(3.21)
0.92
(1.80)
0.42
(0.81)
0.89 
(1.61) 
0.85
(1.54)
1.21
(3.03)
1.02
(2.53)
1.12
(3.35)
1.11
(3.35)
3  1.27 
(2.89) 
1.26 
(2.05) 
1.03
(2.87)
1.03
(2.87)
1.17
(2.39)
0.84
(1.70)
1.20 
(2.33) 
1.17
(2.25)
1.14
(2.59)
0.99
(2.24)
1.07
(2.94)
1.07
(2.94)
4  1.35 
(2.88) 
1.34 
(2.85) 
1.33
(3.12)
1.33
(3.12)
1.16
(2.47)
0.97
(2.06)
0.79 
(1.50) 
0.76
(1.44)
1.22
(2.71)
1.12
(2.48)
1.30
(3.09)
1.30
(3.08)
5  1.27 
(2.67) 
1.26 
(2.65) 
1.37
(3.04)
1.37
(3.04)
1.29
(2.69)
1.18
(2.44)
1.20 
(2.06) 
1.19
(2.04)
1.27
(2.76)
1.21
(2.61)
1.29
(2.97)
1.29
(2.96)
6  1.32 
(2.87) 
1.32 
(2.85) 
1.27
(2.86)
1.27
(2.86)
0.95
(2.02)
0.84
(1.79)
0.92 
(1.71) 
0.91
(1.69)
1.22
(2.65)
1.16
(2.50)
1.28
(2.75)
1.27
(2.74)
7  1.32 
(2.83) 
1.31 
(2.82) 
1.26
(2.78)
1.26
(2.78)
1.09
(2.22)
1.03
(2.10)
1.21 
(1.82) 
1.20
(2.05)
1.26
(2.74)
1.21
(2.61)
1.32
(2.94)
1.32
(2.94)
8  1.35 
(2.97) 
1.35 
(2.95) 
1.60
(3.48)
1.60
(3.48)
1.19
(2.48)
1.11
(2.33)
1.82 
(1.42) 
1.81
(2.92)
1.22
(2.65)
1.18
(2.55)
1.53
(3.38)
1.53
(3.38)
9  1.40 
(3.06) 
1.39 
(3.05) 
1.34
(3.03)
1.34
(3.03)
1.04
(2.86)
0.93
(1.87)
1.42 
(2.40) 
1.40
(2.37)
1.18
(2.62)
1.12
(2.47)
1.27
(2.82)
1.27
(2.82)
Low  10  1.02 
(2.21) 
1.01 
(2.20) 
1.21
(2.67)
1.21
(2.67)
0.70
(1.27)
0.56
(1.03)
1.22 
(1.90) 
1.22
(1.89)
0.87
(1.71)
0.78
(1.55)
1.20
(2.39)
1.20
(2.39)
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Appendix 9. Return premia – with and without delisting returns 
 
Table A9.1. Return premia: zero investment strategies 1 through 4 - distress-risk deciles, with and without delisting returns 
Zero investment return premiums were calculated for four investment strategies that invested in firms with high distress-risk (Dist) and 
shorted firms with low distress-risk (Solv). ‘Premium’ for strategies 1) and 2) represented return on distress-risk decile 1, minus return on 
distress-risk decile 10, where return was equal-weighted for strategy 1 and value-weighted for strategy 2. Strategies 3) and 4) represented 
return on the three deciles with highest risk (distress-risk deciles 1 - 3) minus return on the three deciles with lowest risk (distress-risk 
deciles 8 - 10), where return was equal-weighted across distress-risk deciles for strategy 3 and value-weighted for strategy 4. For each 
strategy, returns were calculated from distress-risk decile returns both without and with the inclusion of delisting returns, denoted ‘No 
Delist’ and ‘Delist included’, respectively. The t-value indicates whether the return premium is significantly greater than zero.  
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Table A9.1. cont. Panel A - O-score distress-risk deciles  
NYSE-AMEX 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    % t  Distress  Solvent    % t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.71 1.21 + 0.50 1.00 1.53 1.21 + 0.32 0.62
2 Value  1  10  1.02 1.01 + 0.01 0.40 1.01 1.01 0.00 0.00
3 Equal  1-3  8-10  1.36 1.31 + 0.05 0.19 1.29 1.31 - 0.02 -0.07
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.15 1.26 - 0.11 -0.46 1.15 1.26 - 0.11 -0.46
NASDAQ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    %  t  Distress  Solvent    %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  0.89 1.25 - 0.36 -0.64 -0.46 1.19 - 1.65 -2.94
2 Value  1  10  -0.50 1.64 - 2.14 -4.20 -0.67 1.63 - 2.30 -4.49
3 Equal  1-3  8-10  0.92 1.25 - 0.33 -0.89 0.09 1.17 - 1.08 -2.92
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  -0.01 1.53 - 1.54 -4.44 -0.13 1.52 - 1.65 -4.71
‘All Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    %  t  Distress  Solvent    %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.07 1.21 - 0.14 -0.29 0.03 1.18 - 1.15 -2.35
2 Value  1  10  0.19 1.19 - 1.00 -2.33 0.08 1.19 - 1.11 -2.58
3 Equal  1-3  8-10  1.14 1.31 - 0.17 -0.52 0.60 1.29 - 0.69 -2.09
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  0.91 1.30 - 0.39 -1.44 0.88 1.30 - 0.42 -1.56 
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Table A9.1. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk deciles 
NYSE-AMEX 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent   %  t  Distress Solvent    %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.54 1.01 + 0.53 1.26 1.42 1.01 + 0.41 0.98
2 Value  1  10  1.06 1.21 - 0.15 -0.45 1.06 1.21 - 0.15 -0.45
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.30 1.24 + 0.06 0.27 1.25 1.24 + 0.01 0.09
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.10 1.30 - 0.20 -0.78 1.10 1.30 - 0.20 -0.78
NASDAQ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent   %  t  Distress Solvent   %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.61 0.67 + 0.94 1.68 0.19 0.52 - 0.33 -0.58
2 Value  1  10  0.09 1.22 - 1.13 -1.82 -0.15 1.22 - 1.37 -2.21
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.25 0.97 + 0.28 0.88 0.44 0.85 - 0.41 -1.25
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  0.89 1.46 - 0.57 -1.61 0.83 1.45 - 0.62 -1.77
 ‘All Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent   %  t  Distress Solvent   %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.57 0.84 + 0.73 1.46 0.65 0.74 - 0.09 -0.18
2 Value  1  10  0.81 1.18 - 0.37 -0.87 0.77 1.18 - 0.41 -0.95
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.27 1.09 + 0.18 0.73 0.83 1.02 - 0.19 -0.73
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.07 1.35 - 0.28 -1.04 1.07 1.35 - 0.28 -1.04
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Table A9.2. Return premia: zero investment strategies 1 through 4 - distress-risk (pos) deciles, with and without delisting returns 
Zero investment return premiums are reported: ‘Premium’ for strategies 1) and 2) represent return on distress-risk (pos) decile 1, minus return on distress-
risk (pos) decile 10. Strategies 3) and 4) return on distress-risk (pos) deciles 1 through 3 minus return on distress-risk (pos) deciles 8 through 10. Returns 
were equal-weighted (value-weighted) for strategies 1 and 3 (2 and 4). Returns were calculated both without and with the inclusion of delisting returns, 
denoted ‘No Delist’ and ‘Delist included’, respectively. The t-value indicates whether the return premium is significantly greater than zero. 
Panel A - O-score distress-risk (pos) deciles  
NYSE-AMEX 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    % t  Distress  Solvent    % t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.54 1.19 + 0.35 0.85 1.44 1.19 + 0.25 0.61
2 Value  1  10  0.91 1.00 - 0.09 -0.29 0.90 1.00 - 0.10 -0.29
3 Equal  1-3  8-10  1.28 1.31 - 0.03 -0.36 1.24 1.31 - 0.07 -0.30
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.12 1.28 - 0.16 -0.69 1.12 1.28 - 0.16 -0.69
NASDAQ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    %  t  Distress  Solvent    %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.09 1.24 - 0.15 -0.27 -0.19 1.19 - 1.38 -2.51
2 Value  1  10  -0.81 1.67 - 2.48 -4.26 -0.99 1.67 - 2.66 -4.59
3 Equal  1-3  8-10  0.96 1.25 - 0.29 -0.81 0.21 1.21 - 1.00 -2.78
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  -0.04 1.52 - 1.56 -4.27 -0.14 1.51 - 1.65 -4.50
 ‘All Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    %  t  Distress  Solvent    %  t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.03 1.22 - 0.19 -1.65 0.11 1.19 - 1.08 -2.28
2 Value  1  10  -0.44 1.17 - 1.61 -3.34 -0.57 1.17 - 1.74 -3.63
3 Equal  1-3  8-10  1.13 1.31 - 0.18 -0.59 0.68 1.28 - 0.60 -2.00
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  0.87 1.31 - 0.44 -1.68 0.84 1.31 - 0.47 -3.93 
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Table A9.2. cont. Panel B - Z-score distress-risk (pos) deciles 
NYSE-AMEX 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    % t  Distress  Solvent   % t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.30 1.02 + 0.28 0.89 1.24 1.01 + 0.23 0.71
2 Value  1  10  1.01 1.21 - 0.20 -0.61 1.01 1.21 - 0.20 -0.61
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.24 1.26 - 0.02 -0.10 1.21 1.25 - 0.04 -0.21
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.06 1.34 - 0.28 -1.14 1.06 1.34 - 0.28 -1.14
NASDAQ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    % t  Distress  Solvent    % t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.79 0.70 + 1.09 1.87 0.58 0.56 + 0.02 0.03
2 Value  1  10  0.04 1.22 - 1.18 -1.85 -0.17 1.22 - 1.39 -2.17
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.29 0.98 + 0.31 0.96 0.61 0.86 - 0.25 -0.78
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.04 1.48 - 0.44 -1.23 0.99 1.47 - 0.48 -1.34
‘All Firms’ 
Strategy Return 
weight 
Decile portfolios  Returns % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress  Solvent  Distress  Solvent    % t  Distress  Solvent    % t 
1 Equal  1  10  1.46 0.87 + 0.59 1.33 0.73 0.78 - 0.05 -0.11
2 Value  1  10  0.89 1.20 - 0.31 -0.80 0.88 1.20 - 0.32 -1.19
3  Equal  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.27 1.09 + 0.18 0.80 0.91 1.03 - 0.12 -0.50
4  Value  1 - 3  8 - 10  1.07 1.34 - 0.27 -1.04 1.07 1.34 - 0.27 -1.04
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Table A9.3. Return premia earned by size and B/M balanced strategy 5, with and without delisting returns 
June each year (t), 1985 to 1994, firms were allocated independently into size, B/M and distress-risk portfolios, for two samples; 1) all firm-
years with required data, and 2) all firm-years with positive book-equity and required data. For each sample, two size portfolios were 
created; big and small. Three B/M portfolios were created; high B/M, medium B/M and low B/M. Two sets of three distress-risk portfolios 
were created; high distress-risk (distressed), medium distress-risk (grey) and low distress-risk (solvent). One set used o-score to measure 
distress-risk, the second used z-score. Eighteen portfolios were formed from the intersections of the size, B/M and distress-risk portfolios for 
each measure of distress-risk. Value-weighted return was calculated for each intersecting portfolio, for each month July (t) until June (t+1). 
For each measure of distress-risk, Distressed Minus Solvent (DMS) was the difference each month between the average of the returns on the 
six distressed intersecting portfolios and the six solvent intersecting portfolios. This difference was averaged across the 120 months. Returns 
are reported both with and without the inclusion of delisting returns, denoted as ‘No delist’ and ‘Delist included’, respectively. The premia 
for all firm-years and positive book-equity firm-year are reported in Panels A and B, respectively. 
Panel A - All firm-years 
Return 
weight  
Model Returns  % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
  Distress Solvent    %  t  Distress  Solvent   %  t 
Value o-score  0.99 1.27 - 0.28 -2.09 0.98 1.27  -  0.29 -2.16
 z-score  0.96 1.38 - 0.42 -2.00 0.93 1.37  -  0.44 -2.10
 
Panel B - Positive book-equity firm-years 
Return 
weight  
Model Returns  % 
No Delist 
Premium %  Returns % 
Delist included 
Premium % 
   Distress Solvent    %  t  Distress  Solvent   %  t 
Value o-score  0.99 1.29 - 0.30 -2.31 0.97 1.28  -  0.31 -2.38
 z-score  0.92 1.32 - 0.40 -1.82 0.90 1.32  -  0.42 -1.91
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Appendix 10. Single factor model, distress-risk deciles  
Table A10.1. Regression results – Single factor model distress-risk deciles  
Time-series regressions were performed using the single factor model:  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) +εi             ( 2 . 1 )  
where (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio. Dependent variables are the monthly 
value-weighted excess returns earned by the sorted distress-risk deciles. Adjusted R
2 is reported for 
each regression. O-score and Z-score results are reported in Panels A and B, respectively. 
  Panel A - O-score  Panel B - Z-score 
Dist 
decile 
a b t(a) t(b) Adj 
R
2 
a b t(a) t(b) Adj 
R
2 
 NYSE-AMEX  NYSE-AMEX 
High 1  -0.33 1.26  -1.03 16.85 0.70 0.06 0.77 0.30  16.11 0.68
2  -0.23 1.18  -1.02 22.74 0.74 0.13 0.74 0.73  18.25 0.73
3  -0.02 1.04  -0.09 22.95 0.82 0.11 0.79 0.67  20.24 0.77
4  -0.11 1.01  -0.73 30.19 0.88 -0.04 0.91 -0.24  22.44 0.81
5  0.13 0.97 1.02 32.56 0.90 0.16 1.07 0.97  28.80 0.87
6  0.07 0.94 0.60 35.99 0.92 0.08 1.05 0.54  31.39 0.89
7  0.02 0.90 0.22 36.44 0.92 0.10 1.10 0.69  33.51 0.90
8  0.23 0.94 2.15 38.25 0.92 0.23 1.09 1.56  32.01 0.90
9  0.25 1.01 2.13 37.10 0.92 0.10 1.04 0.65  29.84 0.88
Low10  0.16 1.01 1.06 28.41 0.87 0.02 1.05 0.09  25.52 0.85
 NASDAQ  NASDAQ 
High 1  -2.00 1.24  -4.33 11.72 0.47 -1.37 1.08 -2.48 8.52 0.38
2  -1.26 1.09  -2.82 10.63 0.48 -0.87 1.05 -2.44  12.91 0.58
3  -1.15 1.21  -2.89 13.33 0.60 0.03 1.04 0.10  15.17 0.66
4  -0.10 1.15  -0.31 15.22 0.66 -0.47 1.18 -1.44  15.77 0.67
5  -0.76 1.04  -2.66 15.88 0.68 -0.02 1.17 -0.06  15.59 0.67
6  -0.56 1.09  -1.81 16.78 0.70 -0.35 1.15 -1.14  16.32 0.69
7  0.19 1.13 0.69 17.97 0.73 -0.11 1.23 -0.39  18.14 0.73
8  -0.02 1.23  -0.07 18.09 0.73 0.40 1.27 1.08  15.22 0.66
9  0.02 1.32 0.06 19.10 0.75 0.07 1.25 0.22  17.54 0.72
Low10  0.25 1.31 0.68 15.59 0.67 -0.20 1.36 -0.54  16.39 0.69
  ‘All Firms’  ‘All Firms’ 
High 1  -1.28 1.29  -3.38 14.83 0.65 -0.44 1.06 -1.37  14.52 0.64
2  -0.59 1.17  -1.87 16.33 0.69 0.16 0.72 0.87  17.69 0.72
3  -0.20 1.17  -0.97 23.68 0.82 0.05 0.81 0.31  21.95 0.80
4  -0.18 1.06  -0.93 23.62 0.82 0.09 0.93 0.57  26.41 0.85
5  -0.17 1.00  -1.11 29.58 0.88 0.12 1.07 0.82  33.04 0.90
6  0.15 1.02 1.38 39.56 0.93 0.07 1.08 0.46  33.25 0.90
7  0.01 0.90 0.09 38.50 0.93 0.05 1.07 0.36  35.48 0.91
8  0.15 0.94 1.75 49.72 0.95 0.31 1.11 2.12  33.44 0.90
9  0.25 1.03 2.36 42.21 0.94 0.11 1.07 0.65  29.04 0.88
Low10  0.01 1.05 0.06 27.27 0.86 0.09 1.15 0.43  24.14 0.83 
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Appendix 11. ‘All Firms’ distress-risk decile regressions 
Table A11.1. Regression results – ‘All Firms’ distress-risk deciles  
Seven time series regressions models were tested. Models 3.3.1 through 3.3.6 are two- and three-
factor models, as detailed in the table. Model 3.3.7 is the four-factor model:  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi         (3.3.7) 
where (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio. SMB is the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks. HML is the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks and a portfolio of low B/M stocks.  
DMS is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high distress-risk stocks and a portfolio 
of low distress-risk stocks (Distressed Minus Solvent). The dependent variables are the monthly 
value-weighted excess returns of the ‘All Firms’ distress-risk deciles. Adjusted R
2 is reported. O-
score and Z-score results are reported in Panels A and B, respectively 
Panel A - O-score Two-factor models 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + hi HML +εi                           (3.3.1) 
High 1  -1.13  1.21 -0.29    -2.87 11.72 -1.41    0.65 
2  -0.50  1.13 -0.16    -1.54 13.18 -0.94    0.69 
3  -0.20  1.17 -0.00    -0.87 19.73 -0.08    0.82 
4  -0.20  1.07 0.03    -0.96  19.86 0.24    0.82 
5  -0.25  1.05 0.15    -1.62  26.18 1.97    0.88 
6  0.10  1.05 0.10    0.90  34.28 1.59    0.93 
7  -0.03  0.93 0.08    -0.30  33.19 1.42    0.93 
8  0.11  0.96 0.07    1.27  42.78 1.54    0.95 
9  0.35  0.98 -0.18    3.28 35.07 -3.33    0.94 
Low10  0.26  0.91 -0.50    1.69 22.96 -6.38    0.90 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB +εi                           (3.3.2) 
High 1  -0.94  1.19   1.10  -3.11  17.09   8.52  0.78 
2  -0.29  1.09   0.95  -1.20  19.48   9.17  0.82 
3  0.02  1.12   0.57  0.13  26.90   7.38  0.88 
4  -0.02  1.01   0.52  -0.12  26.90   7.45  0.88 
5  -0.07  0.97   0.32  -0.50  31.69   5.54  0.90 
6  0.16  1.02   0.01  1.37  38.84   0.12  0.93 
7  -0.05  0.92   -0.20  -0.54  42.25   -4.86  0.94 
8  0.09  0.96   -0.17  1.23  54.76   -5.08  0.96 
9  0.21  1.04   -0.15  2.00  43.85   -3.29  0.94 
Low10  0.02  1.04   0.09  0.10  26.73   1.18  0.86 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + di DMS +εi                           (3.3.3) 
High 1  -0.68  1.20    1.83 -2.32  18.19    9.41  0.80 
2  -0.11  1.11    1.47 -0.43  19.73    8.90  0.82 
3  0.08  1.13    0.86 0.42  26.87    6.92  0.87 
4  0.16  1.02    1.04 1.13  32.21    11.26  0.91 
5  0.01  0.98    0.53 0.05  32.57    5.95  0.91 
6  0.23  1.01    0.23 2.08  40.32    3.17  0.93 
7  -0.01  0.91    -0.05 -0.07  38.19    -0.74  0.93 
8  0.11  0.95    -0.11 1.30  50.19    -2.01  0.95 
9  0.10  1.05    -0.47 1.12  52.99    -8.05  0.96 
Low10  -0.22  1.08    -0.63 -1.45  32.12    -6.40  0.90  
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Table A11.1. cont. Regression results – ‘All Firms’ distress-risk deciles  
Panel A cont. - O-score Three- and four-factor models. 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi                  (3.3.4) 
High 1  -0.99  1.22 0.12 1.23  -3.18  14.87 0.69 8.34  0.79 
2  -0.38  1.14 0.20 1.00  -1.53  17.43 1.47 9.26  0.82 
3  -0.12  1.17 0.21 0.62  -0.66  24.36 2.14 7.79  0.88 
4  -0.13  1.07 0.23 0.58  -0.77  24.80 2.59 8.05  0.89 
5  -0.20  1.05 0.29 0.38  -1.56  31.02 4.20 6.88  0.92 
6  0.11  1.05 0.11 0.03  0.92  34.19 1.69 0.61  0.93 
7  -0.06  0.92 0.01  -0.20  -0.56  35.87 0.16  -4.59  0.94 
8  0.09  0.96 0.01  -0.16  1.13  46.52 0.24  -4.77  0.96 
9  0.32  0.98 -0.26 -0.21  3.32 38.21 -4.88 -4.84  0.95 
Low10  0.25  0.91 -0.51 -0.03  1.65 22.88 -6.22 -0.49  0.90 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi                 (3.3.5) 
High 1  -0.35  1.05 -0.55    1.95 -1.19 13.78 -3.74   10.42  0.82 
2  0.12  1.00 -0.37    1.55 0.46 15.22 -2.89    9.53  0.82 
3  0.16  1.10 -0.13    0.89 0.81 21.58 -1.32    7.07  0.88 
4  0.23  0.98 -0.12    1.07 1.59 25.95 -1.65   11.46  0.82 
5  0.04  1.00 0.09   0.51 0.32  27.69 1.20   5.66 0.91 
6  0.19  1.03 0.07   0.22 1.64  34.04 1.10   2.93 0.93 
7  -0.06  0.93 0.09    -0.07 -0.54  32.71 1.57    -1.00 0.93 
8  0.06  0.97 0.09    -0.13 0.65  43.17 1.96    -2.35 0.96 
9  0.17  1.02 -0.12   -0.44 1.91 43.53 -2.68   -7.67  0.96 
Low10  0.04  0.96 -0.42   -0.54 0.29 27.04 -6.13   -6.16  0.92 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi                (3.3.6) 
High 1  -0.59  1.16   0.77 1.38 -2.36  20.34   6.77 7.72 0.86 
2  -0.02  1.06   0.70 1.05 -0.12  22.75   7.48 7.18 0.87 
3  0.13  1.11   0.43 0.61 0.78  29.19   5.62 5.09 0.90 
4  0.20  0.99   0.32 0.85 1.57  35.13   5.60 9.61 0.93 
5  0.30  0.96   0.22 0.39 0.26  33.67   3.87 4.38 0.92 
6  0.22  1.01   -0.06  0.27 2.02  40.19   -1.15  3.37  0.93 
7  -0.03  0.92   -0.22  0.08 -0.34  42.10   -4.93  1.10  0.94 
8  0.19  0.96   -0.16 -0.02 1.15 54.43   -4.57 -0.30  0.96 
9  0.09  1.05   -0.04 -0.45 1.06 52.66   -0.97 -7.10  0.96 
Low10  -0.18  1.06   0.28  -0.79 -1.32  33.66   4.37  -8.02  0.91 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi           (3.3.7) 
High 1  -0.45  1.09  -0.24 0.69 1.48 -1.74  16.06  -1.70 5.64 7.91 0.86 
2  0.01  1.05  -0.07 0.68 1.08 0.06  18.50  -0.55 6.66 6.97 0.88 
3  0.09  1.12 0.07 0.45 0.58 0.51  24.58 0.75 5.46 4.58 0.90 
4  0.18  1.00 0.03 0.33 0.84 1.38  29.22 0.35 5.28 8.97 0.93 
5  -0.09  1.02 0.22 0.29 0.30 -0.70  30.67 3.10 4.89 3.32 0.92 
6  0.20  1.03 0.05  -0.04 0.25 1.69  33.66 0.72  -0.78 2.96 0.93 
7  -0.03  0.92 -0.01 -0.22  0.08 -0.25 34.66 -0.21 -4.60  1.11  0.94 
8  0.08  0.96  0.02 -0.16 -0.02 0.98 45.17  0.35 -4.07 -0.40  0.96 
9  0.19  1.01 -0.16 -0.09 -0.38 2.10 43.71 -3.38 -2.24 -5.95  0.96 
Low10  0.02  0.97 -0.35  0.16 -0.65 0.11 27.78 -4.80  2.55 -6.77  0.93 
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Table A11.1. cont. Regression results – ‘All Firms’ distress-risk deciles  
Panel B - Z-score ‘All Firms’ Two-factor models 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s  d  t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + hi HML +εi                           (3.3.1) 
High 1  -0.34  1.04 -0.15    -1.01 12.78 -0.86    0.64 
2  0.03  0.76 0.20    0.14  17.17 2.14    0.73 
3  -0.07  0.84 0.19    -0.42  21.14 2.20    0.81 
4  -0.10  0.99 0.29    -0.63  26.73 0.08    0.87 
5  -0.03  1.11 0.22    -0.18  32.20 2.99    0.91 
6  0.05  1.08 0.02    0.36  30.11 0.23    0.90 
7  0.10  1.05 -0.08    0.69 31.72 -1.08    0.91 
8  0.46  1.06 -0.24    3.12 30.12 -3.21    0.91 
9  0.32  1.01 -0.36    2.01 26.31 -4.15    0.89 
Low10  0.21  1.06 -0.46    1.01 21.67 -4.43    0.85 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB +εi                           (3.3.2) 
High 1  -0.18  1.05   0.58  -0.61  15.63   4.91  0.70 
2  0.07  0.73   -0.19  0.41  18.27   -2.72  0.74 
3  -0.06  0.81   -0.25  -0.41  23.58   -4.16  0.83 
4  0.05  0.93   -0.08  0.35  26.51   -1.25  0.85 
5  0.07  1.07   -0.10  0.49  33.43   -1.84  0.90 
6  0.08  1.07   0.04  0.57  33.10   0.64  0.90 
7  0.06  1.07   0.03  0.43  35.29   0.47  0.91 
8  0.31  1.11   0.10  2.11  33.25   0.20  0.90 
9  0.09  1.08   -0.04  0.54  28.95   -0.57  0.88 
Low10  -0.10  1.15   -0.02  -0.46  24.02   -0.20  0.83 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + di DMS +εi                          (3.3.3) 
High 1  -0.21  1.17    0.68 -0.73  16.96    5.32  0.71 
2  0.30  0.79    0.43 1.89  21.20    6.18  0.79 
3  0.18  0.87    0.38 1.24  25.86    6.16  0.85 
4  0.16  0.96    0.21 1.05  27.18    3.20  0.86 
5  0.09  1.06    -0.07 0.64  31.34    -1.18  0.90 
6  -0.03  1.03    -0.28 -0.20  33.33    -4.85  0.92 
7  -0.04  1.03    -0.26 -0.32  35.66    -4.85  0.93 
8  0.22  1.07    -0.26 1.62  33.02    -4.26  0.92 
9  -0.04  1.01    -0.45 -0.03  31.51    -7.50  0.92 
Low10  -0.29  1.05    -0.60 -1.71  26.40    -8.10  0.89 
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Table A11.1. cont. Regression results – ‘All Firms’ distress-risk deciles  
Panel B - Z-score ‘All Firms’ Three- and four-factor models. 
Dist 
decile 
a b  h  s d t(a) t(b) t(h) t(s) t (d) Adj 
R
2 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi             (3.3.4) 
High 1  -0.24  1.07 0.12 0.61  -0.78  14.38 0.69 4.86    0.70 
2  0.00 0.75  0.14  -0.16  0.01 17.14  1.36  -2.14    0.74 
3  -0.11 0.83  0.09  -0.23  -0.68 21.73  1.01  -3.60    0.83 
4  -0.10 0.99  0.29  -0.01  -0.64 26.48  3.43  -0.12    0.87 
5  -0.04 1.11  0.20  -0.06  -0.24 31.94  2.51  -0.97    0.91 
6  0.06  1.08 0.04 0.05  0.41  29.98 0.46 0.75    0.90 
7  0.10 1.06  -0.07  0.01  0.69 31.44  -0.97  0.13    0.91 
8  0.45  1.06 -0.27 -0.05  3.06 29.86 -3.31 -0.88   0.91 
9  0.30  1.00 -0.40 -0.13  1.90 26.36 -4.67 -2.10   0.89 
Low10  0.18  1.05 -0.53 -0.14  0.90 21.58 -4.80 -1.76   0.86 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + hi HML +di DMS +εi             (3.3.5) 
High 1  -0.23 1.18  0.03    0.69 -0.75 15.07  0.16    5.21  0.70 
2  0.11 0.86  0.33    0.49 0.69 21.88  4.05    7.28  0.81 
3  0.00 0.93  0.30    0.44 0.06 26.37  4.13    7.29  0.87 
4  -0.05 1.04  0.36    0.27 -0.37 28.52  4.43    4.81  0.89 
5  -0.03 1.11  0.21    -0.04 -0.22 29.89  2.79    -0.60  0.91 
6  0.01  1.02 -0.06   -0.29 0.05 29.16 -0.79    -4.90 0.92 
7  0.05  1.00 -0.15   -0.29 0.39 31.16 -2.29    -5.31 0.93 
8  0.41  1.00 -0.32   -0.31 3.10 29.65 -4.67    -5.50 0.93 
9  0.24  0.90 -0.48   -0.53 2.07 31.00 -8.01   -10.79 0.95 
Low10  0.09  0.91 -0.65   -0.71 0.65 26.38 -9.14   -12.27 0.94 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + di DMS +εi              (3.3.6) 
High 1  0.00  1.15   0.52 0.62 -0.02  18.08   4.83  5.23  0.75 
2  0.20 0.80    -0.24  0.46 1.35 22.74    -3.97  6.95  0.81 
3  0.06 0.88    -0.29  0.42 0.45 29.69    -5.87  7.59  0.88 
4  0.12 0.97    -0.10  0.22 0.78 27.44    -1.67  3.39  0.87 
5  0.05  1.06   -0.10 -0.06 0.37 31.64   -1.72  -1.00 0.90 
6  0.00 1.03    0.07  -0.29 0.00 33.21    1.25  -4.97  0.92 
7  -0.02 1.03    0.05  -0.27 -0.15 35.48    1.05  -4.94  0.93 
8  0.24 1.07    0.04  -0.26 1.71 32.79    0.69  -4.30  0.92 
9  -0.04 1.00    0.01  -0.44 -0.28 31.27    0.13  -7.44  0.91 
Low10  -0.27 1.05    0.04  -0.61 -1.58 26.20    0.65  -8.10  0.89 
  Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +di DMS +εi         (3.3.7) 
High 1  -0.14  1.21 0.28 0.58 0.66 -0.50  17.02 1.79 5.19  5.53  0.76 
2  0.08 0.86  0.25  -0.18  0.49 0.52 22.31  3.06  -2.96  7.64  0.83 
3  -0.04 0.92  0.19  -0.25  0.45 -0.30 28.38  2.78  -4.88  8.19  0.89 
4  -0.06 1.04  0.35  -0.02  0.27 -0.38 28.31  4.46  -0.33  4.42  0.89 
5  -0.04  1.10  0.19 -0.06 -0.03 -0.27 29.71  2.36 -0.94  -0.56 0.91 
6  0.02  1.02 -0.03  0.06 -0.29 0.11 29.17 -0.43  1.05  -4.95 0.92 
7  0.05  1.00 -0.14  0.02 -0.29 0.41 30.98 -2.05  0.39  -5.31 0.93 
8  0.40  1.00 -0.34 -0.04 -0.31 3.04 29.44 -4.66 -0.73  -5.45 0.93 
9  0.22  0.89 -0.53 -0.11 -0.52 1.96 31.40 -8.55 -2.49 -10.91 0.95 
Low10  0.07  0.90 -0.70 -0.11 -0.71 0.53 26.53 -9.47 -2.12 -12.35 0.94  
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Appendix 12. Fama and French (1993) three-factor model  
 
The three-factor regressions reported in Fama and French (1993), Tables 6 and 9a 
were replicated. The model tested was: 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi     (2.8) 
where (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio. SMB is the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of big stocks. 
HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks and a portfolio 
of low B/M stocks. The dependent variables are the monthly value-weighted excess returns 
earned by intersecting size-B/M quintile portfolios. All firms with positive book-equity and 
required size and B/M data were included in the sample. The average of the monthly 
returns earned by the 25 size-B/M intersecting quintile portfolios is reported in Table 
A12.1.  
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Table A12.1. Average returns – Fama and French size-B/M portfolios 
25 size-B/M intersecting quintile portfolios were formed using the methodology of Fama 
and French (1993). All firms with positive book-equity and required size and B/M data 
were included in the sample. For each month, the value-weighted portfolio return was 
calculated. The monthly returns are averaged across the 120 months, July 1985 through 
June 1995. 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size  quintile  Low  2 3 4  High 
Small  0.02 0.80 1.17 1.12 1.21 
2  0.40 0.96 1.11 1.23 1.21 
3  1.04 1.15 1.38 1.26 1.12 
4  1.14 1.29 1.28 1.11 1.36 
Big  1.40 1.27 1.28 1.25 1.37 
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The average return premia calculated using the Fama and French (1993) methodology, 
from a sample of firms with positive book-equity and sufficient data to calculate size and 
B/M were: SMB = -0.30% (t = -1.25) and HML = 0.24% (t = 1.14).  
Regression results, reported in Table A12.2, were consistent with those reported by 
Fama and French (1993). The adjusted R
2 values were similar in size and exhibited a 
similar pattern. 20 of the 25 R
2 values were above 0.90, compared with 21 out of 25 
reported by Fama and French. The intercepts showed the same pattern, being negative for 
both the smaller-firm lower-B/M portfolios and the bigger-firm higher-B/M portfolios. As 
with Fama and French (1993), the model had the greatest problem with both the small-firm 
and the big-firm low-B/M portfolios, displaying strongly significant negative and positive 
intercepts, respectively. The three-factor model was generally unable to capture the returns 
earned by small firms. The intercepts changed from strongly significant and negative for 
the small-firm low-B/M portfolio, to significant and positive for the small-firm higher-B/M 
portfolios.  
The observed pattern of coefficients was similar to that reported by Fama and 
French (1993). The market factor coefficient varied around a value of 1. The HML 
coefficient was strongly significant and negative (positive) for the low-B/M (high-B/M) 
portfolios. The SMB coefficient was negative for all big-firm portfolios and positive for all 
other portfolios. 
The t-values reported by Fama and French were generally larger than those reported 
here. This may reflect the larger sample size used for the Fama and French (1993) study.   
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Table A12.2. Regression results – Fama and French size-B/M portfolios and factors 
premia. 
The Fama and French (1993) three-factor model was tested: 
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εi     (2.8) 
The sample consisted of all firms with positive book-equity and available data to determine 
firm size and B/M. (RM – Rf ) is the risk premium on the market portfolio. SMB is the 
difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of 
big stocks. HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high B/M stocks and 
a portfolio of low B/M stocks. The dependent variables are the monthly value-weighted 
excess returns earned by the intersecting size-B/M quintile portfolios. Adjusted R
2 is 
reported for each regression.  
Ri – Rf = ai + bi (RM – Rf ) + si SMB + hi HML +εI                  (2.8)
Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size    Low  2 3 4  High  Low 2  3  4  High 
  a  t(a) 
Small  -0.77 0.04 0.42 0.33 0.31 -3.44 0.28 3.01  2.48 2.10
2  -0.04 0.11 0.14 0.32 0.19 -2.90 0.81 0.95  2.45 1.39
3  0.20 0.21 0.42 0.25 -0.02 1.55 1.03 2.77  1.45 -0.17
4  0.23 0.22 0.13 -0.12 0.10 1.64 1.17 0.88 -0.88 0.64
Big  0.43 0.10  -0.12 -0.01 -0.13 4.26 0.45 -0.39 -0.26 -0.04
  b  t(b) 
Small  1.01 0.92 0.91 0.87 0.94 17.37 24.68 29.09 28.92 26.89
2  1.06 1.03 1.05 0.95 1.01 29.93 32.38 29.21 31.82 28.32
3  1.03 1.10 1.06 1.00 1.06 27.91 27.00 31.61 28.90 29.83
4  0.98 1.10 1.08 1.00 1.04 26.74 32.91 27.99 30.31 25.83
Big  0.88 1.07 1.08 0.95 1.09 33.23 33.15 23.76 29.26 28.19
  h  t(h) 
Small  -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 0.29 0.56 -0.51 -0.66 -0.08  5.02 8.33
2  -0.53 -0.18  0.04 0.29 0.50 -7.83 -3.03 0.62  5.04 7.28
3  -0.63 -0.14  0.05 0.30 0.45 -8.90 -1.82 0.84  4.47 6.63
4  -0.56 -0.09  0.13 0.33 0.50 -8.00 -1.42 1.75  5.30 6.44
Big  -0.73 -0.21  0.24 0.38 0.76 -14.11 -3.33 2.77  6.14 10.34
  s  t(s) 
Small  1.21 1.11 0.98 1.02 1.09 14.36 20.44 21.57 23.38 21.45
2  0.94 0.91 0.73 0.83 0.90 18.29 19.81 14.04 19.05 17.40
3  0.67 0.71 0.65 0.54 0.55 12.57 11.98 13.37 10.81 10.75
4  0.34 0.22 0.39 0.07 0.18 6.39 4.56 6.97 1.37 3.00
Big  -0.22 -0.15 -0.23 -0.21 -0.09 -5.76 -3.24 -3.42 -4.52 -1.57
  R
2   
Small  0.87 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.93  
2  0.95 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.92  
3  0.94 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.91  
4  0.93 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.87  
Big  0.95 0.93 0.85 0.89 0.87   
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Appendix 13. Intersecting quintile portfolio characteristics  
 
The portfolio characteristics of the intersecting quintile portfolios were examined to 
determine whether they exhibited a pattern after the independent sorts and whether a 
pattern was evident for the characteristic that was not sorted on. If a pattern is evident and 
the related factor is a priced risk factor, then the pattern in the regression coefficients 
should reflect the pattern in the characteristic. 
  Generally the characteristics that firms were sorted on were controlled. However, a 
pattern was often left in the extreme quintiles. Also, a pattern was evident for the 
characteristic that was not sorted on. 
A13.1 O-score portfolios  
  Portfolio characteristics for the intersecting quintile portfolios, formed using o-
score, are reported in Table A13.1, Panel A.1 through A.3. 
A13.1.1 Size-B/M portfolios 
The size-B/M portfolio characteristics are reported in Panel A.1. The low-B/M and 
high-B/M quintiles showed a variation in average portfolio B/M across the size quintiles. 
The small-firm low-B/M portfolio had a low average B/M, of –0.54, compared with the 
other low-B/M portfolios, whose B/M ranged between 0.11 and 0.24. The small-firm high-
B/M portfolio had a high B/M, of 1.85, compared with the other high B/M portfolios, 
whose B/M ranged from 1.40 to 1.56. 
Once size was controlled for, average firm size only varied across B/M quintiles for 
the big-firm portfolios. Firms in the low-B/M (high-B/M) portfolio were on average larger 
(smaller) than firms in the other big-firm portfolios.  
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  Portfolio o-score varied with both size and B/M. Once B/M was controlled, smaller 
firms had higher distress-risk. Once size was controlled, the pattern of o-scores across B/M 
quintiles was dependent on the size quintile. For the small-firm and size-2 quintiles, the 
pattern in the average o-score was U-shaped, with the low- and high-B/M portfolios having 
higher distress-risk. For the other size quintiles, a monotonic positive relation was evident 
between B/M and o-score; firms with lower B/M did have lower distress-risk. 
A13.1.2 B/M-distress portfolios 
The B/M-distress portfolio characteristics are reported in Panel A.2. Once B/M was 
controlled, average B/M was consistent across distress quintiles, except for the most-
distress portfolios in the low- and high-B/M quintiles. The B/M ratios of these portfolios 
were low and high, respectively, when compared with the other portfolios in the quintile. 
This was consistent with the pattern in B/M characteristics reported by Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) for B/M-distress portfolios. 
Once distress-risk was controlled, the average o-score was mostly consistent across 
the B/M quintiles. However, the most-distress low-B/M portfolio exhibited a comparatively 
high o-score value (high distress-risk), of 7.23. Also, the least-distress quintile of firms 
showed an inverted-U shaped relation between average o-score and B/M, with the low- and 
high-B/M portfolios exhibiting the lowest average o-score values (lowest distress-risk). 
Size showed distinct patterns across both the B/M and distress-risk quintiles. 
Controlling for B/M, lower distress-risk firms were on average bigger. The exceptions were 
the least-distress higher-B/M portfolios, where firms were mid-size. Once controlling for 
distress-risk, the lower B/M portfolios had bigger average firm size. These two patterns 
combined meant that firms in the low-B/M least-distress portfolio had the biggest average 
size and firms in the high-B/M most-distress portfolio had the smallest average size.  
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A13.1.3 Size-distress portfolios 
Examining the size-distress portfolio characteristics, Panel A.3, once o-score was 
controlled, average distress-risk did not vary greatly across size quintiles. The exceptions 
were the small-firm portfolios, in both the most- and least-distress quintiles. The distress-
risk for these firms was higher and lower, respectively, than the other firms in the quintile. 
Once size was controlled, only the big-firm quintile showed variation in average 
firm size across distress-risk quintiles, with lower-distress portfolios having a bigger 
average firm size. 
B/M showed a distinct pattern across both the distress-risk and size quintiles. Once 
size was controlled, an inverted-U shape relation was evident between distress-risk and 
B/M, with both the most- and least-distress portfolios exhibiting the lowest B/M values 
within each size quintile. When distress-risk was controlled, the small-firm portfolio, in 
distress quintiles 2 through 5 (least distress-risk), exhibited a higher average B/M value 
than the other portfolios in the respective distress-risk quintile. 
A13.2 Z-score portfolios  
  Portfolio characteristics for the intersecting quintile portfolios, formed using z-score 
to measure distress-risk, are reported in Table A13.1, Panels B.1 through B.3. 
A13.2.1 Size-B/M portfolios 
Size-B/M portfolio characteristics, reported in Panel B.1, show that controlling for 
B/M, only the low-B/M and high-B/M quintiles exhibited variation in B/M across the size 
quintiles. This variation related predominantly to the small-firm portfolio, with the low-
B/M (high-B/M) small-firm portfolio exhibiting a very low (high) B/M of -0.55 (1.84).   
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Controlling for size, only the big-firm portfolios showed a variation in average firm 
size across the B/M quintiles. Average firm size decreased monotonically from $7,278.8m 
for the low-B/M big-firm portfolios to $4,258.2m for the high-B/M big-firm portfolio. 
Once B/M was controlled, except for the low-B/M portfolios, the bigger-firm 
portfolios exhibited a lower average z-score (higher distress-risk). For the low-B/M 
portfolio, both the small-firm and the big-firm portfolios exhibited the lowest average z-
scores. Once size was controlled, a monotonic negative relation was displayed between 
B/M and average z-score for all size quintiles. Therefore, once size was controlled, firms 
with higher B/M, on average, had a high distress-risk.  
A13.2.2 B/M-Distress 
Examining the characteristics of the B/M-distress portfolios, Panel B.2, once B/M 
was controlled, B/M only varied with distress for the low- and high-B/M quintiles. For the 
low-B/M quintile, the variation related to the smaller-firm portfolios. The low-B/M most-
disress portfolio had a very low average B/M of – 1.35. The average B/M of the high-B/M 
portfolios varied positively with distress-risk, decreasing from 2.01 for most-distress to 
1.45 for least-distress.  
Once distress-risk was controlled, the average z-score only varied with B/M for the 
most- and least-distress quintiles. The most-distress low-B/M portfolio had a low z-score of 
–1.87, representing very high distress-risk. In contrast, the average z-score of the other B/M 
portfolios ranged from 0.26 to 0.85. For the least-distress quintile, the low-B/M portfolio 
had a very high z-score of 23.42, compared with z-score values that ranged from 7.77 to 
10.20 for the other B/M portfolios.  
A distinct pattern was found in size across both the B/M and distress-risk quintiles. 
Controlling for B/M, the pattern in size depended on the B/M quintile. The low-B/M (B/M- 
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4 and high B/M) quintile exhibited a negative (positive) relation between distress-risk and 
size. For the B/M-2 and B/M-3 quintiles, the most- and least-distress portfolios had the 
smallest firm size. Once distress-risk was controlled, a pattern was evident in size across 
the B/M quintiles. Considering distress quintiles 1 through 3, both the low- and high-B/M 
portfolios had the smaller average firm size. However, for distress quintiles 4 and 5 (least-
distress), the relation was monotonic and negative. Combined, this resulted in average firm 
size being biggest for the lower-B/M most-distress and the medium-B/M medium-distress 
portfolios.  
A13.2.3 Size-Distress portfolios 
Examining the size-distress portfolios, Panel B.3, once size was controlled, only the 
big-firm quintile showed a variation in size across the distress-risk portfolios. For the big-
firm quintile, firms in the most-distress portfolio were on average the smallest and firms in 
the least-distress quintile were on average the biggest.  
Once distress was controlled, only the most- and least-distress quintiles showed a 
variation in average z-score across the size quintiles. For the most-distress quintile, the 
small-firm portfolio had average z-score of –0.71. The average z-score of the other size 
portfolios increased monotonically (distress-risk decreasing) with size, from 0.92 to 1.21. 
For the least-distress quintile, the average z-score ranged from 17.30 to 8.65, decreasing 
monotonically (distress-risk increasing) with increased size.  
Once size was controlled, small and big firms exhibited different patterns in B/M. 
For smaller-firm quintiles, average B/M described an inverted-U across the distress 
quintiles. For the bigger firms, average B/M decreased monotonically with distress-risk. 
Once distress was controlled, B/M increased monotonically with size for the most-distress 
quintile and decreased monotonically with size for the remaining distress-risk quintiles.  
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Table A13.1. Intersecting quintile portfolio characteristics 
Each year (t), 1985 to 1994, firms were sorted into three sets of intersecting quintile 
portfolios: 1) size-B/M, 2) B/M-distress, and 3) size-distress. The mean portfolio B/M, size 
and distress-risk measure is calculated for each portfolio, for each year at portfolio 
formation date and averaged across the 10 years. Portfolio characteristics when o-score (z-
score) was used to measure distress-risk are reported in Panels A.1 to A.3 (B.1 to B.3).  
Panel A.1. - O-score size-B/M portfolio characteristics 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size   Low  2  3  4  High  Low  2  3  4  High 
  Average B/M  Average size ($MVm) 
Small  -0.54 0.47 0.69 0.94 1.85 24.9  30.3  29.0  27.5  20.3 
2  0.11 0.47 0.69 0.93 1.56 139.8  143.5  141.9  138.8  133.2 
3  0.20 0.47 0.68 0.92 1.45 370.9  358.8  350.8  352.9  365.7 
4  0.17 0.47 0.69 0.93 1.40 986.4 1004.2 1005.4  991.8  965.4 
Big  0.24 0.47 0.68 0.93 1.43 7249.1 5651.8 5999.0 5467.2 4259.5 
 Average  o-score 
Small  6.03 2.40 2.03 1.84 2.09
2  1.91 0.79 0.92 1.26 1.46
3  0.29 0.35 0.62 0.97 1.30
4  0.12 0.18 0.55 0.96 1.22
Big  -0.29 0.12 0.37 0.58 0.62
 
Panel A.2. - O-score B/M-distress portfolio characteristics 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress   Low  2  3  4  High  Low  2  3  4  High 
  Average B/M  Average size ($MVm) 
Most  -0.64 0.47 0.69 0.94 1.95 102.7  100.0  74.7  85.7  45.2 
2  0.19 0.48 0.69 0.93 1.72 515.9  472.7  363.0  369.1  201.2 
3  0.25 0.48 0.69 0.94 1.62 1197.9  788.8  763.4  723.7  524.1 
4  0.25 0.47 0.68 0.93 1.57 1907.6 1276.2 1355.8 1279.3  736.5 
Least  0.24 0.47 0.68 0.92 1.60 2138.0 1368.9  899.3  870.5  279.1 
 Average  o-score 
Most  7.23 4.22 3.91 3.68 3.85
2  1.92 1.89 1.90 1.89 1.91
3  1.07 1.06 1.06 1.09 1.10
4  0.23 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.26
Least  -2.10 -1.52 -1.49 -1.67 -2.22
 
Panel A.3. - O-score size-distress portfolio characteristics 
 Distress-risk  quintile 
Size    Most  2  3  4  Least  Most  2 3 4 Least 
  Average B/M  Average size ($MVm) 
Small  0.48 1.09 1.09 0.98 0.90 20.0  29.0  32.2  32.3  32.8 
2  0.56 0.83 0.77 0.70 0.62 132.6  140.0  140.9  142.5  144.8 
3  0.55 0.80 0.69 0.62 0.51 355.0  353.7  367.8  363.9  361.1 
4  0.38 0.86 0.79 0.63 0.46 958.2  959.8  975.0 1005.0 1024.4 
Big  0.41 0.70 0.80 0.64 0.46 2716.8 3494.1 4444.6 6504.7 8244.4 
 Average  o-score 
Small  5.50 1.93 1.09 0.25  -2.21
2  3.90 1.91 1.10 0.23  -1.58
3  3.36 1.87 1.07 0.22  -1.65
4  3.55 1.83 1.08 0.27  -1.62
Big  3.05 1.78 1.03 0.23  -1.41
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Table A13.1. cont. Intersecting quintile portfolio characteristics 
Panel B.1. - Z-score size-B/M portfolio characteristics 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Size   Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2  3  4  High 
  Average B/M  Average size ($MVm) 
Small  -0.55 0.47 0.69 0.94 1.84 24.9  30.3  29.0  27.4  20.2 
2  0.11 0.47 0.69 0.93 1.56 139.7  143.5  142.0  138.8  133.4 
3  0.20 0.47 0.68 0.92 1.45 370.6  359.2  350.7  353.1  365.4 
4  0.17 0.47 0.68 0.93 1.40 985.7 1004.2 1005.1  992.0  963.1 
Big  0.24 0.47 0.68 0.93 1.43 7278.8 5652.2 6002.8 5468.3 4258.2 
 Average  z-score 
Small  8.96 5.07 4.51 3.53 2.98
2  18.41 5.64 4.11 3.23 2.50
3  17.43 4.96 3.78 2.88 2.01
4  8.72 4.68 3.35 2.32 1.70
Big  7.01 3.86 2.89 2.04 1.68
 
Panel B.2. - Z-score B/M-distress portfolio characteristics 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) quintile 
Distress    Low  2 3 4  High  Low  2  3  4  High 
  Average B/M  Average size ($MVm) 
Most  -1.35 0.47 0.70 0.95 2.01 114.0  362.3  346.5  870.3  462.8 
2  0.30 0.48 0.69 0.93 1.78 301.9  959.7 1165.8  859.0  332.2 
3  0.20 0.48 0.69 0.94 1.68 843.1 1105.3 1069.3  607.2  140.5 
4  0.19 0.47 0.69 0.93 1.51 1248.2 1021.3  410.3  199.3  52.7 
Least  0.22 0.46 0.68 0.92 1.45 1170.7  480.1  219.9  113.8  43.8 
 Average  z-score 
Most  -1.87 0.26 0.63 0.85 0.67
2  2.09 2.13 2.12 2.08 2.11
3  3.01 3.03 3.02 3.00 2.98
4  4.23 4.19 4.17 4.13 4.05
Least  23.42 9.08 8.83 7.77  10.20
 
Panel B.3. - Z-score size-distress portfolio characteristics 
 Distress-risk  quintile 
Size    Most  2 3 4 Least  Most  2  3  4  Least 
  Average B/M  Average size ($MVm) 
Small  0.25 1.11 1.10 0.90 0.58 17.2  23.6  27.1  28.5  31.4 
2  0.74 0.93 0.87 0.69 0.45 135.5  138.1  138.7  140.5  142.9 
3  0.93 0.79 0.76 0.63 0.38 368.8  370.1  359.4  350.9  360.3 
4  0.97 0.78 0.73 0.52 0.35 1009.6  952.0  995.6 1009.6  989.1 
Big  1.02 0.82 0.62 0.44 0.30 4410.4 5990.3 6557.8 5746.5 7242.3 
 Average  z-score 
Small  -0.71 2.12 3.00 4.13  17.30
2  0.92 2.09 3.02 4.18  17.21
3  1.12 2.09 3.02 4.18  16.42
4  1.17 2.07 3.00 4.21  10.15
Big  1.21 2.06 3.00 4.16 8.65
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Appendix 14. Intersecting quintile portfolio returns 
Table A14.1. Intersecting quintile portfolio returns 
Each year firms were sorted into three sets of intersecting quintile portfolios: 1) size-B/M, 
2) B/M-distress, and 3) size-distress. The value-weighted return is calculated for each 
portfolio, for each month, July 1985 to June 1995, and averaged across the 120 months.  
Panel A - O-score 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) 
Size   Low  2  3  4  High 
Small  0.06 0.81 1.18 1.13 1.27 
2  0.46 0.96 1.13 1.24 1.25 
3  1.05 1.15 1.38 1.26 1.11 
4  1.14 1.29 1.26 1.12 1.31 
Big  1.40 1.23 1.28 1.22 1.34 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) 
Distress   Low  2  3  4  High 
Most  0.74 1.03 1.30 0.86 1.43 
2  1.18 1.19 1.24 1.13 1.33 
3  1.37 1.25 1.03 1.25 1.13 
4  1.54 1.19 1.30 1.27 1.33 
Least  1.31 1.30 1.45 1.27 1.57 
 Distress   
Size   Most  2  3  4  Least 
Small  0.56 1.06 1.03 1.10 1.12 
2  0.69 1.06 0.93 1.30 0.99 
3  1.21 1.10 1.16 1.23 1.22 
4  1.12 1.05 1.17 1.29 1.28 
Big  1.41 1.36 1.13 1.35 1.29 
Panel B - Z-score  
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) 
Size   Low  2  3  4  High 
Small  0.06 0.80 1.18 1.14 1.27 
2  0.45 0.95 1.13 1.24 1.26 
3  1.05 1.15 1.36 1.27 1.10 
4  1.13 1.29 1.26 1.13 1.30 
Big  1.40 1.23 1.29 1.22 1.34 
  Book equity-to-market equity (B/M) 
Distress   Low  2  3  4  High 
Most  0.74 1.00 1.09 1.15 1.28 
2  1.23 0.93 1.13 1.13 1.24 
3  1.09 1.30 1.27 1.48 1.50 
4  1.59 1.13 1.56 1.47 1.35 
Least  1.29 1.36 1.48 1.05 1.61 
 Distress   
Size   Most  2  3  4  Least 
Small  0.45 0.77 1.13 1.06 0.80 
2  0.93 0.94 1.07 1.18 0.83 
3  1.07 1.19 1.12 1.31 1.17 
4  1.08 0.95 1.26 1.44 1.26 
Big  1.14 1.15 1.35 1.40 1.37  
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